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This thesis examines the relationship between conflict and violence in the Deep South 
of Thailand and the political participation of people in the conflict areas by focusing on both 
electoral and non-electoral modes of participation. In this thesis, we hypothesized that first, 
conflict leads to a greater desire for peaceful political participation. Second, people in a 
conflict zone are more likely to participate in politics in other forms, including electoral and 
non-electoral ways. Third, there is a relationship between level of violence and level of 
political participation: the same concerns that lead to violence also lead to participation; 
people’s experiences of the conflict and violence have an additional impact on their desire for 
political participation, thus, high levels of violence correlate with high levels of peaceful 
participation. Fourth, a weak civil society failing to promote popular interests and resist state 
domination will lead to more conflict.  Finally, a strong state preventing demands and closing 
channels for peaceful political participation will lead to more conflict. 
 In this thesis, we explore political participation through three channels; 1) political 
participation through elections which includes political participation of both voters and 
politicians in parliamentary, senate, and local elections, 2) political participation through the 
state which focuses on three main state actors, security officials, justice officials, and local 
authorities, and 3) political participation through civil society, examining five different 
groups of civil society actors, including the youth, women, business, religious leaders, and 
the media. Following this, the thesis draws a comparison among three different levels of 
conflict areas, which are non violence, low violence, and high violence conflict areas in 
v 
 
Pattani and Songkhla, in order to discover if there are any linkages between the levels of 
conflict in the Deep South and the level of political participation of people in the region. 
In this thesis, we see that conflict can be seen as a form of participation, albeit a 
violent form.  The conflict and violence creates a greater desire for people to be more active 
in politics through peaceful means as they seek to reduce suffering from the insurgent 
violence. This study finds that people in the conflict areas of the Deep South are more likely 
to participate through many channels when they perceive incentives are high enough to 
overcome risks. The thesis reveals that the levels of violence and levels of some forms of 
political participation are correlated: the more frequent the violent incidents, the higher the 
level of voter turnout. The roles of civil society are also increasing in the Deep South, even 
though many CSO activities are controlled by the state. State control, through either funding 
or coercion, decreases meaningful participation and makes some participation with the state 
illegitimate, for many in the Deep South. When people realize that their participation is not 
free will, they may turn to violence as they think it is the only means to resist and freely 
express their opposing political views. However, other people participate, despite state 
control, because participation can be a useful tool for challenging and resisting the state, but 
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The struggles between Malay-Muslim separatists and Thai authorities in the 
southernmost provinces of Thailand, namely Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and the four districts 
of Songkhla have occurred for more than a century. As recorded by the Deep South Watch 
Organization, since 2004 more than 6700 people
1
, both Buddhists and Muslims, have died in 
the ongoing crisis and several thousands have been injured. Despite more than 264,953 
million baht
2
 (Komchadluek, 4 January 2016) of government budget that have been dumped 
to deal with the problem in the south for over 10 years since 2004, there is still no concrete 
solution and there seems to be no end in sight.  
The area has a long history of resistance to the authority of central government since 
being incorporated by the kingdom of Thailand in 1902. Since Thaksin Shinawatra came to 
power as prime minister of Thailand in January 2001 and employed hard-line policies as well 
as limited popular participation in political activities, the security situation in Thailand’s three 
southernmost provinces, plus four violence-affected districts of Songkhla, has deteriorated. 
Since then, shootings, arson, and bombings have continued on an almost daily basis in the 
three provinces by unidentified groups of people marking a new level of insurgency beyond 
that in other regions of Southeast Asia and one not seen in Thailand for over 30 years 
                                                          
1
 The number of deaths in the three southern border provinces and four districts of Songkhla 
since the re-emergence of violence in 2004, according to the Deep South Incident Database (DSID), is 
6,745 and number of injured is 12,375, updated to September 2016. For the latest statistics of the 
Deep South unrest, visit www.deepsouthwatch.org. 
2





(Albritton 2005: 166). The violence signified a new level of the “age-old ethno-political 
conflict” in the Thai south and stressed the hostile relationships between the Malay-Muslims 
and the Thai state (Thanet 2004: 8). 
Interestingly, depsite the ongoing attacks, the local people in the area do not disregard 
participation in voting and other political activities. The voter turnout rate of the national 
elections in 2005 and 2011 collected by the Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 
surprisingly shows an increasing rate of voter turnout in the southernmost area where the 
conflict continues. The voter turnout rate of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat in 2011 increased 
2.2%, 5.3%, and 6%, respectively, from the year 2005.  
Besides elections, political participation of people in the form of non-electoral 
activities such as interest group involvement, civil society or in participation in community 
political activities is also rising. However, popular participation is more or less neglected by 
the government.  Research by Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity, Prince of 
Songkhla University in 2011
3
 shows local people in the three southernmost provinces 
perceive one of the main reasons why the government’s Community Economic Development 
Plan failed is because people in the area did not have an opportunity in planning and 
participating in the project. Although there are people who believe in political participation, 
the fear of being suspected by both militants and the Thai military which can cause difficulty 
in livelihood or even death impedes them from participating in any political activities.  
Consequently, some of them choose to keep themselves low profile and stay out of politics in 
any forms.  
                                                          
3
 The research was conducted by the Deep South Watch Organization in September 2011 by 
surveying 3,031 people in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwas. Srisomphop Jitpiromsri, ‘Kwamrounrang tee 
yuedyuea ruearung nai satanakarn karnMueang tee mai naenorn lung karnlueaktung 2554’ [The 
prolonged violence during uncertain political situation after the 2011 national election], Deep South 
Watch, (published online 27 September 2011) <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/2305>. 






 The answer to the question of why most of the people living in the midst of 
longstanding ethnic conflict and violence in southernmost Thailand, despite the 
ineffectiveness of politics, still participate politically has not yet been discovered. Therefore, 
this study will examine political participation in the conflict area in the southernmost part of 
Thailand by focusing on both electoral and non-electoral modes of participation.  Moreover, 
the study will investigate the role of the state and its agencies, as well as the governmental 
response to the political activities of southern people in the conflict area. Also, the 
involvement and roles of civil society, including economic, political and religious sectors are 
investigated in order to explore how these actors play their roles in the local politics of 
participation and whether conflict experiences result in changes in the level of political 
participation or not.  
The thesis will proceed in this way: Chapter two provides a theoretical review on the 
concept of political participation. According to the review, political participation can be 
broadly defined to include any activities intended to affect public policies. However, for the 
aim of comprehensive analysis and clarity, the term political participation in this thesis will 
refer to those political actions undertaken by ordinary citizens, both individual and collective, 
that are intended either directly to affect governmental decision-making on public policy or to 
indirectly affect social change. In addition, the second chapter examines factors influencing 
political participation from various studies, ranging from socioeconomic status, to life-cycle 
model, to attitude and personality, to ethnicity and ti experiences of conflict and violence.  
Also, this chapter discusses modes of political participation. Based on the study of 
well-known scholars in the field of political participation such as Lester Milbrath, Verba & 
Nie, and Huntington & Nelson, this thesis divided modes of participation into three 
categories, including political participation through elections, political participation through 





participation in Thailand and, particularly in the southern border provinces of Thailand in 
order to assess the development and challenges of political participation since the change of 
the Thai government system to constitutional democracy in 1932. After that, chapter two 
examines the linkage of the two different terms, conflict and participation. This chapter aims 
to review the comprehensive effect of conflict and violence, which, according to the literature 
review, does not always lead to negative consequences. Instead, conflict and violence can act 
as a driving factor of participation. Also, the research methodology is described in the second 
chapter to allow readers to understand how the data and information used in this thesis is 
collected and analyzed. 
   Chapter three presents an introduction of political participation in the Deep South of 
Thailand in the earlier period before the reoccurrence of violence in the 2000s. This chapter 
considers how local people, when conflict and violence was not a major concern, participated 
in both electoral and non-electoral participation. The study also examines grievances in 
participation of local people in the earlier period as they could possibly affect the degree and 
pattern of political participation in the current period.  The third chapter thus provides 
background of political participation in the Deep South of Thailand before the upsurge of 
violent incidents in 2004. The objective of this chapter is to observe if there is any change in 
political participation between the periods before and after the conflict and violence expanded 
in 2004. The three modes of political participation, including electoral participation, 
participation through the state, and civil society are discussed in the third chapter. 
 Then, chapter four begins to discuss electoral participation during the conflict in the 
Lower South since 2004. This chapter introduces significant aspects of electoral participation 
which are important to understand the influence of conflict and violence as a factor 
promoting or obstructing participation. The study of political participation through elections 





politicians, to understand their broad patterns of political participation. For voters’ 
participation, a special emphasis is given to not only elections in national level, but also local 
elections. Therefore, this chapter discusses voters’ electoral participation by dividing it into 3 
parts, including general elections, Senate elections, and local elections. For politicians’ 
political participation, chapter four observes different groups of politicians, ranging from the 
most influential political group in the Deep South, the Wadah group, to the Darussalam 
group, and to the new players in national politics in the conflict areas of the Deep South. 
Some further examination on political participation of local politicians is also significant to 
understand the complexity of political participation during conflict and therefore included for 
analysis in this chapter. Then, the fourth chapter ends with a direct comparison of conflict 
and non conflict areas by dividing into three different violence conflict areas; Ranot and 
Sathing Phra districts of Songkhla represent non violence conflict areas, Chana and Thepa 
districts of Songkhla represent low violence conflict areas, and Mueang district of Pattani 
represents high violence conflict area.  
Chapter five continues to examine participation during conflict, but moves to non-
electoral form of participation, which is political participation through the state. Political 
participation through the state refers to political activities that citizens contact, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, with government officials. The fifth chapter intends to focus on both voluntary 
and involuntary political participation through the state by dividing into three main state 
actors, security officials, local authorities, and judicial officers. Our aim of this chapter is to 
illustrate the roles and influence of state actors as well as their relationship to local people 
and examine how their performances affect political participation of local people during the 
conflict. Then, we look at our case studies, where the degree of conflict and violence is 
varied, to testify the statement that conflict and violence can be used for motivation of 





Chapter six examines political participation through civil society. The roles of civil 
society organizations (CSOs) in the conflict areas of the Deep South have been increased a 
lot since the re-emergence of violence in 2004. The sixth chapter starts with the discussions 
on the development of civil society organizations in the Deep South in the beginning period 
of the upsurge of violence. Most civil society’s activities in the early period were mostly 
conducted by the expert-led CSOs and professional activists. Then, knowledge and the know-
how of the expert-led CSOs were transferred to local people through their political 
participation in civil society. When the conflict and violence increased and continued, more 
local people participated, both as activists and participants. The sixth chapter intends to 
examine the five groups of civil society that have very important roles during conflict in the 
Deep South. The five groups of civil society include youth, women, business sector, religious 
sector, and the media group. The performance of civil society needs strong support from both 
local people and the Thai government. So, the sixth chapter will not complete if we do not 
understand the relationship between civil society and local people as well as between civil 
society and the government. In order to have a clearer picture of political participation 
through civil society, the final section draws a direct comparison from the three case studies. 
The sixth chapter presents that the differences in possible risks and incentives from the 
conflict and violence, a degree of state control, and the capabilities of CSO itself shaped a 
pattern of political participation through civil society.   
The final chapter of this thesis attempts to validate all hypotheses. This chapter 
addresses five hypotheses that need to be examined to understand the effect of conflict and 
violence on political participation in order to response to the main objective of this thesis, 
which is to study the relationship between conflict and violence in the Deep South of 
Thailand and political participation of people in the conflict areas.  Besides, the seventh 





attempt that this study would be useful not only for academic research, but also for policy 
formation and implementation in order to increase awareness of political participation and 
improve conflict situation in southern Thailand. 
Since most of today’s conflict and violence in southern Thailand are rooted in the 
past, paying attention to historical overviews of the conflict is very important to understand 
political behavior of people in the conflict areas nowadays. Understanding historical 
background is significant to understand why some Malay-Muslims in the Deep South have to 
rebel, why other Malay-Muslims choose to take part in the Thai political system, and why 
they have to take risk of political participation, despite living in the midst of ongoing 
violence. So, the following section presents the historical background that intends to 
articulate the depth and complexity of the struggles of Malay-Muslims in the Deep South 
since the early time before incorporating by the Thai Kingdom in 1902. When the readers 
read through following chapters of this thesis, they will have better insight on the complexity 
of Malay-Muslims’ grievances and their motivations of participation. 
 
Historical background of the conflict and violence in the Deep South of 
Thailand:  
 
The three southernmost provinces of Thailand, namely Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, 
and the four districts of neighboring Songkhla, were historically part of the Kingdom of 
Patani
4
 before being incorporated into the kingdom of Thailand in 1902. The majority ethnic 
community in these provinces is Malay and their religion is Islam, whereas Thailand (then 
                                                          
4
 “Patani” refers to the Malay Sultanate of Patani, being known as Greater Patani or Patani 
Raya, before the annexation by Siam, which included the present provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat, Satun, and part of Songkhla. “Pattani” (with two “t”) refers to the Thai province of 







) is a Buddhist-dominant nation. The Muslims in Thailand can be roughly 
divided into two groups
6
. One is the Muslims who speak the Malay language and live in the 
four southern provinces of Thailand, Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun.  However, 
nowadays many Malay-Muslims in Satun and urban people in the three southern provinces 
have begun speaking southern Thai rather than the Malay language. Another group is the 
Muslims who speak Thai and live in other parts of the country (McCargo 2007: 3 and 
Dorairajoo 2009: 63-64).  
Historically, the concerned conflict area was called the “Four Southern Provinces”, 
comprising Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun but the Malay-Muslims in Satun are more 
incorporated into Thai culture than other Malay-Muslims in the other three provinces. 
Originally, Satun was part of the Malay sultanate of Kedah and became part of Monthon 
Saiburi under Siamese authority in 1897. The boundary of Siam was re-drawn by the Anglo-
Siamese Treaty of 1909 or the Bangkok Treaty of 1909 between the British Empire and the 
Kingdom of Siam. According to this Treaty, most of Kedah was ceded to Britain, and Satun 
was given to Siam because its people were more integrated into the Siamese population 
(Thanet 2004: 1). Therefore, although Satun is one of the four provinces of Thailand which 
have a Muslim majority, Satun has not experienced any of the conflict caused by the Malay-
Muslims attempt of separatism. Thus, after the 1970s, the conflict area in the southernmost 
provinces of Thailand was changed to the term of the “three southern provinces”, including 
only Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. 
 
  
                                                          
5
  Siam changed its name to Thailand in 1939. 
6
  From now on, the Muslims who speak Malay will be referred as ‘the Malay-Muslims’ and the 





Understanding historical grievances 
 
The Kingdom of Patani was originally known as the ancient Hindu-Buddhist 
Kingdom of Langkasuka until the fourteenth century (Islam 1998: 443). It was an important 
commercial hub for Asian and European traders so the city had a variety of ethnicities and 
religions during that time (Nilsen 2012: 38). However, in 1457, the kingdom of Patani 
replaced Hinduism and Buddhism by adopting Islam as a state region and large numbers of 
people, including the King, converted to Islam (Islam 1998: 443). Subsequently, the 
Kingdom’s sociopolitical structure was mostly dominated by Muslim religious elites 
(ulamas) and the kingdom was reputed as one of the cradles of Islam in Southeast Asia 
(Dorairajoo 2009: 65).  
After 1786, the Patani Kingdom was defeated by King Rama I or King 
Buddhayodfachulaloke, heir to the Chakri dynasty (r. 1782-1809). The Patani sultanate, in its 
relations with Siam, was regarded as a dependent state in a tributary system, where Siam was 
the suzerain and Patani was the vassal. The sultans were obliged to pay tribute to the kings of 
Siam as a symbol of loyalty and in return for protection from powerful enemies. Under the 
suzerain-vassal relationship, the Patani Kingdom, though not independent, had limited 
autonomy in the rule of its people (Thanet 2007: 15).  
In 1809 King Rama II, or King Buddhalertla Napalai (r. 1809 – 1824) decided to 
divide the kingdom of Patani into seven Malay principalities (Khaek Chet HuaMueang), 
which were Pattani, Nongjik, Saiburi, Yala, Yaring, Ra-ngae, and Raman, in order to both 
weaken the power of Patani rulers and simplify central administrative management. Each 
principality was ruled by a heredity sultan who was given autonomy in taking care of his 
internal affairs (Kobkua 1984: 107). However, this rule was changed when King Rama V, or 
King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868-1910) wanted to modernize and centralize the state bureaucracy 





government system and introduced a new provincial administration, as known as 
Thesaphiban system, throughout the Kingdom.   
The tributary states and outer provinces were gradually integrated into the centralized 
system of new provincial administration nationwide between 1892 and 1915. Despite an 
awareness of ethnic differences between the inner provinces and the tributary states and outer 
provinces, the government decided to ignore the ethnic and cultural differences and removed 
the names of provinces that indicated their ethnicities, for example the White Lao provinces 
were changed to Monthon Isan (the North-Eastern administrative area) and the seven Malay 
provinces were changed to Boriwan Chet Hua Mueang (the area of the seven provinces) in 
1901 (Tej 1968: 262-263). 
The seven Malay provinces were then integrated and were under control of the 
Siamese governor of Monthon Nakorn Srithammarat in 1901, whose authority was directly 
under Bangkok command. The tributary system was replaced with the taxation system 
(Ockey 2011: 100). Formerly, the task of collecting taxes was performed by the Patani elites 
and some of the collected taxes were paid as tribute to Bangkok. When Siam took over this 
task, the Patani rulers and elites felt they were losing their ruling power and control over their 
people (Dorairajoo 2009: 66).  
According to Tej Bunnag (1968: 244-245), the reasons for this nationwide 
administration reform and centralization were to fulfill political, strategic, and financial 
objectives.  Besides for modernization of the country, the integration was to defend the 
Kingdom’s territory from France and Great Britain. Moreover, the integration could ensure 
loyalty of tributary states and outer provinces and also turn their labor and revenue to use for 






However, the reform did not go smoothly. There was resistance in many tributary 
states and outer provinces throughout the Kingdom, for example the uprising by the group of 
people called “Phu mi bun” (Holy men) in Monthon Isan
7
 and the disturbances against the 
reforms in the North by the Shans (Tej 1968: 273-275). The Thai government also confronted 
opposition from the Malay provinces since the reform alienated most traditional elites as their 
power declined. The local elites, then, sent letters to request British protection in Singapore 
(then called Melayu) as they regarded Siam as encroaching on their traditional rights. Siam 
decided to apply strong and decisive measures to place the seven Malay states under the 
direct control of Siam and to prevent British intervention.  
Consequently, the resistance against the new administrative system of Siam by local 
rulers appeared in 1902, known in Bangkok as “seven Malay Phraya conspired in a rebellion, 





, the last Sultan of Patani, but he was defeated and charged with treason. 
Other sultans were convinced or coerced to accept the new provincial system as Siam 
promised to give them some privileges in return (Ockey 2011: 100). Therefore, the royal 
Patani dynasty was brought to an end and Siam officially proclaimed its authority over 
Patani.  
After being annexed by the Kingdom of Thailand (then called Siam) in 1902, a 
measure reinforced by the Anglo-Siamese Treaties of 1904 and 1909 forced Thailand to cede 
claims to four southern Malay states, namely Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis (see 
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 For more information about the uprising of the Holy men, see Tej Bunnag, “Khabot Phu Mi 
Bun Pak Isan R.S 121” [The 1901-02 Holy Men's Rebellion in Northeastern Thailand], Sangkhomsat 
Parithat [Journal of the Social Sciences], 5: 1 (June 1967), pp. 78-86. 
8
 Tengku or Tunku refers to prince or princess who is the heir of the royal houses of Malay.  
9
 Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin was released in 1906. After another failed revolt in 1915, he 





Figure 1-1), to the Great Britain in exchange for the reduction of British extra-
territorial privilege of consular jurisdiction in Siam, loans for railway construction, and the 
cancellation of the secret convention of 1897, that Siam agreed not to grant any concession 
and territory in the Siamese Malay states without British approval  (Klein 1969: 134).  
 





The takeover provoked a kind of hostility, especially among Patani elites who were 
loyal to the Sultans of Patani. As a result, the occupation of Siam without mutual consent of 
Patani residents brought about a national security problem in which there were uprisings and 
violence in the former Patani, mostly led by the local elites and traditional leaders, against 
Siamese control. One of the significant periods of unrest was the rebellion in 1922 by the 





the Thai state implemented the Compulsory Primary Education Act of 1921. This Act 
required Malay-Muslim children to attend Thai primary schools. At first, many Malay-
Muslims expressed their disagreement with this education reform by refusing to pay tax and 
land rent to the Thai state (Thanet 2008: 102). Then the disappointment in the government’s 
education policies escalated to a violent clash in 1922. However, according to Phan-ngarm 
Gothammasan (2008: 11-12), the rebellion did not actually occur. The rebellion was only in 
the stage of planning and gathering support. The rebels got caught before the violent clash 
happened. Thus, this rebellion in 1922 was sometimes called “the abortive rebellion”. 
However, this political unrest led to the realization of Malay nationalism (Thanet 2008: 102) 
and the improvement of civil services as well as the development of guidelines for Thai 
officials in the Lower South to be more conform to Malay-Muslim culture, called “the six 
principles of public policy” (Phanngarm 1998: 28-31). 
 Besides the disturbances in the South, Siam faced a political crisis in 1932 during the 
reign of King Prajadhipok (King Rama VII).  The coup, led by a group of soldiers and 
civilian bureaucrats, who called themselves the People’s Party, demanded a change of the 
traditional political system into a modern democratic form of government with a 
constitutional monarchy.  On 24 June 1932, a coup successfully ended the absolute monarchy 
and the group consolidated its power. Phraya Manopakorn Nititada was selected by the leader 
of the People’s Party, Pridi Phanomyong, to be the first Prime Minister of Thailand. Then, on 
10 December 1932, the first constitution was promulgated by the King and a general election 
for the first time in the history of Thailand was held in November 1933 (Likhit 1992: 121-
124).  
Even though the first general election in 1933 was an indirect election in which voters 
elected their representative of a sub-district (Tambon) who then voted for the representative 





opportunities, at least another channel to convey the message to the state, for the Malay-
Muslims to participate in the Thai political process. Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin
10
, the 
youngest son of the last sultan of Patani,  Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin, and one of the 
most important separatist leaders returned from Kelentan and desired to work within new 
political system of Thailand (Ockey 2008: 127). He told to the Thai government that “he 
would like to be a citizen living in Siam because Siam now has acceptable constitutional 
system” (Chalermkiat 1986: 45). Therefore, the new political system opened more channels 
not only for the Malay-Muslim voters but also traditional elites and separatists, some of 
whom had violently fought against the Thai state, to participate in Thai politics in order to 
pursue their goal of autonomy through the new political system.  
 As a result of the national election in 1938, Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkram 
became prime minister of Thailand with full control of the army. His government issued 
nationalistic and integration policies in order to civilize and modernize Thai culture and 
create a unified nation-state by following the success of Japanese nationalism. Another 
reason for issuing assimilation policies, mentioned by Thongchai Winichakul (1994), was the 
fear of losing further territory. This fear led to the conception of Thai-self and other-selves, 
namely Mon, Karen, Shan, Lao, Hmong, Kmer, and Malay. Therefore, whenever these 
ethnicities were considered as a potential threat to sovereignty, Thais of diverse ethnicities 
were expected to give precedence to their national identity over their ethnicity. Particularly, 
when some Malay-Muslim rebel movements expressed their goals as separation from 
Thailand, this action created a negative perception and collective memory towards the ethnic 
Malay-Muslims as a possible threat to the nation-state of Thailand that needed to be dispelled 
(Dorairajoo 2004: 466). 
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Thus, the concept of Thai nationalism was promoted and certain cultural rules were 
enforced nationwide according to the Thai Cultural Mandates or State Decrees issued 
between 1939 and 1942. These rules included mandates such as changing the name of the 
country from Siam to Thailand, wearing modern and international-style forms of dresses, 
trousers, and western-style hats as shown in  
Figure 1-2, sitting on chairs at tables and using forks and spoons, instead of fingers, 
when eating, prohibiting betel chewing, promoting national pride and unity, and forcing the 
public to use the name “Thai” to refer to all Thais without subdividing them such as Northern 
Thais, Southern Thais, or Muslim Thais. The objective of Phibunsongkram’s nation-building 
policy was to eliminate backward practices then reform, rebuild and standardize not only 
social and cultural behaviors but also the physical representations of the country (Thanet 
2004: 23). 




This Thai government poster showing prohibited dress on the left and proper dress on the right 
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A process of Thai-ness (also known as Thai-zation, Thaification, or Thai-cization) 
was also initiated to integrate all the non-Thai and non-Buddhist minority groups, including 
the Malay-Muslims in the far South. Although under the Thai constitution every Thai person 
has equal rights, Malay Muslims in the southernmost part of Thailand, who are regarded as 
Thai nationals, feel deeply alienated from people in other parts of the country (McCargo 
2011: 833-835). The feeling of exclusion was intensified when the Thai government again 
strongly promoted the concept of Thai-ness in the 1950s during the second term of 
Phibunsongkram with the belief that promoting common identity of being Thai would make 
all minority groups in the country enhance their sense of belonging to the Thai kingdom and 
this sense of belonging would attach them to the country and remove any threat that they 
could possibly cause against the nation (Christie 1996: 186).    
Being born in Thailand and speaking Thai as a first language are not enough to be 
considered fully Thai. Being Thai also includes willingness to merge one’s ethnicity, 
language and religious identity up into the dominant attitude of Thai-ness (McCargo 2011: 
845). However, the Malay-Muslims in the southern border provinces of Thailand chose not to 
act according to the government’s instructions on integration policy. They have a long history 
of fighting to preserve their ethnic identity for decades. One reason, that Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, 
the southern Thai former foreign minister and the first ASEAN Secretary-General, pointed 
out, is that the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand have “geographical proximity to the 
larger Islamic Malay cultural world and the irredentist spirit of the population” (International 
Crisis Group 2005: 1). But the government has pretended to ignore that the country is 
comprised of different ethnic groups and insisted that everyone must be socialized in a certain 
way to be a “real” Thai citizen. The Thai government perceived the resistance of the Malay-
Muslims in preserving their identity not only as a denial of Thai-ness integration policy but 





government refused to accept their ethnic identity and categorized the Malay-Muslims in the 
same group as Thai-Muslims, despite the historical fact that Thai-Muslims and Malay-
Muslims are different. As Patrick Jory (2006: 43), a Thai cultural and political history 
scholar, commented, “within official discourse of Thai-ness while there is a place for Thai 
Muslims, it seems there is no place for Malays.” 
First, the most controversial policy of assimilation was the abolition of the Islamic 
law. Since the occupation of the Patani kingdom in 1902, the Siamese government applied 
the “colonial theory of plural jurisdictions” in the Malay South (Loos 2006: 6). The 
pluralistic legal system was one of the Siamese transformations due to European colonialism 
(Loos 2006: 3). Under this plural jurisdiction, the government established separate Islamic 
courts to apply Islamic family law; Thai law was employed in the Malay South only if one of 
the parties involved was a Buddhist Thai (Kobkua 1995: 70).  
Nonetheless, the government, in 1943, replaced Islamic laws with Thai laws. The 
practices of Islam relating to family law (marriage and divorce) and inheritance were also 
abolished. For the Malay-Muslims, the replacement of the Islamic laws was very 
unacceptable because they regarded the Islamic laws as an essential part of life. Therefore, 
some of them chose to leave Thailand and migrated to other Muslim countries such as 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (Che Man 2003: 10). Islamic laws, however, were restored in 
Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun again in 1946 during the period of Prime Minister Pridi 
Phanomyong and still exists today.  .   
Second, according to the 1921 Compulsory Primary Education Act, instead of 
studying at village schools run by “Toh Kru” (a Muslim senior religious teacher), all children 
were required to attend Thai primary schools where the medium of instruction was the Thai 
language and Buddhist ethics were taught, mostly by Thai monks who served as teachers 





teaching of Quran and Arabic language were also forbidden (Chalermkiat 1986: 31). This 
regulation aimed at destabilizing the core of Malay influence and resulted in a slow but 
lasting integration of the Malay-Muslims to Thai domination but at the same time this 
strategy threatened the identity of the Malay-Muslims in the south (Dorairajoo 2004: 467).  
Third, the former sultanate, which had been divided into seven provinces in 1808 
during the reign of King Rama II, was re-centralized into the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
and Narathiwat, and Bangkok sent Thai governors to govern these three provinces under a 
centralized administrative system in 1933, in order to weaken the political power of 
traditional aristocrats. Fourth, according to the Thai Cultural Mandates or State Decrees, the 
government forbade Muslims to wear sarongs (Muslim traditional costumes) and use Malay 
names if they sought admission to government schools or employment in government 
services (Islam 1998: 444). Fifth, the Malay language was not allowed for teaching in the 
public schools or to be used in communications with government officials. Sixth, the Malay-
Muslims were no longer allowed to have Fridays as public or school holidays (Thanet 2004: 
26). 
The Malay-Muslims considered this strict enforcement as a direct attack on their 
religious, linguistic and cultural identity. Even though Thai constitutions since 1932 have 
allowed freedom of religion in which every person shall have absolute freedom to profess and 
practice any religion, denomination or doctrine as long as such faith and practices are not in 
conflict with laws, public order, and morality of the country, Muslims in the far southern 
provinces still have had much to fear for their culture and way of life, as connected to their 
religious practices. They feared that government integration policy might turn their homeland 
into dar al-harb (house of war or the hostile territory to the Muslims). Consequently, these 
courses of action caused more anger, dissatisfaction, and resistance among Malay-Muslims, 





why they strongly resist the Thai policy of integration is that, according to Clive Christie 
(1996), the Thai government attempted to break the link between the religion of Islam and the 
ethnicity of Malay-ness. Then, the modern Patani separatist and irredentist movement began 
in the late 1930s after the implementation of assimilation policies. There were rebellions and 
disturbances; schools were torched and Thai-Buddhist teachers were assassinated as a 
consequence of the Thai state’s integration policy to Thai-icize the Malays of southern 
Thailand (Dorairajoo 2004: 465-466).  
The governments that followed Phibunsongkram’s government cancelled some of the 
assimilation policies towards Malay-Muslims in order to normalize the political turmoil in the 
Muslim south. The Islamic Patronage Act was issued in 1945 during the period of Prime 
Minister Khuang Aphaiwong, as advised by Pridi Phanomyong. Under this Act, Fridays 
became Muslim holidays; Islamic laws on family and inheritance were restored; the National 
Council for Islamic Affairs (NCIA) was established and functioned as Islamic advisory 
committees to Ministries of Interior and Education; the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs 
(PCIA) was found in many provinces and worked as advisor to Thai authorities in the 
provinces;  and the Chularajmontri
12
 (head of all Muslims in Thailand) was re-appointed to 
act on behalf of the King regarding the matters of Muslims (Thanet 2004: 28). Although 
some of these integration policies thus loosened up after Prime Minister Phibunsongkram was 
overthrown in 1944, the negative feelings from unjust laws and practices were already rooted 
and embedded into the heart of Malay Muslims against the Bangkok government (Gowing 
1975: 31).  
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Moreover, the socioeconomic inequality between Malay-Muslims and Thai Buddhists 
is also one of the main grievances of local people in southernmost Thailand. Despite their 
comparatively small size, the three southernmost provinces have plenty of natural resources 
but the economy of the Malay-Muslims has been in a very unsatisfactory situation, compared 
to the rest of the country. The Malay-Muslims mostly are fisherman, small farmers growing 
rubber trees, fruits, or vegetables, whereas Thai Buddhists who live in the same border region 
are mainly government officials, merchants and plantation owners while Sino-Thai, who 
comprise less than 6 percent of the total population in the three provinces, are mostly 
merchants and own most of the businesses in the area. The communication between these 
groups is thus rather formal in terms of socioeconomic positions between rulers and ruled and 
between traders and peasantry (Suhrke 1975: 194).  
In addition, since World War II when the production of rubber became more 
profitable, the Thai government subsidized investment in rubber production and other cash 
crops in the Malay-Muslim villages by not only giving funds but also encouraging migration 
of non-Muslims from other parts of the country to southern Malay-Muslim provinces 
(Gowing 1975: 30). The government promised to provide 7-10 acres of land for each Thai-
Buddhist family that migrated to the Malay-Muslim provinces (Che Man 2003: 13). This 
approach was partly intended to improve the agricultural production and partly to shift the 
balance of population between the Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists The local Malay-
Muslims inevitably feared their identity could be eroded and vanish from their homeland as 
the government could plan to submerge the Malay-Muslim population and change the Patani-
Muslim region into a predominantly Buddhist area.  
These negative attitudes were enhanced by oppressive actions of some heavy-handed, 
corrupt, and abusive government officials toward local Muslim people and even by some 





vulnerable situation for their private interests (Gowing 1975: 31). Moreover, many 
complaints and petitions from the local Malay-Muslims concerning the cruel and unjust 
behavior of Thai officials, especially the police, were passed down from generation to 
generation by word of mouth inciting pessimistic thoughts and simmered in the conflict in the 
Muslim south (Thanet 2004: 31). 
 The grievances mentioned above amplified antagonistic feelings of Malay-Muslims, 
stemming from traditional ruling elites and aristocracies who were discharged and 
disfranchised from their positions and power, to the local Malay-Muslims who were 
maltreated and abused by Thai officials and faced discrimination by unjust practices of Thai 
laws.  They, thus, sought a way to reinstate their power, culture, and identity (Thanet 2004: 
6). The hostile thoughts became more visible on a relatively small scale through the 
appearance of rebel groups and intermittent unrest, including guerilla operations, killings, 
intimidations, and kidnappings, during the 1960s – 1980s.  
In addition, an expansion of conflict in the southernmost part of Thailand unavoidably 
involved neighboring Malaysia one way or another. The two nations have a connecting 
border between the conflict area of southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia and it was 
believed that the separatists used the Malaysia side of border as their sanctuary. Also, Malay-
Muslims in the Thai South share the same identity of Malay and common religion of Islam so 
they gained some moral support from sympathizers in Malaysia. The Malaysian press and 
newspapers sometimes reported the insurgences in the Thai south in a supportive manner 
towards the Malay-Muslims in Thailand (Thanet 2004: 11). Thus, the violation of Malays-
Muslims in Thailand concerns Malay-Muslims in Malaysia to some extent and this created a 
dilemma for the Malaysian government between the conflicting demands. On the one side, as 
a Muslim country where some of its people have the same identity and religion as people in 





brotherhood in Thailand. On the other side, the Thai government resisted interference by any 
country and the Malaysian government would not want to have a problem in international 
relations with Thailand.  
 Besides the rebel movements of Malay separatism in Thailand, the border area of Thai 
South and Malay North was more tense when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 
officially known as the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), declared war on the Malaysian 
government (then called the Federation of Malaya) in 1948 and used the Thai side of the 
border as a shelter for its guerilla operations (Suhrke 1975: 196). In order to lessen the 
political and security tensions at the border, the two governments initiated various degrees of 
collaboration to contain both movements. However, the agreements between both 
governments were not as successful as they expected. The Malaysian government asked for 
Thai support in controlling the border areas that the MCP used as a sanctuary but the Thai 
government, at that time, had its own internal security problems to deal with Communist 
insurgents in the north and northeast and separatists in the south of Thailand. Thus, the 
government’s reaction quite disappointed the Malaysian government by deciding to leave the 
MCP alone as long as it did not attack Thai forces (Suhrke 1975: 201). 
 The conflict in the southernmost part of Thailand, undoubtedly, drew attention from 
various countries and international organizations, especially, the Muslim countries, the 
League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the United 
Nations. Moreover, an estimated 250,000 Malay-Muslims in the Thai south signed a petition 
in 1947 asking for the United Nations to look after the Muslim separation in Thailand and 
demanding for the incorporation with the new Federation of Malaya (Suhrke 1975: 196), but 
there was no overt response from the UN. Some organizations may have covertly been given 
support and training from Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, 





ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was formed in 1967, although the 
organization’s aim is to collaborate and accelerate economic growth, social and cultural 
development, and enhance regional peace among members, the Thai government preferred to 
isolate its internal security problems from international interference, including ASEAN. 
However, the Thai government recently accepted the role of the Malaysian government in 
facilitating peace talks, started in 2013, between the Thai government and representatives of 
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), one of the leading southern rebel groups.  
 
Emergence of the fighters  
 
 The racist and centralized policies of the Thai state, exacerbated by mistreatments of 
corrupt and unjust Thai government officials, incited antagonism and contributed to Malay-
Muslims rebellions.  However, the rebel organizations in the south after the 1960s were 
dispersed and not unified. Some groups originated with and gained support from the old, less 
educated elites, including traditional religious leaders and teachers from the village, whereas 
some groups were established from the young, higher educated Muslims who had graduated 
from abroad such as Malaysian, Pakistani, Saudi Arabian, and Egyptian universities (Suhrke 
1975: 199). Having study and experience from Islamic countries outside Thailand, the latter 
groups had ideas of Islam and a vision of the way to fight for their homelands in different 
ways from local religious elites. Although these groups and movements were different and 
complicated in terms of members and their operations, their aim was generally the same, that 






 One of the most significant and renowned rebellions, the “Haji
13
 Sulong Rebellion” 
took place after the arrest of  Haji Sulong Abdulkadir al-Fatani
14
, the President of the Islamic 
Religious Council and a respected and influential Muslim fighter for Malay-Muslims in the 
Far South of Thailand, in January 1948, during Phibunsongkram’s second premiership. As a 
modernist or new thinker, Haji Sulong was not popular among some traditional Muslim 
teachers. Some of them reported to a Monthon governor that Sulong could be considered as a 
“potential threat to the peace and security of the area” (Thanet 2004: 16). The government 
determined not to get involved in this religious conflict and no charge was announced against 
Haji Sulong at that time (Ockey 2011: 108). However, the government still kept an eye 
closely on those people who seemed to stand against the interests of Thai government. 
Undoubtedly, Haji Sulong was one of the persons whom the government placed under 
observation, especially after he established an Islamic organization in Pattani, the Patani 
People’s Movement (PPM) in 1944 with an aim to encourage cooperation among Muslim 
leaders to fight against the Thai government’s interference in Islamic and Malay culture 
(Thanet 2004: 27). He later helped initiate the seven-point demand
15
 to the Thai government 
in 1947. This seven-point demand included: 
(1) The appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four districts of 
Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun, and in particular having authority to dismiss, 
suspend or replace all government servants, this individual to be local-born in one of the 
four districts and to be elected by the people. 
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(2) Eighty per cent of government servants in the four districts to profess the Muslim 
religion. 
(3) Malay and Siamese to be the official language. 
(4) Malay to be the medium of instruction in the primary schools. 
(5) Muslim law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim Court other than the civil 
court where the onetime kafir (non-believer) sits as an assessor. 
(6) All revenue and income derived from the four districts to be utilized within them. 
(7) The formation of a Muslim Board having full powers to direct all Muslim affairs under 
the supreme authority of the heads of state mentioned in (1).  
 Because of his recognition and popularity among Muslims in the South, Sulong’s 
point of view on Islamic identity was accepted widely in the Muslim community. Sulong’s 
seven-point demand was claimed to be “the most progressive aspiration reflecting the 
contemporary political development of the people's experience” (Thanet 2004: 33). 
Nevertheless, the Thai government perceived the seven-point demand in an opposite way. 
Even though the seven-point demand did not openly mention separatism or political 
autonomy, the government response to Sulong’s seven-point demand was limited. The 
government did not immediately refuse all seven demands but the government response was 
quite superficial. According to the government, the seven-point demands were accepted in 
principle but they were considered achievable only in the long term, except the demand on 
the separate Muslim court that was absolutely rejected (Ockey 2011: 115). 
Not long after submitting the seven-point demand, Haji Sulong and his associates 
were arrested and charged with treason on 16 January 1948 under Khuang Aphaiwong’s 
government. Later, a violent clash, as feared, occurred between Thai police and Malay-
Muslims on 25-28 April 1948
16
 at the village of Dusun Ynor, in Narathiwat province, which 
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was later known to the Thai as the “Dusun Ynor Rebellion”. This rebellion was led by Haji 
Tingamae or Ma Tinga and occurred partly because of the accumulated feeling of fear and 
suspicion of the Thai officials towards local people during that time. So, when the police saw 
the villagers gathered to perform rituals, they suspected them of forming the unrest against 
the Thai state. The Thai police then opened fire in order to disperse the villagers. The clash, 
which lasted for three days, turned out to be a misunderstanding on the parts of the Thai 
police towards the Malay-Muslims (Thanet 2008: 118).  It resulted in nunerous deaths on 
both sides
17
and many thousands of Malay Muslims escaping over the border into Malaysia 
(then called Malaya) (Chalermkiat 1986: 159).  
Although the Thai government was able to contain the uprising after declaring a state 
of emergency in September 1948, the situation in the three southernmost provinces remained 
very tense. The unrest intensified again after the disappearance of Haji Sulong, who was later 
believed murdered by Thai police in 1954 (Brown 1988: 74). Even though the long attempt of 
Sulong in pursuing his desire for better Malay-Muslim community to the Thai government 
turned out badly, his effort to fight for the better livelihood of the Malay-Muslims exhibited 
an instance of how the Malay-Muslims participated and expressed their demands through 
open channels of participation in Thai political system. Also, the Sulong case revealed how 
difficult it was for the Malay-Muslims to fight for protecting their identity and how hard it is 
to demand their rights within the limited political participation channels of the Thai state of 
the time. 
There was a mixture of feelings and reactions of southern Muslims to the mysterious 
death of Haji Sulong.  Some Muslims were more afraid of government power and its brutal 
actions. They, then, chose to be quiet and cease involvement in any political activities, or 
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some even fled to Malaya (Chalermkiat 1986: 119), whereas other Muslims were inspired by 
the legend of Sulong and gathered to fight against the Thai government. The principles of 
Haji Sulong sparked a new vision and perception of Malay nationalism in which political 
autonomy based on Islamic principles would well suit a new development of democracy in 
Thailand at that time (Thanet 2004: 14).  On the one hand, Haji Sulong had been suspected 
by the Thai government as a separatist and thought to be hostile to  the Thai state ; on the 
other hand, he became the symbol of the Malay Muslim who fought honorably to protect 
Malay-Muslims’ rights and identity against the racist policies and unjust practices of the Thai 
state. In the history of the Malay Muslim struggle against Thai authority and suppression, the 
leaders of earlier movements mostly were traditional leaders such as the raja or kings of the 
old Patani kingdom (Thanet 2004: 13). The emergence of Haji Sulong thus made a new story 
of the hero of Malay-Muslims. 
Since Haji Sulong mysteriously disappeared, his legend and story has been carried on 
from generation to generation. Even though Sulong chose to fight non-violently within the 
Thai political system, his followers carried out his will in different ways. Some of them 
followed his practices of pursuing their goals within the system such as Den Tohmeena, the 
son of Haji Sulong and a former member of parliament, whereas some Malay-Muslims who 
were inspired by Sulong’s belief and his fight gathered and formed underground 
organizations. Due to these many indignations and inspirations, several rebel organizations 
were established to fight against the Thai state.  
The first to undertake violent resistance in the South was The Barisan Nasional 
Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, or Patani National Liberation Front). The BNPP was found in 
1959 by Tengku Abdul Jalal, a former Narathiwat MP in 1937 and 1938 elections and a 
supporter of Haji Sulong. The BNPP gained support from traditional aristocrats and religious 





complete independence from Thailand.  Throughout the 1960s, the BNPP undertook guerilla 
operations and engaged in intermittent violent clashes against state forces (Islam 1998: 446). 
Subsequently, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN, or National Revolutionary Front) 
was also found in the early 1960s with its aim to establish the Islamic Republic of Patani 
(Islam 1998: 447). The founder of the organization was Ustaz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan, a 
Toh Kru at Ruso district in Narathiwat province. So, the main support of this group came 
mainly from the pondoks.  The BRN also had a close relationship with the communist parties 
of Malaysia and Thailand. Unlike the BNPP, the BRN concentrated on political organization, 
especially in religious schools, rather than guerilla operations. The organization did not 
totally avoid violence and had its own armed group (International Crisis Group 2005: 7-8).  
 The third group, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)
18
 was found by 
Tengku Bira Kotinila (Kabir Abdul Rahman or Weera Na Wangkram
19
), the heir of royal 
house of Patani who had finished political studies from India and received a Masters degree 
from Sweden. PULO was established in 1968 in Saudi Arabia with the objective to return 
independent Patani Raya to the Malay-Muslims. The members of this group were mainly 
recent Patani university graduates from Bangkok and overseas as well as the Malays (or 
Melayu) in Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. PULO even gave scholarships to Malay-Muslim 
students for further study in Bangkok, Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and European 
countries
20
 (www.puloinfo.net).  It is believed that PULO was very active and had the best 
trained and equipped armed force, making this organization the largest and most effective 
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 One example of the Malay-Muslim students, who received scholarship from the PULO was 
Da-Oh Maseng, or better known as Haji Da-Oh Thanam. He was a former member of PULO and 
received financial support from the PULO for further studying in Saudi Arabia and Syria, see 
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Thanam’ chak sa phan Kor Tor jon theung karn phuk thot’ [Smiling talks of Haji Da-Oh Thanam, 
from the Kor Tor bridge to the release on parole, Prachathai, (published online 27 September 2015) < 





increased in the late 1960s and the violence expanded further in the late 1970s  in the Muslim 
majority provinces of Thailand (International Crisis  Group 2005: 8).  
However, although the objective of these organizations was similar in achieving 
independence of Patani through armed combat, they did not cooperate with each other. They 
chose to carry out their operations independently (Islam 1998: 447). As a result, the guerilla 
attacks, especially the attacks on police stations, schools, and government buildings, in the 
three southernmost provinces: 9). According to the government report, during 1968-1975 
there were 385 attacks with the Muslim insurgences; 329 Muslim deaths; 1,208 arrests; and 
250 insurgent camps were destroyed (Che Man 2003: 15).  
 
 
A moment of reconciliation 
 
 As a result of the assimilationist and seemingly racist, prejudiced and repressive 
policies against the Malay-Muslims by the Thai government, during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
rebellions increased and become more violent; there were guerilla operations, including 
extortion against local people, farmers, and local business owners, kidnapping, bombings of 
police stations and military installations, arson of schools and official places, and killings by 
several groups of separatists throughout the far south. The Malay-Muslims who lived in the 
violent conflict area of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat could not avoid the effect from these 
guerilla operations and were convinced to be a part of  the operations (Che Man 2003: 15).   
The Thai government recognized that increasing separatist activities and other 
disturbances in the Malay-Muslim areas not only undermined national security but also 
damaged the Thai economy. In addition, the government perceived that military operations 
alone were not able to counter this violence. Therefore, after many lessons Thai governments 





compromising way by applying both hard and soft methods to restrain the crisis and aim at 
integrating the Malay-Muslims. For the hard tactics, Thai governments sent military forces to 
fight against the separatists, mostly in cooperation with the Border Patrol Police, the 
paramilitary forces (Thahan Phran), and Buddhist and Muslim civilian volunteers 
(International Crisis Group 2005: 9).   
For the soft tactics, the Thai government issued a series of policies in order to 
compromise on certain demands and quell the conflict. Several government programs were 
designed to improve socio-economic conditions in the provinces. First, the pondok schools 
were allowed to re-open and provide secular and Islamic education to Muslim students. 
Second, Malay-Muslims were permitted to keep their Muslim names. Third, the government 
in the 1970s offered some special privileges to the Muslim students, including quotas for 
admissions into the universities and government agencies and study tours to Bangkok at 
government expense. Fourth, the government launched extensive economic development 
projects in the Muslim majority provinces, including the construction of roads, schools, and 
universities, the development of irrigation systems and flood control projects and incentives 
to rubber plantation owners in replacing old trees with high-yield agriculture crops (Islam 
1998: 447).  
 When General Prem Tinnasulanond was in power between 1980 and 1988, the soft 
methods were increasingly implemented to deal with the South problem. His policy was 
based on the concept known as “Politics Leading Military” by focusing on political 
participation, economic development, and amnesty rather than emphasizing only on sending 
troops into the problem area (International Crisis Group 2005: 11). His government issued 






(1) Politics must lead military in an effort to fight against the Communists and other armed 
insurgencies. 
(2) Policy of Politics Leading Military must be employed indiscriminately to avoid the 
people’s war. 
(3) Armed counter-insurgencies must be changed to peaceful methods. (Che Man 2003: 16) 
Also, General Prem initiated a new administrative system by appointing the 
Combined 43
rd
 Civilian-Police-Military Command (CPM 43) to work together on security 
operations against the separatist movements and to halt the extrajudicial killings and 
disappearances in the Muslim provinces. At the same time, additional mega projects on 
economic development, infrastructure construction, and enhancing political participation 
were also implemented. Village committees were set up with the assistance of military 
personnel and government officials to support economic development and security at the 
village level (International Crisis Group 2005: 11). These development projects initiated by 
this government were aimed not only to improve socio-economic condition of the southern 
people but also to develop the loyalty of the Malay-Muslims towards the Thai government.  
 To effectively implement General Prem’s new approach, the Southern Border 
Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) was also initiated in 1981 to quell the conflict in 
the south. Although the SBPAC was under control of the Fourth Army Region commander, 
its strategy did not focus on the military way of fighting, but emphasized improving poor 
communication among various agencies, resolving problems between the Malay-Muslims 
and Thai government officials, overseeing economic development projects, and most 
importantly, creating more understanding of Malay-Muslim culture. Its staffs largely were 
local officials. For non-Malay personnel, knowledge and understanding of Malay-Muslim 
culture and language were provided in training before posting to the conflict area, and 





governmental agencies (International Crisis Group 2005: 11). SBPAC also worked closely 
with CMP-43 on security matters.  
 Successor governments continued to apply soft tactics to solve the conflict in the 
South. Chartchai Chunhawan’s government (1988 – 1991) allowed the Muslims to practice 
their culture and religion more freely in order to encourage social harmony. The government 
of Chuan Leekphai (1992-1995), Democrat Party leader, also continued this policy and 
expanded economic development in the Malay-Muslim provinces. Later, when General 
Chavalit Yongchaiyut was in power in 1996-1997, he considered the conflict in the south as a 
serious problem that needed to be given with more attention. He implemented his policy, 
called Harapan Baru (New Aspiration), which was initially launched in 1989 when he was 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Supreme Command Headquarters, in order to achieve these 
three objectives 1) to improve quality of Malay-Muslim life and their democratic awareness 
2) to enhance harmony among the different ethnic groups and create trust between 
government officials and the locals 3) to protect local culture and promote popular 
participation in solving problems in their own communities (Che Man 2003: 17).  
 Nonetheless, these integrative strategies towards the south problem, initiated by 
General Prem and followed by subsequent governments, could not solve a few major 
problems, including corruption and Thai domination of culture. For example, the street names 
were changed from Malay to Thai by the government, and the Malay-Muslim students were 
still encouraged to study and speak Thai. Even though this policy was workable in that many 
Malay-Muslim children now speak Thai, it created a side effect in causing negative attitudes 
and reactions against the Thai government as the Malay-Muslims perceived it as an attack on 






However, despite these deficiencies, the conciliatory policy as well as the 
government’s military offensive and its extensive intelligence networks seemed to be more or 
less successful as the economy rapidly developed in the south and the violence during the 
1980s and early 1990s considerably decreased; the numbers of separatist members declined 
as some of them fled the country whereas some of them accepted the government’s offer of 
amnesty and returned home to join the Thai army, or participate in the government’s 
development programs and  other state-supported activities (International Crisis Group 2005: 
12). Therefore, during this period, it could be said that the situation in the Patani Muslim 
provinces turned to a low level of violence and higher level of involvement in political 
participation as there were more Malay-Muslim villagers actively involved in civilian 
political institutions (Dorairajoo 2009: 66). Although the government’s policy of integration 
was still applied in some ways, the effective socioeconomic and political development 
minimized violent responses during this period.  
 
 
The upsurge of the conflict and violence in the Deep South of Thailand 
since 2004:  
 
Beginning of the reversal 
 
The first election under the new constitution was held in 2001. The Democrat party 
utterly lost to the new shining political party, the Thai Rak Thai (TRT). Thaksin Shinawatra, 
the leader of the TRT party, took power of the government and became the 23
rd
 prime 
minister of Thailand.   However, during his first few years as prime minister, there was no 





downhill very suddenly. Among other problems, the government’s declaration of a war on 
drugs and the decision to remove the military from its security responsibilities in the Malay 
Muslim provinces and hand over to police created more distrust and worsened the situation 
(Ockey 2008: 149-150). 
Thaksin’s policy during his first term before 2004 aimed at normalizing the far South 
by replacing policies initiated by former governments with his own strategies. He removed 
the military from power in the region as it was believed that in this situation of instability, a 
variety of groups, including the military and various political groups gained benefits from 
long-standing conflicts in the region such as budget allocations, corruption, and control of 
smuggling that prospered in the border region (McCargo 2006: 46-47). In May 2002, Thaksin 
abolished both the Combined 43
rd
 Civilian-Police-Military Command (CPM 43) and the 
Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC). These two agencies were 
military-led institutions established in the early 1980s during the government of General 
Prem Tinsulanonda and were considered to be major contributors to the success of the 
counter-insurgency campaign at that time. Then, he assigned the police to take primary 
control and responsibility over the violence in the South with the aim of dismantling the 
existing power structure. Consequently, the military felt a loss of prestige and influence, the 
army, then, stopped all cooperation with the police (Storey 2007: 5). Moreover, the 
government also sought to modernize the thousands of Islamic schools in Thailand. In 
addition, perceiving the importance of socio-economic development as a means to stop the 
violence, the Thaksin government continually injected development funds into the area by 
approving a 13,450 million baht (around $340 million US dollars
21
) aid package to the 
southern provinces. (Smiths 2004: 3-4).  
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Nevertheless, the conflict worsened when Prime Minister Thaksin applied heavy-hand 
strategies nationwide by declaring a “War on Drugs” in February 2003. Although, it was 
seemingly successful in the view of the Thaksin government, as he announced his “victory” 
in the war on drugs on 1 December 2004, his forceful policy led to a growing number of 
extrajudicial disappearances and created a climate of fear throughout the country, especially 
in the three southern provinces, which stirred up a strong and hostile reaction from the 
insurgents (McCargo 2007: 4). In addition, the antagonistic atmosphere was inflamed when 
the police implemented Thaksin’s heavy-handed policy using draconian tactics. The police 
started searching each suspect’s home who had been accused of being drug dealers and/or 
insurgents and/or even who been accused of nothing, capturing them, without warrants, for 
investigations; many of them never returned home. The police were accused of involvement 
in many extrajudicial killings and disappearances. Nationwide, there were more than 70,000 
people allegedly involved in the drug trade arrested and more than 2,500 were killed during 
Thaksin’s war on drugs.  According to the Royal Thai Police report, among all the deaths, 
there were only 1,329 involved in drug cases (Human Right Watch 2004: 9). Moreover, 
Thaksin’s decision to support the post-September 11 “war on terrorism” declared by 
President George W. Bush and send Thai troops to Iraq further provoked Thailand’s Muslim 
population, especially in the South. 
The violence flared up in bloody incidents in 2004, starting with an attack on military 
and police installations, seizure of arms, and burning of schools by an unidentified group 
operating throughout Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat on January 4, 2004. It resulted in the 
deaths of four Buddhist soldiers after splitting them from the Muslim ones (Dorairajoo 2009: 
67), 21 schools were burnt, and 400 rifles, 20 pistols, and 2 machine guns were stolen. Even 
though there were attacks on the military in the past, this time was seen as a great blow to 





forces by successfully escaping with hundreds of military weapons. Moreover, this attack 
signaled that the state was facing more effective and complicated groups of insurgents than 
the previous ones, and even Prime Minister Thaksin accepted that these attacks were a well-
planned and well-coordinated operation. 
Later, there was another incident of bloodshed between religious militants and 
military forces on April 28, 2004 at the historic Krue Se Mosque in Pattani which led to the 
death of roughly 108 militants and 5 members of the security forces (Albritton: 2005: 166). 
This violent confrontation reminded people of the Dusun Nyor Rebellion, which occurred in 
April 1948, and it was the first time in 56 years that this story was widely retold to the public. 
The document Berjihad di Patani, the holy war of Patani, was found after the attack, and 
stressed the Islamic-based motivation of the fight against the Thai state and Kafir, or 
unbelivers (Askew 2010: 125). However, the Thaksin government tried to convince the 
public that there was nothing involving religious or ethnic conflict. Thaksin claimed the 
militants rather were related to drug addicts or drug traffickers, as a result of the war on 




While the government did not believe that the violence was related to the separatist 
organizations, military officers were confident that the violence was instigated by well- 
organized Muslim separatist groups. Defence Minister Chettha Thanajaro told the media that 
“the attacks were carried out by Muslim separatists, and they may have received assistance 
from abroad. He described the attackers as 'well trained' and added that worse is yet to 
come.” (The Nation, 29 April 2004) This difference of view could create confusion among 
Thai people and also showed the disunity between the government and security officers. 
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Although government officials tried to link the violence with drug trafficking and claimed 
that the militants were drug addicts who fought for money or drugs, the relatives of the 
victims confirmed they were good people and had never shown their intention to fight. 
Duncan McCargo (2008: 135-136) interviewed the participants of the April 28 incident. 
Many of them said they were naïve and innocent. Some of them were tricked by persuading 
them to go to a wedding. The interviews by McCargo are similar to many of the interviews 
reported by the Nation and Bangkok Post where many relatives told reporters that their sons, 
brothers, and cousins were good people, unaggressive and never used any kind of drugs
23
. A 
later confrontation that escalated the violence happened after a demonstration outside the Tak 
Bai police station on 25 October 2004, when over a thousand Muslim protestors were 
arrested and piled five and six deep into army trucks. At least Seventy-eight Muslim men and 
boys died of suffocation en route to a military camp in Pattani (McCargo 2007: 4). It was 
widely accepted that many of the arrested protestors were just bystanders (Albritton 2005: 
170). Since then, the violence in Thailand’s three southernmost provinces has become one of 
the most significant concerns of the Thai government.   
This violence
24
 signified a new level of the “age-old ethno-political conflict” in the 
Thai south and stressed the hostile relationships between the Malay-Muslims and the Thai 
state (Thanet 2004: 8). In response to the increasing violence, Thaksin decided to respond to 
the rebels with harsh policies and tightened control over the conflict areas by declaring 
Martial Law in 2004 and through an Emergency Decree, after a series of bombings at Yala in 
July 2005, to give the state full control over the conflict, increasing state interference at the 
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 The epidemic of violence in the southern province did not happen in Satun at all, even though 
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local level to suppress the violence. Under the Emergency Decree, the decision making on 
security issues was moved from military commanders to the prime minister, and the security 
services had immunity to search, investigate, and arrest suspects without a warrant and to 
hold the suspects for seven days without charge (Storey 2007: 5-6). The state became 
stronger as power was centralized to the national government and it expanded control over its 
citizens in all dimensions.  
In addition, due to his policeman and millionaire background and having utmost 
power in the parliament, Thaksin himself was considered decisive and obstinate. He showed 
reluctance to accept any criticisms about him and his policies both public and in 
parliamentary debate. His policies thus reflected his dispositions, as the liberty of monitoring 
agencies, the media, including television, radio, and printed and online media were weaken 
during his time (Ockey 2008: 134). Moreover, the voices or opinions of MPs, journalists and 
academics, even reputably international organizations, such as, the United Nation, were 
ignored.   
However, not all state responses under the Thaksin regime were oppressive. After the 
violence throughout the year 2004, there were arguments explaining that the current violence 
in the South was a result of underdevelopment and poverty of the Malay-Muslims in the 
conflict areas. The Thaksin government responded and demonstrated its agreement to this 
explanation by transferring massive amount of additional funds to the southern border 
provinces to solve the poverty problem hopefully within two years (Srisompob and Panyasak 
2006: 112). Moreover, Thaksin supported the provincial project to introduce Halal food 
industrial complex in Pattani and planned to make the southern border provinces to be a 
major center of Halal food industry. However, the perception that socioeconomic grievances 
caused the upsurge of violence in the south was refuted by some scholars such as Srisomphob 





the conflict and violence should not simply be perceived as a result of underdevelopment and 
so the development funds would have little impact to lessen the violence.  
Besides the economic development projects, the National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC) was established in March 2005 as an independent agency in response to domestic and 
international pressure and criticism after the Tak Bai bloodshed. This commission was 
appointed by Thaksin to understand and assess the crisis and political grievances and find out 
the most effective and peaceful resolution for the government (Storey 2007: 6). The agency 
was led by the highly-respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and became a 
platform for cooperation between leading civil-society activists and intellectuals from 
Bangkok to the South. Even though its members were mainly non-Muslims and non-
southern, the NRC is considered as the first encouraging step of the government in its 
attempts to deal with political grievances of people in the conflict area, rather than focusing 
only on security measures.  
According to the NRC’s report, religions or separatism only played a minor role in the 
current conflict. The key to reduce the violence in the lower South was peaceful 
reconciliation through non-violent methods and the assimilation should not be promoted 
(Ockey 2008: 136). The suggested long-term solutions were to support education and 
economic development, promote forgiveness and acceptance of differences by increasing 
mutual understanding among the Malay-Muslims, government officials, and Thais in order to 
reduce anger and resentment, and encourage grassroots participation, whereas the short-term 
solutions included withdrawal of the military and set up unarmed peace teams. However, 
Marc Askew (2010: 135) commented that it seemed “the NRC sidestepped the hard questions 






However, the NRC report, which was published in June 2006, was criticized by some 
intellectuals, the press, and the former leader and Privy Councillor, General Prem 
Tinsulanonda. General Prem disagreed with the NRC proposal on making Malay another 
working language in the Deep South and confirmed that the one and only national language 
of the country is Thai
25
 and the Thaksin government agreed with Prem’s argument
26
, even 
though the NRC members tried to explain that the working language was not the same as the 
official language. Unfortunately, Thaksin followed very few of the Commission’s 
suggestions and persisted in his heavy-handed approach. Duncan McCargo (2008: 10) 
commented that “the NRC’s proposals were considered too progressive by most government 
officials but did not go nearly far enough for most Malay-Muslims.”  
Moreover, more than twelve thousands troops were sent to the area of violence 
(McCargo 2006: 62). One of the most arguable policies was the announcement on the zoning 
areas in the three southern provinces in 2005. Villages in the three southern border provinces 
including Songkhla were zoned into red, yellow, and green zone according to the degree of 
violence and suspected numbers of insurgents in the areas. The red zone villages, 358 from 
1580 villages, were cut off government development funds. Thaksin said,  
Deprivation of government funding in the red zone areas was to prohibit (the insurgents) from 
using money for wrongdoings, including bombings, nail throwing onto roads, and shootings. 
If the villagers did not help each other (to improve the situation), government budgets, 
including the SML
27
 would be removed (Prachatai, 17 February 2005).   
                                                          
25
 “Prem not happy with NRC’s idea,” The Nation, 26 June 2006 
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Prem-not-happy-with-NRC-s-idea-30007305.html>, 
accessed 10 August 2014. 
26
 “Govt backs Prem against use of Malay in South,” The Nation, 27 June 2006 
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Govt-backs-Prem-against-use-of-Malay-in-South-
30007409.html> , accessed 10 August 2014.  
27
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However, there were concerns from scholars that this policy lacked of understanding 
and not a way to stop the violence. As Chaiwat Satha-Anand (2005) commented, the 
government was performing two policies in opposite directions. On the one hand, the Thaksin 
government injected vast amount of government special budget in the Malay-Muslim 
provinces because of perceiving the poverty problem as a cause of the violence. Giving them 
money, therefore, could lessen the violence. On the other hand, the Thaksin government cut 
off development budget in the red zone villages because Thaksin believed injecting more 
money to the red zone villages could be dangerous and lead to more violence.  Chaiwat 
remarked, the Thaksin government’s strategies on the zoning areas and cutting their 
development budget were rather a punishment to the violent areas but the appropriate 
solutions should be based on understanding rather than punishing (Manager, 17 February 
2005). 
Whilst Thaksin’s harsh policies were more or less seen as politically popular and 
acceptable in other parts of the country, people in the southernmost provinces rated Thaksin’s 
policy as counterproductive and unsuccessful (International Crisis Group 2005: 1). Even 
though the harshness may have initially been popular elsewhere, when it did not work people 
began to question it and wanted an end to the conflict.  
Most Thai news reported in 2004 was dominated by the crisis in the south which 
created a depressed atmosphere throughout the country. Although there were reports and 
complaints from newspapers and the locals of the killings and disappearances of around 200 
local Muslims by local police and military in the first half of the year 2004, these grievances 
were concealed by the shocking news of daily killings by the Malay-Muslim separatist 
movements. The brutal killings, beheadings, and body burnings caused fear of both Thais and 
Malay-Muslims in the conflict areas.  The victims were not only policemen and soldiers but 
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also village chiefs, bureaucrats, judges, Buddhist monks, civilians, and even school teachers 
and students.  The senseless and vicious killings threatened the life and everyday activities of 
southern people and marked a renewed campaign of terror by insurgents groups,  which one 
not seen in Thailand for over 30 years (Albritton 2005: 166).  
Even though the violence reappeared during the period of the Thaksin government, 
many academics believed that the re-emergence of violence in the Thai south in 2004 was 
multifaceted, ranging from a set of long-term social, economic, and political grievances, 
including cultural, religious, and linguistic marginalization of the southern Muslim minority 
by the hegemonic Thai Buddhist state, discrimination against the Malay-Muslims in 
education and employment, mistreatment by local Thai government officials, especially the 
police and military, and a deficiency in economic development of the Malay-Muslim 
provinces, which were among the poorest provinces in Thailand, (International Crisis Group 
2005: 1, Melvin 2007 and Askew 2010), rather than one leader who caused the problems.  
However, it is undeniable that Thaksin’s decision to handle the South’s problem with 
the use of violence and neglecting the softer methods such as discussions and negotiations 
was one of the major factors that aggravated the situation.  There have been calls for peaceful 
solutions by academics, the National Human Right Commission, and even the King Rama IX, 
Bhumibol Adulyadej, who suggested an approach to Thaksin in solving the southern crisis on 
24 February 2004 by “understanding (khao jai), reaching out (khao theung), and developing 
(pattana)” (McCargo 2005: 500). Thaksin’s ruthless policy during 2004 – 2006, instead of 
diminishing the unrest, widened distrust and discrimination among Thais and non-Thais and 
polarized society by creating a climate of mutual distrust and suspicion between Muslim and 
Buddhist communities, as it provoked more violence and conflict in the Thai South (Liow 





Consequently, the violent attacks
28
 rapidly increased from only 84 in 2003 to 1,838 in 2004 




Figure 1-3: Violent attacks  in southernmost provinces of Thailand during 1993-2005 
 
Source: Deep South Incident Database (DSID), Deep South Watch (DSW), Prince of  
Songkhla University, Thailand 
 
Even though the conflict and violence in southern Thailand does manifest as local-
ethnic-issue-caused-violence rather than as Islamic terrorism or a broader religious 
movement, as the conflict and violence occur in Muslim-dominated areas, it is undeniable 
that the influence of Islam which is passed along by either traditional and local religious 
persons or by online channels of communication in a contemporary society has connected 
Muslims in the country to Muslims in other parts of the world community and allowed them 
to share their feelings and experiences.    
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Due to technology that connects the world together, people from every part of the 
world where internet can be reached, are easily connected and can feel linked to the same 
situation even though they do not have anything physically related to that place. Likewise, 
feelings of sympathy among the Muslims in southern Thailand for their fellow Muslims who 
are persecuted and suffer from unjust treatment may contribute to the violent forms of 
participation against their own state. The sharing of emotions among fellow Muslims has 
increased over the last two decades due to the reach of communication technology combined 
with the alienation of the Malay-Muslim in southern Thailand that has lasted for over a 
century may have contributed to Malay Muslims militancy against the Thai state. In sharing 
the same ideas of Islam and having sympathy for Muslim brotherhood, several separatist 
organizations in southern Thailand gained support either financial or training from the 
Muslim world in the Middle East and Malaysia and some groups are influenced by the 
Muslim movements in other parts of the world (Dorairajoo 2004, Ukrist 2007, and Wattana 
2007). As Ukrist Patthamanand (2007: 77) explained, the insurgents had been consolidating 
their forces and training militia under an administrative and military structure. They had 
prepared a seven-step plan
29
, leading to the overthrow of the Thai state in the area, and the 28 
April attack was believed to be in the seven-step plan. He illustrated that the insurgents aim at 
invoking a psychological effect and he believed that the operation could link to and be 
cooperated with the terrorist movements outside the country. 
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  Although the government first refused to accept that there was external influence, 
they, later, admitted that influence from the teachings of external Islamic movements had 
been involved and explicitly recognized this in the 28 April attack. Therefore, Thai 
governments pressed to eliminate these separatist militants by strengthening the capacity of 
military and intelligence forces. Some of the separatists were killed; some of them 
surrendered; some of them fled to Malaysia and other countries. However, violent activities 
still continue and the violent unrest is now considered as an “insurgency” or “separatist 
insurgency” (Askew 2010: 118). 
Since September 11, 2011, or the 9/11 attack, the perception towards the Malays has 
worsened. Domestic and international propaganda put a stamp of “terrorist” on the Muslims 
around the world, including in Thailand. Collective recognition about the history of Malay-
Muslim separatism in southern Thailand and the global propaganda of Islamic terrorists has 
faultily shaped the perception of Thai-Buddhists towards Malay-Muslims as potential 
separatists who are un-Thai and create trouble and violence that powerfully threaten the 
national security of the Thai nation state (Dorairojoo 2004: 466). Conversely, the cumulative 
narrative about the history of assaults against the local Malay-Muslims by Thai officials and 
security forces and the current bloodshed against Muslims in other countries around the 
world has agitated and brought together more support from Muslims for the new groups 
advocating radical Islamic separatism recently found in southern Thailand. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, although Islamic consciousness and a sense of 
sharing and unity with their Muslim brotherhood can possibly convert people to militancy, 
the conflict and violence in southern Thailand cannot be simply viewed and analyzed only as 
a religious movement or Islamic terrorism or a single-factor-caused problem. The current 
violence is rather a multifaceted problem driven by local issues stemming from historical 





officers, and socioeconomic unfairness, as well as the deficiency to generate truly 
participatory and representative structures that have never been effectively resolved yet 
created more violence in the problem area which threatened the Thai state’s authority for 





The return of military-led control 
 
 The high degree of corruption, the inability to deal with the insurgency in the South, 
the weakening of democracy and royal authority, and the divisions within the military led to 
the decision of the military leaders to remove Thaksin from power (Ockey 2007: 138). The 
coup, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the first Muslim
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 army commander and the 
leader of the Council for National Security, was successfully seized power from the Thaksin 
government on 19 September 2006. Even though the coup satisfied most people, in particular 
the anti-Thaksin demonstrators, as it ended the period of political unrest, the coup illustrated 
a setback for democracy in Thailand and brought back the country to military regime for the 
first time in fifteen years. (Ockey 2007: 133).  
After Prime Minister Thaksin was overthrown by the 2006 coup d’état, Thailand was 
governed by the military government first led by General Sondhi Boonyaratglin, and then the 
junta-appointed Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanond. The unrest in the southern 
border provinces continued. However, there were expectations that the Surayud government 
would better deal with the conflict and violence than the Thaksin government which, many 
Thais believed, was “too intractable and too hated to resolve the conflict” (Ockey 2007: 140). 
 The military government tried to cope with the southern conflict by focusing on both 
reconciliation and the rule of law. General Surayud’s government re-established the SBPAC 
and the Civilian-Police-Military command, which were both abolished during the Thaksin 
government. However, the SBPAC was revived this time as a civilian organization of 
bureaucrats under the Ministry of Interior comprising many locals on the board committee. It 
emphasized development activities, preserving the rights and seeking justice for local people, 
creating good relationships between the Malay-Muslims and the Thai state, and security 
                                                          
30








. In addition, a new army-dominated Internal Security Operations Command 
(ISOC) Region 4 Forward Command has been added to manage the southern crisis (Askew 
2010: 136).  
A month after Surayud became the 24th prime minister of Thailand, he visited the 
lower South and publicly apologized to the Malay-Muslims for the mistakes that the previous 
government made and for the many deaths of Malay-Muslim people in the Krue Se and Tak 
Bai incidents. This was the first time since the series of disturbances began in 2004 that the 
leader of the country came out and acknowledged government mistakes. His public statement 
admitting that the Thai government made mistakes was a good sign of the Surayud 
government dealing with the conflict with more concern and understanding. The Surayud 
government assigned the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), which was established in 
October 2006, to set up a special committee in order to investigate and study the conflict and 
disturbances in the three southernmost provinces. A year later, a 105 page report was 
submitted to the government. According to the report, the violence was mainly caused by 
insufficiency of government security policies, and inadequate implementation in which 
justice and peaceful methods were not being fully applied by the state (Askew 2010: 138).  
From late 2006, pacifying words, such as “peaceful means”, “justice”, and 
“participation”, could be seen more often in government strategies toward the southern 
conflict. The following prime ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat, both 
under the Palang Prachachon (People’s Power) Party and successors of the Thaksin regime, 
continued this compromise approach. The success of this approach showed in the decrease in 
violent attacks in 2008, with the violent attacks dropping dramatically from around 1,850 
attacks in 2007 to only 821 in 2008 as demonstrated in Figure 1-4. The duo strategies of 
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conciliation and detention seemed to be able to weaken the ability and support of the 
insurgents, the attacks continued on a small scale though (Ockey 2008: 125). 
 
Figure 1-4: Violent attacks in southernmost provinces of Thailand during 2006-2015 
 
Source: Deep South Incident Database (DSID), Deep South Watch (DSW), Prince of 
Songkhla University, Thailand 
 
 
 The Democrat government, led by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (in office during 
2008-2011), applied the concept “Politics leading Military Force” which was first used 
during the General Prem administration in the 1980s. However, the Abhisit government’s 
approach in solving the southern conflict was not much different from former governments. 
His strategy focused on development and justice. He continued funding several development 
programs in which the government dumped 63 billion baht into the conflict area over three 
years of his term. The SBPAC has been empowered to function independently and report 
directly to the Prime Minister. During this period, the idea of elective self-government in the 
three southernmost provinces, known as Nakorn Pattani, was proposed by General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh, former prime minister, but Abhisit immediately disagreed claiming it would 
create more confusion and conflict and that Chavalit’s proposal of Nakorn Pattani aimed to 



















November 2009: 15). However, even though the Democrat party had been popular in the 
broader south for many years and there were some expectations of improved performance in 
dealing with the southern conflict, Prime Minister Abhisit disappointed voters as there still 
was nothing that could be assessed as concrete solutions to the problems during his period.  
The government of Yingluck Shinnawatra had not developed any proven effective 
policy in tackling the problem, whereas the insurgents have developed their operations to be 
more professional and well planned. During her electoral campaign, she promised to initiate 
new policies for the south, including enhancing public input in decision-making processes 
and launching a special administrative zone. However, these advertised policies were not 
implemented after she won the 2011 national election. Another challenge is the disagreement 
between the government and the military in counter-insurgency policies. Yingluck knew that 
the military was backing the opposition and challenging the army would affect her position in 
a negative way. Therefore, the southern crisis nowadays is left in the hands of the army under 
the operation of ISOC Region 4 Forward Command, so that elected governments have 
limited input. 
Under the Yingluck government, a first round of peace talks were held in March 2013 
in Malaysia with representatives of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary 
Front or BRN), one of the biggest, yet diverse, southern rebel groups. This did demonstrate a 
big step forward in an attempt to lessen the conflict. Even though there were secretly talks 
between the Thai state and the separatist groups, this was the first time of the open talk that 
officially discovered to the public. However, there are suspicions from people, academics, 
civil society, and the military about the inability of the BRN and its representatives in 
negotiating and controlling other insurgent groups. Although the peace talk is considered as 
an improvement towards the conflict resolutions, the violence continued and even increased 





Due to the political unrest in Bangkok since November 2013, the fourth round of talks 
planned for December 2013 where hopefully more rebel groups would join the discussions 
had to be postponed.  The Yingluck government was overthrown in May 2014 by a military 
coup led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander. He, then, 
established the National Peace and Order Maintaining Council (NPOMC). The name was 
later changed to "National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to rule the country under the 
military-led government. General Prayuth announced that he will adopt the King’s advice to 
“understand, reach out, and develop”, continue the policy “politics leading military”, and 
work on the process of peace talks,  but talking about a self-administered zone is prohibited, 
in order to deal with the conflict and violence in the southern border province
32
. However, 
there are concerns by politicians, academics and civil society groups that the total military 
control in the troubled south and leaving aside civil society, democracy, and popular 
participation would be a big mistake in tackling the complicated crisis in southern Thailand
33
.  
The conflict and violence in the Malay-Muslim provinces has existed for longer than 
the oldest living people in the South and become a fact of life for people in the conflict area. 
In the past, the conflict and violence occurred as a consequence from other factors such as the 
history of forceful annexation of Patani kingdom under Siam, the assimilation policies that 
abandoned Malay culture and Islamic practices, and the unjust treatments of the Thai state 
officials towards the Malay-Muslims. Nowadays, since the conflict and violence existed for 
very long time, it becomes a cause of other things, not a consequence. After the rise in 
conflict in 2004, the Thai state used different tactics to curb the violence. However, most 
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tactics aimed to increase utmost power of state by increasing the state interference at local 
levels and impeding the pathways to participation of the locals.   
Despite the increasing conflict and state control, that existing conflict rose to a new 
level in 2004, sparking a desire to participate. According to Marc Askew (2010: 147-148), 
the local Malay-Muslims, whom he spoke to, recently show less interest about the conflict in 
the past and the concept of Malay-Muslim identity. However, it does not mean that they do 
not care about the conflict at their hometown but it possibly means that they look forward to 
the peaceful solutions through the desire for participation within the Thai state. If that desire 
is blocked, more conflict will be likely to ensue.  
 
 
Research questions  
  
 The national policies toward the conflict in the South to date have never been 
effective enough to solve the ongoing violence. One of the most important issues yet 
overlooked is political participation of people in the conflict area. However, although people 
desire to participate in politics, being involved in political activities in the conflict areas does 
not always come as smoothly as desired and sometimes can cause more tensions and 
endangerment to and among them.  Therefore, making decision towards political 
participation always comes to the situation that people have to choose between taking risks of 
personal security by participating in politics and disassociating from politics to make their 
lives safer from being suspected by both sides and pray for the situation to be better one day.  
 Many factors and players such as state, insurgents, interest groups, civil society, local 
authorities, and people together have important roles in shaping the path of political 
participation. As Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson (2009: 94) mentioned, “the greater 





the likelihood that certain problems can be alleviated before they turn into serious and 
irresolvable conflict.”  Especially during the democratic era, it seems like political 
participation really matters in a way to draw opinions and allow people to express and 
contribute greatly to create peace in their own communities. Therefore, due to concerns of the 
importance of political participation in the conflict area, this research would like to study and 
examine these following questions; 
1. Why do/don’t people in the conflict area participate in the election? 
2. How do people in the conflict, less conflict, and non-conflict areas participate in 
politics? 
3. How does the government play its role in the area of political participation during the 
conflict? 
4. How does civil society in the South act politically? 
5. How does the ongoing conflict impact on political participation? 
6. How does political participation affect the conflict? 
 
Scope of the study 
 
There has been considerable speculation as to why most of the people living in the 
midst of longstanding conflict and violence in southernmost Thailand want to participate in 
politics rather than ignore it or join the rebels.  To find the answer, this research will focus on 
political participation of people who are directly affected by the violence in the South. The 
research will focus on the period since 2001 which was the year that ex-Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra, whose policy was considered as one of the important reasons for the 
flare up in violence, won the national election and came to power until the present period.  
Moreover, the research will pay attention not only to the national and local elections but also 





or not the seemingly endless crisis of violence in Southern Thailand affected people’s 
political behavior. 
 Therefore, the research will seek to examine how and why Malay-Muslim people 
participate in politics, as well as, the governmental response to the political activities of 
southern people in the conflict area. Following this, the paper will explore whether conflict 
experiences result in changes in the level of political participation or not by comparing 
between non violence, less violence, and high violence conflict areas of Songhla and Pattani.  
 
Significance of the issue 
 
In the past decade, the violence of Thailand’s three southernmost provinces, plus four 
districts of Songkhla, has become a significant concern of the Thai government and has 
drawn international attention.  The Southern people have been faced with political violence in 
which rebels have been fighting Thai authorities on and off for many years. Presently, daily 
killings of local policemen, soldiers, religious leaders, and other civilians, bombing and 
torching of schools, temples, official places, markets, shops, and even people’s homes 
marked a new level of insurgency and violence, one not seen in over 30 years, and currently 
southern Thailand has become the most violent region in Southeast Asia where the Malay-
Muslims have suffered the most from the ongoing ethnic conflict. Not only the local Malay-
Muslims but Thai-Buddhists residing in the area are suffering from pain and loss of their 
loved ones. They, whichever religion or ethnicity they are, have to live in danger and in fear 
of being targets and victims. While the Thai-Buddhists are fearful of being targets of the 








The crisis has also destroyed the economic, social, and even education system in the 
conflicted area. The government has to spend much more of its budget for domestic security; 
local income has been decreasing because of diminishing numbers of tourists and reduced 
revenue from rubber plantations which are the main sources of income for the South; children 
cannot go to school safely and many schools have been attacked by unidentified groups. Even 
today the violence in these three southern provinces is largely unpredictable and considered 
as “the single most aggressive challenge that southern Thai Malay-Muslims have issued to 
the sovereign Thai nation-state” (Dorairajoo 2009: 70). 
Also, the violence has widened distrust and discrimination among Thais and non-
Thais and polarized society by creating a climate of mutual distrust and suspicion between 
Malay Muslim and Thai Buddhist communities (Liow 2007: 15) in the southernmost 
provinces of Thailand. The effects of the conflict in these provinces, besides damaging 
national security, economics, the country’s reputation and the social life of local people, has 
also affected the international relations between Thailand and neighboring Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), the Organization of Islamic 
Countries, and the broader Muslim world. Furthermore, there are worries, not only for the 
Thai government but also among neighboring countries, that the grievances of the Muslims in 
southern Thailand may bring support from Muslim terrorist organizations or jihadist groups 
such as Jemaah Islamiyh (JI) and Al-Qaeda to fight against the Thai state, which could 
possibly expand the situation so that the Malay-Muslim insurgency could make Thailand the 
next front in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. However, there is little evidence to prove 
any linkages between the Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand and international terrorist 






Therefore, the Southern violence currently is not only a concern for the Thai 
government and local people, it has also been closely observed and watched by the national 
and international media, national-level policy makers, and academia, as well as national and 
international organizations including Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), human rights 
and humanitarian organizations, and social development organizations.  Many representatives 
have come to the three southern provinces to work in response to the crisis and sort out the 
possible solutions to stop the crisis. However, although there have been many attempts from 
many experts in studying the causes and patterns of the violence as well as searching for the 
best solution, the possible ways to end the violence have been difficult to discover. So, this 
research is conducted with the aim to offer an alternative way of considering the problem by 
emphasizing the governmental and non-governmental actors and how they can support each 











Chapter 2 : Literature Review and Research Methodology 
 
 
Political participation  
 
Concept and definition  
 
The definition of political participation varies among scholars and can mean different 
things to different people. Traditionally, the definitions of political participation focused on 
any political activities that intend to influence government policies (Traut and Emmert 1993: 
239). Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim (1978:46) defined political 
participation as “those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at 
influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or actions that they take.” While 
Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) limited political participation to only legal activities, the term 
political participation can be considered in a broader aspect. It can mean “any activity by 
private citizens designed to influence governmental decision-making” (Huntington and 
Nelson 1976: 4). Samuel P. Huntington and Joan Nelson (1976: 4-7) included both legal and 
illegal acts whose goal is to influence government behavior, ranging from voting, 
demonstration, protest, riot, to insurgent violence, into their definition of political 
participation.  
Later, the description of political participation is expanded and not restricted to only 
political acts but also includes non-political forms of activity such as being members or 
participating in civic and religious groups, or educational and work-related organizations. 
Involvement in such activities is important not only for strengthening civil society but also 
bolstering political participation (Prinat 2002: 32). The occurrence of participation is not only 





groups, political parties, and government elites. Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen (1993: 
228) defined participation as “the the product of strategic interaction of citizens and leaders". 
Similar to Rosenstone and Hansen’s definition, Prinat Apirat (2002: 33) perceived the role of 
political participation as the channel for the exchange of ideas in a two-way communication 
system which provides the linkage of conversation between citizens and their representatives 
or the state. 
 Political participation can refer to many activities, legal and illegal, electoral and non-
electoral activities, all of these forms of participation can be recognized as means for 
influencing public policy. As Verba and Nie (1972: 4) mentioned, “Participation is not 
committed to any social goals but is a technique for setting goals, choosing priorities, and 
deciding what resources to commit to goal attainment.” Also, participation is essential for 
civilized behavior to express different views nonviolently through dialogue where differences 
are discussed and compromised (Belloni 2001: 168). James Ockey (2008, 153-154) remarks 
in his work regarding the relationship between political participation and political integration 
that although participation can lead to discussions of alternatives that some consider an 
unpleasant resolution, “it is, and has long been, an effective means of integrating the 
[southern] region into the national polity.”   
Therefore, the exchange of opinions and discussions among citizens and between 
them and the state as well as popular engagement in politics is necessary to generate 
meaningful political participation. Participation leaves political outcomes in the hands of the 
citizenry by providing the citizens more control over political activities and increasing public 
pressure on political elites. When there are greater demands for participation, rather than 
considering democracy may be at risk, the increase of citizen participation brings an 





Political participation can be broadly defined to include any activities that intend to 
affect public policies. However, for the aim of comprehensive analysis and clarity, the term 
political participation in this thesis will refer to both electoral and non-electoral forms of 
participation and exclude non-political forms of participation such as memberships in civil 
groups or work-related organizations. When talking about political participation, it means 
those political actions undertaken by ordinary citizens, both individual and collective, that are 
intended either directly to affect governmental decision-making of public policy or indirectly 
to influence the selection of government personnel.  
 
Factors influencing political participation 
 
There are many factors influencing political participation. Numerous studies on 
political participation accept and document one of the well-known studies called “resource 
model” or “standard SES model” (Campbell et al. 1960, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, and 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  This model talks about the effects of socioeconomic 
status (SES) on political participation behavior and explains that the SES is the major 
influencing factor that affects level of participation (Verba and Nie 1972, Verba et al., 1995). 
According to this principle, there is a relationship to a large extent between political 
participation and individuals’ resources, including social status, education, occupation, and 
income. Sidney Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady (1995: 3) stated that “those 
who wish to take part must also have the resources that provide the wherewithal to 
participate.” The SES facilitates individuals in gaining civic skills and knowledge and 
promoting positive attitudes and participatory norms that lead to an effort to influence the 
government and political system (Traut and Emmert 1993: 241).  Therefore, individuals with 
high socioeconomic status or individuals’ resources are more likely to participate in politics 





 However, focusing only on socioeconomic status is criticized by many academics 
who claim that it is not enough to analyze patterns and motivations of people in engaging in 
politics (Nelson 1979, Leighley 1995, Albritton and Denton 2008). Jan E. Leighley (1995: 
183-184), conducted research on political participation, comments that besides examination 
of individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics, multivariate analyses, including individual’s 
political attitudes and political mobilization, across demographic groups should be added to 
the study in order to develop a better understanding of  who participates and why.  
Another model called a “life-cycle” model (Milbrath 1965, Glenn and Grimes 1968, 
Nie, Verba, and Kim 1974, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Jennings and Markus 1988) 
indicates that there is a relationship between age and level of political participation. Political 
participation generally increases with age, but with the young and the old less likely to 
engage in the community.   According to Lester Milbrath (1965: 134), “Participation rises 
gradually with age, reaches its peak and levels off in the forties and fifties, and gradually 
declines above sixty.” So, from this theory, the middle age group is most likely to be active 
politically.  
Additionally, personal attitude and personality is important to the level of political 
participation (Mussen and Wyszynski 1952, Milbrath and Klein 1962, Nelson 1979, and 
Kundu 1994).  There are numerous studies looked at the association between attitude and 
personality and political participation in various ways since there are many diverse 
personality traits. For Dale Nelson (1979: 1027), people who participate in politics would 
have a general interest in politics, an understanding of political issues, and a preference to 
discuss or talk about politics with others. The work of Sima Kundu (1994), which examined 
the personalities of Indian people, found that people with high self-esteem are more likely to 
engage in political activities. Lester Milbrath and Walter Klein (1962) noticed that sociable 





these studies have one common factor that people’s attitude and personality have a great 
influence on political behavior. 
 Personal trust towards the political system and political authorities and a belief in 
their effectiveness to solve problems also affect levels of political participation. Individuals 
who have high levels of trust tend to engage less in political activities because they perceive 
political authorities as problem solvers and believe the community is in the good hands of 
trusted officials. They, then, feel little need to engage in politics or influence decision makers 
(Nelson 1979: 1027). 
For some citizens, political participation, particularly participation through elections, 
is a civic duty (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Chareka, Sears, and Chakera 2006, and 
Weinschenk 2014). As Raymond Wolfinger and Stephen Resenstone (1980: 7-8) described, 
“the most important benefit of voting [is]… a feeling that one has done one’s duty to 
society…and to oneself.” Citizen duty is thus notably related to electoral participation.  
However, if one is not satisfied with the current government, they wait for several years to 
vote again. Engaged citizens, who have self-expressive norms, are more participatory. They 
look for more direct ways of influencing policy makers, such as boycotts, protest, and other 
forms of political action. So, duty-based participation may encourage voter turnout but self-
expressive norms of engaged citizens can also stimulate political engagement in other forms 
of political actions that are broader than electoral politics (Dalton 2008: 85-86).  
Several studies also identified ethnicity as an important source of political 
participation (Wilson and Banfield 1971, Greeley 1974, Nelson 1979, Miller, Gurin, Gurin, 
and Malanchuk 1981, Lien 1994, Wrinkle et.al 1996, and Albritton and Denton 2008). As 
Andrew M. Greeley (1974: 170) mentioned, “Religioethnic background is a meaningful 
predictor of political participation (in American society)”. Even though evidence regarding 





research time, the impact of ethnicity has a greater effect even than the SES, on the 
differences in levels of participation (Nelson 1979: 1024). In general, Wrinkle et. al (1996: 
144) believed “the greater the connection of an individual with his or her fellow ethnics, the 
more likely he or she will be to be engaged in non-electoral political participation.” Similar to 
the study on political participation in southern Thailand, Albritton and Denton (2008) found 
that it is not only socioeconomic status that shapes political participation, cultural or ethnic 
identifications also seem to influence political participation to some significant degree.  
Nevertheless, rather than the ethnic background and a sense of shared identity, the feelings of 
power deprivation and thoughts of inequality and unfairness in the social and political system 
also mobilize political action and participation as a response to feelings of political 
disaffection (Miller et al. 1981: 508).   
Among these factors mentioned earlier, people’s experiences of conflict and violence 
also affect the level of political participation; experiences of conflict and violence lead to 
greater collective action (Wood 2003, Bellows and Miguel 2006, Blattman 2009, and 
Shewfelt 2009). John Bellows and Edward Miguel (2006) examined conflict in Sierra Leone 
and found that people who experienced family deaths and displacement increased their 
political awareness and participation. They were more likely to attend community meetings, 
join political groups, and vote. Also, Chris Blattman (2009) demonstrated a causal link from 
conflict and violence to political engagement in Uganda. Victims of conflict are more likely 
to participate socially. They are more likely to vote and lead their communities (Blattman 
2009: 231). However, Susan Gluck Mezey (1975: 508) argued regarding the relationships 
between personal experience and political participation that political activities and attitudes 
are not “the immediate results of the individual's primary experiences, but are likely to be 
modified by other influences which arise at later stages in the individual's career.”  According 





reactions from certain individuals, who may or may not have experiences or interests in 
political activities.   
From the literature on factors influencing political participation discussed above, the 
analyses on the correlations between political participation and these factors, including the 
SES, ages, personal attitudes, personality traits, personal trust, citizenship norms, ethnicity, 
and conflict experience, are multivariate and complex, depending on various motivations, the 
period and place of research, and modes of participation. Therefore, this thesis intends to do a 
multifaceted analysis to test the relationship between political participation and the conflict in 
the southern border provinces of Thailand.  
 
Modes of political participation 
 
As Lester W. Milbrath (1965: 2) mentioned, people can relate to their political system 
in a variety of ways to meet their different demands and objectives. Some persons participate 
in politics to achieve their personal goals; others participate in the politics because they want 
to improve it.  Rather than just participation in free and fair elections, people participate in 
different political activities with different levels of participation over time. These differences 
in types and levels of political participation signify variations in which citizens try to 
influence government (Hirlinger 1992: 553). Therefore, alternative modes of political 
participation are also essential and deserve attention. Political participation can be, and 
should be, considered much more broadly as multidimensional activities including both 
electoral and non-electoral forms of participation (Verba and Nie 1972, Bobo and Gilliam 






Huntington and Nelson (1976) categorized political participation into five categories 
First, electoral activities which include election-related activities such as voting, making 
campaign contributions, and participating in political party activities. Second, lobbying which 
means individual and/or collective attempts to pressure government leaders on issues that 
affect a large number of people. Third, organizational activity which represents the activity 
of participating in an organization with the aim to influence government decision making. 
Fourth is contacting government officials which differs from lobbying in which contacting 
government officials aims to profit only one person or a small group of people. Fifth, 
committing acts of violence which means the use of physical violence against people and/or 
property in order to influence government decision-making.  
 Verba, Nie, and Barbic (1973: 237) clustered political participation into four broad 
“modes of activity”, excluding violent activity from their list. The four different modes are 1) 
voting, 2) campaign activity such as fund-raising, campaigning about political issues, or 
signing petitions about particular issues, 3) communal activity which refers to non-electoral 
activity by which individuals or groups of people try to influence community policies with 
the aims of contributing to the public good, and 4) particularized contacting, the act of 
contacting a government official by an individual to deal with a particular problem affecting 
only herself/himself or her/his family and aiming at narrow outcomes related only to the 
respondent or his family.   
Based on clusters of participation classified by Huntington and Nelson (1976) and 
Verba, Nie, and Barbic (1973), this research will examine political participation in three 
channels; 1) political participation through election which includes voting and campaign 
activity, 2) political participation through the state which comprises contacting government 
officials and particularized contacting, and 3) political participation through civil society 






1) Political participation through elections 
 
Political participation through elections can be considered as the most basic and 
simplest form of political participation that does not require a lot of initiative and has a fairly 
low opportunity cost (Prinat 2002: 38). Elections, as mentioned by Russell Dalton (2008: 94), 
are “the source of democratic legitimacy, and they are a simple means of engaging the mass 
public in the democratic process.” Moreover, elections can also be regarded as the safest 
means of political activity in generating a connection between the state and its citizens and 
allowing citizens to convey their opinions and preferences for society through their selection 
of elected representatives whom they believe can represent citizens’ interests and influence 
the government’s policies (Prinat 2002: 49). Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978: 53) viewed 
elections as a unique and influential mechanism that allows citizens to have their chances to 
pressure and control their government.  
However, Max Kaase and Alan A. Marsh (1979) perceived voting in a different way. 
They argued that voting is distinct from conventional political participation. According to 
Kaase and Marsh (1979: 86), “voting is a unique form of political behavior in the sense that it 
occurs only rarely, is highly biased by strong mechanisms of social control, is accompanied 
by rain-dance ritual of campaigning and does not involve the voter in major informational or 
other costs.” Similar to Kaase and Marsh, Dalton (2008: 85) agreed that elections are not only 
sporadic events but also quite inactive means of political influence. Moreover, voters have no 
guarantee that policies presented during election campaign will be followed by the elected 
government after they won an election. In addition, elections can be corrupted by fear (such 
as intimidation or threats of violence), corruption (such as vote buying), and fraud (such as 





the political system and democracy and turn them to the use of violence as another way to 
preserve their political interests. 
Individuals decide to participate through voting as it is the simplest way to take part in 
politics. However, elections are passive and irregular actions and may be undermined by 
corruption, or limited choices. So, people, especially those who become more educated and 
politically skilled, try to find different methods of participation that can increase potential 
power of the citizenry and give them more direct ways to influence public policy (Dalton 
2008: 85). Compared to non-electoral modes of participation, Dalton (2008: 93) said, “when 
participation expands beyond elections it allows citizens to select how and when they 
participate, since they do not have to wait until the next election to be active.” There are 
various non-electoral methods of political participation that citizens can choose to serve their 
different objectives which will be discussed in the next section below, starting with political 
participation through the state. 
 
2) Political participation through the state 
 
In addition to participating through electoral channels, citizens also participate by 
contacting the state and its agencies. Alan Zuckerman and Darrell West (1985: 117) 
identified citizen contacting as “individuals who approach government officials or other 
powerful persons in order to obtain help for themselves, their families, associates, or larger 
social groups.” This channel of participation needs much more initiative in determining the 
what, who, and how of the contacts than most other modes of political participation because 
citizens know what they want and contact the related officials to meet their desire (Verba and 
Nie 1972: 105). However, this citizen-initiated contacting can have as much influence on 





According to Verba and Nie (1972), there are two types of citizen contacting 
depending on matters of concern. One is particularized referent contacting, which relates to 
matters of narrow concern just to themselves or their families. Examples of particularized 
referent contacting through the state and its arms are plentiful. People may contact the state 
and its agencies to seek governmental assistance for different purposes, for example, 
unemployed people searching for a job, working people looking for social security, farmers 
seeking agricultural insurance programs, or parents finding student loans for their children. 
Another is general referent contacting or social referent contacting, which involves matters of 
broad concern to larger groups, neighborhoods, or communities. This type of citizen 
contacting engages public problems or concerns that affect large sections of society (Verba 
and Nie 1972: 66). Individuals who are general or social referent contactors are thus more 
likely to be more civic-oriented and have higher socioeconomic status than the former group 
(Traut and Emmert 1993: 239).  
Besides contacting state officials, people can also contact politicians directly or 
through their political party offices. According to Jacob Aars and Kristin StrØmsnes (2007: 
93), “Citizens-initiated contact with politicians is an increasing, but often neglected, form of 
political participation.” Contacting politicians is more common in small communities because 
people have a better knowledge of their local affairs and their elected representatives (Aars 
and StrØmsnes 2007: 113). However, interaction between citizens and politicians and/or 
elected officials may be mostly limited to voting in elections or to the campaign period which 
does not provide sufficient opportunities for people to meet their demands (Prinat 2002: 32). 
Thus, political participation through state channels can open more chances for people to 






Although the state can act as one of the channels of political participation, 
simultaneously, the level and form of political participation can also be confined by the state 
and its prevailing strategies applied by its political elites (Vráblíková 2010: 1-2). Hanspeter 
Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni (1995: 45) mentioned 
that the openness of political participation is a function of the state. Due to the existence of 
various interests from different groups, the state needs to regulate those interests and keep the 
balance at a certain level. The principles of legitimacy and non-discrimination must be 
applied in order to prevent state policies and public interests from being dominated by a few 
strong political actors. If government performs in a way that is unfavorable or biased to any 
group, those citizens may be more likely to ignore participation through the state (Hirlinger 
1992: 554). 
In a strong state with powerful centralized authority, the channels for popular 
involvement are limited and not institutionalized. This increases the cost of political 
participation which leads to a lower level of participation. Citizens will have to apply more 
expensive strategies, such as protests or demonstrations, to get involved in politics. If 
peaceful participation continues to be blocked by the state, it is likely that people will employ 
more violent means of participation (Kriesi et al. 1995: 45). Political support from the state is, 
thus, vital to stimulate conventional political participation. Unless the state provides proper 
support for civic participation, citizens may get involved with more violent activities that 
defy political authorities and the state. Nonetheless, if citizens do not perceive their rights and 
ability to develop their community, they might see no benefit to participation. Thus, if 
citizens’ political attachment is weak, it is likely that they may withdraw from any types of 
political actions (Albritton and Denton 2008: 23-24). Therefore, the state should encourage 
citizens’ political engagement at every stage of the decision-making process. Practices, such 





be arranged to create opportunities for different interest groups to express their demands and 
exchange information among groups and between the state and its citizens. Due to having 
different opinions from various groups, conflict of interests may occur. With such practices 
of civic participation and support by the state, conflict of interests can be harmonized and 
balanced.  
By strong state, Joel S. Migdal (1988: 4-5) referred to a state that has high capacities 
to complete these following tasks; “penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract 
resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined way”. Besides having high 
capacity in dealing with the required socioeconomic tasks, Kreisi and his collaborators (1995: 
33-34) explained further, a strong state always applies exclusive strategies, which are 
confrontational and polarizing. The strong state does not allow a high level of citizens’ 
involvement in politics and does not facilitate proper channels to participate. By applying its 
exclusive strategies, the strong state can limit opportunities for participation as much as 
corrupt elections can. When citizens cannot expect a positive reaction from the state’s 
political system, they find other ways to have their voices heard and that may lead to more 
costly and violent means of participation. As Carole Nagengast (1994: 115) argued, the state 
is often “the greatest instigator of cycles of violent human rights abuses as it seeks to 
suppress change and prevent opposition movements from undermining its legitimacy”. 
Participation through the state allows people to take their first step in contacting 
government authorities, including politicians, in various ways to meet different demands for 
either themselves or society. The state and its agencies are thus crucial actors of this mode of 
political participation that can control the effectiveness and reliability of this mean of 
participation. However, if the political acts cannot fulfill a citizen’s purposes, he/she may find 






3) Political participation through civil society 
 
 
Political participation through civil society refers to non-electoral acts of participation 
where individuals or groups of people participate in an organization or community activities 
with the aim to influence government decision making on community policies (Verba, Nie, 
and Barbic: 1973, and Huntington and Nelson: 1976). The concept of civil society is not new, 
but it came into renewed prominence in the 1980s after the collapse of communism and the 
expansion of democracy, speedy global inter-connection, and a significant increase of NGOs 
globally, as well as increasing emergence of armed intrastate and violent ethnic conflicts 
(Chandhoke 2007: 609). The study of civil society then became a center of attention for 
social science and political science scholars as it is thought to be an important component in 
advancing intra-state peace building processes (Edwards 2004: 2).  
Ernest Gellner (1994) discussed civil society in terms of its relationship with the state. 
According to Gellner, civil society is: 
set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the 
state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and 
arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing 
the rest of society. (5) 
Similar to Gellner, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (1998: 3) 
perceived that although civil society is the sum of public will which acts independently, the 
role of civil society should not impede the performance of the state in carrying out 
responsibilities to its citizens. While civil society can counterbalance the state power, the 
state can also stipulate the agenda of civil society. As John Keane (1998: 5) mentioned, a 
contemporary civil society is “a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-





permanently in tension with each other and with state institutions that frame, constrict and 
enable their activities.”  
Generally speaking, civil society includes voluntary and non-profit organizations of 
many different kinds, humanitarian institutions, social and political movements, and other 
groupings of social participation and engagement, whose attempts are “to meet public goals 
for their members, or to gain collective goods or group benefits” (Spalding 1996: 69-70).  
Civil society is considered to be in a middle position between the public and the private. 
According to Helmut Anheier’s (2000: 17) inclusive definition, civil society means “the set 
of institutions, organizations, and behaviors situated between the state, the business world, 
and the family.”  
With their networks and cooperation with local communities, civil society 
organizations can stimulate political participation by providing opportunities for association 
and raising awareness of shared problems in the community (Boulding 2010: 456). 
Participation in civil society organizations also increases citizens’ political skills and thus 
facilitates participatory activities (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995: 309-310).  Civil 
society, especially in the local community, is the place where people discuss and exchange 
their opinions about politics or issues of concern and it is the place where people’s voices can 
be forwarded to political authorities.  When citizens are more interested and experienced 
about politics, they are more likely to find a strong reason to participate in the political 
process. Civil society thus can put together social networks, locally, nationally, or even 
internationally, and enhance interpersonal trust among citizens as well as boost civic skills 
that contribute to political participation and collective actions and eventually create a ‘good 
society’, defined by Wallace and Pichler (2009: 255) as one in which “citizens engage in 





However, the probability and efficiency of political participation also depends 
significantly on the nature of civil society organizations and of their membership. 
Involvement with non-active and non-political organizations may not encourage political 
actions as well as those that have more active members and activities because those formal 
and active organizations can provide greater competence in developing civic skills that are 
essential to promote political participation ( Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995: 280-281).  
Moreover, civil society can operate as an important bridge linking the state and 
citizens, representing members’ interests and pushing forward the process of policy-making.  
Civil society, on the one hand, conveys messages from the government to their members and 
the public which promotes inter-understanding and communication between the state and its 
citizens. On the other hand, civil society organizations express their group interests to the 
state through various channels of political participation to ensure that their members’ interests 
will be realized in public policies. Nonetheless, interests of each civil society organization 
can be various and contradictory. Besides, strong civil society organizations which have more 
financial support, better political skills, and stronger expression channels usually propose 
their group interests more powerfully and effectively than ordinary or weak organizations. 
Organizations, therefore, should follow laws and regulations, as well as collaborate and 
compromise, rather than compete against each other. The state, too, should treat them equally 
without any privilege through proper participation channels that are sufficient and accessible 
enough to make sure that various groups have fair opportunities to express their demands and 
participate in the decision-making process (Songyan 2005: 8-9).  
There is an alternative perspective on state-civil society relations. Both state and civil 
society play important and complementary roles in society; however, they may perceive 
themselves as oppositional (Spalding 1996: 72). For the liberal model, civil society interacts 





society organizations provide support for the state in a variety of forms such as offering 
expert opinions or local wisdom, providing ground support when implementing policy, and 
observing the results of policies. Moreover, a strong civil society can provide “a base of 
legitimacy and a capacity for activity on which the state can build” (Spalding 1996: 66). The 
social integration of civil society in a locality, as Horstmann (2002: 145) stated, can “help 
stabilize the local state”, whereas the extensive national networks of civil society can “help 
stimulate and reinforce the process of national integration.”  
For the radical model, civil society is an arena for independent political activity that is 
meant to oppose the role of the state and the domination of state elites (Carbone 2005: 169). 
From this point of view, civil society is a counter-weight to state power. The competence and 
activities of civil society, such as protecting human rights, offering channels of 
communication and participation, providing trainings for activists, and promoting pluralism, 
can improve the quality of governance and stabilize the government but at the cost of the 
empowerment of citizens and possibly the weakening of state power in the long run 
(Kalinowski 2009: 68). Even though civil society sometimes challenges state power, the 
process of public decision-making unavoidably involves civil society organizations one way 
or another as they have important roles in strengthening state-citizens relations and 
encouraging citizens’ engagement in public interests.  Therefore, the relationship between 
state and civil society can be considered as permanently in a state of flux depending on 
changing needs, policies, and preferences. The situation will rely on the attempts of actors in 
state and civil society to expand their scope of power or to protect their ability to function 
(Spalding 1996: 67). 
In order to meet the ultimate objectives of the groups, the level of strength of civil 
society has to be taken into account. According to Migdal (1988: 33-41), civil society will be 





opposition to the state and make state control very difficult. However, civil society 
organizations need to be aware that top-down planning that neglects members’ interests often 
negates participation. The strength of civil society also highly depends on state policy. The 
state is considered to be the most critical actor in setting conditions and agendas for civil 
society (Chong and Elies 2011: 9). Moreover,  the strength of civil society includes “relative 
autonomy from the state; ability to provide viable strategies of survival to members, and meet 
their cultural and symbolic needs, including financial and organizational resources; 
accountability; and members’ support” (Spalding 1996: 70). Therefore, while “an expansive 
participant strong society makes political authority more accountable and reduces the scope 
for exclusionary politics and covert activity” (Cox 1999: 15), a weak civil society is unable to 
ensure government accountability or resist state domination. 
Nonetheless, positive state – civil society relations are vital to create a harmonious 
society. With state power and support, civil society can establish the effectiveness of its 
organizations and create a smooth pathway for citizens’ political participation. Civil society 
is even more significant for a divided society. Civil society as a public sphere between the 
state and the individual has a critical role in the initiation and long-term sustainability of the 
peace process by enhancing participation and promoting a foundation of democratization, the 
rule of law, and human rights (Belloni 2001). Robert Putnam (1993) perceived the important 
role of civil society in encouraging community engagement and in promoting the capability 
of government institutions and makes the political system function efficiently.  
Although political participation through civil society can either support or slow down 
the work of the state, civil society is thought to be a key mechanism for social change through 
its functions of developing individuals’ political skills, promoting political participation, and 







These three modes of political participation have negative and positive sides as 
discussed above. However, political participation is important to the political system as an 
input channel of citizens’ demands and proof of state legitimacy.  The effectiveness of each 
mode of political participation thus depends not only on how many channels of participation 
the state provides but also how the state encourages and promotes political awareness of 
participation to its citizens. Without political awareness of citizens, political participation 
channels are worthless and without state responsiveness and responsibility to people’s 
demand, political participation is meaningless too. As types and levels of political 
participation vary in each country and differ between times and situations, the next section 
will discuss political participation in Thailand in order to understand the Thai political system 
and how Thais participate. Then, the thesis will discuss more specifically political 
participation in the southernmost part of Thailand, where the conflict and violence occurs.  
 
Political participation in the Thai context 
 
Thailand is the country in Southeast Asia with the longest experience of independent 
and democratic rule (Freedman 2006: 29). Democracy in Thailand started more than 80 years 
ago after the overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932 during the reign of King Prajadhipok 
(Rama VII) with the hope for wider opportunities of popular involvement in politics. After 
the change of political system to constitutional monarchy under a parliamentary democratic 
system in 1932, the first constitution of Thailand was promulgated in 10 December 1932 and 
the first national elections were held a year after. It was an indirect vote in which the voters 
selected their representative from each Tambon (a sub-district) and the representatives from 
each sub-district voted for a Member of Parliament (MP). Subsequently, elections in Thailand 





of the coup did not give full political participation to Thai citizens in the beginning and 
claimed that Thai people were not ready yet for democracy (Saitip 1995: 199). 
Under Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkram’s dictatorship (during 1938-1944 and 
1948-1957), political freedom of Thai citizens was limited, freedom of speech was banned 
and many people were arrested without trial, or assassinated, or disappeared. However, his 
authoritarian power collapsed in 1957 when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat staged a coup and 
removed Phibun from power. Despite his participation with the students to discharge Phibun 
in the 1957 protest, the Sarit government (1958-1963) did not promote popular involvement 
of Thai citizens. On the contrary, his government was regarded as “the most repressive 
regime” (Ockey 2004: 13) since he suppressed most channels of political participation and 
the only and most powerful institution in Thai politics during that time was the army 
(Sudhamani 1978: 278). As a result, during this period, political activities by citizens rarely 
occurred.  After Sarit’s death in 1963, the authoritarian regime was continued by General 
Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-1973). Popular involvement was still limited and restrained for 
another ten years.  
Under the military governments of Phibun, Sarit, and Thanom from 1938 to 1973
34
, 
there were 35 years of political repression for Thai people. Popular participation was not 
promoted, but shunted aside by the state under the military regimes in order to strengthen 
military rule and prolong absolute power in Thai politics (Saitip 1995: 1999). Political 
freedom was strictly restrained under the enforcement of the Anti-Communist Law and the 
Law on Association that forbade any civil organizations engaging in any political activities. 
Movements and gatherings were disallowed and the media, including newspapers, radio, and 
television was under tight control of the military government. There were hundreds of people 
who were arrested, assassinated, or disappeared without trial (Boonsanong 1975: 190). 
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 There were civilian-led governments during 1938-1973 but there was no civilian-led 





Moreover, during this period, there was a big gap between the poor and the rich. The majority 
of Thai people, especially peasants and workers, were left in poverty, while the elites, both 
the military and the civil bureaucrats, as well as the privilege business groups, mostly 
Chinese merchants, became excessively wealthy. Due to the political and economic hardship 
under the military junta, the former group seemed to be “politically apathetic and 
subordinated” (Boonsanong 1975: 191-192).  
As a result, Thai people were less likely to participate in political activities.  This 
could be one of the reasons that voter turnouts in national elections between 1933 and 1969 
were low and never exceeded 50 percent, except the election in February 1957, when voter 
turnout was as high as 57.50 percent (see Figure 2-1). However, the February 1957 general 
election was reported as a rigged election, and one of the reasons for the demonstrations in 
September 1957. 
 
Figure 2-1: Voter turnout of national elections in Thailand from 1933 to 1969 























Among the 9 elections between 1933 and 1969, there was only the election in 1946, 
during the first term of Seni Pramoj, held under a democratic atmosphere. The other elections 
were held under military rule, to provide a façade of democracy for Thai people (Orathai 
2002: 280). According to Orathai Kokpol (2002: 280), Thai politics repeated itself a vicious 
cycle:  
First there was a coup in which the military took over, sometimes with a civilian prime minister 
as front man. Then a new constitution was promulgated and an election was held to legitimize 
the military leader and his government. Then another military faction staged a coup to alternate 
power in government. 
Therefore, several elections in Thailand were held after military coups and new 
constitutions in order to legitimate the military governments and allow them to have their 
partisans in the parliament. Therefore, having elections during authoritarian regimes did not 
necessarily show democratization, as they were regarded as an instrument for the military 
junta to secure their positions (Che Man 2003: 3-4). The election results until 1975 were won 
by a government party because they were able to control the cabinet and the bureaucracy 
(Ockey 1994: 253). Non-electoral participation was still limited and constrained.  
As mentioned by Kriesi et al. (1995: 45), when political participation is suppressed by 
the state, people, especially those who are educated and have high political awareness, tend to 
assume violent methods of participation. When channels of political participation were 
limited, some of Thai people decided to bypass channels to raise their voices by participating 
in communist movements, committing crimes, or protesting illegally and violently 
(Boonsanong 1975: 191). The student-led protests against the military regime in 1957 and 





After the military government was overthrown in 1973, the civilian-bureaucratic 
governments led by Sanya Dhammasak (1973-1975), Kukrit Pramoj (1975-1976), and Seni 
Pramoj (1976) ruled the country more democratically. During this period, though it lasted 
only three years, political participation blossomed and a wider variety of actors engaged in 
politics (Ockey 2004: 144). However, voter turnout never exceeded 50 percent until 1983 
(see Figure 2-2).  
 
Figure 2-2:  Voter turnout of national elections in Thailand from 1975 to 1996 
 
     











































After the short period of non-military led governments, variety of groups of people, 
mostly on the left, led by Thammasat university students gathered in 1976 to participate in 
the protest against the return of General Thanom. The Seni Promoj government splintered, 
and some, mostly ultra-rightists, decided to use violent methods to stop the uprising. Thus the 
1976 protest led to the massacre of 6 October 1976 and became one of the most violent 
events in the history of Thailand.  
Since the 1980s, the country had gradually moved forward to a somewhat more 
democratic regime and a desirable participatory atmosphere. Even though the prime ministers 
during the 1980s, General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) and General Chartchai 
Chunhavan (1988-1991) had military background; they governed the country with more 
political openness. During the period of openness, political activities, including public 
debates and forums, demonstrations, and civil society organizations were thriving 
(Christensen 1991: 98). With the blooming of political participation and the popularity of 
General Prem, voter turnout was rapidly increasing from 50.76 percent to 61.43 percent in 
1986 and remained over 60 percent for another 10 years until the 1996 general election, 
except in March 1992 when the country was under the military regime (see Figure 2-2). 
After a 10-year-long parliamentary democratic regime and greater participatory 
condition, the improvement of democratization and political participation was interrupted and 
moved backward when Thailand experienced another coup in February 1991. After the 
decreasing influence of the military in Thai politics for the past 10 years, the coup 
demonstrated another attempt of the military to play a major role and to have influence in the 
government. The military junta, called National Peace-Keeping Council (NPKC), seized 







. Under military rule, political freedom of Thai people was once again 
limited. 
The NPKC appointed Anand Panyarachun, a civilian without military background, to 
be a prime minister.  Even though governing under military guardianship, Prime Minister 
Anand was able to act quite independently from military demands and tried to promote the 
concepts of transparency and liberalism (Suchit 1992: 134). The coup replicated the vicious 
cycle of Thai politics by promulgating a new constitution and holding an election to 
perpetuate the coup group’s domination. The national election in March 1992 was reported to 
have prevalent fraud and vote-buying. Unsurprisingly, the pro-military parties won this 
election.  
However, this elected government under the military regime was not acceptable to the 
public. There was a protest in May 1992 to oust General Suchinda Kraprayool, the prime 
minister, from his position. Unlike the protests in 1957 and 1973 where the leading protestors 
were university students, the 1992 uprising was led by politicians, professional people, and 
the middle class. Due to the prevalent usage of mobile phones during the protest, this protest 
was also well-known as “the mobile phone mob”. The bloody protests and the resignation of 
General Suchinda ended year-long military domination and started again the rise of a 
desirable participatory environment in Thailand. A new national election was held in 
September 1992, with slightly higher voter turnouts than in the former election.  The 
Democrat party won and formed a coalition government.  
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 The NPKC gave five reasons for taking power from Chartchai government; 1) the 
government had unbearable corruption problem, 2) government officials were oppressed and 
intimidated by political officials, 3) Chartchai government was the parliamentary dictatorship, 4) the 
military institution was threatened, and 5) The case of the abolition of royal institution was distorted. 
For more details, please see “Announcement of the National Peace Keeping Council No.1,” The 





Political participation in Thailand reached a new stage when the country adopted the 
16th constitution, promulgated in October 1997, often called “the People’s Constitution”. It 
was the first time that Thai people participated directly or indirectly in the establishment of 
the constitution. Moreover, the 1997 constitution gave greater importance to political 
participation of Thai people in the governance and checking the exercise of the state power. 
The new regulations that enhance political participation of Thai people included, for example, 
specifying that election is a duty of Thai people, generating more flexible rules to set up a 
political party, and for the first time that the Senate will come from direct election.  
Moreover, the role of non-state actors has been growing and developing. People and 
the media have had more freedom of expression, social movements flourished; and civil 
society organizations expanded their activities. In the past, the lower class was inactive in 
political activities and it would seem almost impossible for them to fight for their rights 
against the elites’ absolute power (Boonsanong 1975: 191).  However, the 1997 constitution 
has opened more opportunities and provided more benefits for not only the lower class but 
also for the middle class to get involved in politics through the increase of civil society 
activities (Ockey 2004: 156).  
After the promulgation of the 1997 constitution, voter turnout gradually increased and 
reached its maximum of 75.03 percent in 2011 (see Figure 2-3). However, there was a big 
drop of voter turnout in 2006 after Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra (2001-2006) decided 
to dissolve the Parliament due to the widespread opposition against his rule by the group 
called People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), with the drop in voter turnout, largely due to 








Figure 2-3:  Voter turnouts of national elections (on constituency system) in Thailand 
from 2001 to 2011 
 
     
         Sources: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 
 
Due to the rising power and popularity of Prime Minister Thaksin, who was the most 
charismatic and, at the same time, the most controversial leader of Thailand, Thai people 
have divided into two sides, those who support Thaksin and those who are anti-Thaksin. 
Thailand has faced a long political conflict that causes deep division among Thai people. The 
result of this division expanded to bloody turmoil with many people dead and injured during 
the protests in 2006, 2010, and recently in 2013-2014.  
The political conflict has opened an opportunity for the military to step in and expand 
its influence in Thai politics through bloodless coups in 2006 and 2014 and brought the 
country back to a military regime. Although the leaders of both coups have promised to 





















limitation of political freedom through a close watch of public political activities, tight 
control of media, and censorship of internet sites have weaken the forces of democracy. 
Being governed under military regime also erodes trust in the Thai political system and 
impedes political participation, especially participation through state channels. 
However, the political conflict unexpectedly created a positive result in term of 
political participation in that Thai people, whichever side they take, show increasing interest 
and participation in Thai politics. Unlike the protest in May 1992 where the protestors mostly 
were the middle class in Bangkok, the protests since 2006 have showed political participation 
of people of all classes, both in urban and rural, Bangkokians and non-bangkokians. Thai 
people have become more active and increasingly participate in political activities through 
many channels; the higher level of voter turnout after the coup in 2006 demonstrated the 
increasing participation through elections (see Figure 2-3); the increasing number of political 
groups and their activities, not only in Bangkok but throughout the country, shows the higher 
level of participation through civil society; and the prevalent expressions of political opinions 
via social media present the rising participation through cyber society.  
In term of civil society in Thailand, even though civil society should be non-
government institutions and a critical player for democratization and participation, according 
to Naruemon Thabchumpon (2011: 130-131), a state-led civil society where the state 
dominates civil society organizations could be seen in Thailand. Moreover, power 
distribution among members of civil society is hardly found in Thai society. Civil society 
organizations that are more politically and financially powerful tend to gain more privileges 
than those that are less influential. Regarding networks of civil society groups, there is little 
evidence of incorporation of civil society organizations in Thailand, especially at the local 





organizations strengthen their networks in order to enhance their bargaining power by being 
in alliances with academics, the urban middle class, and the media (Naruemon 2011: 132).  
Civil society in Thailand offers a chance for citizen activism, encourages political 
participation at all levels, and develops citizen knowledge and skills, especially at local level, 
can ensure that voices of different groups of people can be heard louder in the decision-
making process. The capabilities of civil society to work as a facilitator of citizen actions and 
a challenger against the state’s absolute power can be considered as a positive influence that 
can help the country move towards a more sufficient level of democratic stability (Naruemon 
2011: 137).  Additionally, civil society can provide the lower class more opportunities to 
participate in politics, rather than elections and “in ways that may prove more effective than 
voting”. (Ockey 2004: 156-157) 
In general, Thai politics has experienced many political reforms and varying degrees 
of participation by members of the society since 1932. Thailand has regular elections and 
allows people to have political freedom as well as participate in politics but the elections are 
sometimes unfair and people’s liberties are limited in order to prevent the opposition coming 
to power. The free and fair elections in Thailand, especially outside Bangkok, were 
incomplete and often corrupted by vote-buying, fraud, and the corruption of officials 
(McCargo 2002: 59).  Rather than providing benefits to people or class interests, the benefits 
and power are shared within elite governance groups both elected and unelected namely the 
military, bureaucracy, and big business groups, allowing them to remain in power over others 
(Thompson 1993 and Case 1996). As Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1987), a well-known Thai 
political scientist, criticized, Thai politics reflect elite self-interests rather than those of the 






According to a survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Thailand has an increasing 
score of political participation after 2006, the beginning of the period of contemporary 
political conflict in Thailand. Political conflict among people with different political 
ideologies and socioeconomic backgrounds also has a large influence on political 
participation. However, when compared to other democratic countries in Southeast Asia, 
political participation in Thailand, though it is in the leading group, has unchanged scores 







Figure 2-4, gained increasing scores in 2014, Thailand and Cambodia were the only 
two countries where scores were constant, without any improvement. Especially, after the 
latest coup leader, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, became the head of the government in August 
2014, Thailand is again ruled under military government. Political participation in Thailand 
has decreased as the media is controlled, opposite political opinions are prohibited, and the 
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Figure 2-4:  Political participation in Southeast Asia democratic countries 
 
     
         Sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
 Therefore, with the mix of freedom and control, some might argue the political 
system and participation in Thailand can be seen as, at least in some periods, capable of 
dealing with people’s demands through democratic process. However, others might argue the 
Thai political system is based on self-interest, corrupt, and unable to solve the actual 
problems of Thai residents (Neher 1988: 193). As Duncan McCargo (2002: 50) mentioned, 
“despite the growing importance of political participation, fundamental inequalities of power 
and resources persist in contemporary Thailand.” This problem needs to be solved and the 
state has to be responsive in order to improve political participation for Thai people. 
Moreover, the problems of inequity of political power and the limitation of popular political 





















country, especially the Malay Muslims in the southernmost part of Thailand as discussed in 
the following section.   
 
 
Political participation in the Thai southern border context 
 
 
Many studies about political behavior and political participation of people in the 
South describe that southern people (Khon Tai) often claim that they have more political 
awareness than Thais (Khon Thai) of other regions (Suthiwong 1984, Charun 1999, Thanet 
2004, and Ockey 2008). Although this statement cannot be proved or disproved, Askew 
(2006: 21) mentioned Khon Tai are regularly aware and suspicious of deceitful activities of 
the Thai state and of opportunistic politicians. They would oppose actions they regard as 
unjust. Moreover, when compared to the Thai community, the Muslim people have a well 
organized and structured set of collective actions. They regularly participate in Friday prayer 
and big gatherings at the mosque together, where they talk about politics. One reason is that 
Islam does not separate religion from politics (Thanet 2004: 49).  
Although the political rights and channels of participation for people in the deep 
south, especially those living in the conflict area, seem to be narrowed and restricted by state 
interference, this condition can be conducive to either expanding the violence or, 
simultaneously sparking the desire of more people to participate. People in the conflict area 
of southern Thailand still engage in Thai politics to some extent through many channels of 
political participation. The next section will clarify political participation in southern 
Thailand by dividing it into three channels of participation, as discussed earlier in the above 
section on modes of political participation. The three forms of participation include 1) 





political participation through the state which refers to contacting government officials, both 
voluntarily and involuntarily, and 3) political participation through civil society which 
involves organizational and communal activity. In this study, level of political participation is 
measured into both quantitative and qualitative forms. For quantitative data, the thesis 
collected statistical data such as voter turnout, electoral results, number of cases received by 
courts, and number of members of business organizations to help evaluate level of political 
participation. However, measuring political participation might be flawed if focusing only on 
quantitative data. So, this study also measured political participation by comparing qualitative 
data or the stories told by participants during field research, using this data and information to 
support the statistical data. Since level of participation cannot be measured precisely, this 
study does not intend to give a definitive answer. It provides evidence qualified, by using 
words such as more or less likely, tends to be high or low, to show the likelihood of people’s 
political participation. 
 
1) Political participation through election: Although the violence has escalated, 
political participation of the Malay-Muslim people who are living in the midst of a long-term 
conflict has increased over the past 20 years. In the earlier period, voter turnout rates of 
national elections in 1946 in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat were as low as 32 percent, 20 
percent, and 28 percent respectively (Morell 1974: 254) and until 1983 turnout rates in 
Pattani were never more than 50 percent (Pichai, Somchet, and Worawit 1987: 2). According 
to Ockey (2008, 132-133), one of the reasons that turnout rates in earlier periods was quite 
low could possibly be because of the difficulty of the voters to get to the polls which 
increased the opportunity cost of voting for Muslim people. Moreover, the problem of low 
literacy in the south has been another barrier that impedes the Malay-Muslims from political 





was beneficial to Buddhist candidates who had their support in urban areas where it was less 
difficult for people to get to the polls. As a result, the first national election in 1933, the 
representatives of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, where the majority is Muslim, were Buddhists.  
However, the Malay Muslim communities in the south have generally preferred to act 
within the political system to achieve their goals. So, especially after public utilities and 
transportation were thoroughly developed and the level of literacy increased, we could see the 
attempt of the Malay Muslim communities to achieve their objectives through the Thai 
political system, even during periods of serious conflicts (Ockey 2008: 124). This is 
confirmed by recent national elections in 2005, 2007 and 2011 as the voter turnout in the 
lower south where the conflict and violence has been located was more than 70% and higher 
than the national average
37
.  
Participation through elections is one of the channels that the Malay-Muslims in the 
south can choose their representatives in the parliament, who will be able to represent their 
interests and protect the rights of the Malay-Muslims. Therefore, after the society is more 
developed and the Malay-Muslims are more educated and aware of their political rights, the 
Muslim representatives of the three southernmost provinces have gained more seats in the 
parliament. Almost all of the representatives from the three provinces, Yala, Patani, and 
Narathiwat in the latest election in 2011 are Muslims. There is only one Buddhist 
representative who won in Yala.  
Even though the southernmost people are facing a harsh time of conflict, they have 
shown their desire to participate in the political system through elections, at a higher rate than 
people who live in other areas where conflict does not affect them directly.  For some, the 
prolonged conflict and violence between the insurgent groups and the Thai state can only end 
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up bloodily by an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.  For some, such non-violent ways as 
elections are seen as a better way that can lead to national integration and finally the end of 
the conflict. So, elections are only meaningful if they can lead to policy changes for the 
common good of the society. 
 
2) Political participation through the state: In Thailand, there is concern that the 
centralized government and its coercive policy towards the southern conflict would impede 
people from participating in politics and that would prolong the conflict and violence in the 
area. Research by the Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity, Prince of Songkhla 
University in 2011
38
 shows local people in the three southernmost provinces perceive one of 
the main reasons why the government’s Community Economic Development Plan failed was 
because people in the area did not have an opportunity in planning and participating in the 
project.  
Moreover, state interference over Malay-Muslim citizens destroys the relationship 
between the state through its agencies and people, especially the relations between people and 
the military, which is an important agency that takes major actions aimed at solving the 
conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. Approximately 150,000 soldiers, police, and 
paramilitary troops have been sent to the region to fight and protect people from an estimated 
9,000 rebels in three southernmost provinces (Srisompob 2012: 7). Martial law gives the 
military utmost power over civilians to control the violence. However, the military has been 
accused of enforcing the law without understanding local tradition and regardless of Islamic 
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rules. Moreover, the army has been blamed for using violent strategies by threatening and 
torturing the Malay-Muslims who have been suspected of involvement with the rebels.  
In addition, the massive government budget that has been dumped into the area for 10 
years to solve the problem creates doubt among academics and people who work in the 
conflict area about the transparency of this budget. They question whether state agencies, 
especially the army, enjoy working in the so-called “industry of insecurity” area and 
somehow they believe this is the reason why the violence is prolonged and nowhere close to 
an end (McCargo 2007, Funston 2008, and International Crisis Group 2009). The big concern 
of this defect by the state plus the army is that the insurgents reiterate the injustices and 
human rights abuses by the Thai military to draw people onto their side and alienate them 
from the state. 
Although the desire to participate in politics is an individual decision, the state is one 
of the most important variables that affect the level and pattern of political participation of its 
citizens. However, due to the state’s centralized power and restricted control over citizens, 
political participation in a conflict area is limited by the state’s close watch and tightly 
control under the application of martial law. Thailand can be considered as a strong and 
coercive state in which popular involvement in politics, particularly for those living in the 
midst of conflict and violence, is more likely limited, perhaps pushing them away from 
participation and joining the opposition to against the state rather than bringing in more 
people to participate peacefully through state provided channels. 
 
3) Political participation through civil society: There are increasing numbers of civil 
society organizations in the three southern border provinces since the conflict flared up in 





There are now about 250 civil society organizations
39
 working in the southern border 
provinces of Thailand in many fields such as human rights, women, economics, public health, 
education, media, and development. However, civil society in southern Thailand is weak and 
divided. Although there are such civil society groups as the Civil Society Council of 
Southernmost Thailand and the Deep South Civil Society Media Network that operate to 
create more cooperation among other civil society organizations, the wider and deeper 
collaborations are yet to be seen.  
The increasing numbers of civil society organizations in southern Thailand 
encourages more people to engage in politics and ensures that people have voices in the 
policy-making process towards resolutions of the ongoing conflict. However, the feelings of 
insecurity and the suspicions of local people about the work of civil society organizations 
obstruct them from participating and cooperating in civil society activities. The civil society 
organizations in the Far South of Thailand therefore struggle to prove their effectiveness and 
attract larger group of local people to participate and strengthen the power of the civil society.  
Furthermore, the role of religion must be mentioned here. Typically in southern 
Thailand, religion linked to politics. For example, during election campaigns the candidates 
use religion as a bridge to connect them to the people. For Muslim election candidates, they 
come to pray at mosque and spend time there to promote their policies. Similar to Muslim 
candidates, Buddhist election candidates go to temples to meet and introduce themselves to 
Buddhist voters. However, religion has a more active role and involvement in political 
participation during a conflict situation. Both monks and Imam or Islamic religious leaders 
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are the victims of the violence and the militants are trying to create a division between 
Buddhists and Muslims, threatening the Thai-Buddhists to get them to leave the area
40
. 
However, while both Buddhist and Islamic clericals are targets of the conflict between 
Malay-Muslim militants and the Thai state, they are also important actors that influence 
people’s thoughts and opinions about the prolonged conflict. 
For the Buddhists, the ongoing conflict that has cost thousands of Thai Buddhist lives 
heightens the anti-Muslim sentiment among the Thai Buddhists, not only in the three 
southernmost provinces but throughout the country. The normal functions of Buddhist 
temples in the Far South have changed during the conflict period. Many temples are used not 
only for routine religious activities but also for security purposes, such as shelters for Thai 
soldiers or army camps (McCargo 2009: 23). Buddhist monks have become more engaged in 
politics and express their attitude or even comment on the work of the government regarding 
the conflict
41
. For example, The Pattani Sangha Administration issued statements in response 
to the violent attacks that caused the deaths of Buddhist monks on 16 October 2005 and 5 
March 2011
42
.   
For the Muslims, religious leaders have unavoidably been involved in the conflict 
since the beginning.  The situation of the Malay-Muslims and the religious leaders in 
southern Thailand was particularly bad during the government’s assimilation policy of 
promoting Thai-ness in the late 1930s during Phibun’s government. Examples of  Phibun’s 
assimilation policy are the pressure to convert non-Buddhists to the national Buddhist 
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religion, the eradication of the Islamic civil laws in 1943
43
, the requirement that all children 
had to attend Thai primary schools, instead of studying at village schools run by “Toh Kru” 
(Muslim senior religious teachers) and the cancellation of Fridays as public or school 
holidays. These policies created fear among the Malay-Muslims that the government 
integration policy might turn their homeland into dar al-harb (house of war or the hostile 
territory to the Muslims) and caused more anger, dissatisfaction, and resistance among the 
Malay-Muslims, traditional elites, and religious leaders in the former Greater Patani.   
The reactions of Malay-Muslim clerics towards the government assimilation policy 
and oppressive actions of the Thai state varied from peaceful to violent acts against the Thai 
state. Some of them, such as Haji Sulong Abdulkadir al-Fatani
44
, the President of the Islamic 
Religious Council and a respected and influential Muslim religious teacher in the Far South 
of Thailand, pursued their demands for the better livelihood of the Malay-Muslims through 
opening channels of participation within the Thai political system, whereas some of them 
chose violent means by supporting or joining the rebels.  
In terms of relations between Buddhist and Muslim clerics, although there is little 
communication between them in the area (McCargo 2009: 14), there is recently emerging 
cooperation among religious organizations in Thailand, for example, the Inter-religious 
Council of Thailand (IRC-Thailand), founded in 2009. The organization brings together faith 
leaders from Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism to work towards peace in 
the southern border provinces of Thailand. However, the work of this organization has not yet 
been made clear to the public.   
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It is undeniable that civil society organizations in the three southernmost provinces of 
Thailand have critical roles not only in encouraging political participation but also working as 
a link between the government and local people. There are increasing numbers of civil 
society organizations working in the conflict area of southern Thailand in a variety of fields. 
The funding and civil society activists come from various sources, both domestic and 
international, both Muslims and non-Muslims, and either with or without government 
funding. However, rather than support from the state, the effectiveness of civil society 
depends largely on participation from local people. Due to the condition of conflict and 
violence that can cause unforeseen danger, it is quite difficult for civil society activists to gain 
trust from local people and convince them to join civil society activities.  
When studying political participation of people in the southernmost parts of Thailand, 
influence of the long-lasting conflict is an important variable that needs to be taken into 
consideration. Living in the midst of conflict and violence causes additional concern for the 
Malay-Muslims and other people in the area in deciding how or whether or not they should 
participate. Even though the Thai government does open opportunities for people to 
participate in politics through various channels as discussed above, the tight control under 
martial law and the surveillance by the military still limit political freedom of people there. 
The reactions of people are varied; some ignore politics, some turn against the state, and 
some turn this conflict into more participation. As a result, this thesis makes its main focus on 
this relationship between political participation and conflict, which will be discussed in detail 








Conflict as participation 
 
 
In this section, I review the literature on the relationship between political 
participation and conflict in order to examine the research’s fundamental hypotheses that 
conflict leads to a greater desire for meaningful political participation and when meaningful 
political participation is blocked, it will lead people to more violence in a vicious circle. 
When people think of ‘conflict’, a word with negative meaning, they often imagine a 
confrontation that end up with violence. However, conflict or hardship may be predominantly 
“influential, and in an unexpected direction, a positive one” (Blattman 2009: 245). The same 
factors that lead to conflict and violence can also be a pathway leading more people to 
peaceful political participation. Moreover, Roger D. Petersen (2002) studied ethnic conflict 
by employing an emotion-based approach. He argued that in the midst of conflict, people 
with fear would avoid any risky behaviors because fear “heightens the desire for security” 
(Petersen 2002: 68), whereas people with anger or resentment tend to be more involved in 
riskier activities. Thus, the literature suggests that conflict and violence sometimes have 
pacifying effects by acting as a driver of peaceful political participation and, simultaneously, 
acting in an opposite way as a stimulator for aggressive political action. 
There are several studies from various regions that portray similar patterns of positive 
effects from conflict and violence on the level of political participation. Christopher Blattman 
(2009), whose research focused on war and political participation in Uganda, found that 
violence can lead to greater collective action and victims of violence are considerably more 
likely to vote and to lead in their communities. Experiencing violence increases voting among 
the former soldiers in Uganda.  John Bellows and Edward Miguel (2009) studied war and 
collective action in Sierra Leone and found that individuals who directly experienced 





are more likely to attend community meetings, join social and political groups, and vote. 
Later, Steven Dale Shewfelt (2009) examined social and political life after wartime trauma in 
Aceh, Bosnia, and among Vietnam veteran in the United States. His conclusion is similar to 
the former studies that individuals who experienced more extensive wartime trauma are 
generally more likely to participate in many types of social and political activities than are 
those who experience fewer traumatic wartime experiences.  
Conflict and violence can then act as a trigger that pulls people’s aspiration to 
participate in solving the conflict through non-violent means of participation, largely due to 
witnessing violence and suffering, and this could be the most likely way that leads a country 
to perpetual peace. As Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson (2009: 94) mentioned, “the 
greater the level of participation by all political communities and domestic constituencies, the 
higher the likelihood that certain problems can be alleviated before they turn into serious and 
irresolvable conflict.”  
Conversely, conflict and violence can also reveal negative effects to political actions 
in a way that motivates aggressive political behavior, if there is evidence of state oppressive 
acts that obstruct personal rights and deny citizen participation. The authoritarian regime and 
state repressive security structures can then transform popular pubic resistance into violent 
armed revolution as a response to a brutal and discriminate use of force by the state, as 
happened in Southeast Asia during the 1940s and 1950s, in Central America during the 1970s 
and 1980s, and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s (Goodwin 2001). As Oskars Thoms and Ron 
James (2007) mentioned, denial of political participation rights is linked to internal conflict. 
Abuses of such personal integrity rights as the inequality in accessing basic needs and 
political participation can be recognized as “direct conflict triggers” that lead to conflict 





Thus, conflict and violence have tremendous influence on political attitudes and 
participation. On the one hand, conflict and traumatic experience can transform into the 
increase of individual participation and community activism (Bellows and Miguel 2009: 
1145). On the other hand, living in violent context can have a negative influence on political 
actions depending on the level of state control of citizen participation. Therefore, an 
alternative solution to ease the conflict is to improve access to political participation, not only 
in government but also in the establishment of an open civil society, and a weakening of the 
state’s desire for repression (Thoms and James 2007: 705, and Minority Rights Group 
International 2007: 32).  When there are many legal and non-violent channels of participation 
and the political right of people to participate is protected and promoted, violent actions 
should be less unlikely (Muller 1985: 48). 
In sum, on the one hand, conflict and the state’s repressive actions during the conflict 
can damage confidence in the political system and impede people from participation.  
Moreover, there is a possibility that this condition can turn them to the use of violence as 
another way to preserve their political interests. On the other hand, conflict can promote the 
shared feeling of non-violent actions among groups of people who suffer from the conflict 
and want no more harm and violence in their communities. With this sense of feeling, 












Political participation and conflict are interesting and important issues worthy of 
careful analysis. On the one hand, they seemingly are contrasting words with opposite 
meanings. However, they can be, on the other hand, the perfect match that can turn crisis into 
opportunities and create good fortune from adversity. This thesis therefore would like to 
examine the relationship between political participation of people in the conflict area of 
southernmost provinces of Thailand and find out if there are any linkages between the 
escalating conflict and the level of political participation of people who experience the 
conflict. Based on the literature review discussed earlier, this thesis comes out of these 
following hypotheses; 
1. Conflict leads to a greater desire for peaceful political participation  
2. People in a conflict zone are more likely to participate in politics in other forms 
including electoral and non-electoral ways.  
3. There is a relationship between level of violence and level of political 
participation as follows; 
 The same concerns that lead to violence also lead to participation  
 People’s experience of the violence has an additional impact on their 
desire for political participation. 
 Thus, high levels of violence correlate with a high level of voting, and 
other forms of participation.  
4. A weak civil society failing to promote popular interests and resist state 
domination will lead to more conflict. 
5. A strong state preventing demands and closing channels for peaceful political 






The first three hypotheses are formulated to understand the linkages between the 
escalating conflict in the southernmost provinces of Thailand and the level of political 
participation of people who experienced the conflict. The first hypothesis, which is that 
conflict leads to a greater desire for peaceful political participation, aims to examine the 
general concept of conflict as participation, as reviewed in the literature examined in chapter 
two.  Then, after the concept of conflict, in general terms, is examined to determine whether 
or not the conflict can lead in an unexpected direction, a positive one, the second hypothesis 
aims to examine the political behaviour of people in conflict areas and test the author’s 
assumption of greater participation of people in the conflict areas of the Deep South. 
Hypothesis three aims to link the first two hypotheses together and examine if there is any 
relationship between conflict and participation. The fourth hypothesis aims to investigate the 
participation and performance of civil society and its interaction with local people and the 
state. Finally, the fifth hypothesis looks into the state’s roles and policies towards political 




The research was conducted by applying both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies. The unobtrusive research, which is content analysis and analysis of existing 
statistics, was applied to this thesis as a method of studying the violence in Thailand’s 
southernmost provinces.  Also, the research methodology included conducting qualitative 
field research by using techniques of informal and in-depth interviews to collect data from 
local people and authorities including government officers, Members of Parliament (MPs), 








 The techniques used in unobtrusive measures were as follows; 
 
1. Content analysis 
The research examined the past and present crisis in southern Thailand by gathering 
data from the following sources; 
- Newspapers and newspaper editorials: The data was collected from both national 
and international press during the period in question which was from 2001 until 
the present time. 
- Books and scholarly journals: The issue of violence in three southernmost 
provinces of Thailand has been of wide concern to not only Thai academics and 
journalists, but also international experts on Thailand, on ethnicity and violence, 
on Muslim separatists, or even on terrorism. Therefore, there are many books 
written in Thai or English by these academics and experts about political 
participation and Southern Thailand’s violence during the past ten years. 
Moreover, there are many books written on such topics as political participation, 
ethnic conflict, ethno-religious violence, Muslim minorities, and Muslim 
separatists that happened in other countries that provide a comparative 
perspective.  
- Speeches and interviews: The research also examined speeches and interviews 
given by heads of government and government officials as well as local people in 
the conflict area. These speeches and interviews can be found from newspapers 
and government websites such as the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
- Web pages:  There are many websites posting information about the violence in 





coordinated network of organizations that includes civil society and academic 
sectors both inside and outside of the southern provinces, and www.isranews.org 
which is owned by Thai Press Development Foundation. These websites collect 
news and articles mostly written by people who work for NGOs and stay in the 
conflict zone so the researcher can search for viewpoints of the locals and people 
who actually work in the studied area.  
- Social media: Due to the popularity of the use of social networking sites such as 
Facebook, posted and shared information on social media is included in the study. 
The social media is now not only used by individuals for personal purposes, the 
government agencies, civil society organizations, and even insurgent groups also 
increasingly use this channel to promote their activities and connect with people 
inside and outside the conflict area. Therefore, this source of information can help 
the researcher to gather a variety of information and opinions from various groups 
of people. 
- Government reports: The official reports on the conflict from government 
agencies, such as Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), Office of the 
Prime Minister, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defence, are also taken into 
consideration as important sources in examining the issue through government 
perspectives.  
 
2. Analysis of existing statistics 
This method is particularly significant because existing statistics should always be 
considered at least a supplemental source of data. This research analyzed data on voter 
turnout, the amount of deaths and injuries and economic growth of the conflicted area to 





brought data to bear on the question of how the ongoing conflict affects the level of political 
participation in the southernmost part of Thailand. To that end, the researcher used data 
available from sources such as the National Statistical Office of Thailand, the Office of the 
National Economics and Social Development Board, and the Office of the Election 
Commission of Thailand. 
 
Field work method 
  
1) Semi-structured interview 
This thesis used the semi-structured interview method as the primary technique in 
collecting data. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of research techniques in 
social science, the semi-structure interview is the most suitable technique for this thesis. 
Firstly, this thesis was conducted in conflict areas where discussing conflict and violence is 
regarded as a sensitive issue that could bring danger to participants. Therefore, the anonymity 
of participants is crucial. Although other qualitative technique, such as focus groups, can 
provide in-depth data from participants (Johnson and Turner 2003: 310), it is not anonymous 
as participants in the group can see each other and hear each others’ answers. In addition, the 
nature of group interviews does not encourage free expression (Khan et.al 1991: 2) and the 
group opinions may be dictated by only a few participants (Johnson & Turner 2003: 310).  
 Some quantitative methods, such as questionnaires, are inexpensive (Johnson and 
Turner 2003: 310), guarantee anonymity, and are able to have larger population than 
qualitative method (Steckler et al. 1992: 2). They may be less time-consuming, and data can 
be analyzed more quickly (Yauch and Steudel 2003: 473). Yet, information from the 
quantitative method may lack in-depth information that the researcher needs that and can 





After evaluating all techniques, the semi-structured interview method is the most 
suitable technique for this thesis. This is mainly because the anonymity of participants is the 
priority concern of this study and in-depth data is needed for analyzing the topic. Despite, the 
limitations of this technique, such as it being time-consuming both in data collection and 
analysis, this technique is worth the investment in time.  
The semi-structured interview technique was applied in conducting this research 
because it allows interviewees to express their experiences and opinions freely and allows 
follow-up to clarify those opinions.  Moreover, as some questions involving interviewees’ 
experiences of conflict may inadvertently prove to be personal and sensitive, semi-structured 
interviews allow the discussion to move on to less sensitive topics as appropriate. Yet, semi-
structured interview can allow the researcher to have in-depth information from engaging in 
an open and informal talk with interviewees. 
The information sought from the interviews was as followings: 
1. The opinions and experiences on political participation and conflict in southern 
Thailand 
2. The reasons for and expectations of participating / not participating in political 
activities 
3. The effects of ongoing conflict on political participation 










Table 2-1 shows the core questions asked in the interview, which were set to serve the 
associated topics:  
 
Table 2-1: The sample of topics and questions asked in the interviews 
 
Sample topics Sample questions 
1. Level of political participation and the 
relations between conflict experiences and 
participation. 
 Do you usually vote? 
 Do you participate in any other political 
activities? 
2. The effect of the conflict and violence on 
political participation. 
 Has the conflict prevented you from 
participating in political activities? 
 Has the violence motivated you to get 
involved in politics or try to make things 
better? 
3. Roles and involvement of the state in political 
participation during the conflict 
 
 What methods of political participation are 
available to people in your community? 
 Are people in the conflict areas able to 
participate? How do they participate? 
4. The significant impact of the state on the level 
of political participation and conflict 
 
 Are there enough channels of political 
participation provided by the state? 
 How satisfied are you with state policy on 
political participation and conflict in 
southern Thailand? 
 How does your organization coordinate with 





Sample topics Sample questions 
5. Roles of civil society in responding to 
political participation 
 
 Are you a member of any CSOs? 
 What are your reasons for joining, as a 
member or participants of, CSOs? 
 Do your organization’s activities receive 
much attention from local people? 
6. The significant impact of civil society on the 
level of political participation and conflict 
 Are there enough CSOs in your community? 
 How effective is civil society in your 
community? 
7. The experiences and strategies of politicians 
in running for an election in southern 
Thailand 
 
 What were your strategies in running for an 
election? 
 Does the conflict affect your election 
campaign and policies? 
8. How can political participation enhance 
economic development during the conflict? 
 
 How does your organization participate in 
politics? 
 Do you think a business organization should 
participate in politics? Why? Why not? 
9. Roles and impact of religion towards the 
conflict 
 
 Do religious activities receive much attention 
from local people nowadays? 
 How can religious organizations help people 
who face hardship from the current conflict? 
10. How does the violence affect political 
participation? 
 
 Has the conflict prevented you from 
participating in political activities? 
 Has the violence inspired you to get involved 






2) Risks of interviews 
 
Conducting field research in conflict areas, where participants have a different culture 
and background from the researcher, unavoidably caused some risks and limitations in 
interviews. First of all, due to the concern for safety, the selection of places of interviews had 
to be limited to the areas with lower risks of violent incidents, such as in urban areas. Since 
the interviews were mostly conducted in urban areas, some points of views from rural people 
might be overlooked. However, the researcher did not ignore this weakness. The viewpoints 
of rural people were expressed through interviews of some university students who were 
studying ta Prince of Songkhla University and Thaksin University, but have their hometown 
in rural areas of the southernmost provinces of Thailand, where the conflict and violence is 
more frequent. They expressed the viewpoints of their families and communities, located in 
rural areas, where the researcher could not easily go herself.  
Secondly, the researcher needed to exercise caution and discretion in questions asked 
during interviews. Although the objectives of the interviews were not to bring out detailed 
stories of violent experiences from interviewees, some questions could, without intention, 
cause some anxiety. So, the researcher tried to avoid discussing sensitive issues to decrease 
the risk of anxiety. Yet, there were some interviewees who wanted to share their experiences 
about conflict and violence at their hometown and wanted their stories be heard by other 
people. In addition, having a different religion and culture between interviewer and 
participants may have caused some limitation in discussions. The researcher, who is 
Buddhist, needed to be careful about participants’ religious practices. For example, the 
researcher needed to concern about Muslim praying times and avoid making appointments 
during that time. Some sensitive issues regarding their religious belief, needed to be avoided 





who is Buddhist, needed to be careful about participants’ religious practices. For example, the 
researcher needed to be concerned about Muslim praying times and avoid making 
appointments during that time. Some sensitive issues regarding religious beliefs, needed to be 
avoided or asked with care. Moreover, the differences in religion might cause some distance 
between the researcher and interviewee. There is chance that an interviewee might share 
different information with researchers from a different background or speaking a different 
language, such as English or Malay. 
Furthermore, since the topic of this study is related to the ongoing conflict in their 
region, questions regarding conflict issues needed to be avoided, or asked carefully. Since the 
interviewees were sometimes suspicious, especially when talking to strangers, they tended 
not to give in depth interviews on subjects related to conflict issues. Therefore, in-depth 
information received from interviews was difficult to attain. Last, but not least, since the 
interviewees comprised many groups of people, ranging from university students, to NGOs, 
to military and government officials, the researcher received two opposite sides of the same 
stories. So the researcher needed to be as neutral as possible. To further decrease any bias, the 
researcher tried to find more information from statistical data and other academic sources 
before making analysis drawing conclusions.  
 
3) Ethical issues 
 
 The researcher paid close attention to the safety and rights of interviewees, especially 
when the information provided could put them at risk. This thesis was also approved by the 
Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury and was conducted according to 
their high standards. In addition, due to the differences of culture and religion between the 





university lecturers in the region and discussed potential cultural issues. The data collection 
process was designed to protect the anonymity of participants. The use of pseudonyms is 
applied to all participants. Exact positions or titles are not referenced. Thus, phrases like “a 
local government official”, or “an elected politician” were used in order to preserve 
confidentiality and participants’ identities.  
 The researcher made contact with participants before going to interview them. All 
participants understood the risk involved in this thesis. All of them were aware of the topic 
and scope of questions. The researcher asked participants to choose a place and time where 
they feel comfortable and safe. The researcher did not disclose these schedules to anyone. 
Also, all participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form reminding 
them they could withdraw at any time. The researcher took particular care in avoiding 
sensitive questions, so that no problems were expected. However, if there were situations 
where participants felt uncomfortable or stressed, the researcher was prepared to move away 
from those questions or stop the interview. The researcher asked for permission every time 
before asking them some sensitive questions and if they were hesitant, for example some 
participants might fear that their information might negatively affect their career or future and 
felt uncomfortable talking openly or having a record of that interview. Whenever this 
happened, the researcher did not pressure them to answer. Among all interviewees, there was 
one participant who felt uncomfortable to have the interview recorded because he was afraid 
that his story might later put him at risk. So, the interviewer, with his permission, took notes 









The participants for semi-structured interviews were divided into seven categories as 
follows; 1) local government sector, 2) economic sector, 3) political sector, 4) education 
sector, 5) religion sector, 6) civil society sector, and 7) university students. The researcher 
chose not to interview ordinary local people directly because she was concerned that local 
people might not be well aware that some discussed issues, such as violent incidents, 
separatism, and military activities might put them at risk. In order to avoid any such risks, the 
researcher chose to interview university students, representing local people, and professionals 
from various sectors in order to receive a variety of information from a wide range of 
viewpoints.  
Moreover, based on the fact that the researcher had a limited timeframe that she could 
spend in southern Thailand and her outside status, it would be very difficult to receive much 
in-depth information from local people, since the process of gaining trust always takes time 
to accomplish. In contrast, participants in this thesis were easier to contact and willing to 
discuss in-depth information about the situation in the Southern Thailand with a shorter 
timeframe needed due to their familiarity with the research process.. The seven groups of 
participants were able to provide very helpful in-depth information that researcher might not 
receive from local people. University students, while outside the villages when interviewed, 
are locals. They live in Songkhla, Pattani and surrounding provinces. Many of them are 
Muslim. Some had experiences of violence first hand, both by separatists and the state. 
Students might seem to be the most vulnerable group of all participant groups. However, 







Case study  
 
 The research was conducted in Mueang district of Pattani and 4 districts of Songkhla 
by dividing into 3 different areas of study. 
1. High violence conflict area: Mueang district of Pattani 
2. Low violence conflict area: Chana and Thepha of Songkhla 
3. Non violence conflict area: Ranot and Sating Phra of Songkhla 
 For Pattani, the province has experienced the most frequent violence in 2014. 
According to the 2014 Annual Report by Deep South Incident Database (DSID), during 
1 January – 24 December 2014, there were 793 serious incidents in 3 provinces and 4 
districts of Songkhla, 291 from 793 violent incidents happened in Pattani (272 incidents in 
Narathiwat, 200 incidents in Yala and 30 incidents in Songkhla). Among all districts of 
Pattani, Mueang district experienced the most frequent violence in 2014 (41 from 291 
events). So, Mueang district of Pattani was selected as a case study and put into the group of 
high violence conflict area for this study.  
As the violence has escalated beyond 3 provinces (Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat), the 
4 districts of Songkhla which are Na Thawi, Saba Yoi, Chana, and Thepha has been added 
into the Emergency Decree in the Deep South of Thailand. Interestingly, amidst the violent 
incidents, voter turnout in these 4 districts was higher than the other districts in the province 
that have no record of violence. Constituency 8 of Songkhla including Chana and Thepha 
districts has the highest voter turnout rates which were 82.42% in 2005 and 83% in 2011. 
Constituency 4, Ranot, Krasae Sin, and Sathing Phra districts were reported as one of the 
poorest districts of Songkhla and have no record of violence. Voter turnout there was only 





 Therefore, based on statistical data of violence and voter turnout, Mueang district of 
Pattani and the 4 districts of Songkhla were chosen for comparison in order to seek a clearer 
perception of how people in high violence conflict, low violence conflict, and non violence 
conflict zones act differently in terms of political participation.  Mueang district of Pattani 
represents a high violence conflict area study, Chana and Thepha of Songkhla is studied as 
low violence conflict area, and the non violence conflict area of study are Ranot and Sathing 
Phra (Kra Sae Sin was not taken into consideration because there is no mosque in this 
district). 
This thesis focuses mainly on political participation in conflict areas of the Deep 
South. Case studies were chosen to create clearer pictures of how people in different types of 
conflict zones and non conflict zones act differently in terms of political participation. 
Despite having different social and historical context, Ranot and Sathing Phra are located in 
Songkhla, which is the same province as the low violence conflict areas of this study, Chana 
and Thepha. So, they share some similar aspects, such as the same local state officials.  Also, 
since Ranot and Sathing Phra are not far from the Deep South where the violent incidents 
occur, the influence from the conflict and violence in the Deep South unavoidably affects 
people in Ranot and Sathing Phra to some degree. Therefore, due to sharing some issues of 
conflict and violence, Ranot and Sathing Phra were selected for study to provide a broader 
perspective on the influence of conflict and violence, although they are not presented as full 
case studies.  
 The present chapter presents insights from the literature on political participation in general 
view and more specifically on conflict-related participation. Also, the overall image of political 
participation in the Thai and Thai south context is presented to provide a basic understanding of 
political participation in Thailand. In the next chapter, my thesis further explores political 
participation and conflict in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand before 2001 by dividing 





Chapter 3 :  Political Participation in the Deep South before 2004 
 
 
Due to being conquered unwillingly by the Thai state, and incorporating all the 
religious, ethnic, cultural, educational, socio-economic grievances explained above,  the 
Malay-Muslims in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand has a long history of 
resistance in varying degrees against the Thai governments to preserve their rights and seek 
justice. However, not all Malay-Muslims consider such violent resistance as the best way to 
fight for protecting their rights. The vast majority show their intentions to participate within 
the Thai political system through elections, contacting state officials, and civil society to 
pursue their goals. Although the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand cannot always overtly 
express their political opinions because of concern over the consequences which may be 
violent, their attention to politics is not different from the Buddhists (Albritton and Denton 
2008: 9).  
 When the Thai government lessened the degree of assimilation policies and moved to 
a more democratic system, the Malay-Muslims participated increasingly within the Thai 
political system through national and local elections, as well as non-electoral channels of 
participation. As James Ockey (2008: 124) stated, “When political participation has been 
allowed, the Malay Muslim community has sought to work within the system to meet its 
goal.” Because of increasing political participation, the Malay-Muslims were able to acquire 
more political control, which also enabled them to gain more bargaining power and 
capabilities to develop their communities and protect their rights and seek justice. Moreover, 
the open channels of participation would make the Malay-Muslims more willing to 







Political participation through election 
 
 The change of the Thai political system from absolute monarchy to constitutional 
democracy in 1932 opened opportunities for the Malay-Muslims to participate in Thai 
politics. However, the group of reformers, called the Promoters, considered that Thai citizens 
were not ready yet for full democracy due to the low level of education and political skills. 
So, members of parliament in the early period comprised one half appointed members and the 
other half elected members (Ockey 2008: 126). In addition, formal political parties were 
banned until the 1957 election, although informal political parties emerged at the end of 
World War II.  
The first election in Thailand was held in 1933, an indirect election. The first elected 
MPs in the three southernmost provinces were all Thai Buddhists. However, none of them 
was elected ever again. The next election in 1937, the first direct election in the country, 
opened new channels for the Malay-Muslims to express their political opinion through voting 
and the parliamentary system. The competition of the candidates was intense, especially the 
competition between Kamukda Abdunlabut
45
 and Chareon Seubsaeng
46
in Pattani province. 
Charoen, although a Buddhist, was Haji Sulong’s supporter and closed friend (Bukhoree 
2006: 30) so he got some support from the Malay-Muslim voters who supported Haji Sulong. 
During the election campaign, Kamukda tried to convince the Malay-Muslim voters to vote 
for a Muslim candidate (Kamukda was the only Malay-Muslim among four candidates) and 
criticized Haji Sulong that he supported a Thai Buddhist candidate rather than the Malay-
Muslim brotherhood (Ockey 2008: 128-129). However, the election in the three southern 
provinces cannot be considered only as a contest between the Malay-Muslims and the Thai-
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Buddhists, it should also be considered as a competition between two different political 
opinions regarding the Malay-Muslim future, especially a competition between Kamukda’s 
integration campaign policy and Haji sulong’s autonomy principles, supported by Charoen. 
James Ockey (2008: 130) commented about this rivalry that 
This pattern may seem ironic since generally Kamukda supported integration while Haji 
Sulong supported autonomy, yet this reversal is also a good indication of the way that 
integration and autonomy were confused, but nevertheless central to the electoral process at 
the time.  
Before Thailand had elections, the Malay-Muslims who wanted autonomy or 
disagreed with Thai integration usually joined the rebels and express their demands violently 
against the Thai state. After elections were held, Malay-Muslims who wanted autonomy 
chose to fight within Thai political system to pursue their goals. Although it is a different 
kind of fight, it could be the way to reach to the same goals.  
The first direct national election in 1937 indicated the successful attempt of the 
Muslim candidates and voters to have their Muslim representatives from the three southern 
provinces in the parliament for the first time. The two elected MPs, Kamukda Abdunlabut 
and Tengku Abdul Jalal
47
, were traditional elites who decided to participate within Thai 
political system as representatives of the Malay-Muslims. However, the election did not open 
opportunity for only traditional elites to participate in Thai politics but also opened a chance 
for ordinary Malay-Muslim citizens.  Waelae Ben Abat
48
, the first Malay-Muslim MP of 
Yala, was not of royal blood but was just an ordinary Malay-Muslim tradesman in Yala who 
decided to take part in Thai politics and use the parliamentary system as a way to defend the 
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interests of the Malay-Muslims (Bukhoree 2012: 44-45).  All three MPs from the 1937 
election were re-elected in 1938. The results of the 1933, 1937, and 1938 national elections in 
the three southern border provinces are shown in Table 3-1 
 
Table 3-1: National election results from 1933 to 1938 
 
 Yala Pattani Narathiwat 
 Name Religion Name Religion Name Religion 
1933 Sa-Nga Saisinlapa Buddhist Thaen Wisetsombat Buddhist Rit Ratthanasisuk Buddhist 
1937 Waelae Ben Abat Muslim Kamukda Abdunlabut Muslim Tengku Abdul Jalal Muslim 
1938 Waelae Ben Abat Muslim Kamukda Abdunlabut Muslim Tengku Abdul Jalal Muslim 
    
 Source:  Adapted from James Ockey 2008, “Elections and Political Integration in the Lower 
South of Thailand,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on the Plural 
Peninsula, edited by Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: NUS Press), 
p. 127. 
 
However, even though the Thai new political system opened more opportunities for 
the Malay-Muslims, both traditional elites and ordinary citizens, to have voices in the 
parliament through voting, the work of the Malay-Muslim MPs from the three southern 
provinces was threatened by the Thai governments.  Tengku Abdul Jalal, or Adul Na Saiburi, 
was the first Malay-Muslim MP of Narathiwat who tried to work within the Thai political 
system. However, after his debate in parliament in 1944 against General Phibun, where he 
argued that the Phibun government mistreated the Malay-Muslims, he was kept under 
observation by the government. He, then, had to flee to Malaysia in 1945
49
. Since the channel 
for participation through the parliamentary system was closed for him, he was left to choose 
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between violence and doing nothing. So, rather than participating within the Thai political 
system as before, he chose violent methods to fight against the Thai state by joining the 
resistance movement
50
, founding the BNPP later on.  
Since the Malay-Muslim MPs could not function effectively in the Thai political 
system, the confidence of the Malay-Muslims in the Thai political system and governments 
gradually decreased (Thanet 2004: 21). Moreover, the dissatisfaction of the Malay-Muslims 
toward the assimilation policy during Phibun government (1938-1944) led to low voter 
turnout in the region which benefited the Buddhist candidates (Ockey 2008: 132-133). As a 
result, all seats in the three southern provinces were won by the Thai Buddhist politicians in 
the 1946 election. There was only one seat in the 1948 election belonging to the Muslim 
candidate in Narathiwat, Samat Eiamvirot, and only one Muslim candidate in Pattani, 
Kamukda Abdunlabut, was re-elected in 1952 (see Table 3-2).  
 
Table 3-2: National election results from 1946 to 1952 by provinces 
 
 Yala Pattani Narathiwat 
 Name Religion Name Religion Name Religion 
1946 Prasart Chaiyatho Buddhist Chareon Seubsaeng Buddhist Wong Chaisuwan Buddhist 
1948 Salee Kunnarong Buddhist Chareon Seubsaeng Buddhist Samat Eiamvirot Muslim 
1952 Prasart Chaiyatho Buddhist Kamukda Abdunlabut Muslim Erb Issara Buddhist 
 
Source:  Adapted from James Ockey 2008, “Elections and Political Integration in the Lower 
South of Thailand,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on the Plural 
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Although the Thai governments provided electoral channels of participation, political 
participation through voting in the early period could not gain much attention from the 
majority of the Malay-Muslims. Among the 5 elections between 1933 and 1948, only the 
1946 national election was held under a democratic regime during the term of Prime Minister 
Seni Pramoj, while the others were held under military governments. However, the voter 
turnout rates of national elections in 1946 were still as low as 20 percent, 32 percent, and 28 
percent in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, respectively, while national average was 32.52 
percent (Morell 1974: 254).  
The reasons of the low voter turnout in earlier periods could also be because of the 
limited development of transportation. So, it was difficult for the Malay-Muslim voters in the 
rural areas to get to the polls, especially in the wake of World War II (Ockey 2008: 132-133).  
Moreover, the low literacy in Thai of the Malay-Muslims was another difficulty that 
obstructed them from political participation (Yegar 2002: 90). Also, the close surveillance 
and aggressive actions by the Thai state and its officials towards the Malay-Muslim 
candidates and residents destroyed trustworthiness in the Thai political system. So, the 
majority of the Malay-Muslims chose not to participate in elections, which favored Thai-
Buddhist candidates who had their support from the Buddhists in the urban areas of the three 
southern provinces. However, although voter turnout was low in the southern border 
provinces, the competition between election candidates was aggressive and intense. Samat 
Eiamvirot, the Muslim MP from Narathiwat, was shot to death in front of his house in 
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The 1957 election in February was the first election where the candidates were 
formally affiliated with political parties, after the country issued the Political Party Act in 
1955 during the Phibun government. However, the government party until 1975 always got 
the majority of votes because they had controlling power over the cabinet and the 
bureaucracy (Ockey 1994: 253). Similar to other regions, the elected candidates of the three 
southern border provinces were mostly affiliated with a government party. The Seri 
Manangkasila party, the government party and first registered political party of Thailand, led 
by General Phibun, won most seats in the 1957 February election; the Sahaphumi party, a 
government party supported by General Sarit, won most seats in the following election; and 
the Sahaprachathai party (United Thai People’s party), a government party led by General 
Thanom, won most seats in the 1969 election (see Table 3). Areephen Uttarasin (2013), the 
former MP from Narathiwat, interestingly remarked that despite the unjust practices and the 
implementation of assimilation policies of the military governments during the 1950s and the 
1960s, the well-known Malay-Muslim politicians who were highly likely to be elected 
decided to affiliate with the government parties. The Malay-Muslim politicians who were 
affiliated with the government party included Ahmeen Tohmeena, the second son of Haji 
Sulong and older brother of Den Tohmeena. Despite the widespread belief his father was 
killed by the Thai officials in 1954, Ahmeen decided to run for election in 1957 under 
Phibun’s party, the Seri Managkasila. This is because in the opposition the Malay-Muslim 
politicians would have no influence in cabinet or on policy. Therefore, joining a government 








However, Ahmeen Tohmeena faced a similar fate to Tengku Abdul Jalal. During a 
year of participation through parliamentary system, he was a spokesman for the Malay-
Muslims regarding their rights and justice. In 1958, he published and distributed the book 
written by his father, Haji Sulong. This book, Gugusan Chahaya Kesalamatan (The light of 
peace), explained “the necessity of struggling for independence and co-operation among the 
Malays” (Haemindra 1977: 85, note 3). The Thai government perceived this distribution of 
Sulong’s books as a threat to the Thai state, so the books were burnt and Ahmeen was 
charged with being a rebel (Komchadleuk 13 March 2013). After he was discharged, he was 
closely watched and believed himself likely to be assassinated by the Thai government 
(McCargo 2008: 63). So, he had to flee to Malaysia and was believed to become the leader of 
the BRN-Coordinate (Thairath 2 January 2014).  
After the 35-year-long period that the country was ruled under military governments 
between 1938 and 1973, there was a short period of civilian government. The influence of the 
military government party had faded and would finally disappear. However, many politicians 
from the government parties still remained although they changed to other political parties 
instead.  Under the new constitution issued by the civilian government, led by Sanya 
Dhammasak, in 1974, some election regulations were changed. For example, the candidates 
had to affiliate with political parties and the constituencies changed from province based to 
district based. Some seats in the 1975 election were lost to Thai-Buddhist candidates. There 
were half Malay-Muslim MPs and half Thai Buddhist MPs in the Far South, and they came 
from different political parties (see Table 3-3).  
Unlike the 1975 election, in the 1976 national election, the Malay-Muslim candidates 
from the Democrat party won all seats in the three southern provinces (See Table 3-3). This 
election can be considered one of the most important elections for the Malay-Muslims 





would guarantee a Minister position in the government to a Malay-Muslim if the Democrat 
candidates in the southern border provinces won all the seats. The religious leaders in the 
South then cooperated and worked together to support Democrat candidates; ultimately, the 
Democrat candidates won all seats in the three southern provinces, including Satun. As 
promised, the Democrat Party, the winning party in the 1976 national election, appointed 
three Malay-Muslim MPs to work in high-ranking positions in the government. Siddik Sareef 
from Narathiwat was appointed as Deputy Minister of Education; Den Tohmeena from 
Pattani was appointed as Secretary of the Minister of Defence; and Sudin Phuyutthanon from 
Pattani was appointed as Secretary of the Minister of Finance. It was the first time in Thai 
history that the Malay-Muslims in southernmost provinces of Thailand worked in high-level 
political positions in the Thai government
52
 (Areephen 2012).  
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Table 3-3: National election results from 1957 to 1979 by provinces 
 
 Yala Pattani Narathiwat 
 Name Religion Political Party Name Religion Political Party Name Religion Political Party 
Feb 
1957 






































































































Source:  Adapted from James Ockey 2008, “Elections and Political Integration in the Lower South of Thailand,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic 




In subsequent elections, especially in 1979 and 1983, although the majority of MPs in 
the three southern provinces were still Malay-Muslim candidates, they were affiliated with 
different political parties. Therefore, instead of creating a powerful political force for the 
Malay-Muslims, the Malay-Muslim politicians had limited influence in national politics as 
their power was divided by political party differences. To deal with this concern, the Malay-
Muslim politicians formed a political group called “Wadah”, meaning unity, in order to 
create a stronger political force for the Malay-Muslims. Den Tohmeena was elected to be 
chairman of the group with a 12-member committee (Che Man 2003: 19). Its members 
included not only the Malay-Muslims but also Thai-Buddhists, such as Preecha Boonmee and 
Phibun Pongthanet.  
At first, the candidates from the Wadah group ran in the 1986 election under the 
Democrat party, and five of its candidates won election in the three southern border 
provinces. However, the Wadah group was upset by the head of Democrat party, Pichai 
Rattakul, because he did not appoint any member of Wadah group to a political position. As a 
result, Wadah decided to withdraw from the Democrat Party and formed its own political 
party called People’s party or Pak Prachachon and successfully ran in the 1988 election (Che 
Man 2003: 20).  Later, the Wadah group joined the New Aspiration Party, formed and led by 
General Chavalit Yongchaiyut, and won most seats in both elections in 1992 (see Table 3-4). 
Due to its stronger political power as a group, the Malay-Muslim MPs were able to gain high 
ranking positions in the cabinet. For example, Den Tohmeena was appointed Deputy Minister 
of Public Health in 1990 and Deputy Minister of Interior in 1992; Wan Muhamad Noor 
Matha was appointed Deputy Minister of Interior in 1994 and Minister of Transport in 1995; 
and Areephen Uttarasin was appointed Deputy Secretary General of the Prime Minister in 
1995. 




Table 3-4: National election results from 1983 to 1997 by provinces 
 
 Yala Pattani Narathiwat 
 Name Religion Political Party Name Religion Political Party Name Religion Political Party 
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1988 Phairoj Chaleawsak 


















































































1995 Prasert Phongsuwansiri 
Burhanuddin Useng 































1996 Phisal Yingsaman 





































Political participation through elections has been revolutionized, since the 
promulgation of the 16
th
 constitution in October 1997. The 1997 constitution is often called a 
“People’s Constitution”. The new regulations, such as specifying that election is a duty of 
Thai people, providing more flexible rules to set up a new political party, and electing the 
Senate for the first time in Thailand, positively affected political participation of Thai people, 
including the Malay-Muslims in the three southern provinces. The first election after the 
promulgation of the 1997 constitution was held in 2001, which will be discussed in Chapter 
4. This channel of political participation has at least a limitation, however. Thai politics, 
under a bureaucratic polity where political power is clustered in the centralized 
administration to protect some specific interest groups, leaves only small space for the elected 
representatives of the provinces to work for their voters (Suhrke 1977: 240). Moreover, due 
to the limited power that can be used to fulfill Malay-Muslim demands and protect their 
rights through the parliamentary system, some of the candidates and voters chose to join the 
separatist movement outside the parliament.  
In sum, political participation through elections in the Deep South before the re-
emergence of the conflict and violence in the early 2000s experienced some limitations for 
both voters and politicians. For the voters in the earlier period, their participation in voting 
showed a low rate of voter turnout due to many reasons, including the difficulty in 
transportation, the illiteracy of local people, a lack of interest in politics, and the negative 
attitudes of local people towards Thai government officials and the political system. So, when 
voters lacked incentives to vote, their participation in elections tended to be low. For 
politicians, the earlier period illustrated the difficulties for Malay-Muslim politicians to work 
in the Thai parliament. The feeling of distrust of the Thai government towards the Malay-
Muslim politicians obstructed their performance of their duties. As a result, when 




left with no choice, but to join the rebels instead. Although the roles of Malay-Muslim 
politicians gradually increased, especially in the 1990s, the centralized power of Thai politics 
impeded Malay-Muslim representatives from working effectively for their electorates. When 
the Malay-Muslim politicians could not deliver policies as promised, voters did not vote and 
this could also contribute to the low rate of voter turnout. 
 Even though political participation through elections cannot provide fully satisfactory 
solutions to the conflict in the South, they are at least another option for the Malay-Muslims 
to express their demands through elected candidates, and those demands hopefully can be 
heard by the government and affect public policy. Although the elected MPs have an 
important role in directly bringing people’s problems and demands to the government, the 
state officials and local authorities are also very important not only in delivering state policies 
but also in taking care of individual problems as a first contact point for the locals. Political 




Political participation through the state 
   
After Thailand changed to a new political system in 1932, modes of political 
participation opened for broader groups of people through more participation channels 
provided by the state. In addition to electoral participation, Thai citizens, including the Malay 
Muslims, also participated by contacting the state and its agencies. However, there were some 
problems ranging from cultural differences between Thai state officials and the locals to the 
oppression from state centralization policy and government officials. Political participation 
through the state before 2001 thereby was not popular among the Malay-Muslims in the 




contact and interaction between the Malay-Muslims and state officials, including courts, local 
bureaucrats, and security officials.  
The conflict and violence in the South that originated from the annexation of the 
Patani kingdom by the Kingdom of Siam and the history of the Malay-Muslim’s resistance to 
protect their rights and independence was fuelled by a range of grievances as explained in the 
former section.  Amongst all the grievances, the state assimilation policies towards the 
Muslim laws and courts were one of the most sensitive problems that created dissatisfaction 
and reduced the participatory atmosphere among the Malay-Muslim communities in the 
lower South. In terms of political participation, courts are generally regarded as a neutral 
institution that people use to communicate with state officials when they need justice (Dor 
and Hofnung 2006: 131).  In the past, since the annexation with the Thai kingdom in 1902, 
Siam wanted to apply a single legal system to the entire country which included the area of 
the Malay-Muslims in the lower south. Islamic law was thus replaced by Siamese law. 
However, King Chulalongkorn approved a compromise on sensitive cases related to family 
and inheritance by granting autonomy to the Malay-Muslims to apply Islamic law over civil 
cases (Surin 1985: 120). So, during that period public legal issues were settled under Thai 
laws and personal matters of the Malay-Muslims were judged under Islamic laws by Muslim 
judges or Qadi, later called Dato Yutitham
53
. 
However, in practice the Thai government still intervened and controlled the legal 
procedure of the Malay-Muslims. The Thai government was concerned that Islamic law was 
not consistent and systematic, so the government demanded control over the Muslim courts 
when?? Add date (Surin 1985: 123). The Thai government took control of the religious courts 
by getting involved in the selection process of Qadi who were Muslim judges of the religious 
courts. As for cases filed under Thai courts, although Muslim judges were appointed to join 
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the panel, they only acted as advisors to Thai judges. So, the Muslim judges had no real 
power in the Thai state court system (Yegar 2002: 77-78).  
The intervention into the Malay-Muslim justice system by the Thai state was even 
more problematic when the Phibun government abolished Islamic family and inheritance law 
in 1944 under his assimilation policy, although this change was short-lived.  All the Islamic 
judges of the religious courts for family and property cases were removed (Thanet 2007: 36). 
Phibun believed that “enacting a special law applicable to Muslims would be equivalent to 
granting Muslims special rights, and thus fragmenting Thai identity” (Muhammad 2011: 6).  
However, for Muslims, Islamic laws, especially for marriage, divorces, and 
inheritance, are very important. They believe that it is a heavy sin if they do not act according 
to religious prescriptions. So, the Malay-Muslims avoided filing their cases in Thai courts 
that were arbitrated by Thai judges under Thai laws (Chalermkiat 1986: 33). The Malay-
Muslims thus preferred to settle their cases informally. Some would present their cases to the 
Islamic courts in Malaysia and some would take their cases to the local ulama in their 
provinces (Ockey 2011: 110). The intervention of the Thai state towards the Islamic justice 
procedures increased the antagonistic feelings of the Malay-Muslims towards the Thai state 
and pushed them away from contacting Thai state officials, especially when they needed a 
justice. There also were protests in the Muslim Lower South provinces to demonstrate their 
disagreement with Thai state policies.  
The subsequent government wanted to reduce the strong feelings and normalize the 
situation. The Khuang government thus promulgated the Islamic Patronage Act in 1945 and 
reintroduced Islamic law to apply to cases related to family affairs and inheritance, which is 
still applied until the present time. However, the application of Islamic laws only applied to 
the Muslims in the four southern provinces as indicated in the section 3 of the Rule on the 




Islamic Family Law and Inheritance shall be applied in the Court of First Instance in Pattani, 
Narathiwat, Yala and Satun where Muslims are both the plaintiff and the defendant or a 
Muslim files a request in non-contentious cases. (Muhammad 2011: 7) 
Nevertheless, the judicial system of Islam was still under the control of jurisdiction of 
the Thai central government.  The Muslim judges or Dato Yutitham, who were selected by 
the government and had to be able to speak and write Thai, had no real power because the 
final judgment of each case was decided by a judge from the Ministry of Justice. The 
intervention of the Thai government in Islamic courts was opposed by Haji Sulong, who 
strongly believed that the Muslim courts should not be under secular government and the 
Muslim judges had to be selected by the local imams (Ockey 2011: 112). 
So, Haji Sulong raised the concern on the Islamic court system in his seven-point 
demands to request for a separate Muslim court and the utmost authority of Muslim judges in 
religious courts. However, although there were attempts from the government to negotiate, 
Sulong’s request for the court system was never approved. The Thai government explained 
that having separate courts would be too costly for the Thai government as there were 
relatively few religious cases each year  (Thanet 2008: 109). As per records, there was no 
Malay-Muslim case in the Thai courts at all between 1943 and 1947 (Chalermkiat 1986: 34). 
However, the reason claimed by the Thai government seemed to avoid the fact that it was 
probably not that the Malay-Muslims had few cases but that they needed their cases to be 
judged by Islamic laws. So, this could be the reason that the Malay-Muslims chose not to 
contact Thai judicial officials to file their cases in Thai courts that against their religious 
prescriptions. Ultimately, the concern about the Islamic courts brought about negotiations 
between the Thai state and the Malay-Muslim religious leaders. Although there was no 




expressed, “brought religious leaders in the lower South into the political process in 
meaningful ways”.  
A disagreement on the separation of courts and intervention of the Thai state in 
religious courts were not the only factors that created a negative atmosphere on political 
participation through the state. The implementation of centralization and the assimilation 
policy that gave less importance to the problem of cultural differences between the Thai-
Buddhist governors and bureaucrats and the Malay-Muslim citizens also stirred antagonism 
in the broader Malay-Muslim community. However, not only the state policy was criticized; 
the mistreatment by Thai governors and bureaucrats of the Malay-Muslims was also part of 
the failure in encouraging popular participation through the state.   
The ignorance and unawareness of cultural differences by Thai-Buddhist governors, 
who were the rulers of the provinces, contributed to their ill-treatments of the locals. The 
behaviors of the governors, who came from different races and religions, induced hesitation 
among the Malay-Muslims to make contact with the state agents. However, the maltreatment 
caused by their negligence in regard to Malay-Muslim culture caused more problems and 
increased the feeling of detestation and opposition against the state. One example that 
illustrated the problem of cultural ignorance of Thai governors that impeded the Malay-
Muslims from political participation through the state came during the implementation of 
State Decrees between 1939 and 1942. The Governor of Pattani, Luang Sunavinwiwat, 
informed local bureaucrats not to provide government services to Malay-Muslims who wear 
sarongs or dressed improperly according to the State Decrees (Chalermkiat 1986: 28).  
Another unpleasant incident of cultural ignorance happened in 1944 when the Thai 
Governor of Pattani, Khunjunyawiset, told the Malay-Muslim dignitaries and ulama at a 
meeting to display honor toward a statue of Buddha as it represented a symbol of the state. 




an insult to Islam, although the Thai governor of Pattani explained that this was just a gesture 
of respect.  Tengku Abdul Jalal, the MP of Narathiwat, sent letters to Prime Minister Phibun 
and raised this issue in the parliament. The response from the government and parliament 
upset him (Yegar 2002: 91-92).  
Besides the cultural ignorance of the Thai Governors, the tight control and 
surveillance due to the suspicions of the Thai rulers towards the Malay-Muslims impeded and 
discouraged the Malay-Muslims from pursuing their political goals within the Thai political 
system.  Even though the new political system opened new pathways for participation, it 
seemed that the pathways for the participation of the Malay-Muslims was surrounded by 
surveillance cameras and barred by a brick wall. An active participant in politics was usually 
perceived by the Thai state as an enemy who needed to be kept under close watch by the 
state. Thai governors as local state authorities were then assigned to do this job for the state.  
There were many examples of Malay-Muslims who tried to participate within legal 
channels of political participation, but the more the politically active they were, the more 
likely they became suspected of insurgency in the eyes of the Thai state. An early example 
was Tengku Abdul Jalal, the former MP of Narathiwat. After he tried to raise the issue of 
abuse and mistreatment by the Thai governor and local authorities towards the Malay-
Muslims in 1944, he was regarded by the Thai state as too radical and needing close 
observation. So, he was put under close watch by Thai state officials. With no choice and no 
hope in the Thai political system, he had to leave the parliament and country; subsequently, 
he became the founder of the BNPP, the underground separatist group that used violence to 
seek independence from Thailand.  
The next example was more tragic. Similar to Tengku Abdul Jalal, due to Haji 
Sulong’s political activity, government officials started to place Sulong under close 




112). Unlike other Malay-Muslims who used violent methods to reach their goals of 
autonomy to preserve their rights under Islam and their identity of Malay, Sulong fought to 
reach the same goal but with non-violent means under Thai laws. However, the expressions 
of autonomy, even by non-violent methods, were always considered by Thai governments as 
supporting separatism (Ockey 2008: 137). Therefore, Sulong’s actions were considered 
suspicious and he was kept under close watch by state officials and local authorities. Phraya 
Rattanaphakdi (Chaeng Suwannachinda)
54
, the last royal Thai governor of Pattani was re-
appointed by the military government in 1947 as the governor of Pattani and was ordered to 
solve the conflict in the South.  He opposed Sulong’s political orientation and perceived 
Sulong’s active political roles as stimulating conflict and resistance in the southern provinces 
(Thanet 2008: 101). He started to secretly spy on Sulong by selecting both Thais and Malay-
Muslims who he trusted as his agents
55
 (Chalermkiat 1986: 104-105). Eventually, Phraya 
Rattanaphakdi had a crucial role in the arrest of Sulong in 1948
56
. Sadly, Sulong was then 
killed by the Thai police in 1954.  
Moreover, besides the hostile relationship with the Thai-Buddhist governors that 
hindered Malay-Muslim’s intentions of political participation through the state, the 
relationship between Thai bureaucrats and the locals was also sour.  Olli-Pekka Ruohomaki 
(1999: 99) described the southerners as having “a feeling of dislike for the central 
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government and its representatives and pride in the local dialect, culture, and history.” So, the 
contact and relationship between the local Malay-Muslims and the Thai-Buddhist bureaucrats 
who were sent to the area by central governments remained limited because the Malay-
Muslims perceived those bureaucrats as outsiders and as hostile (Enloe 1980: 88).  
One of the major problems that limited political participation through the state in the 
earlier period before 2001 was the cultural and language barrier. Although the Malay-




Table 3-5), the number of Malay-Muslims who worked in local administration was 
very low. In 1975, 85 percent of village chiefs in Yala, Pattani, and Naratiwat were Muslims 
who could not read and write Thai (Girling 1981: 265), whereas the majority of the 
administrative bureaucrats in the three provinces were Thai Buddhists who could not 
understand Malay (McCargo 2005: 5). This unbalance of local officials not only decreased 
the possibility of political participation through the state but also reduced effectiveness of 
policy implementation. The work of village heads as a bridge to deliver state policies and as 
representatives of the villages to convey the desires of the community to the Thai bureaucrats 
who worked in the area were difficult due to the ineffectiveness of communication caused by 






Table 3-5: Population of the three southernmost provinces in 1973, 1990, and 2000 
 
 
1973 1990 2000 
Total Muslims Muslims 
(%) 
Total Muslims Muslims 
(%) 
Total Muslims Muslims 
(%) 
Yala 218,546 133,313 61 340,982 217,365 64 415,500 286,279 69 
Pattani 387,842 302,517 78 515,372 403,287 78 596,000 480,972 81 
Narathiwat 371,930 290,105 78 546,755 432,655 79 662,400 543,168 82 
 
    Source: 1973 data was adapted from Nantawan Haemindra, “The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in 
the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part One),” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Vol. 7, No. 2 (September, 1976): 198.  
    1990 and 2000 data was adapted from National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime 
Minister, Bangkok, 1990 and 2000 
 
    
Even though there were attempts by the Malay-Muslims, such as Haji Sulong, to ask 
for more Malay-Muslim government officials in the Malay-Muslim provinces, the state 
would not act on this request. Astri Suhrke (1977: 239) argued that, even if the Malay-
Muslims were qualified in terms of education, they were deprived from working in 
administrative positions in the Far South because they seemed to be untrustworthy in the eyes 
of the Thai state. Some of the Muslim bureaucrats even changed their religion to Buddhism 
because they believed being Buddhist could give them more success in their careers 
(Chalermkiat 1986: 28). 
Therefore, Thai-Buddhist officers were sent to work in the Malay-Muslim provinces 
instead of employing local Malay-Muslims. Moreover, many of officials were reassigned to 
work in the southern border provinces as a punishment for bad behavior in other regions 
(Ockey 2008: 148).  There were more than one hundred civil servants transferred to the Far 
South as a punishment for the charges of, for example, corruption and maltreatment, during 




Many of them were disappointed to work in a remote area far from Bangkok, and that created 
tensions and bad treatment when giving service to local people. The relationship between 
state officials and local people worsened due to many complaints about harassment, 
mistreatment, and corruption by the Thai state officials. As a result, many locals preferred to 
avoid contact with Thai bureaucrats and officials, including the police and the military 
wherever and whenever possible (McCargo 2004: 7).  
The relationship between Thai security officers and the Malay-Muslims was also 
weak and probably the weakest among all units of the bureaucracy. The locals perceived state 
security officers, especially the police, as violent and unjust. When the locals think about the 
Thai security officers in the South region, the story that were passed from generation to 
generation were mostly stories about hostility, maltreatment, and injustice. For example, the 
story about the maltreatment caused by an unjust assimilation policy and its implementation; 
the police aggressively pulled off and threw away women’s hijabs; the police took off and 
kicked taqiyah (prayer cap) like a rattan ball (Chalermkiat 1986: 30-31), and the following 
story about the Thai police as a law enforcement agency that applied aggressive strategies to 
the suspected: 
when a Malay was accused of friendship with bad elements, he was immediately arrested by 
the Siamese police, taken to a lonely place, and beaten before he was taken to the place of 
detention. They were always threatened and slandered in various ways by the Siamese 
police, arrested, or simply beaten without bothering to take the matter to court (Syukri 1985: 
86). 
 Another story of aggressive and abusive practices by Thai security officers that led to 
political unrest in Pattani happened in 1975 when five Muslims were allegedly killed by Thai 
marine soldiers and one boy was seriously injured but survived. It was one example of how 




but peaceful protests for 45 days in Pattani to request the withdrawal of the marines, 
compensation for the victim’s families, and a meeting between Prime Minister Kukrit and the 
Muslim leaders in Pattani (Suhrke 1977: 240). Thousands of Malay-Muslims participated in 
the protests. The government sent its representative, a minister Prida Phattanabut, to negotiate 
with the protesters, and finally, the protest ended after the negotiation. 
 This kind of story has been told and repeated again and again and for some, they even 
have experienced it themselves. Especially, due to the heavy-handed tactics towards the 
suspected Malay-Muslim insurgents, instead of a feeling of being protected by state security 
officers, many felt more insecure. The local Malay-Muslims thus become estranged and too 
afraid to contact Thai security agents, even when they were facing danger. 
 However, after the government policies changed towards more flexibility and a 
participatory atmosphere during the premiership of General Prem in 1980, the local 
grievances, including the problems of abuse and maltreatment by security officers received 
more attention. Counter-insurgency institutions, such as the Combined 43
rd
 Civilian-Police-
Military Command (CPM 43), the security agency that work against insurgencies and 
extrajudicial killings in the Malay-Muslim provinces, and the Southern Border Provinces 
Administrative Center (SBPAC), the military-run center to deal with local grievances, were 
founded in the 1980s to deal with the conflict and violence in the south with more peaceful 
strategies. 
After the promulgation of the People’s Constitution in 1997 that focused more on 
popular participation, the security sector of the Thai state issued a national security policy for 
the southern border provinces in 1999 in line with the purpose of the 1997 constitution. 
According to this policy, the state security agency realized the importance of political 




conflict and violence and bring peace to the region
57
. However, the success of this policy has 
not yet been accomplished. 
Political participation through the state needs cooperation between two sides, the state 
and the people. However, for people in the Deep South, the accumulated grievances, ranging 
from the intervention of the Thai state into the Malay-Muslim justice system, to the cultural 
and language suppression, to the suspicions and mistreatment by some Thai government 
officials that many people experienced gradually destroyed the relationship between the state 
and local people, and negatively affected political participation through the state. Even 
though the Thai government showed some attempt to encourage more participation and create 
more trust among the Malay-Muslims, especially during the Prem government when the 
tension was eased, the feeling of being a deprived minority and the suspicions of some 
Malay-Muslims deterred many from contacting the state. Some people chose to contact the 
state in an attempt to increase minority consciousness in the eyes of the state (Brown 1988: 
65). Nevertheless, the power of individual participation through elections and through the 
state apparently was not strong enough to attract more attention from the Thai state. Thus, 
some Malay-Muslims decided to participate collectively as a group through civil society 
organizations to pursue their political demands.  
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Political participation through civil society 
 
Political participation can be in many forms, both individually through elections and 
contacts with state officials, and collectively through civil society. Although the definitions of 
civil society are varied among scholars as explained in Chapter 2, the main feature of civil 
society is generally understood as the linkage between the state and the individual (Belloni 
2001). Civil society, as a socio-political space, is essentially instrumental in supporting 
individual voices in society to be expressed without impediment and in controlling excesses 
of state political power (Belloni 2001: 167). Political participation through civil society 
therefore is an important function of civil society in order to create societal quality and 
connection among these three actors, state, civil society, and individuals (Wallace and Pichler 
2009: 256).  
Although the concept of civil society is not new and has been studied by Western 
scholars for more than two hundred years ago (Edwards 2004: 7), organized civil society 
organizations were unfamiliar to Thai people prior to the period of democratic transition in 
1970s (ADB 2011: 1). However, if we consider the concept of civil society as a group of 
people set up to represent collective goals with an aim to influence government decision 
making on community policies (Verba, Nie, and Barbic: 1973, and Huntington and Nelson: 
1976), the emergence of civic participation through civil society organizations in the Malay-
Muslim provinces can be traced back at least to the 1940s when Haji Sulong founded the 
Patani People’s Movement (PPM) in 1944.  The major objectives of the PPM were the desire 
for autonomy within the Thai kingdom and the development of better welfare of the Malay-
Muslims through legal means under the Thai constitution. Sulong and the PPM requested the 
seven-point demand to the government asking for better welfare of the Malay-Muslims and 




goals for Malay-Muslims through democratic methods, the organization was considered as 
“the first civic non-belligerent political movement to emerge in the area” (Porath 2010: 589).  
 Another organization that suits the definition of civil society is the Gabungan Melayu 
Patani Raya or Greater Patani Malayu Association (GAMPAR). GAMPAR was established 
by Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin in 1948 as a civic welfare association to look after well-
being of the Malay-Muslims and request the right of self-determination for the Malay-
Muslims (Porath 2010: 590). One of GAMPAR’s strategies was to gain world support, so 
members of GAMPAR sent petitions to the UN and other countries’ governments demanding 
the recognition of the rights of the Malay-Muslims. However, since the non-violent methods 
through constitutional means alone could not accomplish their foremost goal of autonomy, 
GAMPAR was later dissolved and the old members of GAMPAR and the former Narathiwat 
MP, Tengku Abdul Jalal, founded the The Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani or Patani 
National Liberation Front (BNPP) in 1959. The BNPP was recognized as the first belligerent 
separatist movement (Porath 2010: 591). 
 Despite the expansion of separatist movements during 1960s – 1980s, this period also 
showed the prominent roles of the Malay-Muslim intellectuals and the student-led civil 
society organizations in the Malay-Muslim provinces of Thailand. The first example of a 
successful Muslim student-led organization, which still has a major role in Muslim activities 
nationwide, including the three southern provinces, is the Thai Muslim Student Association 
(TMSA)
58
. The TMSA was established in 1965, and later registered as a legalized 
organization in 1967, by a group of Muslim students from various universities in Thailand to 
help and educate Muslim youth in the country. Former members include Wan Muhammad 
Noor Matha, a long time MP, cabinet minister, and speaker of the House, and Karun Kuyai, 
advisor of the Council of Muslim Organizations of Thailand (CMOT) and advisor to the 
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Minister of Education. The TMSA expanded its networks and cooperation not only 
throughout the country but also internationally under its motto “We all are brothers”.  
The TMSA activities in educating and increasing the potential of the Muslim youth in 
all dimensions were well acknowledged and created many capable students who later became 
distinguished persons in the country. Also, the learning through participation in civil society 
movement created political skills and awareness that benefited members’ careers in the 
future. Important and successful Muslim politicians who used to be a member of the TMSA 
were, for example, Wan Moohammad Noor Matha, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, Minister of foreign 
affairs and Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and 
Areephen Uttarasin, the long time MP of Narathiwat, Deputy Minister of Education, and 
Secretary to the Minister (Preeda 2001: 105).  
 Since the activities of the TMSA did not involve political matters, members of the 
TMSA, mostly Malay-Muslim students from the three provinces who got government 
scholarship to study in universities in Bangkok such as Areephen Uttarasin and Chusak 
Maneechayangkul, set up a new group called Selatan in 1972. Unlike the TMSA whose 
activities excluded political matters, the Selatan group organized political activities 
promoting democracy and justice in the three southern provinces (Areephen 2015). The 
Selatan group had a major role in the Pattani protest in 1975 after the five Malay-Muslims 
were killed by Thai marine soldiers. The group had been contacted by victims’ relatives to 
help them to bring justice to the victims and their family. So, members of the Selatan group 
decided to expand its members to include a wider range of participants other than university 
students and formed a new group called the Civil Rights Protection Center (Areephen 2014).  
  The roles of the Civil Rights Protection Center in the 1975 Protest in Pattani 
illustrated and exemplified quite clearly the importance of civil society during the conflict. 




undependable and untrustworthy in the eyes of the locals, the victims from violence and/or 
malpractices by state officials then decided to ask for help from a civil society organization, 
in this case from the Civil Rights Protection Center, to bring justice to them. The Civil Rights 
Protection Center worked as an intermediary and representative of the victims in expressing 
their grievances and demands to the Thai government. Where individual voices may not be 
strong enough to draw the state’s attention, especially the voices of minorities from a remote 
area, but political participation through civil society can make the voice louder through 
collective civic power. The Center, as a political activist organization, had better political 
skills and knew how to gain more attention from people and the state. More than ten thousand 
people joined the protest, and due to the power of the masses, the Thai government, after 45 
days of nonviolent protests, finally agreed that the government would replace the Thai 
governor of Pattani with a Muslim governor, arrest the suspects, pay compensation to 
victim’s relatives, gradually withdraw the marines, and give amnesty to protestors (Ockey 
2008: 142). 
 On the other hand, the work of the Civil Rights Protection Center also demonstrated 
the difficulties of civil society in working in the conflict area, surrounded by people’s 
suspicions, the state’s tight control, and the rebels’ violence. Wanich Sunthornnon (2011: 55) 
told his experience when he was a student at Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani and 
participated in the protest in 1975. The Center had asked for volunteer students to go to rural 
areas in order to ask for the locals’ opinions about the protest and try to incite them to join the 
protest. He, as one of the volunteers, described that 
 During the time when we went to the rural communities, there was a high possibility that we 
could face any kind of danger at any time ranging from the threat from bandits to the danger 
from political outlaws from neighboring countries. However, the scariest thing that we were 




information about the persecution by the Thai officials or the economic grievances of the 
locals, we had to find a way to hide it completely. Otherwise, if we met with the (security) 
officials, we might be searched and investigated and that information we recorded could bring 
us into the big trouble.  
 The emergence of political participation among the Malay-Muslim students 
influenced and inspired the young generation to participate in politics to preserve their 
political rights and justice. For example, the PNYS group, was formed in 1979 by the Muslim 
Ramkhamhaeng university students from Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, Satun and Songkhla; and 
the Yala Young Muslim Group, was established in 1981 to coordinate with other Muslim 
clubs in schools and academic institutions in Yala. 
 During and after the 1980s, Thailand had moved forward to more democratic system 
with increasing political liberalization under civilian governments. The roles of civil society 
activists were also strengthened and expanded, including the roles of scholars.  The well 
known scholars who were working and writing on the problems of the Malay-Muslims and 
Thailand’s southern border provinces such as Dr Surin Pitsuwan and Dr. Chaiwat Satha-
Anand had more crucial roles in directly or indirectly guiding government strategies towards 
the Malay-Muslims (Ornanong 2001: 132). Moreover, the open democracy during this period 
encouraged political awareness of people and gave them more confidence to negotiate with 
the Thai state through the collective power of civil society. 
  During the late 1980s, another example highlighted the increasing role of civil 
society in Thailand’s southern border provinces and its expanded networks and cooperation 
in southern Thailand in helping the Malay-Muslims to bargain with the state. The interesting 
case worth mention here is the Hijab Movement in Yala province from December 1987 to 
March 1988, when a group of female Muslim students at Yala Teachers’ Training College 




Muslim women in Thailand only wear Hijab at the time of prayer or during specific Muslim 
ceremonies (Preeda 2001: 109). The encouragement of wearing Hijab in Thailand was 
inspired significantly by the influence of the global Islamic resurgence in the 1970s (Chaiwat 
1994: 281-282). At first, the group of female Muslim students, with the assistance from the 
College’s student club for the promotion of Islamic virtues, sent a letter to the College in 
December 1987, but the response was negative. They then asked for support from the Muslim 
MPs from the Wadah group, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), 
Islamic Council of Yala Province, and the Office of the Chularatchamontri (Romadon 2012: 
19). 
 The request of the Muslim students to wear Hijab in the College expanded to 
demonstrations at the Central mosque of Yala in February – March 1988 and more than ten 
thousand people joined the protest (Preeda 2001: 109). The Hijab movement not only raised 
concerns among Muslims in Yala but there were concerns and debates on the Hijab issue 
throughout the country. Eventually, public pressure brought about success for the Muslim 
students at Yala Teachers’ Training College. The College eased its regulations and allowed 
the Muslim students to wear the Hijab. The success of this movement was partly a result of 
the cooperation between the Muslim student groups in Yala and the Thai Muslim Student 
Association. The College’s Student Club for the Promotion of Islamic Virtues responded and 
liaised within the College and the Yala Young Muslims Group was responsible for finding 
more support and coordination from people in Yala, whereas the Thai Muslim Student 
Association, based in Bangkok and with its networks in other regions, played a major role in 
raising more concern on this issue and finding more supporting groups and cooperation in 





 However, similar to other movements in the conflict area, there were always 
obstructions from security officers, even when the movements were peaceful under the 
regulations of democracy. Moreover,  although the Hijab movement was clearly aimed at 
cultural demands, the Thai security officers always perceived it as a political demand for 
separatism that needed to be suppressed (Ornanong 2001: 144). Muhammad Ayub Pathan, 
the former president of the Yala Young Muslims group, commented that since the Thai state 
experienced many violent acts from the Malay-Muslim rebels for a very long time, the state 
was always suspicious of the Malay-Muslim peaceful movements in open public space 
(Romadon 2012: 26).  Therefore, the Thai government considered the civic movements of the 
Malay-Muslims as a threat to national security, rather than a channel of political participation 
that people use to express their demands to the state.  
 At first, the Hijab movement in Yala lasted only two days (11 – 12 February 1988) 
partly because the movement leaders were inexperienced and not well prepared for the 
situation, and partly because the military blocked the area and hindered people from 
participating. Support from the Wadah MPs to mobilize more people not only led to the 
change of regulations on Hijab dress in the Yala Teachers’ Training College but also brought 
about changing attitudes and more understanding in Thai society (Preeda 2001: 109). 
  When the 16th constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand was promulgated in 1997, it 
was considered by many to be “the most liberal constitution Thailand has ever known” 
(Preeda 2001: 104).  The improvements in the 1997 constitution included the establishment 
of new mechanisms for human rights protections, administrative decentralization, and the 
encouragement of participatory democracy that opened more opportunities for civil society to 
work in communities with more confidence. The promulgation of the 1997 constitution was 
considered a turning point in political reform in Thailand, which also importantly affected 




society organizations have emerged and been active in various areas in the three southern 
provinces since the 2000s as a result of the 1997 constitution and especially the escalation of 
conflict and violence in the south in 2004, which will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
In sum, political participation through civil society before the upsurge of violence in 
2004 illustrates an interesting result. The political and cultural ignorance of the Thai state 
towards the rights of minority groups in the nation, including the Malay-Muslims, caused 
collective actions of local people seeking to fight for their rights and for justice. On the one 
hand, the non-violent collective actions of local people in protecting their rights and justice 
paved the way to the growth of civil society in the later period. On the other hand, the state’s 
limitation of participation through collective actions stimulated more conflict in the areas and 




 After the change of the Thai political system to constitutional democracy in 1932, the 
opportunity for popular participation was more open to Thai people including the Malay-
Muslims in the lower South. Political participation through election took place for the first 
time in Thai history in 1932. Elections were not only an opportunity for the Malay-Muslims 
to select their own representatives, elections also provided a chance for Patani traditional 
elites to participate within the Thai political system as members of Thai parliaments to seek 
to preserve the rights of the Malay-Muslims. However, due to the long history of the fight 
between the Malay-Muslims and Thai state, Thai governments always had suspicions of the 
Malay-Muslims and had problems of an inability to differentiate between demands for 
decentralization or autonomy and demands for separatism (McCargo 2008: 9). Although 




Tohmeena, to work under the Thai parliament, their active performance in presenting the 
problems of discrimination and exposing the unjust practices of the Thai state towards the 
Malay-Muslims were seen as hostility by Thai security forces. As a result, Malay-Muslim 
leaders were kept under close surveillance by the Thai government and their names were put 
onto the blacklist of Thai security agencies (Areephen 2014). Therefore, some gave up their 
first intention of participation through elections and pursue their goals in more violent ways 
instead.   
 The suspicions of the Thai state towards the Malay-Muslims also impeded political 
participation through the state. Haji Sulong was a good example of the Malay-Muslim who 
tried to make contact with Thai state officials in order to increase Malay-Muslim rights and 
recognition. Sadly, his dedication to the greater status of the Malay-Muslims within the Thai 
kingdom was paid for by his death at the hands of Thai police. As James Ockey (2011: 119) 
argued, “Ironically, it was his involvement in Thai politics, rather than any attempt to 
separate from it, that would lead to his untimely death.”  
Moreover, the intervention in Islamic courts and the abandonment of the Malay 
language and Islamic culture under the assimilation policies led to the problem of 
discrimination and unjust practices of the Thai state officials. These problems increased the 
feeling of alienation among the Malay-Muslims and brought about the hesitation to 
participate or interact with state officials. Therefore, political participation through the state 
before 2001 was generally not pursued by the Malay-Muslims in the lower South.  
However, despite the feeling of being a deprived minority, some people chose to 
remain in contact with the state to increase minority consciousness in the eyes of the state 
(Brown 1988: 65). When the power of individual participation through elections and the state 
was not strong enough to accomplish their goals, some of Malay-Muslims decided to 




demands. Although civil society’s effectiveness was hindered by the state’s negative 
perceptions towards Malay-Muslim political activities, the role of civil society organizations, 
such as the Thai Muslim Student Association (TMSA) and the Civil Rights Protection Center, 




Chapter 4 : Political Participation through Elections 
 
 
When Thailand changed its political system from absolute monarchy and replaced it 
with a constitutional democracy, it provided a new political channel allowing people to 
engage more actively through elections.  Political participation through elections was 
considered by many Malay-Muslim leaders and voters as an opportunity to participate non-
violently to preserve their rights, and to make demands for greater autonomy. The elections 
also allowed some Malay-Muslims to enter Thai politics as politicians and take part in the 
policy-making process through the National Assembly of Thailand. So, many Malay-
Muslims, both elites and villagers, participated by running for office and voting at a high 
level. 
In this chapter we begin in-depth investigation of political participation through 
elections, focusing on the impact of the renewed conflict and violence in southern Thailand 
since 2004.  This chapter aims to find out whether or not the ongoing conflict and violence 
affected political participation through elections and how people in the conflict areas 
participated through the parliamentary system. The study of political participation through 
elections in this chapter will cover from the 2001 general elections until the latest national 
election in 2014 because, firstly, many policies that were issued during the government of 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra after 2001 were criticized for causing the upsurge of 
violence in southern Thailand. Secondly, those political representatives elected in 2001 were 
still in office in 2004. Lastly, the change in the electoral system in 2001 as a result of the 
1997 Constitution had a major impact on the level of political participation of voters 





This study pays attention to investigate not only political participation of voters, 
understanding how politicians participate in the elections is also important and cannot be 
ignored. In the earlier period, political representatives of the Malay-Muslims were mostly 
members of the traditional religious or aristocratic elite. After the conflict and violence 
increased in 2004, a wider group of people got involved in politics not only as voters but also 
politicians. The influence of conflict and violence motivated some people to participate as a 
political representative to directly involve in policy formation. Studying political 
participation of politicians can explain how conflict and violence affected their motivation to 
participate and how it created new challenges and competition in electoral campaigns. Also, 
studying participation of politicians can give a better perspective in understanding how 
electoral behavior of voters changed according to the conflict and violence as well as new 
campaign techniques.  The study of political participation through elections in this chapter is 
then divided into two specific groups of political participants, voters and politicians, to 
undertand their broad patterns of political participation. Moreover, all levels of elections, 
including national, senate, and local elections are taken into consideration in this chapter.  
Lastly, we end this chapter with a direct comparison of conflict and non-conflict areas in 
order to get a clearer perspective of how the ongoing conflict and violence affected political 
participation through elections in different areas.  
 
Voters’ political participation in the Deep South 
 
The ongoing conflict and violence affected voters in the Deep South in multifarious 
ways. Although the violent incidents could frighten some voters away from taking part 
through elections, many voters in the Deep South were motivated by the conflict and violence 




each level of elections. Therefore, this section will discuss voters’ participation through 
elections by dividing into 3 parts, including general elections, Senate elections, and local 
elections.  
 
General election in the Deep South 
 
Generally, most Malay-Muslims in the southernmost provinces of Thailand 
participated actively in Thai elections, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3. The 1997 
constitution emphasized the importance of electoral participation, perhaps more than any 
other constitution that Thailand ever had before. Several provisions were added or changed to 
follow the objective of the constitution in encouraging more political participation through 
elections by Thai citizens. For example, Section 68 made voting compulsory, with some 
limited penalties, for the first time, to encourage electoral participation and reduce election 
fraud; Section 136 led to the establishment of an independent Election Commission to hold 
and control elections at all levels; and Section 285 mandated election of members of local 
assemblies and local administrative committees. Since the 1997 Constitution made voting 
mandatory, voters were provided another option of casting a vote by marking a cross in a no 
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 Section 56 of the Organic Act on the Election of Members of the House of Representatives 
and Senators, B.E. 2541(1998), stated that “In the case where an elector intends to cast a ballot for no 
candidate nor party list of any political party, the elector shall mark a cross in the space for indicating 




Figure 4-1: Voter turnout of national elections (on constituency system)  
between 1996 and 2001 
 
Sources: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 
  
Voters nationwide, including many Malay-Muslim voters, increasingly participated in 
the first general election under the new constitution, which was scheduled on 6 January 2001. 
As shown in Figure 4-1, national voter turnout increased from 62.42% in the 1996 election to 
69.94% in the 2001 election. Similarly, voter turnout in the three southernmost provinces also 
increased and even at a higher rate than the national average. Voter turnout of Yala, Pattani, 























Table 4-1: The results of the 2001 general elections in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat 
 
 
Province Name Religion Political party 









Pattani Wairot Phiphitphakdi 















Attaphol Mamah (replacement) 
Najmuddin Umar 








Thai Rak Thai 
New Aspiration 
New Aspiration 
Source: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand  
  
The 2001 general election brought about a landslide triumph of Thaksin Shinawatra 
and his Thai Rak Thai party. He won a near majority of 248 seats in the parliament. 
Thaksin’s decisive victory demonstrated that he and his party received very strong support 
from a huge number of Thai voters nationwide, excepting the southern region.  As shown in 
Table 1, none of the Thai Rak Thai candidates could gain a seat in the lower South
61
. 
While a large plurality of voters in the country gave their votes to the Thai Rak Thai 
party, a newborn political party founded in 1998 by Thaksin Shinnawatra, many voters in the 
Lower South still adhered to their old favorite politicians from both the Wadah group, under 
the New Aspiration party, and the Democrat Party. As shown in   
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 Suthiphan Sririkanon was given a red card and disqualified by the Election Commission for 
alleged vote-buying.  
61




Table 4-1, among all eleven elected MPs in the three provinces, six winning 
candidates were from the Wadah group and the other five winning candidates were from the 
Democrat party.  
 
Even though some former studies on electoral participation in the Lower South 
regarded many voters in the Lower South as candidate-oriented voters, rather than policy-
oriented (Phichai, Somchet, and Worawit, 1987), the repeated success of the Wadah group in 
this election was also due to their successful policies. The aggregation of the Wadah group 
increased its political power and helped in carrying out the promises they gave to their voters. 
Among successful policies initiated by the former Wadah MPs were, for example, foundation 
of an Islamic Bank, a request for allowing Muslim students to wear hijab in government 
schools, and development of Islamic civil laws. The performance of Wadah MPs impressed 
their voters so much that they did not want to change their votes. Moreover, voters’ 
confidence in the Wadah group became an important additional factor that motivated many 
Malay-Muslim voters to participate in voting to make sure that their Malay-Muslim 
representatives had power and authority in the national decision making process.  
While Wadah’s policies gave more importance to the interests of Malay-Muslim 
communities and greater prominence to Malay-Muslim culture, the Democrat party generally 
focused more on community and economic development. The Democrat party’s vote base in 
the Lower South was mainly from Thai-Buddhist voters in urban areas. The five seats won by 
the Democrat candidates in 2001 were mainly in constituencies located in urban areas, such 
as Mueang districts of the three southernmost provinces. In addition, most of the 2001 MPs 




were familiar faces who were elected in former elections
62
. So, while many voters in other 
regions believed in the Thai Rak Thai party’s “Think New, Act New” motto and decided to 
give it a try, many voters in the Deep South were still happy with the performances of their 
former representatives and did not change their votes in 2001.  
Instead, the year 2004 was a turning point when many voters in the Deep South 
decided to “Think New, Act New” about their voting. Political participation through elections 
after 2004 was very much affected by the upsurge of violence started by the firearm robbery 
in January, followed by the Krue-Se and Tak Bai bloody incidents in April and October in 
2004. The disappointment in the reaction of the Thaksin government and Thai authorities 
towards the series of violent incidents was expressed through voting in 2005. The affect of 
conflict and violence on political participation through elections is clear when looking at the 
election results in 2005.   
After the Thai Rak Thai Party won the 2001 election and Thaksin became a leader of 
the Thai government, he wanted to expand his power in the parliament so he convinced other 
smaller parties, including the New Aspiration Party, to merge with the Thai Rak Thai party.  
As a result, the long-term favorite candidates of many Malay-Muslim voters in the Deep 
South, the Wadah group, became members of the Thai Rak Thai Party.  
During the Thaksin government, many campaign policies, such as a four-year debt 
moratorium for farmers, the thirty baht healthcare scheme, and Ban uea athon (low cost 
housing) project were implemented as promised. Although many journalists and scholars 
criticized his populist policies, Thaksin and his party were admired by many voters, 
especially rural voters, in Thailand. Therefore, when the next election came in February 
2005, Thaksin undoubtedly was on top of the Thai political landscape once again. The 
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 There were only two winning candidates, Sommart Jehna, a former teacher and school 
director from Pattani and Dato Suthiphan Sririkanon from Narathiwat, who were elected for the first 




election results of the 2005 general election brought about an even larger landslide victory for 
Thaksin as his party won 377 of 500 seats in the parliament nationwide.  
However, even though he was gaining popularity throughout the country, this proved 
untrue in the lower South where no Thai Rak Thai candidate won a parliamentary seat, as 
shown in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2: The results of the 2005 general election in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat 
 
Province Name Religion Political party 

































Source: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand  
 
The election results in 2005 demonstrated that Thaksin’s populist policies could not 
win votes in the Deep South. Many Malay-Muslim voters were apparently unhappy and 
disappointed with Thaksin’s draconian methods in dealing with the conflict and violence. 
Moreover, due to the renewed violence in 2004, the Democrat party developed its campaign 
policies to focus more on promoting Malay-Muslim culture and peaceful strategies in order to 
particularly respond to the disturbances in the Lower South (Askew 2007: 63-64). The 




revival of SBPAC and CPM 43, the encouragement of decentralization, the establishment of 
Zakat funds in Muslim communities, and the development of an Islamic justice system
63
.  
The apparent disappointment of Malay-Muslim voters had a major impact on the loss 
of all TRT seats in the Lower South, with a corresponding growth of support for the 
opposition party, the Democrat party, in the southern border provinces (Albritton 2005: 170). 
Although voter’s decisions could be a result of mixed-incentives ranging from policy and 
candidate preferences to money (vote buying) motivations, voting for the Democrat party 
could be considered as one of the political expressions that many Malay-Muslims used to 
show their dissatisfaction and disagreement with the Thaksin government in dealing with the 
southern problems (Tan-Mullins 2007: 147). As demonstrated in Table 4-2, almost all MP 
positions in the three provinces were won by Democrat candidates, except one seat in 
Narathiwat won by Kuheng Yawohasan from the Chart Thai party
64
. 
Moreover, the performance of the Wadah MPs under the Thaksin government was 
perhaps considered unimpressive in the eyes of many Malay-Muslims in the conflict areas. 
Although one of the Wadah leaders, Wan Mohammad Noor Matha, was appointed to work in 
a prominent political position in the Thaksin cabinet
65
, many Malay-Muslim voters were 
upset with his performance and believed Wan Noor was changing sides to support the Thai 
state, instead of his fellow Muslims who voted for him (McCargo 2006: 53). Moreover, they 
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For more details on the Pattani Declaration, see “ปชป .งลถแ"ีนำปตัปำาปะปปำ ค"นื้ "าศ.ตป-
ทปพ. 43"ด ะตไนใป”้ Manager, December 25, 2004, <http://www.manager.co.th/Election48/ 
ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9470000102074>, accessed 5 September 2016. 
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 Kuheng was a head of a Democrat branch in Narathiwat. The Democrat party also intended 
to send him as the Democrat candidate to contest the 2005 electionha. However, he was upset with the 
Democrat party in not supporting his brother, Watchara Yawohasan, to contest in constituency 1, to 
replace Pornpich Pattanakullert, who resigned from the Democrats and moved to the Thai Rak Thai 
Party. So, due to his disappointment with the Democrat party, he then resigned and affiliated with the 
Chart Thai party. Mohammad Dueramae and Thaweesak Pi, “ ิท ธ ์ตุญญำมณค เปิด 3 สำเหปุเท้ศ่ไพยงท้
พคช่ำยงด ใป,้” Deep South Watch, July 19, 2011, <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj/2129>, 
accessed 15 March 2016. 
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 Wan Mohammad Noor Matha was a party list MP between 2001 and 2005 and was appointed 




were doubtful of the performances of the Wadah group and questioned why, although the 
leaders of the Wadah group were in power in Thai politics during 2004, the violence 
increased and the extrajudicial killings expanded (Prachatai, 9 November 2007). So, despite 
the success of the Wadah group in earlier elections, especially in the 1990s, all of the Wadah 
candidates lost their seats in the 2005 national election to, in some constituencies, nearly 
unknown candidates. For example, Muk Sulaiman, the Wadah MP of Pattani since 1992, lost 
his seat to a new candidate from the Democrat party, Zata Arwaekuechi, a former member of 
the Provincial Administrative Organization Council in Pattani. However, even though Zata 
had a strong vote base and political network in his hometown due to his former position as a 
local politician, it was nowhere near strong enough to defeat Muk Sulaiman, a Wadah’s 
national politician  (Bukhoree 2006: 56). Therefore, it mainly was likely due to the 
disappointment of voters in the performance of the Thaksin government and the Wadah 
politicians that he won this national contest. 
So, while many voters in other southern provinces voted for the Democrat candidates 
because they were very fond of the Democrat party and Chuan Leekphai, the affection for the 
Democrat candidates in the Deep South was probably not so much that voters wanted to vote 
for them. Instead, it partly was the anger and disappointment of many Malay-Muslim voters 
towards both Thaksin and the Wadah group, which led many voters to vote for the Democrat 
newcomer candidates. Some Malay-Muslim voters wanted to send a sign of disapproval to 




I think most voters in the three southernmost provinces considered both political ideology of 
the political party and the qualifications of a candidate when voting. They used to vote for the 
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popular candidate, such as Wan Noor, who brought many benefits to the Malay-Muslims. 
After the political crisis of the Thai Rak Thai party and the violent incidents in 2004, voters 
changed (their selection criteria). The reason for the change was partly because local people 
did not agree with Thai Rak Thai’s political ideology (toward the Lower South conflict), so it 
increased the number of supporters of the opposite party, the Democrat party. 
Even though many Malay-Muslim voters had faith in the Wadah members for many 
years, the inability in dealing with conflict and violence, despite having political position and 
power in the Thai cabinet, upset many voters, who had high expectations of the Wadah MPs. 
The conflict and violence led many Malay-Muslims to believe the Wadah group was not 
reliable for them anymore. The good relationship between the Wadah group and its voters 




Figure 4-2: Comparison chart between casualties of violent incidents in 2004 and voter 




Sources: Voter turnout in 2001 and 2005 was from Office of the Election Commission of Thailand. 
The number of violent attacks in 2004 was adapted from Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “ความรุนแรงเชงิ
โครงสร้างหรือโครงสร้างความรุนแรงในจงัหวดัชายแดนใต้” [“Structural Violence or Structure of Violence in the 
Southern Border Provinces 2004-2005”], Commissioned research report submitted to the 
National Reconciliation Commission, February 1, 2006, p.12-13.  
 
 
The level of political participation through elections declined in 2005 in some 
provinces of the Lower South. Whereas the national average of voter turnout increased from 
69.94% in 2001 to 72.55% in 2005, voter turnout in Yala and Pattani decreased to 75.93% 
and 72.95%, respectively, still slightly higher than the national average. The ongoing conflict 
and violence could possibly make people feel unsafe to go out to the polls. Higher risks in 
voting need higher incentives to go to vote. If voters did not believe in their representative 
and thought there was no good choice of candidate, they would rather avoid risks, stay at 
home and not bother to vote. As one voter expressed their disappointment, “I saw no 
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go out for vote during this (dangerous) kind of situation
67
.” So, a decrease of voter turnout in 
this election, on the one hand, might be because of fear, on the other hand, it might be 
because the former MPs, including Wadah, upset their voters. Some voters then decided not 
to go to vote.  
However, voter turnout in Narathiwat demonstrated the opposite interesting result. 
Despite the decrease of voter turnout in Yala and Pattani, Narathiwat, where the violent 
incidents occurred most frequently (765 violent incidents) among the three provinces in 
2004
68
, was the only province among the three Malay-Muslim majority provinces where 
voter turnout increased from 72.78% in 2001 to 73.59% in 2005 (see   
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 Interview, a voter from Pattani, February 2013. 
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 The 2005 national election was held on 6 February, so the statistical data on violent attacks in 










Table 4-3: Comparison table between casualties of violent incidents in 2004 and voter 














1 Mueang Yala (not including Po Seng, Bannang Sareng, 
and Bu Di subdistricts) 
78.5 75.05 133 
2 Kabang, Raman, Yaha (not including Patae subdistrict), 
and Mueang Yala (only Po Seng, Bannang Sareng, and 
Bu Di subdistricts) 
76.64 76.01 94 
3 Betong, Than To, Bannang Sata, Yaha (only Patae 
subdistrict), and Krong Pinang 
74.02 76.5 197 
Pattani 
1 Mueang Pattani (not including Paka Harang and Puyut 
subdistricts), and Yaring (not include Charang, Saban, 
Tolang, Tanyong Chueng-nga, Ba Loi, Tanyong Dalo, 
Manangyong, and Nongrad subdistricts) 
75.06 74.53 199 
2 Mae Lan, Khok Pho, Nong chik, and Mueang Pattani 
(only Paka Harang and Puyut subdistricts) 
75.1 74.73 136 
3 Kapho, Mai Kaen, Sai Buri, Pannare, andYaring (only 
Charang, Saban, Tolang, Tanyong Chueng-nga, Ba Loi, 
Tangyong Dalo, Manangyong, and Nongrad subdistricts) 
77.5 76.6 134 
4 Mayo, Thung Yang Daeng, and Yarang 69.25 65.97 134 
Narathiwat 
1 Mueang Narathiwat and Tak Bai 72.41 73.37 140 
2 Su-ngai Padi, Su-ngai Kolok, and Waeng 69.95 68.91 178 
3 Sukhirin, Chanae, Ra-ngae, and Cho-airong 70.31 72.48 244 
4 Si Sakhon, Rueso, Yi-ngo, and Bacho 78.92 79.53 192 
Sources: Voter turnout in 2001 and 2005 was from Office of the Election Commission of Thailand. 
The number of violent attacks in 2004 was adapted from Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “ความรุนแรงเชงิ
โครงสร้างหรือโครงสร้างความรุนแรงในจงัหวดัชายแดนใต้” [“Structural Violence or Structure of Violence in the 
Southern Border Provinces 2004-2005”], Commissioned research report submitted to the 
National Reconciliation Commission, February 1, 2006, p.12-13.  
Remark: 1. Number of violent incidents is based on the whole district 
 2. There were 1, 3, and 11 violent incidents in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, respectively, 
that could not specify the incident locations. 
 
Interestingly, if we consider each constituency, the result, as demonstrated in Table 
4-3, showed that political participation through elections tended to increase in the area that 
had more frequent violent attacks. For example, Constituency 3 of Yala province had the 




in voter turnout in other constituencies, Constituency 3 was the only constituency in Yala 
where voter turnout increased from the 2001 election. Similarly, the violent incidents in 
Narathiwat occurred most frequently at Constituency 3 (244 violent incidents), where voter 
turnout in 2005 increased the most in the province (increased by 2.17% from 70.31% in 2001 
to 72.48% in 2005). 
 Therefore, when considering voter turnout and casualties of violent incidents, data 
supports the fundamental hypothesis of this study that the conflict and violence did not 
undermine political participation of voters in the Deep South. On the contrary, for some 
voters, especially those living in the high violence conflict areas, the conflict and violence 
that occurred in their hometown pushed them to participate more in politics. As one Malay-
Muslim voter from Pattani said, “I want it (the conflict and violence) to stop and I believe 
voting is one of the most likely ways to bring change to my hometown
69
.”  
The conflict and violence after 2004 not only increasingly motivated most people in 
the conflct areas to participate in elections but also raise their political awareness and 
changed their voting behavior. Due to the increasing violence after 2004, people in the 
conflict areas started to observe and question the Thai government’s performance in solving 
the violence. They began to pay more attention to the state’s policies regarding the conflict 
and violence in the three provinces. Also, critics from academia and reports of the media 
towards the government’s aggressive policies on the South magnified political interests of 
local people
70
. Although their enthusiasm was perhaps less because of the new yet 
unattractive Democrat candidates and the disappointing performances of the Thai Rak Thai 
candidates, the upsurge of violence may have contributed to good turnout anyway. The high 
rate of voter turnout in 2005 showed that the ongoing conflict and violence could not 
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 Interview, a Malay-Muslim voter in Pattani, February 2013. 
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discourage electoral participation of many voters. “Even with rumors of potential bombings 
on the election date, most local people in my village still went to vote. The violent incidents 
did not affect our voting,” said one university student from Pattani
71
. 
The nationwide popularity of Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai party had begun to 
weaken by early 2006. There were massive demonstrations between the red-shirt or the pro-
Thaksin (the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship) and the yellow-shirt or the 
anti-Thaksin (the People's Alliance for Democracy) groups throughout the country. Thaksin 
then decided to dissolve the House of Representatives and the next election was scheduled for 
2 April 2006, which was just about one year after the previous election in 2005. The 
opposition parties (the Democrat, Chart Thai, and Mahachon parties) decided to boycott this 
election. Voter turnout of the election in April 2006 decreased nationwide to 64.76% from 
72.55% in the previous election. Moreover, since the major opposition parties did not send 
candidates to this election, most constituencies had only one candidate. Voters had limited 
choices of candidates, so the percentage of people who chose “no vote” significantly 
increased from 2.29% in the 2005 general election to 33.14% in the 2006 election. The 
percentage of voided ballots also increased from 5.99% in 2005 to 13.03% in 2006
72
.  
For the conflict area in the Deep South, the political conflict between pro- and anti-
Thaksin groups was associated with a decrease in political participation through elections in 
the region. Voter turnout for the 2006 election in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat decreased to 
about 60%. Despite many violent incidents on the election day of the 2006 general election 
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 Interview, a university student in Pattani, September 2012. 
72
 Many of the voided ballots in the 2006 national elections were intentionally destroyed in 
order to protest the election. Dr. Chaiyan Chaiyaporn, Political Science Professor at Chulalongkorn 
University, was the first who tore his voting card to demonstrate civil disobedience (Ar-raya Khad 
Kheun) against the Thaksin regime and the April 2 election. Many voters followed his action by 




by suspected militants aimed at stopping people from participating through voting
73
, some 
Malay-Muslim voters did not consider the violent incidents by militants as an obstacle to 
voting. According to the president of Narathiwat’s kamnan and phuyaiban association, the 
boredom with politics due to the political conflict between the Red and Yellow groups and 
the limited choices of election candidates were instead the main reasons for a decrease of 
voter turnout and the unusually high rate of votes for “no vote” and voided ballots in the 2006 
election (Manager, 6 April 2006). 
The political conflict originating from the capital of the country and expanding 
nationwide affected general voters in different ways. For some voters who disagreed with the 
government, they might have ignored elections and decided not to participate in voting. 
However, many voters in the Far South, who disliked the government and the Thai Rak Thai 
party, went to the poll to express their political opinions through elections. As shown in Table 
4-4, all the winning candidates from the Thai Rak Thai party in all constituencies of Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat received less votes than the “no vote” option. In addition, the voided 
ballots were higher than votes of the first-place candidates in Pattani and some constituencies 
of Narathiwat. More interestingly, almost all of the Thai Rak Thai candidates (8 from 12 
candidates) had been elected in the 2001 national elections. The failure of the Thaksin 
government policies that resulted in an increase of violent incidents in 2005
74
 seemingly 
disappointed many voters in the conflict areas. So, choosing not to vote for the Thai Rak Thai 
                                                          
73
 There were several violent incidents on 2 April 2006 in some polling units of the three 
southern border provinces, including the bombing at the polling unit of Cho-airong district in 
Narathiwat (Manager, 2 April 2006), the intimidation by  unknown groups, who threatened people in 
the markets at Narathiwat and Pattani to not go to vote (Manager, 2 April 2006), suspected bombs in 
Pattani (Komchadluek, 2 April 2006), and the rumors of  possible attacks by the Runda Kumpulan 
Kecil (RKK) armed group in seven districts of Narathiwat, and there were many election officers at 
Narathiwat who withdrew from their positions due to the fear of violence (BEC news, 22 April 2006).   
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 According to the Deep South Incident Database, the violent incidents in the southernmost 




candidates was one of the channels that many Malay-Muslim voters could use to seek a 
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Source: Matichon, 4 April 2006   
 
The Constitutional court declared the 2006 general election invalid due to 
irregularities which it considered unconstitutional, including the unfairness of the scheduled 
election date, the positioning of voting booths violating voter privacy, the hiring of smaller 
parties by the TRT party to contest the election, and the wrongdoings of local election 
commissions (Manager, 8 May 2006).  
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Subsequently, the military seized power in a coup, led by General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin, on September 19, 2006. The coup leaders appointed General Surayud 
Chulanont prime minister of the military government in 2006. Under the new military 
government, a new constitution was drafted, the first constitution that allowed people to vote 
to approve the draft of the constitution
76
. A national referendum was held on 19 August 2007. 
Voter turnout was 57.61% nationwide, with 56.69% voting to approve and 41.37% voting 
against the draft of the constitution
77
. Thus, only about 35% voted for the constitution (out of 
all eligible voters).   
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 A provision for a national referendum was legislated in the 1949 Constitution, the 1968 
Constitution, the 1974 Constitution, and the 1997 Constitution. However, the first three constitutions 
allowed a national referendum only for amendments to the constitution. The 1997 Constitution 
allowed a national referendum on the draft constitution, but only if the draft constitution was rejected 
by the National Assembly. Since the National Assembly adopted the draft, the national referendum 
for the 1997 Constitution was unnecessary. See Tom Ginsburg 2009, “Constitutional afterlife: The 
continuing impact of Thailand’s postpolitical constitution,” International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 7(1), p. 91.  
77
 For more information on national referendum (in Thai), see ‘ปำตศศปเสคยแปตัชำมป’ิ [National 




Table 4-5: Comparison table between national referendum results on the draft of the 
2007 constitution and casualties of violent incidents in 2007 in some red zone districts in 
the three southern provinces  
 
District Voter turnout Violent incidents 
Yala (Voter turnout 58.78%) 
Raman 60.41 109 
Yaha 60.55 81 
Pattani (Voter turnout 55.48%) 
Mueang Pattani 58.4 75 
Khok Pho 62.7 60 
Narathiwat (Voter turnout 57.07%) 
Rueso 57.36 144 
Ra-ngae 58.63 142 
Sources: Voter turnout of the 2007 national referendum is from “ตำยแำ  ชำยงด ใปห้ถ ะแปตัชำมปิ
ต ะฐธตตม ูญ: ท้ื พคป่ำตเม้ศแพคง่ปถปงยป” [“Report on the southern border provinces after national 
referendum on the draft of the constitution: the divided political area”], Prachatai, August 
24, 2007, < http://prachatai.com/journal/2007/08/13947>, accessed 5 September 2016.  
The number of violent attacks in 2007 is from “4 ปีไฟใต้คร่า 2,848 ชีวิต” [“4 years of the unrest 
killed 2,848”], Manager, January 5, 2008, < 
http://www.manager.co.th/Local/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9510000001439&TabID=3&>, 
accessed 5 September 2016.  
 
For the southernmost provinces, even though there were some people who tried to 
convince the locals not to vote or approve the constitution (Manager, 21 August 2007), the 
majority of the Malay-Muslims were not persuaded. Voter turnout in Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat was 58.78%, 55.48%, and 57.07% respectively, which was near the national 
average. Interestingly, as shown in Table 4-5, voter turnout in some high-violent-incidents 





Table 4-6: The national referendum results on the draft of the 2007 constitution in the 
Southern region 
 
Province Approve Reject Void Voter turnout 
Chumphon 92.13 6.73 1.14 62.02 
Trang 91.20 7.44 1.36 65.40 
Nakhon Si Thammarat 90.96 7.69 1.35 51.69 
Ranong 90.72 7.91 1.37 59.87 
Surat Thani 90.69 8.02 1.29 58.78 
Songkhla 90.59 7.97 1.43 64.11 
Krabi 89.55 8.96 1.49 63.93 
Patthalung 89.51 9.05 1.45 64.24 
Phuket 88.71 9.81 1.48 58.53 
Phang Nga 85.74 12.73 1.53 64.15 
Satun 81.97 16.23 1.79 62.59 
Narathiwat 73.61 22.03 4.37 57.07 
Pattani 71.79 22.15 6.05 55.48 
Yala 69.83 24.79 5.38 58.78 
Source: Thai Politics Research Center (THPRC) 
 
The national referendum result was significantly different in each region. Fewer than 
40% of voters in the Northeastern region, Thaksin’s base, supported the draft, whereas more 
than 85% of voters in the South, a stronghold of the Democrat party, voted to approve the 
constitution (Thai Politics Research Center 2007). Interestingly, when considering the results 
in the South, the three southern border provinces, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, were the 





As shown in Table 4-6, around 70% of the voters in the three southern border 
provinces agreed with the draft constitution, while about 90% of voters in other southern 
provinces voted to approve the draft.  The result proved at some level that even though many 
voters in the three southern border provinces voted for the Democrat candidates in the former 
election, the reason of voting for the Democrat party, which supported the constitution, for 
many voters in the Deep South was different from voters in other southern provinces. The 
support for the Democrat party in other southern provinces was so high that voters tended to 
agree with the Democrat party on everything. However, the degree of supportfor the 
Democrat party in the Deep South was not as high. So, even though the Democrat party 
supported the draft of this constitution, some Malay-Muslim voters voted against it. Even 
though there were some points in the draft of the 2007 constitution that left some voters in the 
Deep South dissatisfied
78
, a high rate of political participation in the national referendum tells 
us that many Malay-Muslims still believed in political participation as a way to express their 
own views to the Thai government.  
After the national referendum and promulgation of the 2007 Constitution, an election 
date was set for 23 December 2007. The first election after the promulgation of the 2007 
Constitution showed a higher rate of political participation through elections nationwide. 
National voter turnout slightly increased from 72.55% in 2005 to 74.49% in 2007. Many 
voters in the Deep South participated in the election. When considering voter turnout in the 
Lower south, the three southernmost provinces also had an increased rate of voter turnout and 
the rate was higher than the national average. Voter turnout in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat 
was 78.09%, 76.64%, and 77.66%, respectively (see Figure 4-3). 
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 For example, Srisompob Jitpiromsri, a renowned academic in the Deep South, commented 
the constitutional draft did not give enough importance to local administration, which he believed 
would help in lessening the southern border problems of conflict and violence (Prachatai, 20 May 




Figure 4-3: Comparison between casualties of violent incidents and voter turnout of the 
general election in 2007 
 
 
Sources: Voter turnout was collected from Office of the Election Commission of Thailand. 
The number of violent incidents is from Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “Sixth Year of the 
Southern Fire: Dynamics of Insurgency and Formation of the New Imagined 
Violence”, Deep South Watch, March 10, 2010, p.8. 
<http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/730>, accessed 30 September 2015.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 4-3, voter turnout in the three southern border provinces also 
illustrates the relationship between the violence and political participation through elections. 
According to a report by Srisompob Jitpiromsri (2010: 8), the violent incidents in 2007 
occurred most frequently in Yala (745 incidents), where voter turnout was the highest 
(78.09%). In addition, Yala was the only province among the three provinces where violent 
incidents increased, from 425 casualties in 2004 to 745 casualties in 2007, whereas violent 
incidents in Pattani and Narathiwat decreased from 606 and 765 incidents in 2004 to 403 and 
632 incidents in 2007, respectively (see Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3).The high rate of voter 
turnout in Yala showed that the conflict and violence did not impede voters from political 
participation, but it instead motivated their greater desire of voting. One Thai-Buddhist 
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desire to participate. She said, “I know that my vote cannot help (changing anything) much 
because politics in Yala is quite stable and has hardly changed for many years. However, I 
still want to participate in voting and I will vote because I want the conflict to stop
79
.” Her 
statement regarding stability is true for the urban area of Yala, especially Mueang district, 
where Prasert Phongsuwansiri continuously won election since 1995. 
After 3 years of the upsurge in insurgency with no progress towards an effective 
solution, the former MPs either under the Thai Rak Thai party or the Democrat party, had 
failed to prove their effectiveness in solving the conflict and violence in the Deep South. The 
disappointment in the former governments and MPs was expressed through voting in the 
2007 national election. Many voters gave a chance to new players in the MP competition 
rather than voting for the same old candidates, such as Den Tohmeena and Muk Sulaiman of 
the Wadah group, who were long-time players in Far South politics, running under the new 
roof of Palang Prachachon party. Den contested in Constituency 1 of Pattani
80
, but he could 
only attain fourth place and lost the election. Similarly, Muk contested in Pattani 
Constituency 2 and could only gain sixth place.  Moreoever, whereas almost all seats in the 
2005 general election were won by the Democrat candidates, the 2007 general election led to 
more diversity of political parties and almost half of the winning candidates were new faces 
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 Interview, a Thai-Buddhist voter from Yala, November 2012. 
80
 The constituency system was changed according to the 2007 Constitution. Constituencies 
were larger than former elections to decrease vote-buying and money politics in elections. For the 
change of constituency system in the 2007 general election, see the Royal Thai Government Gazette, 




Table 4-7: The results of the 2007 general elections by province 
 
 
Province Name Religion Political party Re-elected / 
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Source: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand  
 
 As shown in Table 4-7, the clearest evidence was in Narathiwat where the five 
winning candidates of Narathiwat were affiliated with four different political parties, 
including Pheu Pandin, Democrat, Chart Thai, and Palang Prachachon parties and two of 
them, Waemahadi Waeda-oh and Watchara Yawohasan, were elected for the first time
83
. A 
Malay-Muslim voter from Yala expressed that due to unimpressive performances of MPs and 
the government’s unsuccessful policies toward the South violence, many voters attentively 
waited for the election. They wanted to vote not only to choose a representative but also to 
“vote to not vote” for the same candidate or political party, who they voted for last time but 
could not deliver policies as promised. So, participating in the election, for some voters, can 
be used as a way to take revenge on some representative they felt upset with
84
.   
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  Ismael Yidoromae, a Pattani MP in 2005,  changed his surname to Ismael Ben-Ibrohim  
82
  Kuheng Yawohasan, as an executive member of the disbanded Chart Thai party, was banned 
from participating in politics for five years from 2008.  
83
 Ni-aris Jetaphiwat won later in a by-election. 
84




The variety of political parties caused difficulty in policy formation. Even though the 
MPs received mandates from their voters, the differences in policies and the lack of unity 
among the MPs of different political parties, in a mix of both government and opposition 
parties, led to difficulties in delivering their policies or entering the cabinet. So, many Malay-
Muslim voters probably took a lesson from the 2007 election. Consequently, the election 
results in the 2011 national election were not as divergent as the former election. Almost all 
the winning candidates in the following election in 2011 were from the Democrat party, 
except in Pattani where two of the winning candidates were from the Matubhum and 
Bhumjaithai parties. However, the victory of the Democrat party in 2011 was not as clear cut 
as the 2005 national election, except in some constituencies, mostly in urban areas, that had 
significant numbers of Thai and Thai-Chinese Buddhists, who were loyal to the Democrat 




Table 4-8: Election results of the 2005 and 2011 general elections 
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When comparing between the two elections in 2005 and 2011 when the Democrat 
party won almost all parliamentary seats in the Lower South, as shown in Table 8, votes for 
the Democrat candidates decreased from the 2005 general election in many constituencies 
and the election results between the first and second place in 2011 were closer than those in 
2005. Comparing to the national election in 2005, the difference between the first- and the 
second-place candidates in 2005 was much less. The vote differences between the first two 
place candidates were more than eleven thousands votes in most constituencies, except Yala 
Constituency 2 and Narathiwat Constituency 3 where the second-placed candidates were only 
behind by 3,898 and 1,669, respectively. On the other hand, the difference in the 2011 
general election between the first- and second-place candidates was small. The vote 
differences in seven out of eleven constituencies were less than five thousand votes. 
Moreover, the results were almost equal in constituency 2 of Yala and constituency 4 of 
Narathiwat, where the Democrat candidates won by only 48 and 479 votes, respectively. 
Based on conversations with local people during field research, the popularity of the 
Democrat party in the conflict areas of the Far South was decreasing, especially among the 
younger generation. Some of them criticized that the Democrat candidates mostly offered 
repetitious and uninteresting policies, but they preferred to see some innovative policies in 
response to the violent crisis in the South from the candidates. A young voter from Pattani 
expressed that: 
Most local people in my village vote for personal qualification or political party, but I place 
more importance on policies. I voted for Pheu Thai Party, while my family always voted for 
the Democrat Party. I liked Pheu Thai’s policies because they were new and interesting. 
Although many people criticized that they were populist policies, I did not mind. My 
hometown is in crisis and unstable, we need a representative who can bring change. The 





The above statement was at least partly true. When looking at policies of the election 
campaign in 2011, almost all parties gave more importance to the conflict and violence in the 
South. The idea of decentralization and some form of autonomy was widely debated. In the 
past, the discussion about regional autonomy was a sensitive issue, as whoever mentioned 
autonomy was suspected by the Thai state of being an insurgent. However, the model of 
autonomy became one of the main policies in the political campaign of the 2011 general 
election in the Deep South, but not for the Democrat party.  
If we consider the election results in 2011 together with the campaign policies of the 
political parties, there were two opposite approaches regarding autonomy and 
decentralization proposed by political parties. The first group opposed the concept of regional 
autonomy; the only party that strongly disagreed with any form of regional autonomy was the 
Democrat party. Even though the Democrat party promoted decentralization, the concept of a 
Special Administration Region or any form of regional autonomy had never been accepted by 
the Democrat party since General Chawalit suggested this idea to the Abhisit government. 
Instead, the Democrat party supported decentralization by improving the function of the 
region’s SBPAC.   
The second group of parties, including the Pheu Thai, Matubhum, and Chart Thai 
Pattana parties, supported the concept of regional autonomy and wanted to provide some 
form of elected regional governance, although the specific forms of regional autonomy were 
different in the details. The Pheu Thai party supported decentralization in the form of a 
Special Administrative Region, or Nakorn Pattani (Pattani City), with an elected governor 
and the party announced it would abolish the SBPAC; the Matubhum party also advocated 
the idea of elected regional governance by offering to set up a Special Administrative 




Mathubhum party also offered direct election of the governors in the three provinces 
(Reuters, 23 June 2011). Similar to the Pheu Thai and the Matubhum parties, the Chart Thai 
Pattani party, a successor to the Chart Thai party, supported decentralization and proposed to 
set up a one stop government service center for the southern border provinces in order to take 
care of the Malay-Muslims in all matters. The Center would have authority to self-manage 
security and develop a budget on its own (Deep South Watch, 25 June 2011).  
The Bhumjaithai party
85
  was not in either group since the party neither supported nor 
disagreed with the concept of regional autonomy and did not include this in their election 
campaign. The party considered implementing a model of regional autonomy was impossible 
to do within four years so the Bhumjaithai party offered to tackle the injustice and drug 
problems as a priority concern (Deep South Watch, 1 July 2011).   
The close race of the MP contest in 2011 between those who supported and opposed 
the ideas of regional autonomy corresponded to the survey of votes in Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat in 2010 by James Klein (2010: 115-125). The results of the survey showed that 
people in the Deep South were divided into quite equal portions between favorable and 
unfavorable views of the idea of regional autonomy
86
. The election and survey results 
demonstrated that voters in the conflict areas used participation through elections as a safe 
method to express their political opinions, especially on sensitive issues such as autonomy 
and decentralization. Accordingly, their expressions through voting were heard by political 
actors and their voices helped initiate policy formation. The high rate of political participation 
through elections of Malay-Muslim voters was one of the reasons for this change. The desire 
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 The Bhumjaithai party was founded in 2009 and many members were from ‘Friends of 
Newin Group’, a political faction in the Palang Prachachon party led by Newin Chidchob.  
86
 From the survey, 51% of participants rejected the idea of consolidating the three provinces 
into one administrative area and 56% believed that having local self government would help lessening 
the southern conflict.  For details of the survey, read James Klein 2010, Democracy and Conflict in 





for decentralization and some form of regional autonomy has been discussed lightly but 
widely in the Deep South for many years but it has never been accepted by Thai 
governments. The high level of political participation of Malay-Muslims helped change 
things that used to be impossible to be less unlikely. The forbidden topic of regional 
autonomy was brought into discussions in public and became a main concern for political 
parties.   
In terms of the level of electoral participation, similar to past elections, voter turnout 
of the 2011 general election in the three southern border provinces was higher than the 
national average, as shown in Figure 4-4 
 
Figure 4-4:  Comparison between casualties of violent incidents from October 2010 to 
February 2011 and voter turnout of the 2011 general election 
 
 
Sources: Voter turnout was collected from Office of the Election Commission of Thailand. 
 Number of violent incidents was adapted from the Southern Border Provinces 
Police Operation Center. <http://isranews.org/south-news/stat-history/item/1982-
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If we consider voter turnout of the 2011 election together with the statistical data on 
number of violent incidents in southern Thailand, the data illustrates more interesting results. 
According to the data collected between October 2010 and February 2011 by the Southern 
Border Provinces Police Operation Center (SBPPOC)
87
, the violent incidents occurred most 
often in Narathiwat (104 violent incidents) where voter turnout was 78.02%, the highest rate 
among these three southern provinces. The analysis can be extended deeper into each 
constituency of Narathiwat. The report from SBPPOC also revealed the relationship between 
the violence and political participation through election in the conflict areas. As shown in 
Figure 4-5, Narathiwat Constituency 4 was the constituency with the highest frequency of 
violence (44 violent inceidents) but the constituency had the highest rate of voter turnout in 
Narathiwat which was 83.38% in 2011. On the other hand, Narathiwat Constituency 2 had 
the lowest rate of voter turnout in the province (74.26%), while it had the second lowest 
frequency of violence. 
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 The 2011 general election was held on 3 July 2011, the statistical data from October 2010 to 





Figure 4-5: Comparison between casualties of violent incidents from October 2010 to 




Sources: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 
Number of violent incidents was adapted from the Southern Border Provinces Police 
Operation Center. <http://isranews.org/south-news/stat-history/item/1982-5.html>, accessed 
10 September 2016. 
 
Remark: Constituency 1 included 2 districts: Mueang and Tak Bai 
   Constituency 2 included 3 districts: Su-ngai Kolok, Su-ngai Padi, and Wang 
   Constituency 3 included 3 districts: Ra-ngae, Chanae, Cho-airong, and Sukhirin 
   Constituency 4 included 4 districts: Yi-ngo, Bacho, Rueso, and Srisakhon 
 
 
The latest general election in Thailand was held on 2 January 2014 after Prime 
Minister Yingluck dissolved the parliament. However, the 2014 general election was opposed 
nationwide by a political group called People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), led 
by Suthep Thaugsuban, the former Democrat MP of Surat Thani and other Cabinet Ministers 
under past Democrat governments. The PDRC preferred to install an appointed People’s 
Council to watch over political reform and corruption problems in the country before having 
an election. The Democrat party agreed with the PDRC on the point that Thailand was not 
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Democrat party boycotted this election by not sending election candidates in all 
constituencies. However, the viewpoint of the PDRC and the Democrat party was not 
unanimous and was opposed by many sides, especially the pro-government Red-shirt group, 
formally known as the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD). People in 
Thailand increasingly divided not only in Bangkok, but nationwide. Therefore, the 2014 
general election was quite troublesome. There was chaos nationwide, especially at many 
polling stations before and on the election day. As a result, out of the total 375 constituencies, 
there were 5 constituencies in Bangkok and 42 constituencies in 9 provinces of southern 
Thailand that were unable to proceed with the election. The nine southern provinces included 
Songkhla, Trang, Patthalung, Phuket, Surat Thani, Krabi, Ranong, Phang Nga, and 
Chumphon. 
Despite all the chaos in many provinces of Thailand, the three southern border 
provinces were able to run the election. However, there were some reports of disruptions in 
some constituencies in the three southern provinces. There were 46 polling units in 4 districts 
of Yala (Mueang, Kabang, Than To, and Betong) that were unable to proceed with the 
election because the polling units were surrounded by PDRC protestors (Naewna, 3 February 
2557); polling unit 3 of Khok Pho district in Pattani’s constituency 2 was also blocked, and 
rubber tires were burned on the route to the polling unit (Manager, 2 February 2014). In 
addition, there were bomb attacks in Pattani’s Khok Pho district on the night before the 
election
88
 (Bangkok Post, 2 February 2014). Narathiwat was the only province in the southern 
region where all polling units were able to run the election.  
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 The explosion killed three soldiers and one civilian, Jaktra Promkaew, an assistant chief of 
Khok Pho district and the head of polling unit 4 in Pattani's Constituency 2. However, the director of 
the Pattani election committee, Prapas Chainapong, personally believed the attack was not related to 




The voter turnout of the 2014 general election therefore varied widely, due to the 
political unrest from the anti-2014-election protestors. As shown in Figure 6, Narathiwat, the 
only province that had no closed polling unit, had the highest rate of voter turnout (45.68%), 
followed by Pattani (40.83%), where one polling unit was closed, and Yala (32.61%), where 
46 polling units were blocked. Interestingly, when comparing voter turnout in 2014 and 
casualties of bomb attacks in the three southern provinces in 2013
89
, the result again 
illustrated the relationship between violence and political participation through elections.  
According to the ISOC report between 1 January and 22 December 2013, bomb attacks 
occurred most often in Narathiwat (129 bomb attacks) where voter turnout in the 2014 
general election was the highest and there was no serious attack in all polling units during the 
election. The least frequent bombings in 2013 were in Yala (69 bomb attacks), where the 
province had the most unrest during the 2014 election and 46 polling units had to be closed 
(see   
                                                          
89
 The 2014 national election was held on 2 February 2014, so the statistical data on bombings 










Figure 4-6: Comparison between bomb attacks in 2013 and voter turnout of the 2014 
general election (unofficial result) 
 
Sources: Voter turnout was collected from Manager, 3 February 2014. 
<http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9570000013300>, 
accessed 10 September 2016. 
 Bomb attacks data was collected from Internal Security Operations Command 
(ISOC) Region 4 Forward Command. <http://isranews.org/isranews-all-
data/isranews-data-south/item/26142-blast.html>, accessed 10 March 2016. 
 
Although we cannot ignore that voting is likely a result of mixed motivations rather 
than a single motive, the comparisons between the violence and voter turnout strongly 
supports the hypothesis that political participation through national elections of the voters in 
the conflict areas of southern Thailand are related to the level of conflict and violence. The 
past national elections after 2004 showed that the ongoing conflict and violence did not 
destroy political activeness of voters in elections. On the contrary, the conflict and violence 
triggered more participation and enhanced the degree of political participation in the conflict 
areas of the Lower South. The conflict and violence not only increased their desire to vote but 
also made a significant impact in changing voters’ electoral behavior to be more concerned 
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Senate election in the Deep South 
 
In earlier times, the Senate was indirectly elected or appointed by the government, 
military, or king. Despite its significant roles and power in the legislative process and check-
and-balance system, the appointed Senates had often been criticized for being “mere military-
dominated rubber stamps” to serve the will of governing elites (Chambers 2009: 11).  Under 
the 1997 Constitution, the Senate or the upper house of the National Assembly of Thailand 
had been re-designed and became one of the most important and powerful actors under a 
bicameral system. Following the 1997 Constitution, Thailand’s first Senate direct election 
was held on 4 March 2000 with high voter turnout nationwide, including in the Far South. 
The national average of voter turnout was 71.89% and the rates were even higher in Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat, as shown in Figure 4-7. However, the first Senate election was 
criticized for being problematic, expensive, and prolonged (Montesano 2001: 172). There 
were reports of election fraud and violation of election regulations in 35 provinces, although 
the three southern provinces were not on the list. As a result, the Election Commission had to 
organize by-elections four times and spend around 2,300 million baht of government budget 





Figure 4-7: Voter turnout of senate elections from 2000 to 2014 
 
Source: The 2000, 2008, and 2014 data was official results from Office of the Election 
Commission of Thailand 
The 2006 data was unofficial results published by Isranews, 20 April 2006 
<http://wbns.oas.psu.ac.th/shownews.php?news_id=36643>, accessed 10 October 
2015.  
  
The second Senate election was held on 19 April 2006, after the senate completed its 
six-year term. However, voter turnout in the second Senate election decreased significantly 
nationwide from 71.89% to 62.5%. The decrease of voter turnout could be partly because of 
the political chaos and massive demonstrations of the Red-shirt and Yellow-shirt groups that 
impeded voters participating in elections. Despite the requirement of the 1997 constitution 
that the senate be a non-partison body in order to assure the neutrality of the Upper House, 
many Thai senators were criticized for being proxies who protected the interests of 
politicians. The Thai Media published a long list of senator candidates who had linkages with 
politicians
90
and called the Upper House “The siblings and husbands-and-wives assembly” 
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 For the list of senators who were accused of having relationships with politicians, see ASTV 
Manager Online, ‘Perd Salaek phu samak Sor Wor tua prathet 49’ [Uncovering the 2006 senate 
candidates], Manager, 12 April 2006, <http://www.manager.co.th/QOL/ 
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(The Nation Weekend, 16-22 December 1999) or “an Assembly of slaves” (Thai Post, 5 
March 2000).  
In the southern border provinces, the obstacles to political participation in the 2006 
Senate election were not only the political conflict between the Red-shirt and the Yellow-
shirt groups and the distrust of the senate candidates, but also violence on election day by 
suspected militants in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. There were bombings and shootings at 
10 polling units in Yala and Narathiwat, targeting voting officers and ballot-card-vehicles, 
and scattering nails en route to a polling unit in Pattani, aiming to destroy the election and 
prevent southern voters from voting (Isranews, 20 April 2006). Five people were killed and 
another 13 were seriously injured (Manager, 29 August 2006). However, although voters in 
the conflict areas participated in the 2006 Senate election less than in the first Senate election 
in 2000, many voters still showed their interest in political participation through voting for 
the Senate by going out to the polls at a higher rate than people in other regions (see Figure 
4-7). 
The following Senate election was held on 2 March 2008. Regulations for the Senate 
election were changed under the 2007 constitution of Thailand. According to the new 
constitution, 76 senators, one for each province, were directly elected by voters and 74 
senators were appointed from a wide range of professional groups. However, the Senate 
election in 2008 received less attention from electorates in the Lower South and nationwide. 
Despite the increasing rate of voter turnout in the MP election in December 2007, the Senate 
election, which was held about 2 months later, illustrated the opposite results. Whereas the 





Figure 4-2), the voter turnout of the 2008 Senate election was only about 60%, which 
was less than the voter turnout in the previous senate election in 2006 by about 7% (See 
Figure 4-6). 
The most recent senate election was held on 30 March 2014 during the midst of 
political conflict and street protests by the anti-government group, the People's Democratic 
Reform Committee (PDRC). The political conflict affected the pattern and level of political 
participation in the country.  Some voters gave up their political participation through voting 
and decided to participate via street politics by joining the protests and political movements. 
As a result, the national average of voter turnout in the 2014 Senate election sharply 
decreased from 55.62% in 2008 to 42.79% in 2014. For the Lower South, voter turnout in the 
Senate election in 2014 also dropped, especially in Narathiwat. As shown in Figure 6, voter 
turnout in Narathiwat decreased to 38.71% from 60.35% in the 2008 senate election. This 
was the first time since the re-emergence of conflict and violence that voter turnout in 
Narathiwat was lower than the national average. The political participation of Narathiwat 
voters was undermined by violence on election day. There was a roadside bomb near the 
polling unit of Rueso district in Narathiwat which killed 2 policemen and injured 3 policemen 
who were travelling to provide security for a polling unit (Bangkok Post, 31 March 2014). 
Although the poll continued after the explosion, voters may have felt threatened in going to 
the polling station. As a result, political participation in the Senate election in Narathiwat 
remarkably declined in 2014.  
If we consider the Senate elections from 2000 to 2014, we can see a significant 
decrease in political participation through Senate elections in the Lower South, as shown in 
Figure 4-7. However, when compared to the MP elections, despite the same fear of violence, 
voters in the conflict areas demonstrated more interest in participating in the MP elections 




less than 70% after 2001, except in 2014 when some polling units could not be operated due 
to the political turmoil, while voters in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat participated in the 
Senate elections less and less in every election, despite the high rate of voter turnout in the 
first Senate election in 2000. 
What caused this difference? Living in the midst of conflict and violence, voters were 
in more danger from violent incidents and conflict. Many people thus tended to be more 
selective in participating in political activity that they thought was worthwhile. It likely 
seemed to be that less democratic elections also led to less electoral participation. The senate 
elections were less democratic, at least in two particular ways; firstly, most senators, 
including in the Lower South, were criticized for being proxies and having linkage with 
politicians, such as Muktar Matha, Tuan Abdullah Dauddmareyo
91
, Waemahadi Waeda-oh, 
and Halimah Utarasint. Secondly,  the constitutional design of the Senate that wished for a 
neutral Upper House to check and balance the government and bureacracy might not yet be 
accomplished (Chambers 2009: 20). The ineffectivesness of Senators in the eyes of most 
voters together with the less democratic elections seemingly decreased the desire of voters, 
particularly those living in high conflict areas, to participate in senate elections.  
 
Local election in the Deep South 
 
Voters’ political participation through elections is not limited to only the national 
level, political participation in local elections is also important to voters in the conflict areas 
of southern Thailand. The desire of decentralization was a long-time wish of many Malay-
Muslims, as seen in Haji Sulong’s seven-point demand. However, due to the fears of the Thai 
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state, the request for decentralization was always rejected. The concept of decentralization 
was strengthened after the implementation of the 1997 Constitution. As a result, the Thai 
political system underwent revolutionary changes to enhance decentralization and empower 
local government through the 1997 Constitution’s inclusive provisions (Albritton 2005, 
Charas and Weist 2010).  The key features regarding decentralization and bottom-up local 
administration included, for example, the principle of self-government according to the will 
of the locality, the delineation of power and duties between the central authorities and local 
administrative organizations, and the right of the locality to elect a local assembly and a local 
administrative committee or local administrators (Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 
1997: Chapter 9).  
Currently, the structure of Local Government Organizations (LAOs) in Thailand is 
divided into four types: Sub-District (Tambon) Administrative Organization (TAO), 
Municipality (Tessaban), Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO), and two special 
administrative region organizations, the Bangkok Metropolitan Region and Pattaya City. The 
municipality is further separated into three types: Sub-district (Tambon) Municipality, Town 
(Mueang) Municipality, and City (Nakorn) Municipality, depending on population and local 
income. For the Deep South, there are 267 LAOs in total, divided as illustrated in Table 4-9.  
 
Table 4-9: Numbers of Local Administrative Organizations in three southernmost 










Yala 47 13 2 1 1 64 




Narathiwat 72 13 3 - 1 89 
 Source: Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, Thailand 
 
The Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO) is the smallest local government at 
the community level. According to interviews with local authorities in the Deep South, the 
lower the level of local elections, the more voters tended to participate
92
. As shown in Figure 
4-8, voter turnout was high and increased, especially after the upsurge of conflict and 
violence, with more than 75% of voters participating in voting in 2009. Interestingly, when 
comparing voter turnout in 2009 with the violent incidents in the same year, Figure 8 showed 
an inverse relationship between participation in local election and the violence. Voter turnout 
of the TAO election in 2009 was lowest in Pattani (75.59%), which had the most frequent 
violent incidents (397 violent incidents) among the three provinces. The inverse relationship 
could possibly be because the level of violence was not a major influence on voter’s 
motivation in TAO elections. People expected their MPs to work in the Thai parliamentary 
system to deliver the policies that could solve the ongoing conflict and violence. For the TAO 
councils, most voters expected an individual benefit from a personal connection between 
them and their local representatives. Despite the campaign from state agencies in promoting 
voters to vote for a good person (khon dee), not for an acquaintance (Khon ru jak), or 
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 Interview, local authorities in Songkhla and Pattani, March and April 2013. 
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Figure 4-8: Comparison between voter turnout of Members of the Tambon 
Administrative Organization Council’s elections in 2001 and 2009 by province and 
number of violent incidents in 2009 
 
Sources: The 2001 data is adapted from Trakul Meechai 2003, The final report on Thai local politics 
and government (Bangkok:  King Prajadhipok). 
The 2009 voter turnout is from the Office of the Election Commission of Thailand.  
The number of violent incidents is from Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “Sixth Year of the Southern 
Fire: Dynamics of Insurgency and Formation of the New Imagined Violence”, Deep South 
Watch, March 10, 2010, p.8. <http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/730>, accessed 30 
September 2015.  
 
 
The issue of ongoing conflict and violence was not a major election campaign policy 
of many TAO candidates. They offered more concrete policies to meet the needs of their 
voters, such as construction of basic infrastructure, local development projects, promotion of 
the agricultural occupation, and pensions for the elderly. Voters, especially those in rural 
areas, are more likely to value doable policies that can benefit them directly
94
. The TAO 
representatives were able to deliver policy quicker because the process of policy formation in 
local governments was shorter and involved a smaller group of people. If compared with the 
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policies proposed by the elected MPs of the national level, they had to pass through the long 
process of the parliamentary system before receiving approval by the cabinet and parliament. 
If the elected MPs were not with a government party, the chance to get their policies 
approved would be low. It would be even more difficult for the MPs of small provinces
95
, so 
rural areas often had to wait for an extended period until the policies could be implemented. 
One participant, ironically, said that “Thanks to the conflict and violence, it helped boost the 
government budget and development of our community
96
.” Moreover, since representatives 
at the TAO level were people living in the village who had a motive to develop their own 




Besides, the patron-client system at the local level was also an important factor in the 
high voter turnout. Most of the TAO candidates were supported by the solid ties of their kin-
based relationship in their own neighborhood. In some Malay-Muslim villages, almost every 
household was related by kinship and the election competitors sometimes were relatives or 
friends. As one villager in Pattani said,  
The TAO election is a competition among relatives. They (candidates) may give us some 
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 Interview, a former MP of Pattani, April 2013 
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 Interview, a villager from Pattani, February 2013.  
97
 Interview, a villager from Yala, February 2013. 
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The patron-client relationship is so powerful that it greatly affected voting decisions 
of voters in the conflict areas. For local elections, many voters in the Deep South, similar to 
people in other regions of Thailand, did not vote for a candidate’s performance or policies, 
they went to the poll and tended to vote for the candidate who they knew, with an expectation 
for personal benefits in exchange for their votes. The personal benefits were not limited to 
only money or material goods from vote-buying. For some electorates in the conflict areas, 
personal benefits also included trust and reliability. Due to the distant relationship between 
local people and state authorities in the conflict areas, most local people, especially Malay-
Muslims, were highly dependant on their local politicians to help them in contacting the state.  
Voting for someone they have close ties with ensured them that they would have 
someone they could trust and run to when they faced a problem. So, voters voted for their 
relatives because they had no other way. One university student from Pattani pointed out that 
her father always voted for an influential person, whom he knew, in the district. He also 
convinced her to vote for the same candidate as him. He said, “we need to vote for him 




However, the interviews also revealed that voters of different generations participated 
differently in local elections. For the young generation, they mostly voted for the candidate 
their parents suggested, with or without knowing that candidate. On the contrary, the older 
generation took the local election more seriously. Most parents let their children decide by 
themselves which candidate they wanted to vote for in the national election, but they tended 
to direct and convince their children to vote for a specific candidate in the local election. One 
university student whose hometown is in Yala but is studying in Pattani said, 
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My father always tells me who I should vote for in local elections, mostly he wanted me to 
vote for someone he knew or our relatives. But he let me decide by myself for national 
elections. I am not at home (in Yala) much because I am studying in Pattani. Although I come 
back home to participate in elections every time, I do not know much about the candidates for 




Despite the high voter turnout in the TAOs elections, the local elections for the 
provincial level have not received as much attention as local elections of the TAOs. After the 
third modification of the Provincial Administration Organization Act of 1997 in November 
2003, the first direct election of the PAO Chief Executives was held for the first time in 
March 2004 (Achakorn 2007: 455). The first direct election of PAO chief executives could 
not gain much attention from voters. Voter turnout of the first direct PAOs elections in the 
three provinces was less than 70%. In the latest PAO election in 2012, voter participation 
decreased further.  As shown in   
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Figure 4-9, voter turnout in Yala sharply decreased from 68.06 in 2004 to 57.19 in 
2012. Similarly, Pattani’s voter turnout decreased from 65.64 in 2004 to 61.5 in 2012. 
However, voter turnout showed the opposite result in Narathiwat where the violent incidents 
occurred most frequently between 2004 and 2012. Despite the decrease of voter participation 









Figure 4-9: Comparison chart between voter turnout of the PAO Chief Executive 




Sources: Voter turnout in 2004 is from Teeraphan Jaiman and Passakorn Inlang 2004, ฐานข้อมลูการเลือกตัง้นายก อบจ, 
[Database of PAO election in 2004], King Prajadhipok’s Institute, p.54. 
  Voter turnout in 2012 is from the Office of the Election Commission of Thailand. 
 Number of violent incidents is from the Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center. 
 
Narathiwat, which had the highest voter turnout in 2012, was the only province that 
had three candidates for the PAO Chief Executive position, while Yala and Pattani had two 
candidates contesting (See Table 4-10). Local politics in the Deep South has mostly been 
dominated by the same group of local politicians for long time. For example, Set Aljufree, the 
PAO Chief Executive of Pattani, has been in his position since 2000, even before Thailand 
had direct election of the PAO.  This may mean that voters are happy with their 
representatives so they continued to vote for the same candidate every time. However, a 
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votes due to hopelessness for change. The domination of local politics by long time political 
elites in the provinces impeded other candidates from competing. So, some voters did not 
have many choices and they believed, under a less democratic election, their votes could not 
bring much change to the community. As a young voter from Yala said, “The local politics in 
my hometown is pretty much controlled by a certain group of politicians. My vote is useless. 
They will surely win, whether I vote or not
101
.” When Narathiwat had more choices of 
candidates for their voters, more people participated.  
 
Table 4-10: Candidates for the PAO Chief Executive position in 2012 
Province Name Votes 
Yala 1. Muktar Matha 101,831 
 2. Abdulhalim Bahee 45,482 
Pattani 1. Set Aljufree 139,482 
 2. Mahama Madeng 91,869 
Narathiwat 1. Kuseng Yawohasan 143,810 
 2. Sumit Masalaeh 110,331 
 3. Areepen Utarasint 43,193 
Source: Isranews, 9 November 2012.  
 
 
The result of the PAO election in 2012 indicates that voters in the three southern 
border provinces had different criteria in voting between national and local elections. In the 
2011 general election, most voters voted for the Democrat candidates. However, none of 
Democrat-supported candidates, including Abdulhalim Bahee, Mahama Madeng, and Sumit 
Masalaeh, won the PAO Chief Executive election. 
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Whereas the conflict and violent attacks since 2004 seems to have inspired some 
people to go to the poll, the same factor also discouraged intentions to vote for some 
candidates. Since some people had less trust in each other and in their political candidates, 
they then had to find some other incentive to go to vote. Money could be another inspiration 
that motivated voters to risk their lives and go to the ballot. Some even said they would not 
go to vote if they did not receive a reasonable amount of money
102
.  Due to lifestyles of 
voters in the Lower South, vote buying mostly happened at tea shops after the Malay-
Muslims returned from praying at mosques. Since Muslim women were mostly at home and 
did not usually participate in political discussions at the tea shop, vote buyers were generally 
Muslim men. However, although Muslim women did not directly receive money themselves, 
they were easily induced by their husbands or their fathers to vote for the same candidate
103
.   
People in the Deep South not only faced violence from the militants, they also 
experienced intense local power struggles where some competitors even took other’s lives to 
win the election. According to a report by Nattakorn Vititanon (2010), Narathiwat, Pattani, 
and Yala were the first, second, and fourth provinces, respectively, that had the highest 
number of assassinations of local politicians between 2000 and 2009
104
. There were 34, 31, 
and 24 local politicians in Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala, repectively, who were murdered 
during the period of the study (Nattakorn 2010: 9). Although the study could not decisively 
determine the real cause of the murders, and some may be related to the insurgency, being in 
the top five of the list could more or less explain how intense political rivalry was in local 
elections in the three Malay-Muslim provinces.  
 




 Interview, a university student in Pattani, 23 July 2013. 
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Both at national and local level, the ongoing conflict and violence had a significant 
impact on political participation through voting. For many Malay-Muslim voters, the conflict 
and violence triggered their desire to participate in elections. Many voters in the conflict 
areas decided to participate in voting as a method to show their disagreement with the 
government and make their voices heard by Thai politicians. The power of votes was such 
that major political parties took more consideration of them, which resulted in a change of 
public policies.  
There was speculation that underground groups tried to undermine the elections. 
Besides destroying elections by causing violence, the insurgents could agitate for disunity, 
chaos, and confusion against the Thai state. The insurgents, who also were registered voters 
and participated in elections, went to the poll but their motivation to vote could be complex. 
Some of the new generation of insurgents graduated in political science from a university in 
Indonesia, and wanted to create linkages and expand their network through elections. There 
were beliefs that some insurgents went to vote but intended to void the voting cards; some of 
them tried to threaten other voters not to vote by defaming the candidates; and some of them 
were sent to apply as a candidate in elections (Paskorn 2007: 10-11). However, there is no 
proof of these suspicions. Najmuddin Umar argued that it seemed less likely that the 
underground group would participate in elections or send its members to take part in Thai 
politics because the underground group did not believe in the Thai parliamentary system 
(Paskorn 2007: 13). Political participation through elections by the insurgents, if true 
illustrated that they did not ignore the importance of the Thai political system. Even though 
their goal of participation might seem to be dangerous for the Thai government, having them 
participate and express their views openly through elections would be a lot better than using 




The way people in the conflict areas chose to vote suggests they were saying 
indirectly that they did not agree with the violence and insurgency. At the same time, when 
the governments applied violent strategies or unjust practices that could lead to more conflict 
and violence, many Malay-Muslim voters used their votes as an influential instrument to 
oppose government policies and tell the government what they really wanted. As a result, as 
shown in Figure 4-10, people in the Deep South voted at higher rate than people in other 
regions in most elections, although the level of political participation was diverse in different 
elections. Voters in the conflict areas tended to participate highest where elections were 
considered most democratic and effective. As shown in Figure 4-10, more voters in the Deep 
South participated in the general and TAO elections than in the Senate and PAO elections.  
 
Figure 4-10: Voter turnout of national, Senate, and local elections in Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat 
 
























2011 National election 2008 Senate election 2012 PAO election 2009 TAO election 




Generally, voting behavior is complicated since people have complex motivations in 
voting. Voters in conflict areas of the Deep South have many inspirations, especially after the 
return of conflict and violence in 2004.  The frequent violent incidents became an additional 
concern that affected their desire for political participation. People living in the midst of 
violence seem to be very careful and chose to participate politically only when they think it is 
important and can create an impact on their society. So, the less democratic elections resulted 
in lower voter turnout.  
Living in the midst of conflict and violence and experiencing many losses and deaths 
could be a prime mover that motivated some Malay-Muslims to find a way to stop all the 
conflict non-violently. The Malay-Muslim voters expressed their political views through 
elections and high rate of voter turnout, indicating that many Malay-Muslim voters desired to 
solve the conflict and violence in a non-violent form. Many Malay-Muslims decided to 
participate in Thai politics not only as voters. Many, including the former elites of Patani, 
religious leaders, and new entrepreneurs, took part in the Thai political system as politicians, 
who wanted to represent Malay-Muslims in the Thai parliament. However, their intentions to 
participate as politicians were not as straightforward as expected due to the impact of conflict 
and violence and the nepotism in Thai politics. The next section considers politicians’ 
political participation in the Deep South to investigate how politicians in the conflict areas 










Politicians’ political participation in the Deep South 
 
After being annexed and becoming part of Thailand, there were many troubles 
between the Thai state and the Malay-Muslims, especially the former leaders of the Patani 
kingdom who lost their power and prestige. When political expression, especially on sensitive 
issues that threatened Thai security, was strictly prohibited, the dissatisfaction of the Patani 
elites was expressed violently through unrest and insurgency. Some of them gathered and 
organized underground groups to call for the independence of Patani, as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 1.  When the political system of Thailand was changed to democracy and the first 
election was held, some Patani elites, such as Tengku Abdul Jalal, willingly participated 
within the Thai political system. They considered the elections as a chance to communicate to 
the Thai state and make demands for their fellow Malay-Muslims. A now-legendary figure in 
the Malay-Muslim society, Haji Sulong, sowed the seeds of the future participation for the 
younger generation through public hearings and consultations. Even though his seeds proved 
short-lived, the political participation of Sulong became a model for the new generation. 
There were many Malay-Muslims who followed Sulong’s trail of participation within the 
Thai political system; one of his followers was his son, Den Tohmeena, who later gathered 
with other politicians, both Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists, in the three southern border 










Political participation of the Wadah group 
 
The emergence and struggle of the Wadah group in Thai politics before the upsurge of 
conflict and violence in 2004 was exceptional, as the Wadah group made great progress in the 
Thai political system, as discussed earlier. The former period before 2004 would be 
considered the most successful for the Wadah group as it had won every election since its 
establishment in the later 1980s. Not only were its members, such as Den Tohmeena, Wan 
Muhamad Nor Matha and Areepen Utarasint, able to take high positions in the Thai cabinet, 
but the Wadah MPs were also successful in implementing many policies for Malay-Muslims. 
The past achievements of the Wadah MPs included, for example, permission to wear Hijab in 
government schools and the establishment of an Islamic bank, both when the group was 
affiliated with the New Aspiration Party (NAP).  
However, its fortune was reversed after 2004. If we looked back to the success of 
Wadah in gaining seats in the parliament in every election since the 1986  national election, 
the success made the group  popular not only to its Malay-Muslim voters but also attractive to 
a major national political party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT). After the triumph of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party in 2001, the TRT absorbed the Seritham Party and 
the NAP to establish a majority in the parliament. Duncan McCargo (2006: 53) believed one 
of the unspoken reasons of Thaksin for incorporating the NAP into the Thai Rak Thai party, 
rather than to increase his absolute majority in the parliament, was to gain more votes in the 
South through the popularity of the Wadah group and to develop the southern border 
provinces under his patronage. However, the decision for merger could not accomplish the 
goals of Thaksin and the Wadah group. This section will look at political participation of the 




upsurge of violence, after the conflict and violence re-emerged in 2004 the popularity of the 
Wadah group declined.   
During the Thaksin government, Wan Muhamad Noor Matha, one of the Wadah 
leaders and a NAP party list MP from Yala, was appointed Minister of Transport in 2001 and 
Minister of Interior in 2002. Although having a Malay-Muslim representative in a highly 
influential position in Thai politics could be considered as the Wadah group’s achievement of 
a major goal, Wan Noor’s performance as interior minister proved unsuccessful. The turning 
point came when Wan Noor as Interior Minister was put in charge of Thaksin’s policy of a 
War on Drugs in 2003, one of the most contentious policies of Thaksin. The implementation 
of this policy was harsh and aggressive and led to the extrajudicial killings of 2,275 people 
during the first three-month phase of the campaign including many in the Far South (Human 
Rights Watch 2004: 1). Later, there was unrest in the South in 2004 and it was the duty of 
Wan Noor to handle the violence. However, his performance was not impressive in the eyes 
of many Malay-Muslims. As a result of the vigilantism (kha tat ton) that the Thai authorities 
used to cope with both the War on Drugs and the unrest in the South, many Malay-Muslims 
were arrested and killed. Wan Noor subsequently lost trust from his Malay-Muslim voters.  
In the view of some Malay-Muslims, Wan Noor was changing sides and representing 
the Thai state rather than fellow Muslims. Some Malay-Muslims then lost trust and believed 
Wan Noor fell short in his ability to deal with the violence in the South (McCargo 2006: 53).  
On the other hand, the Thai state became convinced the Wadah was behind the political 
violence in the Deep South. The Wadah politicians, especially those who worked in high-
ranking positions in the government, found themselves in an awkward predicament. As the 
Minister of Interior, Wan Noor had the duty to suppress the riots and unrest caused by Malay-






. A few months after the firearms robbery in January 2004, Thaksin 
removed Wan Noor from the Interior ministry. Even though Thaksin never said in public his 
reason for the dismissal, it was believed that Wan Noor was discharged because Thaksin was 
displeased with his performance in dealing with the continual security problems in the South 
(BBC News, 10 March 2004 and Naewna, 9 March 2004). Another possibility was that 
Thaksin and the Thai state were too aggressive and incautious. They misidentified Malay-
Muslim politicians as the culprits.  Thaksin and Thai state authorities brought those suspected 
culprits too quickly without being sure if they whether true culprits or not. When Wan Noor 
rightly advised caution and wanted to wait and be certain, the government chose a decisive 
and aggressive approach and Wan Noor was criticized and opposed.   
Den Tohmeena faced the same fate. He started his political career by running for MP 
of Bangkok in 1957 under the Prachasantibhum group, a group of Muslims in Bangkok, 
while he was studying Law at Thammasat Univeristy. However, he lost his first battle to 
Khuang Aphaiwong. Eleven years later, he returned to political battle in local elections. He 
won and became a member of the Pattani Municipal Council and a member of the provincial 
council of Pattani (Bukhoree 2006: 27). As a local politician, he gradually strengthened and 
expanded his political network and vote base in Pattani, which helped him to win national 
election as Pattani MP in 1976. He was successful as a Malay-Muslim politician, marking the 
first time in Thai history that a person whose father was accused of being a terrorist became a 
cabinet minister of Thailand
106
.  
However, the degrees from Thai universities and his participation in Thai politics as a 
politician could not protect him from the suspicion and accusations of Thai governments that 
he was taking the side of Malay-Muslim militants, instead of the side of the Thai state.  The 
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suspicions of the Thai authorities also affected Den’s vote base. He did not receive much 
support from local authorities, such as Kamnan and Phuyaiban, due to the mistrust that Thai 
authorities had toward Den’s family since the struggle of Haji Sulong, Den’s father 
(Bukhoree 2006: 29). Even though Den clearly expressed that he and the Wadah only wanted 
to fight through the parliamentary system for Malay-Muslims, it could not stop Thai 
authorities and the military from keeping close watch on him and the Wadah politicians. The 
high suspicions of the Wadah members being separatists led to the attempts of Thai 
authorities to undermine them
107
.   
Therefore, despite having leading roles in the parliament and cabinet, the Wadah 
group struggled to survive in Thai politics after the renewed violence in 2004. The Wadah 
members were facing suspicions of their loyalty from both local Malay-Muslims and the Thai 
state. Since the Wadah politicians were affiliated with the government party and worked with 
the Thai state, many local Malay-Muslims doubted their loyalty and it seemed to be quite 
difficult to rebuild trust. As a result, voters punished them through the 2005 general election 
and the Wadah candidates under the Thai Rak Thai party could not gain a single seat in the 
parliament. Similarly, Den Tohmeena returned to the MP competition again after his term of 
senator ended in 2006. However, despite being a famous figure in Pattani politics for a long 
time, Den could not take back his seat in this election.  
The defeat of Den and the Wadah group clearly emphasized the decreasing popularity 
of the group among the Malay-Muslims in the Lower South. Despite all the hardship the 
Wadah members were facing, the leader of the Wadah group, Den Tohmeena insisted on 
participating legally within the parliamentary system. He pointed out,  
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 For example, Najmuddeen Uma, the Wadah MP from Narathiwat in the 1992 and 2001 
elections, was charged with treason in 2004, since the Thai police believed he took part in the January 
4th attacks in 2004 and was one of the masterminds of the insurgent group (Manager, 3 June 2004). 




My father was killed. If I took up a gun and joined with you (the separatists), I might shoot a 
police officer, then I would die. What benefit could come from this? Fighting through politics, 
through the parliament is better. I totally disagreed (with the underground fighting) but (the 
Thai state) believed I was a separatist. I was in trouble from both sides and I did not know 
what to do (Prachatai, 21 February 2005). 
His statement supports the argument of this study that conflict does not undermine the 
desire for political participation. However, the conflict could cause changes in voters’ 
attitudes and affect their voting behaviors. So, politicians, who were not able to meet voters’ 
new demands, faced difficulties in retaining their seats. 
The election in 2011 was a big change for many Malay-Muslim politicians, especially 
members of the Wadah group, due to the dissolution of the Palang Prachachon party by the 
verdict of the Constitutional Court in December 2008. The Wadah members divided into 
several groups; some members were with the Pheu Thai party, such as Sukarno Matha, 
Suthiphan Sririkanon, and Burhanuddin Useng; some members, such as Den Tohmeena, 
Areepen Utarasint, Muk Sulaiman, Nujmuddin Umar, Phaisan Yingsaman, and Jeh Isma-ae 
Jehmong, moved to a new political party, the Matubhum party. The Matubhum party was led 
by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the leader of the 2006 military coup and the first Muslim 
party leader in Thailand, with the aim to establish a Malay-Muslim party and have Malay-
Muslim ministers in the Cabinet in order to influence the government on the South policy 
(Prachatai, 15 May 2011). Many former Wadah members who decided to affiliate with the 
smaller political party believed the party would allow them to have more participation in 
policy-making which would bring benefits for their voters. Pheu Thai candidate, Sukarno 
Matha, Wan Noor’s brother argued, “The southern border provinces’ problem had to be 




(Deep South Watch, 14 June 2011).  However, none of the Wadah group, either with the Pheu 
Thai or the Matubhum parties, won a seat in the 2011 election
108
.  
Political participation of the Wadah group illustrated the influence of conflict and 
violence towards Malay-Muslim politicians. Living among the conflict and violence where 
everyone was suspicious of each other provided a gap for the enemy to frame the Wadah 
group. The violent incidents, especially the Krue Ze and Tak Bai incidents, that occurred 
while the Wadah MPs were with the government party, were a weak point of the Wadah 
group, which the opposition used to criticize the Wadah group. Unfortunately, despite 
participating in Thai politics for more than twenty years, the Wadah group had not made 
many friends. The Wadah members were always a target of suspicion. The Thai authorities, 
while they supported the Phiphitphakdi and the Abdunlabut families (Bukhoree 2006: 29), 
undermined the Tohmeena family and the Wadah group. Den and other members were 
suspected by the Thai authorities as having entered Thai politics to seek separatism. They 
were under surveillance during the election campaign. Areepen Utarasint, one of the Wadah 
leaders, revealed most of the time after he went to the villages to talk and clarify 
misunderstandings with voters, there would be Thai police or the military coming after and 
asking villagers what he talked about (Manager, 15 February 2005). So, although they were 
supposed to be Malay-Muslim representatives who could link the Malay-Muslims and the 
Thai state and speak for the Malay-Muslims, they were not trusted by the Thai state, and the 
policies proposed by the untrusted Wadah were seldom successful after 2004. When the 
mandate of voters could not be delivered, the number of the Malay-Muslim voters who voted 
for the Wadah group decreased.  
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 Anumat Susaror, a winning candidate from the Matubhum party, was not a member of the 




The experience of conflict and violence inspired many Malay-Muslims to take part in 
Thai politics. At the same time, the conflict and violence also complicated politicians’ 
political participation. The conflict and violence not only created more difficulty in election 
campaigns
109
, it also created more suspicion and distrust of each other. Even though the 
Wadah group was successful in creating unity among Malay-Muslim politicians for a time, 
the struggle to keep its influence was constant after the re-emergence of conflict and violence 
in 2004. Joining the TRT might not be the main factor in the Wadah’s failure in national 
elections after 2004 but the conflict and violence, instead, was likely the factor in the loss. 
The high stakes of violence that led people think it was the time to change. 
 
Political participation of the Darussalam group 
 
In addition to the failure of the Wadah group under Thaksin’s parties after the 2005 
election, the Darussalam group also changed from the Democrat party to the Thai Rak Thai 
party and loss subsequent elections. Wairot Phiphitphakdi, an heir of the Sultan of Yaring and 
one of the Darussalam members, gave the reason for resigning from the Democrat party that 
even when the Democrat party formed the government, it had never approved his requests on 
Malay-Muslims matters. He stated, 
I was with the Democrat party for several terms.… (I) told the party to improve the status of 
the Muslims such as increasing Imams’ salary, giving Imams opportunity to go to Mecca. 
They were poor and had no chance.…I wanted the Party to set up a government budget for 
them so they would have more willpower in teaching Islam.…I had told the Party to help in 
this matter for three or four years already but I never received it (Bukhoree 2006: 25). 
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 Due to the conflict and violence, the MP candidates could not organize campaign speeches 
from late evening until night, which used to be very popular in the three southern border provinces, 
because voters were too afraid to participate at night time. So, the candidates could only walk to 




Wairot’s statement described how he was upset with the Democrat party in not 
allowing him to deliver the policies that he promised to his voters. So, when the Democrat 
party did not let him participate in policy-making, he looked for another option, so he could 
carry out the mandate that he received from his voters.  
Interestingly, despite the long history of political struggle between the former Patani 
traditional elites and the religious leaders since the first direct election in 1937, or to be 
precise between the Phipitpakdi family and Tohmeena family, the long-time adversaries came 
to share the same fate with the Thai Rak Thai party in 2004. However, even though the 
Wadah and Darussalam groups were in the same party, they were not on the same team. 
Wairot and his group gave conditions to the Thai Rak Thai party before making the decision 
to move: he and his group would not ever meet with the Wadah group and the TRT had to 
approve a budget for local development
110
. Moreover, the Thai Rak Thai party promised to 
take care of all election campaign expenses and guaranteed that they would not lose the 
election. Wairot gave an interview before the election in 2005 that he was confident that 
Pattani voters, unlike voters in other southern provinces, did not adhere to a political party, 
they voted for individual candidates and Pattani voters had believed in him for a long time 
(Songkhlatoday, 4 December 2004). However, the decision of Wairot and the Darussalam 
group resulted in the loss of their seats to nearly unknown candidates in the 2005 general 
election.  
As shown in Table 4-11, in 2005 Wairot Phiphitphakdi, MP of Pattani since 1995, lost 
almost half of his votes from the 24,553 votes he received in 2001, to Anwar Salaeh, a young 
business man and a new candidate of the Democrat party. The defeat of the Darussalam 
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 According to Wairot Phipitpakdi, the Thai Rak Thai party gave him a big budget of more 
than 300 million baht to develop Pattani. The other four members of the Darussalam group who 
moved to the Thai Rak Thai party also received this budget. When calculated altogether, they received 
almost 1,000 million baht to develop their provinces. See <http://songkhlatoday.com/paprer/3187>, 




candidates also is clear in constituency 2 of Pattani where Jeh Isma-ae Jehmong, a Malay-
Muslim Police Lieutenant Colonel, lost his seat to the Democrat candidate, Ismael 
Yidoromae, a former PAO council member of Pattani, a school director of an Islamic 
boarding school (Ponoh), and husband of Ahmeen Tohmeena’s daughter (Bukhoree 2006: 
54).   
 




























































Source:  Office of the Election Commission of Thailand   
Remark:  NAP = The New Aspiration Party 
  TRT = The Thai Rak Thai Party 
 
 
Jeh Isma-ae Jehmong was from Yarang District of Pattani. He became a police officer 
under a quota of the Ministry of Interior for Malay-Muslim students from southern border 
provinces. Having police background helped him to receive support from the Thai authorities, 
especially from government officials, unlike Den who received little support from Kamnan 
and Phuyaiban. Some local government officials gave support to Jeh Isma-ae in order to 




seeking to shape politics in the Deep South
111
 (Bukhoree 2006: 50). However, despite 
receiving winning scores of 26,041 votes in 2001 when Jeh Isma-ae Jehmong was with the 
Democrat party, his votes went down to only 8,532 in the 2005 general election when he 
moved to the Thai Rak Thai party.  
Whereas all the former Democrat Malay-Muslim MPs in the three southern provinces 
from the Darussalam group, including Wairot Phipitpakdi, Jeh Isma-ae Jehmong, Sommart 
Jehna, and Pornpich Pattanakullert, resigned from the Democrat party in 2004, there was only 
one Buddhist member of the group who decided to stay with the Democrat party, Prasert 
Phongsuwansiri, a businessman from Yala and the only Buddhist MP of the three 
southernmost provinces since 1995.  He was the only candidate in the three southern 
provinces who was re-elected in the 2005 general election, while the other MPs were new 
faces from the Democrat party.  
While almost all of the MPs in the three southern border provinces were male, there 
has been only one female Malay-Muslim politician, Pornpich Pattanakullert, who has won 
MP elections in Narathiwat since the 1990s. Her political participation as the first and only 
Malay-Muslim female representative is worth mentioning here. Pornpich was a Malay-
Muslim female from Bacho District of Narathiwat, an area that had a high-frequency of 
violent incidents. She was one of the few Malay-Muslim females who had a higher education 
from a Thai university. After graduating from the Medicine program at Chulalongkorn 
University, she became a medical doctor in her hometown in Narathiwat and opened a free 
clinic for the elderly and disabled. Being a politician was not her dream career but the 
obstacles that she experienced from working in public health led her to decide that by 
participating in politics as a politician she could help alleviate the problem of public health 
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 Even though Jeh Isma-ae Jehmong’s father was Toh Imam in Yarang district, he was just an 





care in Narathiwat (Tichila 2009: 135). So, she decided to participate in local elections and 
was elected a member of the Municipal Council of Narathiwat in 1990. Later, Pornpich was 
invited to join the Democrat Party in the national election in March 1992.  
As a Malay-Muslim female, her decision to participate and contest a seat was unusual 
in Malay-Muslim society. Her first participation as the Democrat candidate for the 
Narathiwat MP position was difficult. Her competitors convinced Malay-Muslim voters that 
voting for a female candidate was a sin (Matichon, 17 August 2004). So, she lost her first 
national election. She participated again as a Democrat candidate in the following election in 
September 1992 and she won this time.  
Even though she had been with the Democrat party since her first election in 1992 and 
had won election three times, she was disappointed that her political party ignored her and the 
other Malay-Muslim MPs of the three provinces in the policy-formation process. The 
disappointment led to her decision to resign from the Democrat party and move to the Thai 
Rak Thai party with the belief that the Thai Rak Thai party would help her successfully 
deliver policies for her voters
112
. Unfortunately, after she resigned from the Democrat Party 
in 2004, she never won an election again. In the 2007 general election, whereas other 
members of the Darussalam group were affiliated with the Palang Prachachon party, 
Pornpich decided to run for the MP position under the newly-founded Matchimathipatai 
party. Like other faction members, she lost. Pornpich was defeated by a new player in MP 
elections, Waemahadi Waeda-oh (Mor Wae or Doctor Wae) from the Pheu Pandin party.  
When compared to the Wadah group, political participation of the Darussalam group 
seemed to be less complicated.  While the Wadah group had a two-sided battle from both the 
Thai authorities, who always looked at the Wadah members as suspected separatists and tried 
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 Pornpich and the Darussalam group were also upset that the Democrat party made light of 
her group and did not promote her, as representatives of the Darussalam group, to be party executives 




to undermine them, and many Malay-Muslim voters,  who doubted the sincerity of the 
Wadah group towards the Malay-Muslims. The Darussalam group was considered in a better 
position in terms of support from Thai government officials. The Darussalam group seemed 
not to have issues with government mistrust and none of the Darussalam members was 
accused of being involved in the unrest or with separatism. However, the support from the 
Thai authorities could not help the group members to win an election after the conflict and 
violence re-emerged.  
The dissatisfaction of many Malay-Muslim voters with Thaksin’s policies in lessening 
the unrest that re-emerged in the Deep South in January 2004 impacted hugely in the decline 
of the popularity of the Wadah and Darussalam members under the Thai Rak Thai party in 
the 2005 general election.  Moreover, Thaksin was blamed for being neglectful of his election 
campaign in the conflict areas of the Far South. He campaigned across the country but not in 
the Far South, where there was no Thaksin voter base. So, despite the popularity of the TRT 
candidates in other regions, the loss of all the MP seats in the Far South in the 2005 general 
election was partly the result of Thaksin’s negligence towards Malay-Muslim voters in the 
region.   
After the re-emergence of violence in 2004, voters’ fondness for charismatic 
candidates or the descendants of Patani traditional elites became less important than their 
policy preferences. According to the interviews and the result of national elections since 
2004, most voters tended to vote for the candidate they believed could potentially deliver 
effective policies to lessen the conflict and violence. Unlike people in other regions, the 
experiences of conflict and violence of both voters and politicians in the Deep South became 
an additional influence on their desire for political participation though elections. Most voters 
in the conflict areas expected more from their votes and elected MPs. So, politicians or 




matter how long they were elected or how beloved, lost support. The boycott of the long-time 
elected politicians opened an opportunity for new players to get into political competition. 
 
New players in national politics  
 
The inattention of Thaksin towards the southernmost provinces did not end at the 
election but it negatively affected policy formation and caused difficulty in the work of the 
MPs of the Far South. Although the MPs gave their promises to their voters to implement 
their proposed policies, the policies could not be delivered as they were being blocked by the 
majority rule of the parliament, especially the policies proposed by the MPs of opposition 
parties
113
. The conflict and violence caused higher stakes in voting as violence needed to be 
solved. So, when the mandate from voters could not be carried out, it resulted in a huge 
decline of votes. However, the decreasing popularity of the former MPs opened opportunity 
for new politicians to enter into politics in the conflict areas.  
As shown in Figure 4-11, the dissatisfaction of voters towards the government’s 
policies and their representatives in solving the conflict and violence gave way to new players 
to enter the Thai parliament.  There were 8 from the total 11 candidates (72.73%) who were 
elected for the first time in the 2005 general election. Only 3 candidates in the 2005 general 
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 Source:  Office of the Election Commission of Thailand  
  
 Living in the midst of conflict areas increased risks for voters in participating in every 
political activity. For some voters in the Deep South, political participation through national 
elections meant to them more than strengthening a patron-client relationship, individual 
interests, or civic duty. They voted because they wanted to see the mitigation of conflict and 
violence. When voters intend their representative to take part in the policy formation process, 
they have high expectationa. Due to the high stakes in voting, if that representative failed to 
deliver the policies as promised, voters in conflict areas had no hesitation to give that chance 
to a new candidate. Some said that “Voting is my only tool to pay back the politicians. The 
new candidate I voted for might not have anything better than the old ones, but I just wanted 
them (the former MPs) to know that we are disappointed with their performances
114
.” They 
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thus gave that chance to new candidates to represent the interests of voters in the conflict 
areas and deliver the policies they wanted more effectively.  
 The conflict and violence resulted in changes in voting behavior and opened 
opportunities for new candidates from different backgrounds. In the past, especially during 
the first few elections after the transition of the Thai government system, electoral 
participation in the Deep South was mostly dominated by small groups of traditional elites, 
both royal families and religious leaders, as discussed in Chapter 3. As time passed, people in 
the Deep South gradually learned about Thailand’s new political system and became more 
politically active. Not only was there an increase in voters’ participation, but wider groups of 
Malay-Muslims also participated as political candidates. The later period after the formation 
of the Wadah group (1986-2001) showed more varied backgrounds of elected politicians. As 
shown in Table 4-12, there were groups of, for example, local politicians, bureaucrats, 
businessmen, farmers, employees, and other professional careers, who ran in general 















Table 4-12:  Elected candidates in the three southern provinces by occupation 
 




(2005 – 2011) 
Percentage (number) 
Local politicians 34.62% (9) 22.73% (5) 
Bureaucrats 15.38% (4) 13.63% (3) 
Teachers 11.53% (3) 0 
Businessmen 7.69% (2) 31.82% (7) 
Doctors 3.85% (1) 4.54% (1) 
Policemen 3.85% (1) 0 
Farmers 3.85% (1) 0 
Private employees 3.85% (1) 0 
Lawyers 3.85% (1) 18.18% (4) 
Islamic Private School Directors 0 9.1% (2) 
Information not available 11.53% (3) 0 
Total 100% (26) 100% (22) 
Remark: 1. There are 5 candidates who were elected both before and after the re-emergence of 
violence. They are included in both periods of the analysis. 
   2. The data includes the two candidates who won later in by-elections. 
Sources: The Secretariat of the House of Representatives; Bukhoree Yeema 2012, นกัการเมืองถ่ินจงัหวดัยะลา 
[Politicians of Yala Province], King Prajadhipok’s Institute; Bukhoree Yeema 2006, 
นกัการเมืองถ่ินจงัหวดัปัตตานี [Politicians of Pattani Province], King Prajadhipok’s Institute; 
Rujaluckraya Kananurak 2015, นกัการเมืองถ่ินจงัหวดันราธิวาส [Politicians of Narathiwat Province], 





 Table 4-12 also illustrated some changes in elected candidates’ backgrounds between 
the period before and after the recurrence of violence. From the 1986 election, the first 
election after the formation of the Wadah, to the 2001 general election, national politics in the 
Deep South was mostly controlled by the high number of formerly local politicians (34.62%) 
and bureaucrats (15.38%).  Some descendants of traditional elites, such as Den Tohmeena 
and Wairot Phiphitphakdi, were still widely accepted by most voters during this period 
though.  However, the influence of conflict and violence since 2004 motivated a new group 
of people from various occupations to take part in the elections as political representatives. 
Also, the analysis on elected candidates’s backgrounds could also more or less indicate which 
side people were on.   
 After the violence in 2004, whereas the percentage of former local politicians 
decreased from 34.62% to 22.73%, the candidates with business background increased as 
they gained the most seats in the Deep South (31.82%), compared to the earlier elections 
between 1986 and 2001 where only 7.69% were businesspeople. One of the elected 
candidates who was once an entrepreneur is Anwar Salaeh. Anwar was generally known in 
Pattani as a young successful businessman. He was invited many times by politicians from 
various groups and political parties to run in an election, both local and national, since he was 
25. He never had an interest in politics until he was in his mid-thirties and was invited to join 
the Democrat party. The conflict and suspicion between Muslims and Buddhists was also 
partly his motivation as he wanted to see unity back in his hometown
115
. Voters’ 
disappointment in the former elected candidates and the violent incidents at Krue-Se and Tak 
Bai caused negative votes against their former favorite candidates
116
. So, this left the door 
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opened for new candidates, such as Anwar, to win a position as some voters looked for a 
fresh new politician to take the seat. 
More interestingly, the number of elected candidates who were former lawyers also 
increased from 3.85% (1 candidate) during the period before the violence to 18.18% (4 
candidates) in the elections after the recurrence of violence. The popularity of lawyers could 
possibly increase due to the problems in the justice system in the Deep South as a result of 
the conflict and violence that made more people need help from lawyers, especially in 
security cases. For example, Abdulkarim Dengrakina, the elected candidate of Yala in the 
2005, 2007, and 2011 elections, was once a lawyer in Yala. He helped poor people to pursue 
casea and provided free legal services (Bukhoree 2012: 167). Similarly, Narong Duding, the 
winning candidate of Yala in the 2005 and 2011 general elections, was also a lawyer. He had 
worked at the Muslim Lawyer Association, led by Somchai Neelapaijit, since he was newly 
graduated (Manager, 8 February 2005). Former experiences as lawyers became one of their 
strengths in winning positions after 2004.  
 When considering the group ages of elected candidates, Figure 4-12 showed that there 
were differences between the ages of elected candidates before and after the upsurge of 
violence in 2004. The young candidates (26-35) did not receive many votes from voters in the 
Deep South. The only young candidate (9.1%) who won the general election in 2001 when he 
was in his twenties was Attaphol Mamah, a 26-year-old volunteer teacher from Narathiwat. 
However, he won the by-election after Suthiphan Sririkanon was removed due to alleged 
vote-buying. Based on interviews, some participants in the conflict areas pointed out that 
young people did not gain much recognition from most voters in the Deep South, especially 
from the elderly. It was also quite general that older people tended not to listen to younger 




some new blood or someone who offered policies that opened opportunities for the young 
generation to be able to participate more in politics
117
.” 
 However, Figure 4-12: Percentage of the elected candidates by age 
groupsdemonstrated some changes in voting behavior of voters in the Deep South after the 
violence in 2004. More voters tended to vote for younger candidates. There were a higher 
number of younger candidates (26-35 years old) such as Yusri Susaror (28 years old), Adul 
Sahibatu (28 years old), and Anwar Salaeh (35 years old). On the contrary, the number of 
elected candidates who were 46-55 in the 2005 general election decreased from the previous 
election, and none of the more-than-56-year-old candidates won in 2005. 
 
Figure 4-12: Percentage of the elected candidates by age groups 
 
Remark:  1. The data includes the two candidates who won later in by-elections. 
2. The information of Suthiphan Sririkanon, the winning candidate of Narathiwat in 2011, 
is not included as he was given a red card and removed from the position.  
Sources: The Secretariat of the House of Representatives. 
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The data on elected candidates’ hometown also showed interesting results. Figure 
4-13 showed that more than half of the candidates (12 from the total 22) who won election 
after 2004 came from the top ten districts that had highest violent incidents during January 
2004 – January 2014. Living in the midst of conflict and violence might impede people from 
participating in elections, but for some people, the conflict and violence could not destroy 
their intention to take part in Thai politics. The conflict and violence, on the contrary, could 







Table 4-13: Elected candidates after 2004 by hometown and the cumulative number of 
violent incidents between January 2004 and January 2014 
 
District Number of violent incidents 
(ranking) 
Number of elected 
candidates 
Mueang Yala 1,229 (1) 1 
Ra-ngae 922 (2) 3 
Yarang 891 (3) 1 
Raman 845 (5) 2 
Sai Buri 762 (7) 2 
Mueang Pattani 710 (8) 2 
Nong Chik 677 (9) 1 
Mueang Narathiwat 476 (13) 3 
Tak Bai 419 (15) 1 
Si Sakhon 371 (19) 1 
Panare 346 (22) 2 
Thung Yang Daeng 233 (27) 1 
Waeng 168 (28) 1 
Betong 144 (29) 1 
 Total 22 
Sources: Number of violent incidents is from the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center 
(SBPAC) 







Experiences of conflict and violence do not always come from the insurgents. Living 
in the midst of conflict and violence could easily cause distrust, suspicion, and difficult 
relationships between the Thai state and its people, especially the borderland Muslims. There 
were many times that people in the conflict areas experienced violence by Thai security 
officers caused by deeply suspicions of the Thai state towards the Malay-speaking Muslim of 
southern Thailand. However, the negative experiences did not stop the intention to participate 
in the Thai parliament. One of the elected politicians who was once arrested by the Thai state 
is Waemahadi Waeda-oh or Mor Wae, a medical doctor, civil society activist, and the 
candidate of the 2007 national election.   
Mor Wae was accused by the Thai police of being a Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member 
and planning to bomb five embassies in Bangkok in 2003 (Manager, 29 April 2005).  He was 
arrested for treason in June 2003 and claimed that he was tortured into confessing by the Thai 
police, but he asserted that he was not guilty (Manager, 29 April 2005). Finally, after 2 years 
of investigation, he was released without being charged on 1 June 2005. He then decided to 
continue working for the good of the Malay-Muslims, but in a different way. He stopped his 
role as a civil society activist and began his new political career by running for the position of 
Narathiwat elected senator in 2006. He won with the highest number of votes in Narathiwat 
and became Senator of Narathiwat in April 2006. However, Thailand’s senate was abrogated 
due to the military coup in September 2006. Mor Wae and a number of former senators who 
worked together on the South problems in the National Legislative Assemply under the 
Surayud government then formed the Sajjanuparb group and successfully took four MP seats 
nationwide (three constituency MPs and one Party-list MP) in the 2007 general election.  
Although Mor Wae did not have as strong of a political network as other candidates, 
the government mistrust seemed to help him to get a lot of votes from his sympathisers and 




voters to bring new hope that could help lessen the ongoing crisis in their province. Although 
personal political networks and the Party’s vote base were generally important and could 
greatly help new candidates to be elected, the mistreatment of Malay-Muslim minorities by 
the state created new conditions in voting decisions for some voters in the Deep South. Due 
to unhappiness with the Thai state, many voters tended to vote for a candidate who had 
experienced government mistrust. So, new players, such as Waemahadi, earned votes from 
those who resented the state, or sympathized with those who suffered injustice. 
  
Figure 4-13: Percentage of female candidates in the general elections between 2001 and 
2011 in the three southernmost provinces 
 
Source:  Office of the Election Commission of Thailand  
 
 In terms of gender, most new players in general elections after the recurrence of 
violence were male candidates. Figure 4-13 demonstrated a significant decline of female 
participation in the Lower House. In the 2001 general election, there were 5 female 



















was Pornpich Pattanakullert, the only female MP in the history of the Malay-Muslim 
dominated provinces. Nevertheless, female candidates in the Deep South sharply declined in 
subsequent elections after the violence. There were only 2 (4.17%), 2 (1.61%), and 1 (1.38%) 
female candidates, both Thai-Buddhists and Malay-Muslims, who ran for election in 2005, 
2007, and 2011, respectively. None of them was elected.  
 The conflict and violence had a great impact on politicial participation of politicians 
in the Deep South. It increased pressure on political candidates as people had high 
expectation for their representatives. The high stakes led people to think it might be time for 
change. As one voter mentioned, “I have to vote out the former candidate who has never done 
anything to improve the situation. When we voted for someone and he did nothing for our 
community, it affected us as well. So, whenever I have a chance to change, I go to vote to 
make change happen
118
.”  So, most MPs from the period before the recurrence of violence 
were not re-elected. No matter who won an election, whether they were from the Democrat or 
Phue Thai party, neither side could help in lessening the conflict and violence. This may have 
affected voter turnout. Moreover, while some politicians decided to continue to participate in 
elections, some candidates, especially female candidates, decided to stop running for office. 
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Political participation of local politicians     
   
Even though Thailand is sometimes considered a centralized society, decentralization 
is also present. The attempts to promote decentralization and develop a bottom-up rural 
administration have become more and more important during the past two decades. The 
concept of decentralization and local government system has gained increasing recognition 
by the Thai state after the Fifth National Economic and Social Development plan was issued 
in 1982.  Nevertheless, the Fifth Plan was not able to reach its goal of rural decentralization 
since local administrative power was still largely centralized in Bangkok during that time. 
The notion of decentralization became a stronger trend after the May 1992 event.  The 
decentralization concept turned out to be one of the major campaign policies of at least five 
political parties during the general election of September 1992 (Supasawad 2008: 31). After 
that, the newly elected government under Prime Minister Chuan Leekphai of the Democrat 
Party announced the Tambon (Subdistrict) Council and Tambon Administrative Organization 
(TAO) Act in 1994, which became effective in March 1995, with its aim to decentralize 
decision-making power to local people and enhance popular participation in community 
development (Orapin 2001: 3). As a result, the first local election of TAO was held on 1
st
 
May 1995.   
The election changed the methods of selection but it generally did not change the 
local politicians in rural areas, including the three southern border provinces. Many of the 
local politicians were still former politicians or those already in a political network. A clear 
example of a political network of local politicians in the Far South can be investigated from 
elections of the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO).  The first direct PAO election 
was held in March 2004, just two months after the first bloody incident by Malay-Muslim 




the Deep South of Thailand. National average voter turnout in the 2004 PAO election was 
around 60% (Matichon 15 March 2004), whereas voter turnout in the Deep South was 




Figure 4-9).  
For the Malay-Muslims in the three southern provinces, the PAO election opened new 
political space for them to participate in Thai local politics. However, most of the candidates 
in the PAO elections were familiar faces, who were former politicians in their provinces. 
 
Figure 4-14: Number of PAO chief executive candidates in the Deep South by 
occupation 
 
Sources: Based upon Trakul Meechai 2003, Kanmueang Kanphokkrong Thongthinthai [Thai 
local politics and government] (Bangkok:  King Prajadhipok), Teerapan Jaiman and 
Passakorn Inlang 2004, Thankhormun kanleuaktung nayok aor bor jor [database of 
the PAO chief executive elections], (Bangkok:  King Prajadhipok), Post Today, 26 
February 2004, Isranews, 23 April 2008, and Isranews, 9 November 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4-14 showed that almost all candidates for the PAO elections since the first 
direct PAO election in 2004 were local politicians, including former PAO executives (7, 4, 
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candidates in 2008 and 2012, respectively), and former MPs (Ramree Mamah in the 2008 
election, and Areepen Utarasint in the 2012 election). There was only one candidate, Dawut 
Sa, who ran for PAO chief executive in 2004 and 2008, who was an Islamic religious teacher. 
However, this was not his first election. He ran for the Senate election in 1996 and MP 
election (Party list candidate) in 1997 (Manager, 16 August 2010).  
The ongoing conflict and violence possibly impeded new players, who did not have a 
strong vote base, from running. During the conflict situation, the practices of electioneering 
were more difficult and dangerous. Moreover, voters tended to vote for candidates they 
already knew well because the conflict and violence led them not to take more risks and to 
vote for people they could trust at the local level. Based on the way they voted and my 
interviews, voters in the conflict areas had different conditions in selecting their local and 
national representatives.  In the midst of conflict and violence, local politicians had closer 
relationship with villagers than national politicians. So, voters preferred to vote for someone 
they could trust.  
Although most voters in local elections cast votes based mainly on patron-client 
relations, this does not mean that policies were unimportant. Campaign policies in the local 
elections focused more on local problems and community development rather than on solving 
the violent incidents. So, the conflict and violence after 2004 might not change policies of 
local election candidates. It would not be surprising that voters gave higher importance to a 
patron-client relationship in local elections because they knew each other well and they chose 




Table 4-14: The elected PAO chief executives of the three southern border provinces 
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Province 2004 2008 2012 
Yala Aziz Benhawan Muktar Matha Muktar Matha 
Pattani Set Aljufree Set Aljufree Set Aljufree 
Narathiwat Kuseng Yawohasan Kuseng Yawohasan Kuseng Yawohasan 
  
  Source: Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, Thailand 
 
As shown in Table 4-14, since the first PAO election in 2004, all of the PAO chief 
executives were re-elected. Even though there was a change of PAO executive in Yala in 
2008, both Aziz and Muktar were allies within the same political network of Wan Noor 
(McCargo 2008: 76). On the one hand, the re-elected politicians could be considered 
negatively, as they controlled and dominated local politics and elections
120
. On the other 
hand, politicians, who were re-elected could be seen positively, as most voters were satisfied 
in their performances and trusted in them. Based on election results of national elections after 
2004, when most voters in the conflict areas distrusted their former MPs, they changed their 
votes. So, if they were dissatisfied with their local politicians, we could likely expect the 
same.  







Table 4-15: Election results of the PAO chief executives election in the three southern 
border provinces in 2012 
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Province Candidates Votes 
Yala 
Muktar Matha  
















Source: Isranews, 9 November 2012.  
 
The PAO elections were not only a competition to find representatives of the locality, 
the PAO elections were also a battle among the national major political parties. Winning 
local elections could help the political party to expand its vote base and a bigger vote base 
would benefit the party in national elections and vice versa. For the Far South, after the re-
emergence of violence in 2004, the Malay-Muslims used elections as a channel to express 
their dissatisfaction with the aggressive policies of the Thaksin government towards the 
violence in the Far South by not voting for Thaksin’s political parties, voting out the Wadah 
group politicians, and voting for the Democrat candidates instead. However, this election 
behavior seemed not to extend to local elections, including the PAO elections. For example, 
despite the victory of the Democrat party in the three southern provinces in the MP election 
in July 2011, all the Democrat-supported candidates for the PAO Chief Executive in Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat could not win any seats in the 2012 PAO chief executive election 
(see Table 4-15).  Therefore, although voting behavior of the Malay-Muslims in national 
elections after the re-emergence of violence in 2004 changed to focus more on policy as 
stated in the earlier section, this behavioral change seems not to be applied to local elections. 




The extent of relationships was not limited to between national and provincial level 
but also existed within the local government system. For some families, local government 
organizations were like their family business where almost all members of their family 
worked for many generations. For example, one PAO member in the conflict areas of the 
Deep South explained his political network; 
My Grandfather was Kamnan and Phuyaiban. 
My Father was Kamnan and Phuyaiban too. 
My wife has been Phuyaiban for two to three terms already. 
My nephew is a TAO member. 




Since policy might not be a primary factor to win elections, local politicians tried to 
expand their vote base as much as possible. Many tactics were used, including vote buying 
and violence (Pasuk and Baker 2004: 13). The problems of election fraud, including vote 
buying, were commonly seen throughout the country, including for many Thai Buddhist and 
Malay-Muslim voters, who live in the midst of conflict and violence in the Deep South
122
. 
Interestingly, the most expensive vote buying was in the smallest unit of local government. In 
some villages, while some locals received 200-500 baht per person in vote buying for MP 
elections, they could receive as much as 3,000 baht per person for the TAO elections. In 
some cases, they even received about ten thousand within one day from four TAO 
candidates
123
. The competition for local elections was very tense. There were increasing 
numbers of shootings and killings among local politicians and their vote-canvassers, 
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especially before elections. (Askew 2010: 120). However, similar to other criminal acts, the 
numbers of killings were wrongly added to the numbers of violent attacks by insurgents.    
Unlike the national elections, based on my conversations and interviews in the Deep 
South, I found that local elections were not affected much by the conflict and violence 
because many voters and candidates did not give much importance to the policies on the 
problem of violence in local elections. Most voters participated in local elections and voted 
for their relatives or someone they knew because they did not have other reasons to vote. 
Whereas local people expected national politicians to solve the security issue, they expected 
something else from their local representatives. It appears that in local elections they voted 
for personal linkages rather than national policies and local politicians who had wider and 
stronger networks were highly likely to win.  
 
 
Drawing Contrasts: a direct comparison of conflict and non-conflict areas  
 
After the conflict and violence in the Deep South escalated, it affected many people’s 
lives both socially and politically. In term of politics, the experiences of conflict and violence 
directly affected electoral participation and voting behavior in the conflict areas, as discussed 
earlier in this Chapter. The evidence is clear when looking at political participation through 
elections in Songkhla, where the province combined conflict and non-conflict areas. As 
shown in Figure 4-15, the voter turnout of the 2005 national election in the four conflict-
affected districts of Songkhla (Constituency 7 and 8), which are Na Thawi, Saba Yoi, Chana, 
and Thepha, was higher than in other areas that did not have a record of violence. 
Constituency 8 of Songkhla including Chana and Thepha districts had the highest voter 




73.22%, was at Constituency 4, which included Ranot, Krasae Sin, and Sathing Phra districts. 
The three districts had no record of violence and were reported among the poorest districts of 
Songkhla (Komchadluek, 14 March 2011).  
 
Figure 4-15: Voter turnout of Songkhla in the 2005 national election 
Source: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 
 
 
Therefore, based on the overall picture of the 2005 national election in Songkhla, the 
first election after the re-emergence of violence in 2004, voter turnout provides some support 
for the contention that the relationship between conflict and violence could be a driving force 
to popular participation (Blattman 2007 and 2009, Bellows and Miguel 2008, and Shewfelt 
2009). On the other hand, the “resource model” or “standard SES model” (Campbell et al. 
1960, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) that argued 
individuals with high socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in politics than 
individuals with low levels of socioeconomic status seemed to be accurate when looking at 












and had the lowest voter turnout. However, a deeper study of various elections comparing the 
different level of conflict areas needs to be examined before arriving at any conclusion.  This 
section intends to draw a contrast among the three violent conflict areas and peaceful areas in 
order to investigate the ground assumption of this research, whether or not conflict and 
violence can become a driving force for carefully considered political participation. Based on 
the 2005 national election of Songkhla, the constituencies that had the highest and the lowest 
voter turnout, which were constituency 4 and constituency 8 are brought into the study as non 
and low violence conflict areas. Mueang Pattani represented a high violence conflict area 
because the district experienced the most frequent violence in Pattani in 2014 and ranked fifth 
in most frequent violent incidents among the southern border provinces. Therefore, the three 
different areas brought to the case study are as follows: 
1. No violent area: Ranot and Sathing Phra districts of Songkhla124 
2. Low violence conflict area: Chana and Thepha districts of Songkhla 









Figure 4-16 : Map of the study areas
125
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 Even though Krasae Sin was included in Constituency 4 of Songkhla in 2005, the district is 









As shown in Figure 4-16, Ranot and Sathing Phra districts are located in the 
northernmost area of Songkhla between the Gulf of Thailand and Songkhla Lake. The areas 
were once part of  Phatthalung and came under the control of Songkhla during the reign of 
King Rama IV. Ranot was upgraded to be one of Songkhla’s districts on 1 April 1924, 
comprising 12 subdistricts and 73 villages. Sathing Phra was upgraded to a district later on 1 
November 1957, comprising 11 subdistricts and 79 villages.  
Due to shared history and geography, both Ranot and Sathing Phra have similar social 
and economic backgrounds. The majority of the population in both Ranot and Sathing Phra 
are Buddhists (99% in Ranot and 95% in Sathing Phra) and the main income is from rice 
farming. Even though Ranot and Sathing Phra are not directly connected to the conflict and 
violence in the southern border provinces, the areas have their own conflict and problems 
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 This map is adapted from Map showing the ethnic distribution in southern Thailand  
[image], <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Thailand_insurgency#/media/File: 




mainly involving water resources that led to a conflict between shrimp and rice farmers in the 
areas. Moreover, Ranot and Sathing Phra villagers also shared problems with villagers in 
other districts of Songkhla on artisanal fishery (Pramong phuen ban). 
Chana and Thepha districts are two of the four violent conflict districts of Songkhla. 
The majority of the population in Chana and Thepha are Muslims. Chana is named “the city 
of the two cultures” (Mueang Song Watthanatham) in which both Thai Buddhists and Malay-
Muslims lived peacefully together for a long time
126
. Similarly, Thepha district is a 





Table 4-16: Numbers of violent incidents in Chana and Thepha districts from 2004 to 
2009   
 
District 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Chana 19 2 9 9 1 - 
Thepha 8 7 56 9 8 1 
 






 However, even though conflict and violence did not occur in Chana and Thepha as 
often as in the three southern provinces, violent incidents have happened from time to time 
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 Interview, a religious teacher in Songkhla, March 2013. 
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since 2004, as shown in Table 4-16, so that the government included Chana and Thepha into 
the conflict areas of the Deep South and they are under the special security laws
128
.  
Mueang district of Pattani comprises 13 subdistricts and 66 villages and has the 
largest population in the province. Its population included 86.86% Muslims, 12.86% 
Buddhists, and 0.28% Christians and other religions (Pattani Provincial Office 2008). In the 
first year of the re-emergence of the conflict and violence in 2004, according to a report by 
Deep South Watch, 155 violent incidents happened in Mueang Pattani. One of the most tragic 
incidents in 2004 happened at Krue Se mosque in Mueang district of Pattani causing more 
than 30 deaths of suspected insurgents (Isranews, 1 May 2011). From 2004 to June 2013, 
Mueang Pattani had 604 violent incidents and became the seventh highest of 33 districts of 
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 Chana and Thepha were under the control of the Martial Law Act after 2004. Due to a 
decrease of violent incidents, the four districts of Songkhla, including Chana and Thepha, have been 
under The Internal Security Act from 2009 until the present time and the Martial Law Act was 








Source:   Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 
Remark: Voter turnout, illustrated in the Chart, was based on constituency so the statistics included 
other districts that were in the same constituency of the studied districts. Moreover, there 
were changes of constituency in each election as follows: 
 In the 2001 and 2005 national elections, Ranot and Sathing Phra districts were in 
Constituency 4 of Songkhla (Ranot, Sathing Phra, and Krasae Sin districts). 
Chana and Thepha districts were in Constituency 8 of Songkhla (Na Mom, 
Chana, and Thepha districts but one subdistrict of Thepha, Lam Phlai was in 
Constituency 7). Figure 12 shows only voter turnout of Constituency 8 of 
Songkhla. Mueang district of Pattani (and some parts of Yaring) were in 
Constituency 1, except two subsidricts of Mueang Pattani were in Constiuency 2. 
































 In the 2007 national election, Ranot and Sathing Phra districts were included in 
Constituency 1 together with six districts of Songkhla. Chana and Thepha 
districts were included in Constituency 3 together with Namom and the two 
conflict areas, Na Thawi and Saba Yoi districts. Mueang district of Pattani was 
in Constituency 1 of Pattani with Nong Jik, Kok Pho, Mae Lan, and some parts 
of Yaring district.  
 In the 2011 national election, Ranot and Sathing Phra districts were in 
Constituency 4 together with Krasae Sin and some parts of Singha Nakorn 
district. Constituency 8 of Songkhla included only Chana and Thepha District 




Figure 4-17 shows the differences of not only level of political participation through 
elections, but also a different pattern of political participation between conflict and non-
conflict areas. In the non violence conflict areas of Ranot and Sathing Phra, the conflict and 
violence that occurred after 2004 did not have much influence on the level of political 
participation through voting. So, whereas many voters in the conflict areas were affected by 
the renewed violence that started in 2004, which contributed to a slight decrease of voter 
turnout in Chana and Thepha in 2005 and a significantly decrease of voter turnout in Mueang 
Pattani, voter turnout in Ranot and Sathing Phra districts slightly increased in the 2005 
national election. 
For Ranot and Sathing Phra, a no violent conflict area, and two of the poorest districts 
of Songkhla, the level of political participation through elections in this constituency was not 
as high as in the conflict areas of Songkhla. One explanation by a local authority in Sathing 




The main incomes were from palm, rice farm, and sea products (as known as Withi Nod Na 
Le)
129
. However, agriculture could not provide sufficient earnings, so many young people 
moved to other areas for work and better income. Since some local people worked in other 




In rural area, like Ranot and Sathing Phra, national elections are considered as less relevant to 
their lives. The higher the level of elections, the less they participated. For example, in 
Sathing Phra, more than 90% of the electorate participated in elections of Phuyaiban; about 




This explanation fits the standard SES model that believed individuals with high 
socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in politics than individuals with low levels 
of socioeconomic status (Campbell et al. 1960, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, and Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Some voters, especially working age voters who lived in other 
provinces, only had their names in house registrations, but they were rarely at home
132
. When 
there was an election, most of them could not afford to travel to vote. So, they did not 
participate unless they received some reward in return
133
. Due to a low level of political 
participation through voting, besides a voting campaign by state agencies, educational 
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 Withi Nod Na Le is said to represent the way of life of local people in Sathing Phra that 
depends mostly on the three sources of income, Nod is southern language for Tarn Tanod, or palm; 
Na is rice farm, and Le means the sea. Interview, a local authority in Sathing Phra, March 2013. 
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 Interview, a local authority in Ranot, February 2013. 
133




institutions also took action in promoting the election. One university student told that “my 
teacher (in high school) once took me and my classmates to the poll to vote.” 
134
   
The decrease of voter turnout in the conflict areas in the 2005 general election might 
be because there was no good choice for people to vote. On the one hand, some voters were 
disappointed with their former MPs and disagreed with the government’s policies toward the 
southern problem. On the other hand, they knew little of their new candidates and new 
candidates’ capabilities had not yet been proven. So, it was likely that when voters had no 
good choice, they tended not to participate.  
The conflict areas, both low and high violence conflict areas, also shared similar 
patterns, even though the two patterns were not exactly alike in terms of level. Ranot and 
Sathing Phra, which represented a non violence conflict area, illustrated a different pattern. 
The similarity of the chart pattern of voter turnout in the conflict areas could demonstrate that 
voters in conflict areas shared some similar factors of voting behavior, such as high stakes of 
violent incidents, grievances from the maltreatment of state authorities, and disappointment 
in government policies towards the conflict in the Deep South, and these shared factors 
probably affected voters’ participation in the same direction.  In addition, if we looked 
through the percentage of vote share by party in the MP elections of the three case studies, as 
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Table 4-17: Percentage of vote share by party in the general elections                    





Ranot and Sathing Phra Chana and Thepha Mueang Pattani 
Votes Percentage Votes Percentage Votes Percentage 
The 2001 general election 
Democrat 39,013 59.05% 34,503 45.30% 24,553 39.20% 
Rassadorn 12,059 18.25% 20,418 26.81% 13,245 21.15% 
Thai Rak Thai 7,375 11.16% 1003 1.32% 7,356 11.75% 
New 
Aspiration 
1,916 2.90% 17,403 22.85% 16,610 26.52% 
Others 5,708 8.64% 2,845 3.73% 865 1.38% 
The 2005 general election 
 
Democrat 49,604 71.07% 45,065 51.99% 28,554 43.19% 
Thai Rak Thai 17,360 24.87% 27,551 31.78% 15,663 23.69% 






2,638 3.04% 21,194 32.06% 
The 2007 general election 
Democrat 572,286 80.89% 179,907 61.74% 105,750 41.17% 
People Power  53,220 7.52% 18,502 6.35% 42,097 16.39% 
Puea Pandin 12,552 1.77% 85,461 29.33% 70,311 27.38% 
Others 69,400 9.81% 7,543 2.59% 38,682 15.06% 
The 2011 general election 
Democrat 74,204 92.75% 70,944 84.93% 28,733 37.91% 











Others 922 1.15% 6,206 7.43% 19,033 25.11% 
 






Although the victory of the Democrat party in southern Thailand seemed to be a 
predictable outcome as the party is a regional party of the South, Table 17 demonstrated that 
vote share by political party were significantly different among the no, low, and high violence 
conflict areas. From the elections in 2001-2011, the Democrat candidates received increasing 
votes from voters in no violent conflict areas, Ranot and Sathing Phra, which increased 
sharply from 59.05% in 2001 to 92.75% in the 2011 general election.  
In addition, since the area has been a stronghold of the Democrat party for more than 
a decade, national election results in Ranot and Sathing Phra districts were then predictable 
and had no change before and after the renewed conflict and violence in 2004. “Most local 
people here adhered to the (Democrat) party and their (Democrat) MPs for a long time. Their 
bonding with the Democrat party was deep-rooted and hardly changed
135
.”  
The conflict and violence did not affect them directly as their locations were distant 
from the conflict areas and their population was mainly Buddhist. So, their decisions of 
voting were based on other factors, mainly party preference. The policies of the party or 
candidates’ qualifications had less effect. As long as they were stamped with the Democrat 
brand, voters would buy from this brand name without giving it much thought
136
. One voter 
confirmed that even now “most villagers in my hometown still believe in the Democrat; they 
did not care who the candidate was as long as he was the Democrat candidate
137
.” However, 
there were some voters who might be upset with their representatives, for example, one 
participant in Songkhla complained that his village is always neglected by both national and 
local politicians. Development was mostly focused only in the center of town, such as areas 
near markets, but the villages that are far way hardly receive any concern or development by 
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 Interview, a local authority in Ranot, February 2013. 
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 Interview, a voter in Ranot, November 2012. 
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. However, some voters did not think it was totally Democrat 
politicians’ fault. Instead, the undeveloped village, for some voters, was partly because “we 
(voters) did not know how to make a demand to our politicians. We just accept what we are 
given or not given. We just voted and did not follow up their work to check if our 
representatives did things as they promised
139
.”  
The Democrat MP of Ranot and Sathing Phra in 2001 was Winai Senneam, who had 
won every election since 1992. After the death of Winai in 2009, he was replaced by his 
nephew Chaiwut Phongphaew. Chaiwut achieved a decisive victory over his competitor from 
Thai Citizen Party, Jarun Wongkrajang and became an MP of Songkhla from a by-election in 
2009
140
  and received as high as 92.75% of the vote in the 2011 general election (see Table 
17). Chaiwut accepted that the success of his first election was mainly from the influence of 
the Democrat Party in this area. He clarified that his winning was comprised of three main 
factors, including the popularity of the Democrat Party, the charisma of Chuan Leekphai, and 
the political network of the former Democrat MPs in the area
141
.  
In Chana and Thepha, the popularity of the Democrat party also showed an upward 
trend, but at a lower rate than non-conflict areas of Songkhla. For Chana and Thepha, a low 
violence conflict area, voters in this area were found to be very active in politics, as shown by 
the high rate of voter turnout in national elections between 2001 and 2011 (see Figure 15 and 
17). The conflict and violence that occurred in both Chana and Thepha affected political 
participation through elections similarly to other conflict areas of the three southernmost 
provinces. After the return of violent incidents in 2004, some voters in Chana and Thepha 
might have hesitated to participate in the election in 2005. Also, the lack of good alternatives 
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 Chaiwut Phongphaew won with 143,595 votes, whereas Jarun Wongkrajank received only 
11,930 votes for by-election of Songkhla constituency 1.  
141




may affect lower voter turnout. However, the degree of conflict and violence in Chana and 
Thepha district was not so much that many voters were too afraid to go to the ballots. 
Conversely, the lower degree of conflict and violence created a stronger inspiration in which 
villagers saw the possibility to stop the conflict and violence themselves through political 
participation as a way to protect their community from the insurgency. Therefore, they 
participated in voting at a higher level than other areas of Songkhla that did not have a record 
of violence. 
Moreover, in Chana and Thepha, especially in the Malay-Muslim communities, most 
villagers were connected and engaged collectively in politics. When they went to the poll, 
they gathered and came to the polls together
142
. Their voting behavior was different from 
most voters in urban areas such as Bangkok that tended to go to vote separately. One local 
authority in Songkhla who had experience of work in both Thai-Buddhist and Malay-Muslim 
villages also noticed that Thai-Buddhist voters usually had less participation than Malay-
Muslims
143
. His observation corresponds to many scholars who believed ethnicity is an 
important factor of political participation (Wilson and Banfield 1971, Greeley 1974, Nelson 
1979, Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981, Lien 1994, Wrinkle et.al 1996, and 
Albritton and Denton 2008), as discussed earlier in Chapter 2. Experiences of conflict and 
violence strengthened ethnic bonds and possibly activated their political action that led to 
higher voter turnout than other areas of Songkhla.  
Even though Chana and Thepha is a strong support base of the Democrat party
144
, 
party preference was not a decisive factor for voting of people in this low violence conflict 
area. Whereas the Democrat candidate achieved decisive victory in Ranot and Sathing Phra, 
the victory of the Democrat candidates in Chana and Thepha from 2001-2007 was not as 
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impressive. There were reportedly complaints about the performances of both MPs from the 
Suwit family, Wijit (father) and Naracha (son) that they were irresponsible, ignored their 
voters, and did not participate in most community activities (Phinyo 2005: 81-82). 
In the midst of conflict and violence, people needed to be sure that their representative 
could be trusted and had the ability to deliver the policies as promised, especially when they 
felt being remote from the state due to the conflict situation.  One voter expressed his reason 
for participation in voting after the return of the unrest in 2004 that “I voted to choose a 
representative who would negotiate with a higher level of state authorities for me since I 
could not access to them myself
145
.” So, the conflict and violence in some ways increased the 
focus of voters in voting. Even though many voters in Chana and Thepha were party-
preference voters, it was not the only factor in choosing their representative. As we can see 
from the vote share between the 2001 and 2011 elections, the unimpressive performance of 
the Democrat candidates reduced the loyalty of voters towards the Democrat Party who 
shifted their votes to other candidates in 2001 and 2007. When the Democrat candidate was 
changed to Pol.Maj.Gen Surin Palare, a former immigration police officer and senator in 
2006, votes for the Democrat party in Chana and Thepha significantly increased again. 
In Mueang Pattani, the high violence conflict area, the data showed the opposite 
result. Although the Democrat party won in Mueang Pattani, they received the least votes 
among the three study areas. Moreover, the popularity of the Democrat Party seemed to be 
decreasing, as shown in Table 17, as votes for the Democrat decreased from 39.20% in 2001 
to 37.91% in the 2011 general election. In the past, according to a study on the election in 
Pattani in 1986 by Phichai, Somchet, and Worawit (1988), personal qualifications of election 
candidates was a major factor in voting, whereas policies or reputation of a political party had 
less impact on their decision of voting. However, the above statement might not be true in 
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Mueang district of Pattani after the 2005 national election. After the upsurge of unrest in 
2004, many voters in Mueang Pattani, including Malay-Muslims, Thai-Buddhists, Chinese-
Buddhists, and the very small proportion of Thai-Christians, were affected by conflict and 
violence, which, in turn, resulted in a change of their voting behavior. Moreover, since the 
former MP of this constituency, Wairot Phiphitphakdi, moved to the TRT party in the 2005 
general election, the change of party meant that his policies had to be changed to comply with 
the TRT’s policies. Some of his former voters might dislike this shift and decided not to 
follow him.  
 What led to this change? As discussed earlier, voting behavior is complex since there 
is no single factor in voting. However, the data on vote share confirms McCargo’s statement 
(2014) that in terms of politics, the southern region is not uniform: there are “two southern 
Thailands”. One is the upper south, including eleven provinces from Chumphon down to 
Satun and Songkhla, which has been a stronghold of the Democrat Party for decades. Another 
is the Lower South, including the Malay-Muslim majority provinces of Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat. At the same time, if we put in an additional factor by considering political 
participation through elections based on the effect of conflict and violence, we can see 
another category beside the two, which divided the southern region into two and a half 
southern Thailands, instead of the two Souths.  The additional half is represented in the 4 
conflict districts of Songkhla, including Chana and Thepha. The areas are located in 
Songkhla where most voters were part of the Democrat support base. However, Chana and 
Thepha voters, due to their ethnic background and experiences of conflict and violence, had 
different factors in voting. So, the areas shared some similar ties but were not quite the same 










 From interviews during field research in Songkhla and Pattani with 36 university 
students in the three case study areas, 12 participants from each area, Figure 4-18 
demonstrated the differences in voting decisions among the three case studies. In the non 
violence conflict area of Ranot and Sathing Phra, the interviews showed that most students 
voted for political party (41.67%), while just 33.33% of students in Ranot and Sathing Phra 
gave more importance to policies. Also, their policies of concern might not involve the issue 
of ongoing conflict and violence since the areas are quite far from the Deep South and the 
majority are Thai-Buddhists. The policies that participants looked for were, for example, one 
student voted for a candidate who had an election campaign focused on sport development. 
Another student voted for a candidate who promised to open more opportunities for youth to 
























Ranot and Sathing Phra Chana and Thepha Mueang Pattani 




vote for a politician who offered to solve economic and agricultural problems
146
. There were 
small proportions of participants who were not concerned much about voting. They just voted 
for whom they were told by their parents in order to keep their political rights. One 
participant who voted no vote expressed that “I am bored of elections. I participated but I 




 In Chana and Thepha, a low violence conflict area, the percentage of university 
students who voted based on policy (41.67%) and personal qualification of candidate 
(16.67%) was higher than in the  No violent conflict area, whereas the percentage of voting 
for a political party was lower than the No violence area. An additional factor was party 
leader (16.67%). One student who was concerned most with a party leader when voting said 
that “even though it was the MP election, I did not vote for the MP candidate. I voted to 
choose whom I wanted to be my prime minister
148
.” A state authority in Thepha asserted that 
the popularity of the Democrat party in Thepha was mainly from the attractiveness of its 
party leader. “We have to admit that the Democrat Party has an important role in this 
community (Chumchon) because most people have high faith in Chuan Leekphai. His 
charisma was transmitted to the next Democrat leader, Aphisit Vejjajiva. He has a good 
personality that is quite similar to Chuan’s. He once came to Thepha. Thepha voters really 
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 Interview, a university student from Ranot, November 2012. 
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 Interview, a university student from Ranot, November 2012. 
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 For Mueang Pattani, the evidence from interviews was quite clear that policy is the 
most important factor for most students who living in the high violence conflict area. There 
were 66.67% of students in Mueang Pattani who voted for policies, whereas only 25% and 
8.33% voted for individual qualification of candidates and political party, respectively. 
 




In terms of the reasons for voting, the interviews revealed that people from different 
areas had different reasons for voting based on their expectations in elections and experiences 
of conflict and violence. In no conflict areas, Figure 4-19, most students from Ranot and 
Sathing Phra voted because they were concerned about losing political rights
150
 if they did 
not vote (41.67%). Some of them were relatives of local politicians and planned to run in an 
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 The political rights that will be temporarily removed as a consequence of not voting are, for 
example, the right to run in an election, the right to oppose any election, and the right to impeach state 






















25% 25.00% I vote because I do not want to 
lose my political rights 
I vote because my vote can 
bring about change 
I vote to choose my 
representatives 




election themselves in the future. However, their expectations from voting were not as high 
as in the other two areas. Voters had lower stakes than those in conflict areas, their 
expectation and need from voting and their representatives was not as high as in the areas 
facing problems of violence. Thus, some voters just voted to keep their rights rather than to 
expect in some changes from their votes. 
 On the other hand, there were 33.33%, the highest proportion of participants in Chana 
and Thepha, who participated in voting because they believed that voting can bring about 
change in their communities. The strong belief in voting perhaps resulted in the high voter 
turnout of Chana and Thepha (see Figure 4-19). On the contrary, only 8.33% of university 
students in the high violence conflict area of Mueang Pattani believed that their votes could 
bring change. Instead, the majority of university students from Mueang Pattani (41.67%) 
participated in voting because they wanted to have their representative in the Thai parliament 
who would be able to represent the interest of Malay-Muslims
151
. Even though voters in 
Mueang Pattani still believed that voting could act as a tool to allow their representatives to 
speak out for them in the Thai parliament, the highest stakes during the violent situation and 




The increasing conflict and violence since 2004 had both negative and positive effects 
on political participation through elections of people in conflict areas. On the one hand, 
conflict and violence may have made some people too afraid to go to the ballots. There were 
many times, as stated earlier, that unidentified groups attacked the polling stations to frighten 
people away from the poll. So, due to high stakes, people in the conflict areas need a strong 
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incentive to go to vote and tend to participate only when they think the election is important. 
That appears to be the reason why in some elections that were less democratic, such as Senate 
elections, people participated less over the years.  
Despite all the insecure situations, voter turnout in national and local elections in the 
conflict areas illustrated higher rates than the national average in many elections. The 
ongoing conflict and violence inspired more people to participate through voting. Based on 
interviews with people in the Deep South, I found that most voters I had talked to actually 
believe in voting as an effective way to lessen the conflict and violence. They demonstrated 
their greater desire for political participation through elections, as shown by the high rate of 
voter turnout. Voters were willing to take the risk if they thought their participation could 
lessen the violence.  
 Moreover, the conflict and violence also changed election behavior of people in the 
Deep South. In the past, the southern people in the three provinces gave significant 
importance to personal qualifications of candidates. After the disappointment from the 
Thaksin government’s policy towards the violence in the South after 2004, policies and 
political parties had more impact on their decisions for voting, as seen from the punishment 
vote in the 2005 national election where none of the TRT candidates could gain a seat in 
Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.  
The policy of candidates had less influence on voters’ decision in local elections. In 
national elections, conflict and violence inspired people to vote because they believed 
national policy could help and had stronger power to deal with the ongoing conflict. But for 
local elections, most people came to vote with different motivations from national elections. 
Since local politicians were closer to local voters than national politicians, voters, especially 
those in the conflict areas, needed someone they knew and could trust. So, they tended to 




The statistical and interview data explained in this chapter supports the fundamental 
hypothesis of this study that conflict leads to a greater desire for peaceful political 
participation. However, since the higher barriers and risks need higher incentives and a 
stronger belief in the efficiency of the political system, the conflict and violence then can lead 
to more participation only when people believe participation can make a difference.  Most 
voters in the Lower South went out to vote even when there was the violence but only when 
they believed their votes would matter.  We should expect voter turnout to go down if voters 
do not believe that an election is effective.  
In the next chapter, political participation through non-electoral channels of political 
participation after 2001 is discussed in order to examine how the ongoing conflict and 









Chapter 5 : Political Participation through the State 
 
 
The conflict and violence that re-emerged in 2004 has made political participation in 
the southern border provinces of Thailand more complicated than those in other regions.  
However, the southern people who live in the midst of conflict and violence demonstrated 
their great desire to participate in politics, for example, through elections, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. This chapter continues to investigate political participation, through the 
state, of people in the Deep South in order to examine the influence of the prolonged conflict 
and violence on political participation after 2004. The comparison among the three different 
levels of violent conflict areas, which are no violence, low violence, and high violence 
conflict areas in the southern region will also be observed in order to have a clearer picture of 
how the conflict and violence affect political participation through the state in different 
circumstances.  
 
Political participation through the state in the conflict areas 
 
Generally, the relationship between the state and Malay-Muslims in the Far South has 
been negative. Many Malay-Muslims considered the Thai state as “an instrument of terror” 
(Albritton 2005: 169). Many state bureaucrats, who were sent from other regions with 
different backgrounds, with some sent down unwillingly as punishment, have brought more 
harm rather than peace into the area. The negative outlook and experience towards the state 
authorities differently affected the way people in the southern border provinces participated 
politically through the state. Some people might boycott political participation and join a 




South who still participated legally within Thai political system, while avoiding interaction 
with the state.  
There are two types of political participation, voluntary and involuntary participation, 
which will be the focus of this study. Voluntary participation is a “personal willingness to 
participate” (Eremenko 2011: 6) without being forced by laws or state authorities. Voluntary 
participation is, for example, participating in public hearings, sharing opinions at village 
meetings, organizing civil society activities, and taking part in village defense volunteers. 
Involuntary participation refers to forms of activities that a person is forced to engage by laws 
or state authorities. Involuntary participation includes, for example, participating in trials due 
to being arrested, contacting state authorities to get a license, and contacting a public 
prosecutor in security cases. Involuntary participation may not tell us anything because this 
kind of participation is not a person’s choice. However, involuntary participation is important 
as it greatly impacted on voluntary participation and vice versa. This section will then focus 
on both voluntary and involuntary political participation through the state by dividing into 
three main state actors, security officials, local authorities, and judicial officers, in order to 
inspect to what extent the ongoing conflict and violence influence political participation and 




Political participation through security officers can be in many forms, both voluntary 
and involuntary participation. Some local people participated voluntarily with the military by, 
for example, attending to the meetings organized by the military agencies, such as ISOC, 
directly contacting military officers to ask for some help regarding violent incidents, and 




However, political participation through security officers during the conflict and violence 
were mostly in form of involuntary participation, such as being arrested for trial, being forced 
to give some information, and being questioned and monitored under surveillance.  
Since the re-emergence of conflict and violence in 2004, security officers, especially 
the military, were the most criticized state actors who were always criticized for their 
aggressiveness and maltreatment of local Malay-Muslims. There were some periods during 
Thaksin’s first term in the government that security issues in the Deep South were in the 
hands of the Thai police. After the controlling power in the Deep South was returned to the 
Thai army following the coup in 2006, the Thai military had the leading role in managing the 
conflict and violence in the Far South.  
The military is a powerful state agency not only because it has weapons but also 
because three special laws applied in the conflict areas of the southern region allowed the 
military to have utmost power there. The three special security laws, including the 1914 
Martial Law Act, the 2005 Executive Decree on Government Administration in States of 
Emergency, and the 2008 Internal Security Act, have different regulations and levels of 














Table 5-1: The special security laws in the three southern border provinces and four 
districts of Songkhla 
 
 
The 1914 Martial 
Law Act 
The 2005 Executive Decree 
on Government 
Administration in States of 
Emergency 








Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat, excluding Mae 
Lan district of Pattani
2
 
Mae Lan district of 
Pattani, and the four 
districts of Songkhla 
Superior power The military Prime Minister ISOC 
Search and 
arrest 
 Without court warrant With court warrant Not mentioned 
Detention No longer than 7 days 
without court warrant 
No longer than 30 days      
with court warrant 
Not mentioned 
Political rallies Prohibited Prohibited Allowed 
Amnesty Not mentioned Not Mentioned Allowed 
Remarks: 1) The Martial Law Act was repealed in the four district of Songkhla on 4 May 2010 
  2) The Emergency Decree in Mae Lan district of Pattani was revoked in December 2010 and replaced 
by the Internal Security Act.  
 
Political participation was more restricted under the special security laws. The three 
special security laws not only increased the climate of fear but also limited voluntary 
participation of people in the Deep South. For example, the two provisions under section 9 of 
the Emergency Decree granted the state power to censor the media and social movements and 
gatherings is controlled. Even though Anand Panyarachun and the NRC working group tried 
to convince Prime Minister Thaksin to postpone some of the provisions that would block 
political participation, including section 9, Thaksin agreed to suspend only a few provisions, 
such as the permission to tap telephones, with most of the NRC disputed provisions 




The latest security law, the 2008 Internal Security Act, enforced in the least violent 
areas including the four conflict-area districts of Songkhla and later Mae Lan district of 
Pattani, is considered to be the most moderate. Political participation under this Act is more 
permissible. Political rallies and social movements are not banned. But most importantly, and 
arguably the most disagreeable provision is Section 21, which provides a channel for accused 
persons to surrender voluntarily who will then be free without charges after participating in a 
rehabilitation program of the military for no longer than 6 months. Nevertheless, the number 
of Malay-Muslims who joined this program was too few to assess its success.  
Considering the statistical data, there were a small number of Malay-Muslim militants 
who voluntarily surrendered under Section 21. According to an ISOC Region 4 report, there 
were only 4 Malay-Muslim militants who successfully participated in the rehabilitation 
programs from 2008 to 12 March 2015
152
. Moreover, after 6 months of participating with the 
military program, the suspected Malay-Muslims were sent back to their communities and 
lived in a difficult situation in which the Thai military was still uncertain of their loyalty and 
their neighbors suspect them of being spies of the Thai state (Don 2012: 7). The small 
number of militants participating in the military’s rehabilitation programs showed that 
promoting voluntary participation in the conflict areas needed careful comtemplation. The 
distrust of the military caused suspicion of its activities that impeded local people from 
participating. Moreover, local people participating with the Thai state might be estranged 
from their community because villagers were not certain whether people returning from the 
military program might work secretly for the Thai military as a spy
153
.  
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 The website of the ISOC Region 4 reported on 12 March 2015 that besides the 4 cases that 
successfully passed the training program under section 21 of the Internal Security Act during 2008 – 
12 March 2015, there was one case waiting for court judgement of passing the program in place of 
being charged, and another case who had been participating in the program for 6 months between 12 
March and 8 September 2015. For more details, visit http://www.southpeace.go.th 
/th/News/General/new-580313-1.html, accessed on 9 January 2016. 
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In addition, the enforcement of the three special security laws had an immense impact 
on the image of security officers, which affected directly the level of political participation 
through the state. Although the three special security laws were often criticized for increasing 
conflict and violence rather than lessening the conflict situation, the true fear of villagers was 
not from the laws. Instead, the true terror was from some law enforcement officers, who 
excessively extended their power through the laws
154
. The draconian and aggressive 
enactment created fear in communities. The maltreatment at the hands of state authorities 
occurred almost every day (Srisompob and Panyasak 2006: 112). Many local Malay-Muslims 
then tended to avoid contacting state security officers, whose works should make people feel 
safer rather than more afraid.  
The negative impression of local people towards the Thai state was implanted since 
they were young. According to interviews, some participants said that they were told negative 
tales about the Thai state authorities since they were in Ponoh schools. Some experienced 
forced participation and state maltreatment themselves. However, the negative perception of 
the Thai state that they received either way made it more difficult to build up voluntary 
participation through the state. As one Malay-Muslim university student who studied at a 
Ponoh School in the Deep South stated, 
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 Adilan Aliishoh, a lawyer with the Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation, talked about the 
fear of the locals in the Seminar on the Executive Decree on Government Administration in States of 
Emergency and the Southern Region Problem-Solving in Bangkok on 18 December 2008, see Pakorn 
Puengnetr and Romadon Panjor, ‘Ko Or Ro Mo No kab kan pluk dan kodmai kwammankong sontab 
nai chaidan tai’ [the ISOC and the promotion of overlapping security laws in southern border 
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My friends are very radical and very biased against the Thai state. Most Malay-Muslims, 
especially those who study only in Ponoh schools, tend to hate the state. The direct 
experiences of aggressive officials made them hate the Thai state even more. This group, I 




The nature of the military’s work unavoidably brought people into involuntary 
participation. The security officers had to deal with intelligence as it is one of their main 
duties to catch the separatists. They were determined to find a mastermind, but they made 
things worse. Such work needed cooperation and participation from local people but the 
military’s excessive use of power discouraged local people from giving information 
voluntarily to state officials (International Crisis Group 2005: 7). Even though the police and 
the military could get information from local people through forced participation, this kind of 
participation is seen as short-term or just one-time participation. The local people might have 
to participate because of fear but involuntary participation rarely brings about positive 
participation, and may not lead to useful information. Local people did not want to participate 
because the mistrust of most Malay-Muslims towards the Thai state blocked them from 
voluntary participation.    
The operations of the Thai military in the conflict and violent areas of the Malay-
Muslim majority provinces did not focus only on warlike operations. The Thai military 
applied both soft and hard tactics. These two strategies were known as the hawk way and the 
dove way
156
. The hawk strategy of the military referred to the fighting and warfare-like 
operations, as well as the torture and aggressive methods of interrogation.The dove strategy, 
on the contrary, was more focused on public relations and community development, which 
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was mostly applied in villages that had lower degrees of conflict and violence. The military 
tried to improve its relationship with local people through religious leaders, the most 
respected people in Malay-Muslim communitities. “We (the military) arranged many 
meetings and development projects and invited religious leaders to participate with us. We 
have to win the heart of a person the villagers respect the most first and then that person 
could help us to improve our relationship with the villagers”, said a military officer working 
many years in the conflict areas of the Deep South
157
.  
The military also developed relationships with local people through university 
students. According to interviews with university students in Pattani, there are many student 
groups and projects that are supported by the military budget and the SBPAC
158
. One student 
activist explained that his student group asked for financial support from the military and the 
SBPAC. “They gave us funds to organize activities. I think they wanted to prevent us from 
turning against the state and wanted us to promote the roles of the military in the conflict 
areas”, said a student activist in Pattani
159
. However, the student admitted that voluntary 
experiences from contacting and participating with the military in his student group’s 
activities more or less changed his perception on the military. As he explained, 
I used to hate all state security officers but my view was changed to understand that there 
were both good and bad soldiers. They, sometimes, had to be aggressive, but it is because the 
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Both strategies were deemed necessary in dealing with the conflict in the Deep South 
and directly impacted the pattern and level of political participation. The hawk strategy was 
considered vital in fighting with insurgents who used violence to destroy innocent people. 
Nonetheless, applying only hard tactics could just temporaily stop one attack at a time, but 
could not win the hearts and trust of the locals. In addition, the hawk strategy could 
strengthen negative participations through, for example, interrogation, which resulted in 
pushing more people away from the state. The Dove trategy was therefore considered 
essential in promoting voluntary participation and good relationships between the military 
and the Malay-Muslims in order to draw in more people to support the Thai state instead of 
joining the insurgency. However, the direction of military strategies mainly depended on the 
state’s policies. When the government changed, the policies on the Deep South changed 
accordingly, depending on the attitude of the government leaders. For example, the hawk 
strategy was seriously implemented during the Thaksin government to capture offenders and 
masterminds of the violence. While Thaksin believed in draconian methods in dealing with 
the violence, the Surayud government believed that if the security officers behaved in more 
acceptable ways, there would be a higher possibility to diminish the violence (McCargo 
2008: 89). 
The two strategies had different effects on political participation. The hard tactics 
were aimed at not only overcoming the militants but also subjugating the locals to the Thai 
state. However, after more than ten years of controlling the conflict and violent areas with an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth strategy, the results were not very impressive as the violent 
attacks were still high and many Malay-Muslims felt more afraid and distrustful of security 
officers. Involuntary participation was high but voluntary participation was low. People 
tended to avoid direct contact with security officers, which created the low level of voluntary 




programs to build a better relationship and improve the image of the security officers. Thai 
soldiers were sent to talk to villagers and help in village development. Moreover, based on 
conversations with people and authorities in the conflict areas, many community meetings 
were arranged among the military, local bureaucrats, civil society, and local people to discuss 




Promoting voluntary participation could, to some extent, build trust. Some local 
people were less afraid of contacting the military when they needed help. The military 
sometimes received complaints from local people in the conflict areas when they were in 
trouble because the local politicians did not distribute local budget fairly.  
We (the military) could not refuse when people contacted us for some assistance. However, 
there were many times that our involvement in a local community led to a conflict of interest 
with the local politicians. For example, when the military came to build a road in some remote 
area in the conflict district, some local politicians were dissatisfied because they thought we 
took away their job and budget. So, they sometimes did not participate with us as a way to 
express that they did not want the military to be involved in their business.
162
 
However, although the military tried to improve their image and participated more in 
community projects, the distrust of the Thai military still remained.  A better relationship was 
actually built up but only at low levels to a small group of military, who directly met and 
participated with local Malay-Muslims. For example, one university student mentioned that 
he and his village in Thepha District had a good relationship with the military. “I feel safer 
having the military around. When there was a violent incident, the military would always be 
the first to come. I and the military also worked together to build weirs and take part in some 
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,” said a Malay-Muslim university student from Thepha district of 
Songkhla. Yet overall, according to interviews, the general image of Thai military was still at 
best questionable.  
This indicates that in the conflict areas, trust and participation depends on personal 
relationships with state officials.  There is no trust of the state as an institution or any of its 
parts.  Consequently, whenever a state official is transferred, trust and participation 
disappears.  If individual officials are not willing to reach out to people and build 
relationships, there is no participation, since the institutional face of the state is not trusted, 
just some of its individual members.   
The problem of suspicion happened on both sides. On the one hand, many Malay-
Muslims suspected Thai security officers due to their unjust and aggressive performance. On 
the other hand, many security officers doubted local Malay-Muslims and were afraid that 
some Malay-Muslims would turn against the Thai state. So, the Thai military always 
monitored almost every activity in the villages and forced some local people to participate in 
interrogation. Some local elites, especially religious leaders and even local bureaucrats who 
the Thai government approved to work for the Thai state, were always interviewed and 
observed by security officers. Many Malay-Muslims considered the military surveillance as a 
form of harassment (McCargo 2011: 839). The dissatisfaction from forced participation of 
local leaders added another difficulty in improving positive participation through the state 
because the linkage between the Thai state and locals was broken. Political participation was 
then lower and more difficult without encouragement from Malay-Muslim community 
leaders.  
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The military operations also caused a feeling of inequality among local people. Some 
people, especially those in rural conflict areas, felt that they were treated unequally. “I feel 
that people in the urban areas, have more rights and state authorities respected their rights and 
treated them better than they respect and treat us, the rural people. For us, as a rural person, 
state authorities could do anything they want without considering our rights, but for people in 
urban areas, the state officials are more careful and work according to the laws
164
.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The problem of trust not only occurred for local people but the Thai government and 
the military also distrusted the Malay-Muslims. Military personnel, especially the high 
ranking, had to be carefully selected. The recruitment of Malay-Muslims soldiers to work for 
the Royal Thai Army in their hometown might be difficult since it involved intelligence and 
secret information
165
. So, while there were requests from some local people for Malay-
Muslim soldiers to work in the conflict areas of the Deep South, it would be unlikely for the 
Royal Thai Army to approve it. Moreover, the Fourth Army Region, which is responsible for 
the southern region, lacked trained soldiers to take care of the conflict areas of the Deep 
South
166
. So, the military forces in the Deep South were mostly soldiers from other provinces. 
For example, the Yala Task Force was sent from the the Third Army Region, which usually 
operated in the northern provinces of Thailand
167
.  
Although the Royal Thai Army trained soldiers for three months about the culture, 
religion, and topography of the Deep South, the different backgrounds of soldiers and local 
people still caused difficulties for the military in developing good relationships and drawing 
more participation from local people. 
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Most of our operations, especially civil affairs, needed local people to communicate with 
villagers. Some Malay-Muslims cannot speak Thai. Some might be able to but they pretended 
that they did not understand us in order to avoid participating with us
168
.  
Besides the Royal Thai Army, paramilitary troops were also sent to help the Thai 
military look after the conflict areas. The paramilitary originated in 1978 to help the Royal 
Thai military fighting against the Communists and also to take care of some other internal 
security issues, especially at the borderlands (Ball 2007: 9). The paramilitary forces 
comprised short-trained volunteers from various backgrounds age between 18-30, both male 
and female, and having at least a high school diploma or its equivalent
169
. However, the 
paramilitary was criticized as a part of the weakness of military operation in the Deep South 
(Ball 2007, International Crisis Group 2007 and Ockey 2008). Its reputation was often 
negative, recounted as inexperience, ill-disciplined, and out of control (Ball 2007: 9 and 
International Crisis Group 2007: 12). One local politician mentioned that he found some 
paramilitary troops were drug addicted and some had love affairs with Malay-Muslim 
women. He said “I believed it was not a state policy that caused problems; it was state 
authorities themselves that kept people away from the Thai state
170
.”  
The outside soldiers mostly had little background on the local history, culture, and 
religion. Some might even have looked at local people as enemies so they did not care much 
about Malay-Muslim villagers. For example, the tragedy at Tak Bai in 2004 demonstrated the 
careless management of the Thai army in delivering protestors from Tak Bai police station to 
the army camp. “If they (the security officers) used more care, they might do things slightly 




 From Announcement of the third Army Area on 24 November 2015, Re: Recruitment of 
reserve officers and civilians to join volunteer ranger force (in Thai). 
<http://www.army3.mi.th/army3_internet/admin3/doc/20151125_135921.%E0%B8%A2.58.pdf>, 
accessed 20 October 2016. 
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better,” said one local person in Pattani
171
.  The different background of the military not only 
resulted in incompetence to tackle the conflict and violence but also created more fear and 
mistrust of local Malay-Muslims towards Thai security officers, which could lead to a more 
distant relationship between them (Ockey 2008: 25). 
Political participation through the state in the conflict areas of the Lower South was 
also easily discouraged by the suspicions and rumors of the use of the military budget. Due to 
the huge amount of military budget that was dumped into the areas after the renewal of the 
conflict and violence in 2004, many people queried the use of the budget and some even 
mentioned that there were relations between violent incidents and an increase in the military 
budget or in promotions in military positions. 
There was talk in southern towns that whenever the budget for secret activities was cut, one 
would see increasing violence. If there were changes among high-ranking officials or when 
someone wanted to get a higher rank, violence would escalate. When a large number of 
separatists surrendered, the police or military personnel involved would be promoted (Rung 
2007: 137-138). 
Although it is quite possible that the insurgents might instigate local Malay-Muslims 
to hate state authorities by creating rumors and doubts towards the security officers, the 
increasing suspicions alienated many Malay-Muslims from contacting security officers. Some 
Malay-Muslims even believed that some violent incidents were created by the military to 
cause more difficulties and fears in local communities in order to keep its power and budget 
in the conflict areas, with some academics and journalists calling it “the industry of 
security”
172
. When local people mistrusted military operations, voluntary participation with 
the military was less likely to happen. 
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Another factor that indirectly affected political participation through the security 
officers in the conflict areas was the support of the majority of the country outside the 
conflict zone. The concern was the different point of view regarding aggressive actions of the 
military. The different views between people in the conflict areas and those who were not 
affected directly by the violent incidents were also important in determining the role of 
security officers and level of political participation. While soldiers were seen as heroes by 
people outside the conflict areas, they were seen as evil by many Malay-Muslims in the Far 
South. Whereas many Thai people in other regions supported the military’s violent strategy in 
dealing with the conflict and violence in the Deep South, Malay-Muslims in the conflict areas 
generally disliked it and wanted the military to leave and allow local people to look after 
themselves. Below are some examples of opinions shared by interviewees from non violence 
conflict areas towards the violence in the Deep South; 
The government should take it (the violence in the South) more seriously. The government 




The state should let the military take care of the violence because the military has weapons. If 
the Deep South did not have soldiers with guns to look after it, it could have more violent 
incidents. The security problems should thus be resolved only by the security officers
174
.  
When the majority of the country supported the draconian methods and hard-line 
approach of the military, it was more likely that the military would continue the use of 
excessive force in the areas. The relationship between the military and many Malay-Muslims 
was then more difficult to improve, which exacerbated the low level of voluntary 
participation through the state.  
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Besides, the militant operations that mostly targeted security officers and anyone who 
cooperated with them immensely impeded local people from getting close to security officers 
in order to avoid stray bullets or bombs. So, getting close to security officers was dangerous 
for local people, let alone cooperation and participation with security officers. Moreover, 
when military bases were hit, some locals lost trust in Thai security forces and looked at them 
as incompetent. Some even said “they cannot even defend themselves, let alone defend the 
public” (Rung 2007: 160). Therefore, the militant attacks could weaken the military force and 
discourage local people from working with Thai state agencies.  
During the conflict and violence, voluntary participation through security officers 
might be difficult to promote since their major responsibility was to suppress the insurgents. 
Hard tactics were used in threatening the separatists and forced participation might be hard to 
avoid. Involuntary participation where some Malay-Muslims had been forced to participate 
through aggressive practices negatively affected political participation. Although there was a 
small group of the military operated civil affairs and participated with villagers in many 
community development projects, the general image of the military still remained 
unchanged. Individual state officials, no matter how effective they are, cannot really change 
things, because they build trust in themselves, not in the state.  When they leave, trust will go 





The conflict areas of the southernmost provinces are ruled under the special security 
laws that created complication and some limitations of justice system in the areas. During the 




involuntary forms of participation.  Even though the increasing number of violent incidents 
led to an increase of security cases and rising number of people participating involuntarily in 
investigation and trials. However, local people in the conflict areas also participated 
voluntarily, even during the conflict. For example, they brought their civil cases to the court; 
they contacted justice officers for consultation on some legal issues. This section, thus, would 
like to investigate political participation through justice officers in both voluntary and 
involuntary forms to find out how people in the conflict areas participate in the justice system 
and whether or not both forms of participation impacted each other. 
The problems of excessive power given to the security officials under Martial Law 
and the Emergency Decree, especially the power to search, arrest, and detain a suspect 
without charge, led to many complaints of human rights violations and made the cooperation 
between the locals and state officials much more difficult. One of the complaints about 
Martial Law and the Emergency Decree was pointed out by an interviewee from Pattani. He 
said,  
I think they (Martial Law and the Emergency Decree) have only disadvantages. The laws too 
fully allowed excessive roles of the military. The special laws could not stop the conflict but 
instead pushed more people, especially those who are only suspected insurgents, to join the 
separatists. They became bandits (chon tai) because of these laws. When they (suspects) were 
arrested, detained, and tortured, resentment developed and increased. The laws then did not 
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The right to justice and fair trial was regarded as a fundamental right of all humanity 
that needed to be protected, as announced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by 
the United Nations General Assemply in Paris on 10 December 1948
176
. However, for many 
suspected persons in the Deep South, justice could be easily corrupted by security officers 
during the interrogation and investigation at the first stage of judicial process. The judiciary 
was the only state institution that could balance the excessive power of law enforcement 
officers, so many Malay-Muslims wished to lay their hopes for justice in the hands of the 
Thai court.  
After the re-emergence of conflict and violence in 2004, the issue of justice became 
one of the most important issues that concerned many Malay-Muslims, academics, and civil 
society activists who worked in the conflict areas. Also, the National Reconciliation 
Commission (NRC) realized the problem of injustice, including “injustice at the hands of 
state officials and shortcomings in the judicial process” was one of the main problems that 
prolonged conflict and violence in the three Malay-Muslim provinces (NRC 2006: 3). Even 
the former head of the government, Surayud Chulanond, accepted that “the problem in the 
South was really about justice” (McCargo 2008: 89). The problem of justice massively 
impacted political participation through the state in the conflict areas. The justice system 
brought people to involuntary participation. They had no choice but to take part in 
prosecution of their security cases. Actually, the problems that caused injustice in the three 
southern Malay-Muslim provinces could be found at every level of the judicial process. Not 
only did the state security officials cause prejudice and dissatisfaction where many people 
were concerned, the justice system and the performances of judicial officers were also 
another important source of the problem that enlarged the conflict and hindered local people 
from voluntary participation.  
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The state actors responsible in the judicial process included the police, who had the 
duty of arresting, finding evidence, and investigating suspects at the first stage, and the 
military, which also had power to arrest and investigate suspects under the special security 
laws before sending them to the police (inquiry officials) for processing the cases further. The 
prosecutors had to consider if the case files sent by the investigating officials were strong 
enough to forward to the court, and finally the judges who adjudicate the cases.  
Due to being a designated area under the three special security laws, the judicial 
process in the southern border provinces was more complicated and contentious than in any 
other region of the country. The use of the three special laws in the Deep South brought about 
more distrust and insecurity rather than minimizing the conflict’s intensity in the areas. More 
importantly, they indirectly promoted forced participation rather than voluntary participation. 
The basic right to justice and fair trial has been limited under the application of special 
security laws. For example, under Martial Law, a civilian, who became a suspect based on 
only classified military information, could be arrested and detained at an undisclosed location 
for interrogation up to seven days without charge or court warrant. The arrested person was 
also restricted access to lawyers and medical services and his family was not told about his 
whereabouts. Moreover, many suspects who were detained by the military claimed that they 
were tortured for information and confession by many brutal strategies
177
. So, the basic legal 
protections for a suspect were more often and more strongly violated under the special laws 
as compared to those of the Criminal Code. 
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The security cases filed by inquiry officers were frequently criticized, for lacking 
adequate evidence. So, when the cases were brought to the judicial process, there was a high 
possibility that the public prosecutors and the judges would issue non-prosecution orders.  
 
Table 5-2: Number of security cases in the three southern border provinces and four 
districts of Songkhla between 2004 and 31 May 2015 
 
Number of security cases 9,933 
Number of security cases filed by the investigation police 1,904 
Number of security cases  that were issued prosecution orders by prosecutors  827 
Number of security cases that were dismissed by the court 431 
Source: Manager, 25 June 2015  
 
As shown in Table 5-2, the security cases that were disapproved by the prosecutors 
and dismissed by the judges in the three southern provinces were high. There were less than 
50% or only 827 out of 1,904 cases between 2004 and 31 May 2015 where prosecutors 
decided to issue prosecution orders, which means 1,077 cases or 56.57% were dismissed by 
the prosecutors. Among all the 827 cases issued prosecution orders between 2004 and March 
2015, there were 431 cases or 52.12% where the court ordered dismissals. Therefore, among 
all of the 9,933 security cases from 2004 to May 2015, there were only 396 cases (or 3.99%) 
that were not dismissed and were prosecuted through the final legal process. This may 
possibly indicate that the interrogation and detention itself comprised the intended 
punishment of suspects, outside the legal system, and might be a contributing factor to the 




A major reason of the high rate of dismissed cases was because there was insufficient 
evidence to prove guilt. Most of the time forced confessions were the only evidence that the 
police had, and then used it to bring charges against suspects, despite the fact that confession 
under torture was legally prohibited by laws
178
. The forced confession was not only wrong 
because of the prohibition by laws, the confessions and evidence obtained through torturing 
was also considered politically unproductive and misinformed (Zawacki 2012). There were 
many Malay-Muslims who were arrested and detained by the military and claimed they were 
tortured and forced to confess by the security forces. Some of them brought their cases to 
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Figure 5-1:  Numbers of alleged torture cases received by the Muslim Attorney Center 
Foundation between 2007 and 2013 in the three southern border provinces and four 
districts of Songkhla 
  
 
Source: The Muslim Attorney Center Foundation 
 
 According to the MAC, the Foundation received a total of 393 cases of alleged torture 
during detention in Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and 4 districts of Songkhla between 2007 






















Figure 5-1) and 33 cases in 2015
180
. However, with a limitation of the judicial process 
under the Martial Law Act that protected state officials from prosecution, none of the security 
forces have ever been brought to punishment or successfully put on trial for human rights 
abuses (Zawacki 2012); some financial compensation has been paid to victims or their 
families however. The number of alleged torture cases from the MAC could imply that 
justice in the Deep South has been undermined.  
The forced confession through torture leaves a permanent imprint that potentially 
pushes people away from the Thai state. The fury from being tortured by state officials was 
felt not only by the suspects, but also their family and Malay-Muslim friends and neighbors. 
Negative stories about the Thai state torturing Malay-Muslims then spread and destroyed 
trust of, not only the military, but also the justice system. In a conflict area, word of mouth 




Another reason for lacking sufficient evidence in security cases was because some 
witnesses refused to participate in testifying
182
. Living in the midst of conflict and violence 
where most people distrusted each other, some local people were afraid that if they 
participated in the justice system, it might bring danger to themselves or their families, one 
way or another. They then tended to avoid participating in the justice process.  
The high rate of dismissals of security cases in the Deep South could be considered in 
both positive and negative terms. On the one hand, the high rate of case dismissals reflected 
the failure of the justice system and investigation process that was unable to find the right 
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culprits and punish them. The disappointment and mistrust in the justice system resulted in a 
low level of contacting the state and it also indirectly led to an increase of conflict and 
violence. Some of the local people in conflict areas believed it was easier to kill someone for 
revenge than bring the case to court and wait for justice. Even if they took legal action, they 
believed, there was a high chance that justice officers could convict no one
183
.  
Moreover, the maltreatment of the military in the interrogation process and the 
inability of the investigating police officers in finding sufficient evidence before charging the 
suspects in security cases were widely criticized and increased the resentment against the 
Thai state officers. The forced participation pushed away many Malay-Muslims from 
participating voluntarily in other political activities with state authorities.  Furthermore, the 
distrust in the witness protection program made witness feel unsafe and they hesitated to get 
involved with the cases or participate willingly in the legal process
184
.  So, both Malay-
Muslims and Thai Buddhists who lived in the midst of conflict tended not to participate as 
witnesses in cases and avoided giving any information to state officials due to a concern for 
their safety, and that made the work of investigating police much harder.  
On the other hand, the high number of dismissed cases might demonstrate the 
reliability of the judicial power, creating a positive-trustworthy atmosphere. The judgement 
of public prosecutors and judges in refusing to prosecute the weak cases that had insufficient 
evidence revealed that the justice system of Thailand did not fall under the state power and 
most cases were adjudged fairly. Moreover, the fair trials could save the guiltless person from 
punishment. However, suspects who were arrested and detained under the special security 
laws had to lose their freedom for about 2-5 years
185
 without being judged guilty from the 
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first day of detention until the final judicial process had been done (Isranews, 27 January 
2012). Thus, some Malay-Muslims became concerned that if participating through the justice 
system needed to take that much time, is it better, instead of being in jail, to give up the case 
and look for justice somewhere else
186
?  
Brutal interrogation and 2-5 years in prison are punishment without due process. If 
officials torture suspect, then put them in jail without bail for 2 years or more, they have 
already punished them. The long process of justice could imply that the officials perhaps do 
not care much whether the Malay-Muslim suspects are convicted or not.  In this sense, 
punishment is outside the hands of the judiciary entirely, and in the hands of those who arrest 
suspects. A civil society activist in Pattani stated that some suspects, after they were released 
by a judge’s order, were prohibited by security officials from returning to their village. They 
had to stay at a mosque or in the jungle. She claimed “it is a policy of ‘separating fish from 
water’.  The military might want to observe if these suspects were not in a village, would the 
violence decrease. However, the violent incidents still occurred even without these suspects 
in a village
187
.” Barring suspects from their own homes is yet another form of extrajudicial 
punishment. 
Experience with violent acts and improper practices in the justice system pushed the 
victims to find a way to fight for their rights and freedom. Some of them tried to make their 
problems known by asking for help from civil society activists who had better legal 
knowledge and political skill in contacting and participating with state officials. Somchai 
Neelapaichit, a lawyer and a human rights activist, was one of the persons who stood up to 
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help many Malay-Muslim victims demanding justice.  His wife once asked him why more 
victims of violence did not stand up and fight for themselves. Somchai said it was “fear” 
(Angkhana 2009: 12). The “fear” they had made them leave the state. Somchai was defending 
several suspected Malay-Muslims who alleged torture while in custody against treason 
charges. However, his outstanding role in speaking up for many suspected Malay-Muslims 
led to his disappearance in 2004, allegedly by some authorities who wanted him to be silent 
forever.  
The problems of the justice system and the high number of dismissals were gradually 
addressed. The problems of the justice system brought about more cooperation and political 
participation among justice officers, security officers, civil society organizations, and local 
people in the conflict areas to improve the justice system in the Deep South. For example, 
there was agreement between the Ministry of Justice, the SBPAC and the Courts of Justice in 
attempting to shorten the judicial process of the Court of First Instance to one and a half years 
(Thai Post, 14 May 2013). The development of a community justice center in the three 
southern provinces, aimed to increase feelings of trust of local people towards the justice 
system through cooperation between a civil network and the Ministry of Justice 
In addition to the effectiveness of the justice system, justice officers had important 
roles in maintaining and developing the efficiency of the legal process. However, some 
justice officers, who worked in the conflict and violent areas, could not perform as well as 
expected. The justice officers who had primary responsibility in prosecution included public 
prosecutors and judges.  
The public prosecutors worked in the middle stage of judicial system between inquiry 
officials and judges. During the early stage of the re-emegence of violence in the Deep South, 
public prosecutors who were assigned to work in the Deep South were so young and 




areas (McCargo 2008: 94). Moreover, the criminal and security cases in the three southern 
border provinces, which were mostly related to insurgency and separatism, were very 
complicated and challenging cases and needed prosecutors who had strong character and 
experience in dealing with special security cases. Consequently, instead of issuing 
prosecution orders in only cases that had sufficient evidence for a conviction, many 
prosecutors tended to bring most cases to court. The prosecutors were even considered as 
“the weakest link in the judicial chain” (McCargo 2008: 94), who were incapable of doing 
their jobs and allowed themselves to fall under political influence beyond their legal ethics.  
Subsequently, due to many complaints from academics, human right activists, and 
many Malay-Muslims on the inferior performance of public prosecutors in the conflict areas, 
the voices of people were heard and addressed by the Thai government and related agencies. 
Many training programs for prosecutors were organized to improve the quality of public 
prosecutors on security cases. The knowledge of Forensic Science was developed and applied 
in order to investigate cases more accurately. In addition, the Office of the Special Attorney 
on Criminal Case 2, Region 9 was established in Pattani on 1 October 2013 to take particular 
care of security cases in the South region, including Trang, Patthalung, Satun, Songkhla, and 
the three southern border provinces. In the past, the standard of prosecution of security cases 
in each province sometimes varied. Provincial public prosecutors, who were responsible for 
the security cases, in each province had different views. After the establishment of the Office 
of the Special Attorney on Criminal Case 2, Region 9, the prosecutions of security cases 
improved. All the security cases were prosecuted by specialist prosecutors, who were mature 
and had experience in prosecutions for at least 8 to 10 years in order to increase the 
effectiveness of prosecutions (Deep South Watch, 15 December 2013). 
The latest research on security cases in the southern border provinces of Thailand 




security cases. In the earlier period between 2004 and 2012, many prosecutors spent around 
210.36 days on average before issuing / non-issuing a prosecution order. However, due to 
developments in the judicial process and the Office of the Attorney General, there was 
impressive improvement of prosecutors’ performances. According to the research, the period 
of screening security cases of the prosecutors between 1 August 2012 and 31 July 2013 
impressively decreased from 210.36 to 20.24 days on average (Isranews, 16 August 2014).  
  After consideration by public prosecutors, the cases were sent to a court to be 
adjudicated by judges. Although judges in the Deep South were sent from other provinces
188
 
with different backgrounds and religions, many Malay-Muslims and lawyers who defended 
the Malay-Muslim suspects had high hopes for the court and believed that the court could 
bring them justice and freedom (McCargo 2008: 94). A judge was therefore a position that 
received appreciation and respect. However, working as a judge in the three southern border 
provinces would not be a desirable destination for many judges, especially after the 
assassination of a Pattani judge in 2004
189
 (The Nation, 18 September 2004). Moreover, the 
risk of working in the midst of conflict areas did not only come from the militants, some 
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 Similar to other state authorities who worked in the southern border provinces, judges 
were given some incentives for working in the conflict areas. Besides the special money that 
they received
191
, after one year of working in the conflict areas of the three southern 
provinces, the judges get privileges in choosing which province they prefer for their next 
assignment
192
. However, most of the judges who work in the conflict areas were quite young 
and inexperienced, many of them were newly graduated in their twenties or early thirties 
(McCargo 2008: 94). There are concerns that the inexperienced judges in the three southern 
border provinces might not be able to manage a very serious security case properly and 
expeditiously. An additional concern was mentioned by a civil society activist and journalist 
in Pattani,  
“Prosecution in the Deep South, especially on security cases, needs to be done very carefully. 
The judgement will set the standard for future cases. I am worried that the judgment of an 
inexperienced judge might create the wrong standard, which will affect the prosecution of 
security cases in the conflict areas. The justice process is very important in solving the 




Concerns on this issue were addressed by the Courts of Justice in assigning a new 
position, the deputy chief judge, in 2012. The deputy chief judge had to be a senior judge 
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who had experience in the judicial personnel for more than ten years and the deputy chief 
judge will make a judgment together with the judge in Court of First Instance
194
.  
Nonetheless, political participation through courts was not always a pleasant story. 
One famous example was the court’s verdict of Somchai Neelapaijit, a Thai-Muslim human 
rights lawyer who disappeared on 12 March 2004. The Supreme Court rejected Somchai’s 
family’s request to be a co-plaintiff in the investigation of his disappearance and released five 
police officers accused of being connected with the disappearance of Somchai. This 
undermined the confidence and hope of victims who seek justice against the maltreatment of 
state officers. It was widely believed that his disappearance was related to his work in helping 
the suspected Malay-Muslims who had been tortured by police officers to file a complaint 
regarding the alleged assault (Bangkok Post, 29 December 2015 and Prachatai, 29 December 
2015). The verdict of the Supreme Court not only upset Somchai’s family, but also the 
Malay-Muslims who had been abused by the state officers and sought justice. The Somchai 
case reaffirmed the belief that the Thai judicial system tends to protect state officials over the 
rights of victims and their families. To date, despite 90 cases of enforced disappearance 
between 1980 and 2015
195
, there has been no state officer prosecuted for involvement in the 
enforced disappearances (Prachatai, 29 December 2015).    
The distrust in the justice system and the disappointment in performances of judicial 
officers damaged voluntary participation through the state in conflict areas of the Deep South. 
Moreover, political participation through the justice system was blocked by some difficulties 
in the justice process, such as pressure from parties to the conflict (either state officials or the 
militants), the language barrier, time and money used during trials, to the risk of 
countercharges if they lose their cases. These difficulties in the judicial process resulted in the 
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low level of political participation through the judiciary. Due to the feeling of distrust and 
fear, many Malay-Muslims felt insecure to contact judicial officers and chose to avoid any 
legal commitments, especially when they were mistreated by Thai state officials. 
The distrust of the justice system of Thailand not only alienated local people from contacting 
contacting the judicial service officers on security cases, but also on civil cases, as shown in  
Figure 5-2.  
 
Figure 5-2 : Percentage of civil cases received by the Court of First Instance Region 9   
in 2015 
 
Remarks: 1. Number of civil cases included family and inheritance cases that are judged based on 
Islamic laws. 
 2. Betong Provincial Court has jurisdiction over Betong district of Yala 
 3. Na Thawi Provinicial Court has jurisdiction over five districts of Songkhla, including 
Chana, Thepha, Na Thawi, Saba Yoi, and Sadao.  
Source: The number of civil cases is from Annual Judicial Statistic 2015, Courts of Justice, Thailand.  
 The number of population is from Official Statistics Registration Systems, Department of 





















Figure 5-2 showed a lower number of civil cases received by the Court of First 
Instance in the conflict areas of the three provinces, including Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, 
than in non violence conflict areas of the other southern provinces in the Region 9 (Trang, 
Phatthalung, and Satun, except Songkhla). There were 1.09%, 1.29%, and 0.91% of people in 
Trang, Phatthalung, and Satun, respectively who brought civil cases to the Court of Justice, 
whereas there were only 0.48%, 0.47%, and 0.54% of people in the conflict areas of Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat, respectively, contacting justice officers to file a civil action. 
Interestingly, the number of civil cases in the low violence conflict areas of Betong district of 
Yala
196
, and the 5 districts of Songkhla (Chana, Thepha, Na Thawi, Saba Yoi, and Sadao) that 
are under the jurisdiction of the Na Thawi and Betong Provincial Courts was quite high. 
There were around 1% (0.94% in Betong and 1.01% in Na Thawi) of people in low violence 
conflict areas of Betong and five districts of Songkhla who brought civil cases to the Court of 
Justice, which was 50% higher than the number of civil cases the Court of Justice received in 
the high violence conflict areas of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.  
Although the reasons for the low number of civil cases brought to the courts could be 
complex and no precise explanation can be confirmed, one possible contention that could be 
interpreted from the statistical data was that conflict did matter in the level of political 
participation through justice system. The negative experiences from involuntary participation 
of people in high violence conflict areas perhaps created barriers and pushed people away 
from voluntary participation, whereas in the low violence conflict areas, based on 
conversations with people in low violence conflict areas of Songkhla, people had better 
relationship with state authorities
197
.The lower barriers from fear in the low violence conflict 
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areas positively affected political participation. Local people in low violence conflict areas 
were likely to have more confidence in contacting state authorities. 
Despite the fact that the judicial process should be equally provided as a fundamental 
right to every citizen, for the Malay-Muslims who live in the midst of conflict and violence 
under the three special security laws, the attainment of this right was harder and more 
dangerous than for people in other parts of the country. So, political participation through the 
state in the matter of justice was low since people rather tended to avoid involving 
themselves in any legal proceedings. Nevertheless, for many Malay-Muslims who were 
charged and accused of involving with the insurgency, they had no choice but to be involved 
with the Thai justice system unavoidably. However, the chance to get justice seemed to be 
more difficult for them. The negative experiences of involuntary participation hindered local 
people from having voluntary participation with state authorities. Some local people might be 
so afraid of the security and justice officers that they did not go to them when they faced 
problems. Some might take care of the conflict on their own; some decided not to press 
charges; and some of them then chose to contact local government officials instead. 
   
Local government officials 
 
 Studying political participation through the state cannot be completed without a focus 
on local officials whose responsibilities are considered as a bridge between the central 
government and the locals. The performance of local officials plays an important role in 
defining the pattern and level of political participation and portraying the image of the Thai 
state. In general, people participated with local government officials in many occasions. For 
people in the conflict areas, interacting with local government officials can be in forms of 
voluntary participation such as participating in community meetings, contacting local 




regulations to contact involuntarily with local officials, such as to apply for a license. 
However, the form of relationship and participation between local people and local 
authorities was different at each level of state authorities. The local authoritiess in Thailand 
range from the provincial governors, district chief officers (Nai Amphur), subdistrict 
headman (Kamnan), to village headman (Phuyaiban).  However, the form of relationship and 
participation between local people and local authorities was different at each level of state so 
this section categorized local authorities into two groups based on method of recruitment or 
acquisition of positions. The first group is the national civil service assigned as local 
bureaucrats, which are for example provincial governors and Nai Amphur. The second group 
is the elected-native local officials, which are Kamnan and Phuyaiban. 
 
The national civil service officers assigned as local bureaucrats 
 
This section discussed roles and the relationship between local people and the local 
bureaucrats who are not originally from the Malay-Muslim majority provinces but assigned 
by the central government to work in the area. Even though they are considered as “civil 
servants” who work for a Thai government, they also have major responsibility in taking care 
of locals’ happiness. In the past, the relationship between them was difficult mostly because 
of language and cultural barriers. An elderly Malay-Muslim from Pattani shared his 
experience when he was young that local Malay-Muslims were always afraid of contacting 
local bureaucrats. 
 I once attended a seminar in one of the northeastern provinces and a local person raised his 
hand and asked the local bureaucrat if it is possible to bring sticky rice for lunch. The local 
bureaucrat answered “why not? This is your home.” I was so impressed because this kind of 








So, most Thai-Buddhist government officials who spoke a different language and had 
different culture and religion had little direct contact with local people and vice versa 
(McCargo 2008: 57). Besides, the sporadic unrest before 2004 gradually increased the 
negative attitudes to each other. The communication between the local Malay-Muslims and 
state officials therefore occurred only for important or necessary matters and through middle 
men who could speak Thai (Surin 1982: 23). Political participation then was mainly 
involuntary, such as contacting a district office to get a license or I.D. card. The low level of 
communication and interpersoncal relationships led to low levels of voluntary participation 
through the state even before 2004.  
By 2004 most Malay-Muslims can speak Thai due to the development of education, 
technology, and transportation systems in Thailand. Language barriers became less important 
in political participation between the locals and state officials. However, a new obstacle has 
arisen which is the re-emergence of conflict and violence since 2004. The recent conflict and 
violence in the Deep South made the improvement of the relationship between the Malay-
Muslims and local bureaucrats more difficult. Generally, the openings for unelected local 
bureaucrats are limited. The competition is high and difficult. For many applicants, the three 
southern border provinces might be one of the least wanted destinations due to their distance 
and danger. The Thai government has policies to promote the positions in the Far South by 
providing some incentives and special criteria of recruitment. For example, the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) holds a separate test for Palad Amphur who want to post in the Deep South 
where the competition is less. The experience of working in the three southern provinces 
could lead to quicker promotion of the local bureaucrats because the MOI provides privileges 
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for local bureaucrats who voluntarily work in the conflict areas of the southern provinces to 
count their time in government service as double. So, the career path to Governor can be 
shortened for local bureaucrats who work in the three southern border provinces and four 
districts of Songkhla.  
 









General knowledge of government services 50 40 
Understanding of the responsibilities of Department of 
Provincial Administration 
100 100 
English Language 20 20 
Strategic planning and management 30 - 
Understanding of Thai-Muslim
199
 culture and current 
situation in the three southern provinces 
- 40 
Total 200 200 
Source: Department of Provincial Administration Announcement for recruiting assistant district 




Table 5-3 shows the different criteria for the assistant district officers’ examination 
between other areas and the three southern border provinces. The strategic planning and 
management subject is replaced by the understanding of the Malay-Muslim culture and 
current situation in the southern border provinces. The different criteria demonstrate the 
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increasing awareness of the Thai government of the value in selecting local bureaucrats who 
should have more understanding of the background of conflict and violence and the Malay-
Muslim culture. In the past, most assigned local bureaucrats were outsiders from other 
regions of the country with little understand of the Malay-Muslim culture and lifestyle. Some 
of them unwillingly worked here. The upsurge of violence since 2004 led to the realization by 
the Thai state of the need to improve the provincial administration of the Deep South, 
especially improvement of human resources, to be more understandable and accessible to 
local Malay-Muslims. The assigned local bureaucrats, who voluntarily worked in the conflict 
areas of the Deep South would be able to provide better service and increase trust among 
local people, which directly resulted in greater participation, both involuntary and voluntary.  
The Thai state is now more open for Malay-Muslims to work in provincial 
governments. The conflict and violence made the Thai state see the advantage of allowing 
and encouraging more Malay-Muslims to work with the state in order to promote more 
positive participation between local people and assigned local bureaucrats. The Malay-
Muslims were increasingly acceptable to work with the Thai government and they were 
treated more equally
200
. When people had positive experiences from involuntary 
participation, the promotion of voluntary participation with state bureaucrats would be, at 
least, less difficult. 
 
Although the positions were more open for Malay-Muslims to work for their 
community, some Malay-Muslim bureaucrats had problems in gaining trust from their fellow 
Malay-Muslims. They were seen by the locals as untrustworthy for taking the Thai state side. 
So, political participation during the conflict and violence, sometimes, caused more 
problems. For the Malay-Muslims bureaucrats, who wanted to participate with the Thai state 
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by working as state authorities, they were at risk of being separated from the Malay-Muslim 
community (McCargo 2008: 59-60). On the contrary, for local Malay-Muslims who wanted 
to participate through contacting state bureaucrats, they were at risk of being neglected or 
treated improperly by Thai state officials.  
Provincial governor is one of the most important positions and is the most powerful 
local bureaucrat in a province. After the rise of conflict and violence in 2004, the Department 
of Provincial Administration tends to select a senior bureaucrat who has relavant background 
in the southern area to be a governor. For example, the first Malay-Muslim provincial 
governor, Teera Mintrasak, was assigned in 2006 to be the provincial governor of Yala 
(Isranews, 19 December 2011).  
The political leadership of a provincial governor has been an important factor that 
determined the rise and fall of political participation. Krissada Boonrach, a former governor 
of Songkhla (2011-2014) and later a permanent secretary of the Ministry of Interior, initiated 
policies that encouraged political participation within local communities of the four conflict 
districts of Songkhla. He allowed each village to set up its own rules and regulations in, for 
example taking care of village security, preventing young villagers from drug addiction, and 
managing village orderliness. The village regulations were defined by consultation among the 
four mainstays of community leaders (Phu nam see sao lak) in a village, including 
Phuyaiban, Imam, SAO president, and respected elders of a village
201
. His policy led to 
cooperation and participation among local government officers, religious leaders, local 
politicians, and villagers in communities. When the doors to civil power and political rights 
were more open, it encouraged a significant rise in political participation. Within the first four 
months after promoting participation within local communities, Krissada said, there were 
more than 15 subdistricts from the total of 32 subdistricts of the four violent conflict districts 
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of Songkhla, who participated and followed his policies. Villagers managed to have 
volunteers keeping watch in their villages and at government buildings at night and set their 
own rules and regulations. Moreover, he noticed that a higher number of local people in these 





Krissada had previously applied his strategy of encouraging participation among the 
four pillars of community leaders in Yala, when he was a Yala Governor in 2010, but his 
strategy failed in Yala. Krissada mentioned that there were high suspicions and conflict 
among the community leaders in Yala (INN News, 6 October 2010). The same strategy that 
was unsuccessful in high violence conflict areas could be a success in a low violence conflict 
area where the degree of political participation was more open and feelings of suspicion and 
untrustworthiness were lower.  
On the contrary, a subsequent governor of Songkhla provided a less open atmosphere 
for political participation. This aroused resentment in many villagers who believed in 
political participation, and villagers believed the limitation of channels of political 
participation under this governor seemingly led to more conflict in the area
203
. As shown in  
Figure 5-3, comparing January – June 2012 (during the period of Krissada) and 
January – June 2015 (during the period of a subsequent governor), the violent incidents in 
Songkhla increased from 3 incidents in the first six months of 2012 to 18 incidents in the first 
six months of 2015.  
Figure 5-3:  Numbers of violent incidents in Songkhla 









Source: Deep South Incident Database (DSID), Deep South Watch 
 
One of the examples where the subsequent governor impeded access to participation 
was when he prohibited a group of villagers in Thepha and neighboring districts who 
disagreed with the foundation of the coal-fired power plant and coal pier in Songkhla’s 
Thepha district to participate in a public hearing on the construction of the coal-fired power 
plant on 27 July 2015 (Naewna, 28 July 2015). His prohibition of participation led to a rally 
by anti-coal protestors outside the public hearing in Thepha (Bangkok Post, 22 August 2015). 
He then was faced with around 500 protestors in Songkhla who sought to remove him from 
his post. Some villagers who participated in this protest mentioned that the governor 
oppressed his people and hindered them from political participation (Manager 31 August 
2015). 
However, despite the increasing intention to promote local people to work for the 
Thai state, the negative perception of the effectiveness of local bureaucrats pushed the 
younger generation away from working with the Thai government. As one interviewee from 


















I once dreamed of working as a local bureaucrat like my father, so I decided to study Political 
Science. I realized just recently that I do not want to be a bureaucrat anymore because the 
local bureaucrats have to follow the state’s policies from the central government in Bangkok. 
Even though the local bureaucrats know and understand better about the problem in the 
conflict areas, they can do nothing much. They have to follow the state orders
204
.  
The distance between the locals, especially the grassroots in rural areas, and upper 
level bureaucrats obstructed some Malay-Muslims from formal participation, such as 
participating in public hearings.  If local people, especially at the grassroots, wanted to 
contact state officials, they tended not to participate by themselves but they preferred to come 
with their Kamnan/Phuyaiban, who they know well. A local authority, who worked in Yala, 
said 
When I was posted in one of the rural districts of Yala a few years ago, most villagers came 
with their Phuyaiban when they wanted to contact Thai state officials at the provincial hall. 
Unlike Yala, most villagers in Songkhla are not afraid of us (state authorities) so they usually 




The assigned local bureaucrats might be in a difficult position in promoting voluntary 
participation. While some local people refused to contact national civil servants assigned as 
local bureaucrats, the study found that the relationship between villagers and elected state 
officials (Kamnan/Phuyaiban) was quite close and more effective.   
 
The elected-native local officials 
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There are some positions in the local state, such as Kamnan and Phuyaiban, are 
locals, elected their position by the villagers. Since the promulgation of the Local 
Government Act in 1914 Phuyaiban have been elected by villagers
206
. The candidate can be 
either male or female but have to be in the village for not less than two years. After being 
elected, Phuyaiban can be in the position until he/she is 60 years old. A Kamnan is elected 
from Phuyaiban by Phuyaiban in a subdistrict (Tambon) and can also be in the position until 
the age of 60.  
These positions have conflicting roles. Although both kamnan and phuyaiban are 
recognized as influential positions, as C.D. Neher (1979: 195) noted many years ago, they 
have to engage in a “dizzying array of functions”.  On the one hand, kamnan and phuyaiban 
act as local representatives. They are responsible for, for example, promoting peace and 
harmony in a community, managing public utilities, and presenting locals’ demands to the 
government. On the other hand, kamnan and phuyaiban act as representatives of the Thai 
state. They have major roles in activities such as distributing government policies to local 
people, enforcing laws and reporting illegal acts to state authorities, and regularly attending 
meetings with local bureaucrats and officials (Neher 1979: 195-196). 
Since Kamnan and Phuyaiban are locals, who mostly have language ability in both 
Thai and Malay and are familiar with Thai government officials, they are often requested by 
their villagers to contact Thai local bureaucrats for them. In addition, due to the sour 
relationship with the national civil servants, some villagers did not go directly to the district 
office, they tended to contact Kamnan and Phuyaiban instead. So, local officials are 
considered as both local and state representatives who act as intermediaries and link the two 
sides. However, the work of elected- native local officials can be seen as creating the same 
dilemma where they cannot gain full trust from either the state or the local people. As they 
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are Malay-Muslims, the Thai government sometimes feels suspicious of kamnan and 
phuyaiban that they would cooperate with the militants to oppose the Thai government, while 
the local Malay-Muslims suspected that the kamnan and phuyaiban are the eyes and ears for 
the Thai state. One interviewee, who his father worked as a local official, said,  
During the conflict, it was more difficult for phuyaiban to ask for cooperation from villagers. 
Some villagers are afraid of being killed if they worked for or helped local officials. I 
remember an assistant phuyaiban was shot just because he was a little involved in some 
political matters. So, most villagers preferred to protect themselves from any harm and did not 
want to take any risk
207
  
This student believed voluntary participation through the state did not involve 
ordinary people rather it involved those who are already influential and powerful, who have 
their own bodyguard, and who do not have to worry about living expenses, such as the MPs. 
The locals could only live their lives day by day without being involved in political activities, 
especially those relating to the ongoing violence
208
.  
However, the re-emergence of violence did not totally destroy all the confidence in 
political participation of some villagers. People in the conflict areas, although they avoided 
discussing the ongoing conflict, still cooperated and participated in other matters, such as 
community development and volunteering. According to the interviews, the ongoing conflict 
and violence was not their only concern, many villagers were worry about, for example, 
livelihoods, income and agricultural products, as well as the problem of drug addiction
209
. It 
is undeniable that the conflict and violence brought hardship to people in the conflict areas 
but in another way the conflict and violence also acted as potential motivation for political 
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participation. Local people increasingly realized the importance of communal participation in 
reinforcing their community. Many interviewees said political participation in smaller 
entities, such as in the village, was quite high. An interviewee from a small village of Pattani 
told that Phuyaiban of his village played an important role in organizing public participation. 
He arranged weekly (or sometimes monthly) village meetings and almost everyone in his 
village regularly participated in the meetings, sharing opinions about how to make the most 
of the village fund, and volunteering to look after their village at night
210
. Such voluntary 
participation can be successfully arranged through the leaders that villagers trusted and 
elected.  
Desperation also could not stop political participation. Even though most people in 
the conflict areas did not want to discuss the ongoing conflict and violence with each other as 
it is too dangerous and a sensitive topic, most villagers were likely to discuss and participate 
with their elected-native local bureaucrats in other matters. Based on my conversations 
during my field research, many local people in the conflict areas, especially in rural villages, 
thought of Kamnan and Phuyaiban as the first person to contact when they faced a 
problem
211
. As some interviewees expressed; 
 My family preferred to ask for help from kamnan and phuyaiban rather than other state 
authorities. Kamnan and phuyaiban had many important roles in my village and often visited 
my family. They, then, are in a close, familiar relationship
212
.  
The first person I contact when I have trouble is the phuyaiban. I can call and he always 
answers most calls from his villagers. We (his family) are much closed to our phuyaiban.
213
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Thus, most people gave importance to local elections of Phuyaiban as much as 
national elections, or even more. However, despite being local officials, who correspond with 
the Thai state, the candidates might be either supporters of the Thai state or dissenters against 
the state; some candidates might represent traditional elites; some might be canvassers of a 
politician, and some might answer to a state authority. Voters could vote to support a 
candidate in accordance with their personal attitudes and preferences. Some villagers, who 
might not agree with the state’s policies, still wanted to participate to select a head of village 
who they believed might have similar attitudes but still had to be able to help them in 
contacting the Thai state. The local election of phuyaiban always was the most popular 
election where almost everyone participated vigorously
214
.  
For people in the remote areas, it was not often that their elected MPs came to visit 
them. The distantness caused the feeling of being ignored so they relied more on the elected 
local officials, who were villagers and always with them. “the MP did not come to my 
village, except during his campaign, but kamnan/phuyaiban is always there. He is the closet 




Local officials, who work as intermediaries for the interests of the country and 
happiness of the locals, are then the important actors who could either destroy or strengthen 
voluntary participation of people in the conflict areas. Also, the performance of local officials 
impacted greatly on the people’s decisions to contact the Thai state. However, the 
relationship between local officials, especially the assigned bureaucrats, seemed to be quite 
estranged and the contact between them seemed to be limited because of different 
background and the feeling of distrust. Compared to the assigned bureaucrats, the elected-
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native local officials and the Malay-Muslims are in a better and closer relationship. The 
relationship with national civil servants assigned as local bureaucrats might be sour but at the 
same time it indirectly strengthened the relationship between the elected local officials and 
the grassroots, especially in rural conflict areas where participation gets stymied.  
 
 
Drawing Contrast: a direct comparison of conflict and non-conflict areas  
  
Political participation through the state depended largely on the dynamic relationship 
between state officials and local people. Whereas the ongoing conflict and violence inspired 
many Malay-Muslims to participate through elections, the distrust in state officials during the 
conflict and violence alienated some Malay-Muslims from contacting the state. There are no 
records keeping track of people contacting the state but from interviews, we can compare 
different areas in terms of political participation.  This section therefore examined political 
participation, both involuntary and voluntary, through the state in different areas that had 
different levels of conflict and violence in order to examine if the influence of conflict and 
violence caused differences in political participation through the state. 
In terms of involuntary participation, in non violence areas of Ranot and Sathing Phra, 
political participation through the state is quite straightforward. Since villagers are Thai-
Buddhists, barriers in contacting the state are fewer than for Malay-Muslim villagers. 
Involuntary participation, such as contacting district officers to get a license, and taking part 
in a trial, runs more smoothly without worrying about threat from violent incidents and fear 
of state authorities. Villagers did not have negative experiences from forced participation, 
especially by security officers, because the areas are not under special control of the military. 




quite positive, especially when compared to people in conflict areas. While most people in 
the conflict areas fought against the hawkish strategy of the military in the Deep South, some 
participants from the non violence conflict areas in Ranot and Sathing Phra supported the 
harsh method and opposed the dove strategy. As a participant from Sathing Phra said: 
 I do not agree and do not understand why the government has policies to remedy southern 
bandits (Chon tai).  They kill people, they, then, should be killed or at least arrested, rather 
than offer them an option of assist
216
. 
Moreover, since most people in non-violence conflict areas did not have negative 
perceptions of state authorities, trust was developed in state institutions, and not focused on 
individual officials. So, they contacted and trusted representative of the state, not because of 
being impressed with some officials. One local authority, newly posted in Ranot, said that he 
received a warm welcome on the first day of his post and villagers came to talk to him about 
their problems the same as they did with the former official
217
.  
One local authority who had work experiences in both conflict and non conflict areas 
in southern Thailand explained one of the differences in contacting state agencies of people in 
non conflict and conflict areas was that when Malay-Muslims who lived in the conflict areas 
came to a district office to contact state authorities, they usually came with Kamnan, 
Phuyaiban, or their religious leaders. They were afraid of contacting Thai local bureaucrats 
by themselves. On the contrary, many villagers in non conflict areas of Ranot and Sathing 
Phra could participate through the state without fear. They usually came to make contact with 
state agencies by themselves without taking community leaders with them
218
. 
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For villagers in low violence conflict areas of Chana and Thepha, involuntary 
participation through contacting the state sometimes was not as smooth as in the non violence 
areas. There were cases where Malay-Muslims in Chana and Thepha felt that they did not 
receive proper treatment from state officials, especially security officers. As some 
interviewees from Chana and Thepha pointed out: 
I am very concerned about the problem of discrimination and inequality between the 
Buddhists and Muslims. I notice that when we go through the security check point, the 
military check more seriously, and sometimes aggressively, on Muslims, but let the Buddhists 
go easily. I think we should not be subjected to discrimination.
 219
  
I feel that some villages are given particular attention by the Thai state and they (villagers) are 
suspected as separatists. I am afraid that if the Thai state keep watching and treating them as 




The Thai government always says that people do not understand the Thai state or do not 
understand what they (state officials) are doing. But in turn, I am not sure if the Thai state 




However, compared to the high violence conflict areas, many villagers in Chana and 
Thepha districts could communicate with security officers with more confidence and a 
positive attitude.  While people in the high violence conflict areas might avoid participating 
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with the military, people in the low violence conflict areas demonstrated better interactions 
between the military and local people.  As shown in interviews,  
I have a good relationship with the military. We work together in developing my community 
such as participating in disaster prevention programs
222
. 
My village has a good relationship with the military, I preferred local soldiers though. Some 
soldiers come from other regions and do not understand Muslim culture. If the government 
sent local soldiers, at least from the southern provinces, not from E-san (northeastern region) 
or Northern provinces, the military would have more understanding and can prevent more 





Involuntary participation through the state in the high violence area of Mueang Pattani 
was full of difficulty and suspicion. The state officials had to try hard to gain trust from the 
Malay-Muslims, which proved even harder in more rural areas. Especially the relationship 
between the military and local people was uneven in that the military has superior power.  
The level and pattern of political participation through the state in Mueang Pattani 
was also significantly different between villagers in urban and rural areas. In urban areas, the 
majority of the population could speak Thai and were generally well-educated because the 
area was a location of Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus. Moreover, there were 
many Thai-Buddhists in urban areas of Mueang Pattani. So, the majority of people in urban 
areas had more political skills and lower language barriers in contacting the state than people 
living in rural areas of Mueang Pattani. However, political participation through the state in 
urban areas of Mueang Pattani was very much impeded by the ongoing conflict and violence. 
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A high frequency of violent conflict incidents occurred and mostly targeted state authorities, 
making many locals hesitate to contact state agencies to avoid the risk of being endangered 
by association. During my time in Pattani, there were many times that I was told and noticed 
that some local people avoided being around state officials, especially the military. For 
example, they tended not to park their cars near military vehicles or they preferred not to 
enter into a restaurant where they saw military officers eating
224
.  
 Political participation through the state in rural areas was worse. Due to the feeling of 
untrustworthiness, local people were very careful in having a relationship with state 
authorities. Being a Muslim state official sometimes was not enough to guarantee a warm 
welcome from many Malay-Muslim villagers in rural areas of Mueang Pattani. One local 
government authority, who was a Muslim from another region and was appointed to work in 
one of the smallest subdistricts of Mueang Pattani, expressed that he experienced a difficult 
time during his first few years of working in this area. However, after he attempted to learn to 
speak Melayu, the native language of villagers, and regularly participated in Islamic activities 
and attended prayer service at mosque every week, he was able to gain more trust from many 
villagers and they were more willing to communicate and participate with him
225
. It was not 
only state officials that kept an eye on local people, both state authorities and local people 
kept watching and observing each other. They waited until they were certain of the state 
officials before participating. In the high violence conflict area, political participation through 
the state, when it did occur became personalized due to distrust of the state and its authorities. 
The different experiences in involuntary participation resulted in different levels of 
voluntary participation. In non violence areas of Ranot and Sathing Phra, although the risk of 
participation is lower than in the conflict areas, incentives to participate in public activities 
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are not strong enough to create motivation to participate voluntarily, unless the issue has a 
direct affect on participants. A university student from Sathing Phra raised the example of 
voluntary participation in her village that  
I felt that my village was ignored by the Bangkok government. It may be because we are not 
facing serious problems compared to other areas, such as in the Deep South. So, it always 
took a long time for the government to solve our problems. We (villagers), mostly, managed 




Based on field research, local authorities in Ranot and Sathing Phra pointed out that 
political awareness and participation of Ranot and Sathing Phra villagers generally increased 
when they faced problems relevant to their personal interests and occupation, such as the 
problem of traditional fisheries, water resources, and land conflict. They then participate 
voluntarily and actively to retain their resources. When the problem is solved, political 
participation regularly decreased or was discontinued.  
Political participation in Chana and Thepha districts was directly affected by the 
conflict and violence in the Deep South. Although the ongoing conflict and violence in Chana 
and Thepha occurred less frequently than in the three high conflict provinces, it greatly 
motivated many villagers in Chana and Thepha to participate voluntarily to protect their 
communities from more violence. In addition, although Chana and Thepha districts were 
under the special security law of the Internal Security Act, the provisions on political rights 
were more permissive than those applied in high violence conflict areas of Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat. As a result, channels of political participation through the state in Chana and 
Thepha were more open and supported by both central and local governments. There were 
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meetings of Kamnan and Phuyaiban every month. Then Phuyaiban had to call for meetings 
of village committees within 7 days and report back to the chief district officer. Moreover, 
each district office regularly sent the assistant district officers and their teams to visit local 
people and participate in village meetings
227
. A university student from Thepha said that he 
often participated in the village meetings together with kamnan, phuyaiban, and other local 
officials
228
. “I not only listened to what the adults said, but I also spoke out in the meetings. 
Although the officials in the meetings might not agree with my opinions, they, at least, 




When local communities received support from the state, they could participate freely 
without fear of becoming suspects. So, with the motivation to protect their communities from 
violence, and the support from powerful state actors, voluntary participation in low violence 
conflict area of Chana and Thepha districts was quite high. A local government official in 
Thepha explained that “most local people kept an eye on their community. They were not 
afraid and had no hesitation to contact us (state agencies) when they noticed something 
suspicious. Our community was strong because local people actively participated for the 
good of their village
230
.” Similarly, a local official in Chana also had the same experience. As 
he said, 
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Since they (villagers) trusted us (local officials), my villagers showed great interest to 
participate and cooperate with us, especially in watching over their communities and 
informing us when noticing something unusual or spotting someone speaking Malay
231
”. 
Voluntary participation in Chana and Thepha was then seen as so effective that 
government officials believed it led to a decrease of violent incidents
232
. Due to a decrease in 
violence, Chana was one of the two districts where the military decided to return security 
duties to provincial authorities in January 2013.  
Some people accepted that the Thai state provided many channels for participation but 
there still were many people who did not know how to participate or access those channels
233
. 
The problem in Chana and Thepha is not people that tended to avoid participating, they 
wanted to participate but sometimes their knowledge and experience of politics was limited 
so they did not know how to participate effectively.  
 
In contrast, voluntary participation through the state for people in the high violence 
conflict areas of Mueang Pattani was problematic.  Many local people in the Deep South did 
not trust he state or state authorities and that prevented them from helping and participating 
with the Thai state. Discussions about violent incidents were also avoided in the high 
violence conflict areas. Many local Malay-Muslims tended not to talk about the ongoing 
conflict and violence because they were afraid that it would bring them more harm and 
suspicion from either the state or the militants. Similarly, local officials were likely not to 
criticize or discuss violent incidents that happened in communities as they were sensitive 
                                                          
231
 Interview, a local authoirity in Chana, November 2012. Many Malay-Muslims in Chana and 
Thepha speak southern Thai language, whereas many Malay-Muslims in the three southern border 
provinces and militants speak Malay. When strangers entered Chana district, especially a stranger 
who speaks Malay, Chana villagers would take utmost caution with them and inform state authorities 
to investigate or ask them to move out.  
232
 Interview, a local authority in Thepha, February 2013. 
233




issues that could easily lead to misunderstanding and more conflict in villages. So, political 
participation relevant to security issues were avoided and, as a local official in rural areas of 
Mueang Pattani mentioned, it would be difficult to get many villagers to participate except if 
the activities involved livelihood and social problems. The local official explained that for his 
village, “If it was about the security problem, we (villagers) did not talk. If it was about 
something else such as drug problems and subsistence, we brainstormed and argued to 
develop our village
234
.”  He further explained that “although they experienced violent 
incidents, people here did not run away from Thai politics. They participated in elections. 
The ones that they wanted to run away from were the Thai state officials. The ongoing 
conflict and violence did not make them feel bored with politics, but it increased the feeling 
of distrust in state authorities.
235
” Although some parts of the state are trusted a bit more than 
others, like the judiciary or SBPAC, political participation through the state in high violence 
conflict areas largely became personalized rather than institutionalized.   So, unless the 
problem of trust was resolved, voluntary participation through the state in the high violence 
conflict areas would be difficult to revive. 
 
Figure 5-4: Which state authorities did people in the study areas interact with most 
frequently? 
 










Interviews of 36 participants, 12 in each area, revealed interesting results. As 
shown in 
Figure 5-4, the number of participants who never contacted state officials was 
highest in the non violence conflict areas of Ranot and Sathing Phra districts (41.67%), 
and lowest in the low violence conflict areas of Chana and Thepha (8.33%), where 
people had higher incentives from the conflict and violence and less risk from violent 
incidents and forced participation. In the conflict areas, the security officials came to 
play a role. However, participants from high violence conflict areas had less interaction 
with the military (16.67%) than participants from the low violence conflict areas (33%). 
Participants in the high violence conflict areas preferred to contact Kamnan / Phuyaiban 
(33%) and local politicians (25%) instead.  
 
The level of political participation through the state of people in the conflict areas 
greatly depended on the level of risk and incentives. Living in the midst of conflict and 
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non violence conflict areas. The higher incentives led to higher participation. Another 
important variable that caused a difference in level and pattern of political participation of 
people in the conflict areas was the level of risk. The level of risk could arise from, for 
example, the violent incidents, negative perceptions towards state authorities, and 
unimpressive experiences from forced participation. These risks significantly undermined 
political participation through the state. So, the three study areas, which had different levels 
of conflict and violence, then had different levels and patterns of political participation 
through the state.  In non violence conflict areas, although they had lower risks, most people 
had less incentives than those in conflict areas. They tended to participate voluntarily through 
contacting the state only when they personally faced problems. In moderate conflict violence 
areas, incentive to participation was high enough to motivate people to overcome the 
difficulties, and risk in the areas was not too high to undermine people’s will to participate. 
Therefore, the lower barriers and higher incentives supported people in Chana and Thepha to 
participate. On the contrary, the same incentives that led to high participation of people in the 
high violence conflict areas were undermined by higher risks. So, people in the high violence 








The undesirable experience of coercive actions and extrajudicial killings by the Thai 
police and military, the disrespect of the Malay-Muslim culture by some local state 
bureaucrats, and the problem of injustice due to the limitations of access to the court system 
and improper judicial process under the special security laws, could easily increase the 
feeling of distrust of the state authorities overall.  In conflict areas, distrust means 
participation, when it occurs, becomes personalized. It is not with institutions but with trusted 
members of them. The remoteness and distrust in the Thai state opened a chance for the 
militants to intervene and draw in more Malay-Muslims to join the insurgency.  
The main question that this chapter aimed to answer is what kind of participation 
through the state should we expect to take place in the areas that are full of conflict and 
violence, where the relationship between local people and state authorities was undermined 
for decades. This chapter indicates that political participation through the state in the conflict 
areas of the Deep South comprised both negative and positive participation. The two types of 
political participation are not separate but impact each other. Involuntary participation could 
undermine voluntary participation. On the contrary, if people had positive experiences from 
involuntary participation, it could reinforce positive participation.  
Since some local people did not like the Thai state, “normal” participation rarely 
happened. The negative experiences from involuntary participation of people in the conflict 
and violence areas were hard to avoid. Some Malay-Muslims were arrested as suspected 
separatists and had to participate through the justice system to fight for their freedom. Some 
might feel oppressed from forced participation and tend to avoid taking part in voluntary 
participation. However, in some cases the involuntary particapation that blocked some people 




During the conflict, negative participation can turn to positive participation. Bad 
experiences from contacting security or justice officers could indirectly inspire more positive 
participation with the local government officials. Forced participation caused negative 
experiences towards state authorities. So, people might turn against the Thai state through 
violent actions.  Personal negative experiences discouraged political participation through the 
state. However, people having problems with the Thai state may tend to participate more 






Chapter 6 : Political Participation through civil society 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we discussed political participation through the state and the 
findings showed that many Malay-Muslims in the Deep South only contacted state officials 
involuntarily, when they had no choice. The negative experiences from involuntary 
participation discouraged many Malay-Muslims from voluntary participation with the state 
and estranged many locals from state officials. Moreover, having a close relationship with 
state officials could be dangerous because it could lead to being targeted by the separatists. 
Many Malay-Muslims were, thus, caught in the crossfire between the insurgents and the Thai 
military. So, they were likely to keep a low profile and avoid interaction with state agencies 
to avoid getting killed. Unproductive experiences with involuntary participation and the high 
risk from cooperating with the Thai state resulted in a declining incentive for political 
participation through the state.   
Did the conflict and violence also undermine other channels of political participation? 
In this chapter we will examine political participation through civil society, an alternative 
channel of political participation that may circumvent the broken linkage between the locals 
and the Thai state. As defined in chapter 2, political participation through civil society in this 
research refers to non-electoral political participation where individuals or groups of people 
participate in an organization or community activities with an aim to influence government 
decision making on community policies (Verba, Nie, and Barbic: 1973, and Huntington and 
Nelson: 1976). Unlike political participation through the state, political participation through 
civil society is unforced and voluntary. Taking part in civil society is based on individuals’ 





This chapter concerns political participation through civil society of both local people 
and of the promoters of civil society, including state and non-state actors, as well as their 
relationships during the conflict situation. By studying both sides of the actors, we will see 
more clearly that overall political participation through civil society in the conflict areas is 
developing and expanding, not only in terms of the specific activities, but also in terms of 
involvement of wider groups of actors.By studying both participation of local citizens and of 
the promoters of civil society, we will see more clearly that overall political participation 
through civil society in the conflict areas is developing and expanding, not only in terms of 
the specific activities, but also in terms of involvement of wider groups of actors. 
We will begin by presenting the general development of civil society organizations in 
the Deep South after the renewed violence in 2004. Then, we will look at how each particular 
group of actors participated in civil society. The actors are divided, based on interviews with 
civil society activists, into five categories, including youth, women, the business sector, the 
religious sector, and the media. In addition, the relationship between civil society and locals, 
as well as the interaction between the civil society and the Thai state will be discussed. 
Finally, we will end this chapter by drawing a direct comparison among areas with different 
levels of violence to find out how much impact the ongoing conflict and violence had on 
political participation through civil society.  
 
 
Civil society organizations in conflict areas of the Deep South 
 
 
 Civil society in the Deep South has passed through several stages of development 
since the re-emergence of violence in 2004. The development of the Deep South’s civil 




local-led CSOs, and the expansion of a civil society network. When the conflict and violence 
resumed in the Far South in 2004, it frightened people in the Far South at all levels, including 
civil society activists who worked in the conflict areas. Due to the dangerous situation and 
violent incidents, many civil society activists had to suspend their activities. Some civil 
society activists who came from other areas returned home and some local civil society 
activists faced difficulties to carry out their activities because of safety reasons
236
. 
Simultaneously, the unexpected expansion of violence created fear and suspicion among local 
people. So, most of them chose not to take part in civil society activities and had little 
communication with outsiders and strangers
237
. Therefore, during the very beginning period 
of the violence, the risk of violent incidents was so high that some civil society activists and 
local Malay-Muslims had high barriers to participate in civil society organizations.  
Since the upsurge of conflict and violence triggered panic, especially among locals, 
there were rarely CSOs that had a local origin established during this period
238
. The CSOs in 
the Deep South that functioned during the first few years after the renewed violence were 
mostly expert-led CSOs. The expert-led CSOs in this study referred to organizations that 
were led and/or operated by someone with expertise in a specific field and practical 
knowledge and experience to support civil society activities. Since the increase of violent 
incidents impeded many political activities in the conflict areas, political participation 
through civil society during the first few years of the renewed violence were generally started 
by CSOs based outside the conflict areas, such as in Bangkok. For example, the Local 
Development Institute (LDI), a Canadian-funded national non-governmental organization 
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(NGO) founded in Bangkok in 1991
239
, arranged a conference on the violence in the southern 
border provinces in Bangkok on 7 March 2004, just two months after the gun robbery 
incident. There were many academics and CSOs in Bangkok who participated and 
brainstormed in the conference
240
; the Cross Cultural Foundation, a Bangkok based NGOs 
founded in 2002 by Somchai Homla-or, a renowned Thai human rights defender, expanded 
its activities to cover the human rights issue in the Deep South from the beginning of the 
renewed conflict.  
There were also expert-led organizations established that were based in the conflict 
areas of the southern border provinces. The establishment of CSOs in the conflict areas 
during the beginning period of the renewed violence was mostly initiated by professional 
civil society activists and academics both in the area and from other regions. For example, 
Deep South Watch (DSW), a non-profit organization based at the Prince of Songkhla 
University, Pattani Campus, was established in 2006 by a group of academics and 
professionals in political science, public health, and journalism. The DSW aimed at 
expanding political space for all actors, rather than the Thai state and the separatists, to 
express their views through non-violent methods. 
The conflict and violence in the Deep South that brought thousands of lives to violent 
deaths raised concerns not only to people and civil society activists in Thailand, but also to 
international organizations, such as the World Bank, European Union, USAID, UNDP, 
UNICEF, the Asia Foundation, the Asia Resource Foundation (ARF), Amnesty International, 
the Nippon Foundation, Oxfam International, and the Sasakawa peace foundation. These 
international organizations supported many projects in the Deep South in a variety of fields. 
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Funds from international organizations were considered another important financial source 
for the CSOs working on the Deep South issue. Compared with other regions in the country, 




 Support from international organizations came in different forms. Some international 
organizations only gave financial support to local CSOs to carry out their activities in the 
conflict areas; some international organizations initiated and operated projects in the Deep 
South and hired local people to work as local project coordinators for them. For example, the 
Asian Resource Foundation (ARF), which was established in 1996 and headquartered in 
Bangkok, opened a branch in Pattani in 2005 and employed a Muslim law graduate, Pattama 
Hamingma, to work as its project coordinator (Thai Journalist Association News, 7 July 
2007). The ARF-Pattani runs many programs relating to peace and community development, 
such as the inter-faith dialogue, the establishment of a community learning center, and a 
healing program for youth in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.  
The support of the expert-led organizations during the beginning period of the 
renewed conflict and violence in the Deep South brought knowledge and professional 
expertise to local people in several fields. The transfer of knowledge and expertise generated, 
either directly or indirectly, valuable asset for local people to be able to constitute a civil 
society group of their own. The development brought forward the next stage of the civil 
society development, that is, the expansion of the local-led CSOs in the Deep South. The 
local-led CSOs in this study applies to CSOs that originated in the Deep South and/or are led 
by local people, who may or may not have formal education but are motivated to engage in 
public activities.  
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Although some local civil society activists lacked formal education, the capability to 
form a civil society group and arrange public activities could come from different sources of 
knowledge. Some local activists gained knowledge from participating in the expert-led civil 
society activities, as either local activists or receivers. The experiences of voluntary 
participation in the expert-led organizations strengthened capabilities of local people to carry 
out public works for their own communities. Some local activists received knowledge and 
developed their political skills through their own accumulated experiences of involuntary 
participation, such as participating in the justice system and taking part in government 
recovery programs for victims of the conflict and violence, as we will see below. 
The conflict and violence affected local people in different ways. Some people in 
conflict areas became passive, seldom expressed themselves and infrequently participated in 
political activities, whereas some people turned their experiences of conflict and violence to 
motivation of participation and became active agents of change in the community (Saeed 
2016: 168-169). An increase of local-led CSOs established by victims of the conflict and 
violence in the Deep South demonstrates the latter statement. For example, the Duayjai 
Group, a human rights organization, was founded by Anchana Heemmina and Pattama 
Heemmina in Songkhla in 2010. They were local entrepreneurs from Saba Yoi district of 
Songkhla province and had no interest in human rights problems in the Deep South. After a 
family member was arrested and detained in a security-related case in 2008, they fought 
against many difficulties for justice for their family member before the court dismissed his 
case in 2010 (Prachatai, 7 March 2016). With the experience and political skills they had 
learned from participating in the justice system, they then founded the Duayjai group to 
provide advice to families of detainees and help them to get through the justice process. Thus 




and violence changed victims, easily affected by violent incidents, to strong civil society 
activists, and turned involuntary participation to voluntary participation. The victims-became-
activists transformed the negative experiences of conflict and violence into a motive for 
participation in civil society.  
Consequently, the prolonged conflict and violence in the Deep South indirectly 
encouraged the growth of local-led organizations in the conflict areas. Civil society 
organizations run by local Malay-Muslims in the three southern most provinces of Thailand 
gradually increased and became more important actors in motivating local people to 
participate in civil society activities
242
. However, local civil society activists could be 
challenged by the skepticism of both the state and community members. Some local-led 
CSOs were occasionally viewed by the Thai state as dissident groups that opposed the power 
of the state
243
. So, some local people might not feel safe to take part in civil society activities 
because they were afraid of being misunderstood by state authorities. On the contrary, other 
state-funded local-led CSOs were considered by some community members as a proxy of the 
Thai state. So, some locals, especially those who had negative perceptions of the Thai state, 
felt hesitant to participate with the state-funded CSOs
244
. A student activist from Yala said,  
I do not take part with some CSOs. They received big amounts of money from the 
government to arrange activities, such as conferences and public forums. I do not believe that 
they are promoting public opinions. I believe their activities were rather for promoting the 
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Even though the relationships between Malay-Muslims and civil society could be 
considered better than the relationships between Malay-Muslims and the Thai state, the 
feelings of insecurity and the suspicion towards the roles and objectives of civil society 
impeded some local people in the conflict areas from participating in and cooperating with 
CSOs. 
Moreover, although most public activities of the local-led CSOs were considered by 
some civil society activists to be more effective when they were more localized to better 
serve the needs of local people
246
, the local-led CSOs in the Deep South were small and 
dispersed. Some local CSOs preferred to act on their own and they had insufficient 
cooperation with other organizations
247
. The scattering of CSOs made civil society in the 
Deep South weak and could limited its ability to create strong collective power of people. 
However, the issue of a dispersed and ineffective civil society was increasingly recognized by 
many activists who worked on the ongoing conflict and violence agenda
248
. After the 2010s, a 
civil society networks gradually emerged and increased. One of the leading and pioneering 
founders of a civil society network was the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand. 
The idea to found the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand was initiated by senior 
civil society activists, both Thai-Buddhists and Malay-Muslims, from Bangkok and the Deep 
South, who realized the problem of a dispersed and weak civil society in the Deep South. 
With the agreement of twenty CSOs, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand 
was then formed on 21 July 2011 with the aims to, firstly, enhance the capability of civic 
organizations, secondly, to have a common resolution for the ongoing conflict and violence 
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and sustainable development, thirdly, to exchange knowledge and experiences, and lastly, to 
create more public spaces
249
.  
However, some local civil society activists perceived the Civil Society Council of 
Southernmost Thailand as a government-friendly organization, which mean it received 
support from, among others, the Thai government and might have different perceptions on 
the conflict in the Deep South from other local CSOs
250
. The Civil Society Network for Peace 
(Kor Por Sor) was then established in 2013 by Tuwaedaniya Tuwaemaengae, President of a 
local CSO Lembaga Patani Raya untuk kedamaian dan pembangunan (The Academy of 
Patani Raya for Peace and Development or Lempar). The Kor Por Sor includes eighteen local 
CSOs in the Deep South to pursue its goal in promoting local interests and protecting the 
human rights of Patani people (Deep South Watch, 28 February 2016). In addition, the 
Women’s Agenda for Peace (PAW), a network of those CSOs led by female activists, also 
emerged from an agglomerate of 23 women oriented CSOs in the restive Deep South in 2015 
to promote peace through non-violent methods (Deep South Watch, 28 April 2016). 
CSOs in the Deep South were strengthened and able to engage in the policy-making 
process more effectively through the expansion of the CSO networks. There was more 
collaboration among CSOs and they could draw in a wider group of individuals to take part in 
civil society activities. However, despite the increasing number of civil society networks and 
CSOs in the Far South, many civil society activists were familiar faces, who worked for 
several CSOs at the same time
251
. There were concerns that if civil society in the Deep South 
was led by only a certain limited group of people, mostly middle class, it limited access to 
grassroots participation, and policies represented by civil society were likely to be opposed 
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by local people, who did not gain access to participate in civil society activities. One 
university student activist in Pattani who often participated in seminars and conferences on 
the Deep South problem stated: 
When I attend conferences, seminars, or workshops on the problem of the Deep South, I 
always see a similar group of people who arrange and attend the events. I frequently 
participated in civil society activities because I like to learn from professional perspectives. 
However, I am also curious and concerned if there are only a limited group of participants and 
activists, how can they have a great impact on our society?
252
 
 In addition, civil society in the Deep South rarely expanded its network beyond the 
region. Without the participation and support of people from other regions, who are majority 
in the country, neither civil society nor the state will be able to develop a smooth path to 
peace.  As one local civil society activist in a conflict area of Songkhla put it, 
It does not matter how hard we (civil society activists) work in our own community as long as 
the majority of the country do not agree with our non-violent means. There still are some 
groups of people, especially those who live outside the conflict zone, who do not understand 
the background and nature of the conflict here (the Malay-Muslim provinces) and prefer the 
Thai military to apply violent methods to end the prolonged conflict. We need to make them 
(people in other regions) understand and help us in opposing violent methods from both 
militants and the Thai military
253
. 
Civil society in the conflict areas of the southernmost provinces of Thailand has made 
a lot of progress since the renewed conflict and violence in 2004. Knowledge and the know-
how of the expert-led CSOs were transferred to local people through their political 
participation in civil society during the first stage of civil society development. The second 
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stage demonstrated the efficiency of the local civil society activists, who applied political 
skills they learned from the experts and from direct experience of forced/involuntary 
participation, in helping other victims and making change for their communities. Now, civil 
society has reached a third stage of development, in which many expert and local 
organizations collaborate and have gathered into a network. The next stage of development, 
which has not yet come, could be the creation of national civil society coalitions or networks 
around the country. When more people participate, it will create mutual trust and 
understanding among individuals that are likely lead to political integration in a diverse 
society.  
The ongoing conflict and violence brought many academics, and professional civil 
society actors, as well as funding organizations into the conflict areas in the Deep South. The 
increasing activities of expert-led CSOs in the conflict areas gradually developed the political 
skills of local people in civil society activities. The CSOs educated the local citizens to 
realize about their rights and duties as a citizen, encouraged them to participate in public 
activities, taught them to work with other people, and trained them to be more confident in 
expressing their views to others. Thus, the development of these organizations contributed to 
an overall increase in people’s participation in civil society activities, as both activists and 
participants. 
In the following section, we will look more closely at five different groups of civil 
society actors, starting with the youth, women, business, religious leaders, to the media, in 
order to explore their roles in political participation during conflict and violence and look at 







 political participation in civil society 
 
 Young Malay-Muslims have played important political roles in the Deep South since 
the late 1960s, when many student-led organizations such as the Thai Muslim Student 
Association (TMSA), the Selatan group, and the PNYS group, were established and became 
very active in political movements, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3. Some students who took 
part in civil society activities during that time became important civil society activists after 
the re-emergence of violence in 2004. For example, Muhammad Ayub Pathan, a prominent 
social activist in the Far South, was a former president of the Yala Young Muslim group and 
participated in the Hijab movement in 1987. He continued his career as member of the local 
media and participated in many civil society activities. He was a co-founder of the Deep 
South Watch and became the second President of the Civil Society Council of the Southern 
Border Provinces in 2016.  
 Based on my fieldwork in Songkhla and Pattani and follow-up observations of 
university students I interviewed, youth political participation in civil society in the Deep 
South was complex. Normally, youth are a politically sensitive group that might easily be 
convinced to join militant groups
255
. Some Malay-Muslim youth were induced by drugs or 
money to join violent operations. Two interviewees in Pattani revealed that they were offered 
a hundred thousand baht by their Malay-Muslim friends who became militants to take part in 
violent operations when they were high-school students
256
. Another interviewee from the 
conflict areas of Songkhla revealed that “I had friend who was a drug addict, he was enticed 
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to become addicted to drugs and to then join a separatist group when he was 16-17 years old. 
Since he decided to join, I do not hear about him anymore.
257
” 
Some were persuaded by the ideologies of Patani nationalism and religious belief
258
. 
The latter group was often selected from the intelligent and well-behaved students. They were 
trained to be intellectuals of the separatist groups who will be responsible for planning and 
expanding the group ideology to wider groups of sympathizers and supporters, both local and 
international
259
. One of the students who was asked to join the insurgents said,  
He (the militant) came and talked to me about the great history of Patani. Then, he invited me 
to be a part of the fight for independence of Patani. I told him that I wanted to fight for my 
Patani but I had my own way of fighting. My weapon was a pen, not a gun
260
.   
So, although there was concern with Malay-Muslim youths being vulnerable and 
naive, there still were many young Malay-Muslims who were politically active but not 
convinced easily by the militants. Many of them strongly opposed violent methods and 
participated in non-violent activities of CSOs. One of the most important factors influencing 
young Malay-Muslims to participate actively in civil society was education. The success of 
the 1975 Protest in Pattani and the leading roles of university students in the protest inspired 
many Malay-Muslim families in the Deep South to send their children to study further at 
university level. The number of Malay-Muslim university students admitted both in relative 
and absolute terms increased after the renewed violence in 2004. As shown in  
Figure 6-1, the number of university students from the three southernmost provinces 
at Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, suddenly increased by a large amount in 
2004 and 2005. The number of students from Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat almost doubled 
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each year, from 564 students in 2003 to 963 students in 2004, to 1,641 students in 2005, and 
grew further to 2,265 in 2012. 
 
Figure 6-1: Number of university students at Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani 
Campus, between 2000 and 2012 
 
 




 The ongoing conflict indirectly provided opportunities for Malay-Muslim youths to 
study in Thai universities more easily. For example, the SBPAC provided a scholarship 
program to 1,615 students in the restive Deep South, who failed the universities’ regular 
admissions in 2016 to study in both public and private universities, such as Kasetsart 
University, Chiangmai University, Prince of Songkhla University, Hatyai University, and 
Bangkok University
261
. Studying at the university level not only built knowledge, but also 
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confidence and political skills in Malay-Muslim youths, which are needed to participate in 
political activities, and could support an increase of political participation among the Deep 
South youths. 
 Although it is generally accepted that education is a key driver of political 
participation (Almond and Verba 1963 and Hillygus 2005), motivation from experiencing 
conflict and violence also plays an important role in encouraging participation. The 
interviews showed that university students in the same course could possibly have different 
perceptions on political participation. The different experiences of conflict and violence led 
to different decisions of political participation in civil society. The different decisions 
involved not only a choice of participation or not participation, but also a choice of which 
type of CSOs they wanted to participate with.  
From interview data, I would like to raise three interesting sample cases of university 
students, studying in the same faculty of a university in Pattani. The first student (student A) 
is a Malay-Muslim from a high violent conflict district of Yala province. He had direct 
experience of aggressive action by the Thai military when he was a high school student. He 
said his experience from that day has changed his political attitude. 
 I was having lunch at my relative’s home when a group of soldiers came into the house and 
shouted for the owner of the motorcycle (that was parked in front of the house). I said that 
motorcycle was mine. The soldiers then hit me on the back and dragged me to a military truck 
without asking more questions. I was so scared and desperate because I always heard that 
many people had changed lives after returning from the military camp
262
. Luckily, my 
relative came in time and asked a military officer for the reason for arresting me. The military 
officer said a suspect of a shooting nearby drove the same model as me so they had to arrest 
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 According to the interview, this student believed that Malay-Muslim suspects, who were 
arrested in the military camp, had a high chance of being tortured during investigations and when they 
were released, they might be handicapped and unable to live their life properly. Some might be 




all people they found having a similar model of motorcycle for interrogation. Fortunately, I 
was released and did not have to go to the military camp, a place I was scared of the most
263
.  
 He said it was the first time he started to think about the rights of citizens and that 
experience triggered his desire for political participation.  
 After that day, I had questions about the rights of citizens. Despite living in a democratic 
country, I did not feel that democracy in Thailand truly existed. I was very upset and angry 
with that military officer, who hit and shouted at me, but that experience made me want to 
learn and participate more in politics. I wanted to find out if there were other ways to lessen 
the conflict and violence without using aggressive actions
264
.  
When he had to choose a workplace for his internship, he chose to be an intern at a 
legal aid group in Yala. Although working as internship at a legal aid group did not directly 
relate to what he was studying and his lecturer mildly disagreed with his choice, he said  
I learned many unexpected stories during my internship, which I would never know from only 
studying in the university. I saw many local people were suffering from human rights 
violations and experiencing difficulties accessing the legal system. I wanted to use my 
knowledge to help them and work for my society. I believed knowledge was my best weapon 
to fight for my community
265
. 
After student A graduated, he decided to participate through the state and became a 
policeman. His case supports a major assumption of this thesis, that experiences of conflict 
and violence did not prevent some people from the conflict areas from participation. Instead, 
the experiences of conflict and violence inspired them to participate non-violently and help 
their hometown. As student A mentioned, “I believe I can apply what I learned from the 
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university and my internship to help people and my negative experiences from some state 
authorities reminded me to do things better
266
.”  
The second student (student B) was from a high violent conflict district of Narathiwat 
province. He was once a drug addict and at that time he was urged to join a separatist group. 
A turning point of his life that inspired his desire to political participation was when he 
witnessed his uncle being arrested by the Thai military at his home.  
The Thai military came into my house and arrested my uncle. He was hit and left bleeding. 
Although I was only 12, I knew it was wrong that the state authorities abused a citizen like 
this. After my uncle was arrested, I took note of the date he was arrested and kept every bit of 
news about him. I felt sad and depressed every time I visited him in prison. He was locked up 
in chains and I had to talk to him through a glass wall.  Because of this experience, I began to 
be interested in politics and Patani
267
.   
Student B grew up in a family that believed in Patani self-determination and his 
family members were very active in non-violent activities relating to the Patani movement. 
He developed his strong patriotic Patani nationalism from a very young age. When being 
asked during an interview, where are you from? , normally, students would answer with the 
name of their province (such as Yala, Pattani, or Narathiwat). Student B said “I am a Patani-




His negative experience from the unjust treatment of the Thai military stirred up his 
Patani nationalistic sentiments and feeling of opposition to the Thai state but he believed 
violent means were not the only way to fight for Patani. As he said, “I believed both gun and 










pen are important (to win the fight for Patani). (Using) a gun can be just a bridge but (using) a 
pen can take us to the destination (of Patani self-determination).”
269
  
He decided to participate in one of the biggest student groups in the Deep South when 
he was in high-school, and became a leading member of the group. He also, together with his 
friends, established a student organization in Pattani and participated in many political 
activities to promote the concept of self-determination. However, since he was very active in 
political activities for Patani self-determination, he was closely watched by the Thai state and 
believed he was on the blacklist of the Thai military. Although he strongly believed in non-
violent methods of participation, he said, “I will not change (my political ideology and non-
violent method). However, if my political spaces were closed in the future, I could not 
guarantee that I probably would have to find another way, probably a violent one.”
270
 
The third student (student C) is a Malay-Muslim university student from one of the 
most frequent violent incidents district of Yala. However, his village had a good relationship 
with the Thai military and he never witnessed or had direct experience of military abuse.  
Unlike many Malay-Muslims that had a deep distrust of the Thai state, he had a positive 
perception of the roles of the military and other state authorities in the Deep South. He 
became a student activist when he was in high-school in Yala. When he entered university, he 
still took part in many public activities. He shared his feeling that participation at the 
university somehow made him feel a little more afraid than when he participated in school 
activities in his hometown.  
When I participated at the University Student Union, some extremist Malay-Muslim students 
asked me why I had to help students from other regions, why I became friend with Thai-
Buddhists. I have been told that some Thai-Buddhist Union member even received a 








threatening notice to quit a position from an anonymous student. Although my hometown had 
frequent violent incidents, I felt less frightened at home than at the university
271
.  
After he graduated, he decided to participate in a student organization and became a 
leading member of the group. His organization, comprising university students from several 
universities in the Deep South, promoted multicultural collaborations and opposed all forms 
of violence. The organization is partially funded by the SBPAC. However, being supported 
by the military brought about some difficulties in drawing participation from some Malay-
Muslim youths.  
Some Malay-Muslim youths did not trust our group and perceived that we are a cat’s paw of 
the military. So, they sometimes felt hesitant to participate with us. In addition, some junior 




Political participation of student C was shaped and encouraged by his positive 
perceptions of the Thai state. A respondent indicated that some people generalize the Malay-
Muslims as adversaries of the Thai state and believe they would never cooperate with Thai 
people
273
. The case of student C indicates that their assumption is wrong. There are Malay-
Muslims who are not discouraged by the conflict and violence and show their great desire to 
participate with the Thai state and work together through civil society activities in order to 
promote pluralism in the Deep South. Yet they often face resistance from other Malay-
Muslims who question their motives. 
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The youth organizations in the Deep South seemed to be polarized between those 
funded by the Thai state and those not funded by state institutions. The two distinct groups 
had different political opinions and they were difficult to merge. The divergent standpoints 
among youth groups might discourage political participation of some people who do not wish 
to take sides, or at least do not want to show their stance. In conflict areas, expressing 
political opinions might be sensitive and risky. Participating in some youth groups would 
imply that participants supported or did not support the state. When their choices of 
participation could be dangerous, some might be afraid that participation might bring them 
more harm than good. They then decided not to participate
274
.  
The examples of the three Malay-Muslim university students from the conflict areas 
of the Deep South illustrate that the different experiences of conflict and violence differently 
affected their political participation. Student A had direct experience of aggressive treatment 
by the military. Although it was not a serious case, the incident left a deep scar on his mind. 
On the one hand, the experience with aggressive state authorities made him afraid so he 
wanted to keep a low profile. On the other hand, the incident, which he considered as a 
human rights abuse, caused him to question his own rights as a Thai citizen. Due to 
considering himself at high risk of being a suspect, he then chose to participate in a human 
rights organization and quietly help local people’s cases of human rights violations without 
public recognition. Student B had a negative experience with the Thai state; he did not 
confront the military himself. He decided to join a political student organization and acted 
openly as a leading member to promote self-determination of Patani and demonstrate against 
the state’s human rights violations. While the former two students had incentive to participate 
from negative experiences toward the Thai state, student C, who did not have direct 
experience of the state’s abuse, turned positive attitudes toward the Thai state to participation 
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in a state-funded organization. The three sample cases are not meant to be definitive, but are 
intended to illustrate different patterns of political participation that occur from different 
experiences of conflict and violence.  
In addition, the youth political participation in the Deep South might lead us to re-
think about the involvement of religion, that “Malayness was no longer a sufficient ground 
for galvanizing resistance to the Thai state” (Askew 2010: 127) and the only effective focus 
of the movement against the Thai state was “religious in nature” (Askew 2010: 128). 
According to interviews, while many students of the Malay-speaking provinces now accepted 
that they were Thais, some students strongly insisted that they were Patanians and they 
participated in civil society organizations to demand, if not independence, the revival of their 
culture, language, and history
275
.  Askew may be right that religion could cause conflict and 
violence in the Deep South. However, the strong desire of Patanian people to call for Patani 
self-determination is still fundamental and increasing and that desire motivated some youths 
to participate in CSO’s activities. 
According to interviews, participation and cooperation between the Thai-Buddhist 
and Malay-Muslim youths needed some improvement. A negative attitude among the youths 
of different religions could impede some youths from political participation and contribute to 
the conflict. A Malay-Muslim stated that some Muslims were indoctrinated since they were 
young to believe that Thai-Buddhists are bad. So, there were some Muslims that do not like 
Thai-Buddhists at all. He said 
Even in my faculty, most Muslim students tended to vote for a Muslim to be a president of the 
faculty and try to convince other Muslim students not to vote for a Thai-Buddhist. I am 
Muslim but I do not agree and do not like the idea. It closed the door for the Thai-Buddhists 
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to participate in student activities and prove themselves. I think this caused more problems 
and conflict and I want this negative attitude of hatred to be changed
276
.  
 The ongoing conflict and violence have increasingly obstructed political participation 
combining people of different religions. Another villager from Thepha district said, “although 
I have Muslim friends, we do not talk about violent issues. I have to be more careful when 
talking to my Muslim friends. So, we mostly do not participate in the same activities and are 
not members of the same civil society group
277
.” 
Students’ participation in civil society had influence not only within their groups but 
also on the wider community. According to interviews, most local people preferred to 
participate with student activists rather than other activists or state authorities
278
. University 
students were respected and admired by local people. A student activist in Pattani mentioned,   
Most Malay-Muslims in the Deep South have low education. Many of them are unemployed 
and were urged easily to join rebel groups. Graduating M.6 [primary school] is regarded as 
high. So, youths who graduated with a bachelor degree were considered as very high in the 
eyes of most local Malay-Muslims in the Deep South.  So, when these youths spoke to them 
(local people), they tended to listen
279
. 
Local people believed local student activists could be trusted. These youths are like 
their children who wanted to develop their community. Some locals believed students would 
not betray them so they could openly discuss and express their opinions to these students
280
. 
Although participation between local people and student activists seemed to be positive, 
cooperation and participation among student groups with different ideologies are still rare. 
                                                          
276
 Interview, a Malay-Muslim university student in Pattani, November 2012. 
277
 Interview, a Malay-Muslim university student in Songkhla, February 2013. 
278
 Interview, university students in Songkhla and Pattani, February and March 2013. 
279
 Interview, a student activist in Pattani, February 2013. 
280




The conflict and violence built a sense of belonging for the younger generation and motivated 
them to participate in civil society activities during conflict and violence. However, the 
different backgrounds and accumulated experiences the youths have added along the way as 
they grew up differently impacted their participation with CSOs. 
 
Women’s political participation in civil society 
 
 Political participation through civil society of women in the Deep South tremendously 
increased after the re-emergence of conflict and violence in 2004 (Saowarot and Utit 2016). 
According to a report by the King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2013), there were at least 136 
southern border provinces women’s network organizations.  In the past, Malay-Muslim 
women in southern Thailand generally did not participate in political affairs. They remained 
mostly at home and took care of housework
281
. Since 2004, the conflict and violence has 
unexpectedly changed the roles of Malay-Muslim women as they have become more active 
in public activities.  
 As discussed earlier in the previous section, as soon as the conflict and violence was 
renewed in 2004, many CSOs in the Deep South during the first few years of violence were 
expert-led organizations. Local people’s abilities were developed through civil society 
activities where they took part as participants, recipients, or local project coordinators. When 
the skills of locals were developed, there emerged an increasing number of CSOs of the 
locals, by the locals, for the locals. The emergence and expansion of women CSOs in the 
conflict areas of the southern border provinces also followed this pattern.  
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During the first few years of the renewed violence, there were notable women civil 
society activists, both Buddhists and Muslims, working during the conflict and violence, such 
as Angkhana Neelapaijit, a Thai-Muslim woman rights activists and wife of missing Muslim 
lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit; Pornpen Kongkajornkiat, a human rights activist from Bangkok; 
Chidchanok Rahimmula, a well-known political scientist from Prince of Songkhla 
University; Naree Charoenpholpiriya, a National Reconciliation Commission Member and a 
Thai-Buddhist non-violence trainer; and Soraya Chamchuri, a Malay-Muslim civil society 
activist who graduated with a Master Degree from Chulalongkorn University.   
 The prolonged conflict and violence directly and indirectly harmed many families in 
the Deep South. Some family members were killed and some were arrested. Many women in 
the conflict areas became indirect victims, having lost family members and experienced 
emotional and economic suffering (Saeed 2016: 171). The situation forced them to participate 
in the Thai political system involuntarily. Some wives had to take part through the legal 
system to fight for justice for their husbands; some mothers had to contact state authorities 
for financial remedies for the deaths of their sons, and some widows had to join healing and 
occupational development programs, which were provided by both state agencies and non-
governmental organizations, domestic and international
282
.  
Involuntary participation produced more knowledge and political skills for local 
women. Some women who were once victims of the violence employed their knowledge and 
experience to help other women who faced similar fates. The involuntary participation of 
some women then turned to voluntary participation in civil society. For example, Yaenah 
Salaemae, whose son was detained due to the Takbai incident, lost her husband who was 
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killed during the unrest in the Deep South. Due to her poverty, she finished just Year 4 (Por 
4) of primary school. She could hardly understand or speak Thai but the unfortunate 
circumstances and her love for her son pushed her to fight for justice for him. She 
participated in the legal system in her son’s case and helped other Malay-Muslims, who could 
not understand Thai at all, to translate in court or in communication with lawyers. After 
prosecutors withdraw cases in November 2006, she continued to help other victims by 
volunteering to work as a civil society activist for her community in order to provide relief to 
those affected by violence. She later received the Woman Protecting Human Rights Award in 
2007 (Thitinob 2013: 76-97). 
Moreover, since women were not direct targets of militants and were not suspected by 
the Thai security forces, they faced lower risks in participating in political activities than 
Malay-Muslim men. Low risk for women’s participation associated with high incentives for 
some who were already under pressure and were ready to fight for better lives for their 
families and neighborhood, led to an increase in women’s political participation in the Deep 
South. A female Buddhist journalist, who has worked in the Deep South since the re-
emergence of violence in 2004 said that there are a greater number of Malay-Muslim women 
who have become active in CSOs activities. Many of them work as female representatives in 
contacting state authorities on sensitive issues. She further explained that; 
Malay-Muslim women in the Deep South nowadays have greater roles than Malay-Muslim 
men in many areas. We can see many female activists, such as Rosida Pusu, a local journalist 
and Chairwoman of the Southern Women’s Peace Network to Stop Violence, and Patimoh 
Poh-etae-dao, director of WePeace, the women's advocacy group. Many women activists 




They started from consoling other women as friends who experienced the same fate. Then 
they expanded their roles and women networks were created
283
.  
Women’s participation in civil society in the Lower South was not limited to Malay-
Muslim women; there were also local Thai-Buddhist female activists, who were very active 
in civil society. For example, Som Kosaiyakanon, a Thai-Buddhist widow from Yala 
province, lost her husband, Pol. Maj. Krao Kosaiyanon, as he was killed in an ambush in 
2004. After recovering from severe trauma, she took part in treatment programs provided by 
both the state and by non-state organizations. Participating in those activities made her realize 
the problems of unjust treatment and difficulties in political participation for some women, 
especially those Malay-Muslim women who were poor and could not understand Thai. She 
then established a provincial association for widows in Yala to aid mentally challenged and 
poor widows, both Thai-Buddhists and Malay-Muslims. Although she graduated only from 
primary school, she became a well-known civil society activist in the Far South. She worked 
as a leader of the Yala group of those affected by conflict and violence and as a leading 
member of the Civic Women’s Network in the southern border provinces (Thitinob 2013: 99-
107). 
 Although some studies believed people with high SES are more likely to participate in 
politics (Campbell et al. 1960, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, and Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995), women’s political participation through civil society in conflict areas of the 
Deep South demonstrated a different pattern. In spite of an increasing level of female 
education in the Deep South, as shown in Figure 6-2, a number of women in the Deep South 
who took part in civil society activities were poor and could not afford to study, as 
demonstrated by at least the two examples of Yaenah and Som.  
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Figure 6-2: Percentage of female population 10 years of age and over can read and write 
Thai language  
 
 
Source: The National Statistical Office of Thailand  
 
 Figure 6-2 shows the rapid development of female education in the Deep South 
during the 2000s. In 2000, the numbers of females in the Deep South who could read and 
write Thai were considerably lower than the national average and other provinces in the 
region. There were only 75.79%, 74.16%, and 70.35% of women in Yala, Pattani, and 
Narathiwat, respectively, who had literacy in Thai, whereas almost 90% of women in other 
provinces had ability to read and write Thai language. However, education in the Deep South 
for women developed rapidly during the 2000s. Consequently, the percentage of literacy of 
women in the Deep South in 2010 significantly increased, to a higher rate than the national 
average, except in Pattani, where female civil society groups are highly active
284
. 
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 Interview, a university lecturer in Pattani, March 2013. 
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 When considering the rising levels of education among women, it is noteworthy, as 
we see in  
 
Figure 6-3 below, that increasing literacy has not yet led to equality in higher education. 
 
Figure 6-3: Percentage of female population 3 years of age and over by educational 
attainment in 2010 
 
 
Source: The National Statistical Office of Thailand  
 
 Although the percentage of literacy generally developed, the numbers of females in 
the Deep South studying in higher education were still lower than national average. 
Narathiwat, which has the highest percentage of female literacy, actually has the lowest rate 
of females attaining higher education, at only 7.61%, compared to 15.28% in Songkhla, as 
shown in Figure 6-3. 
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In the conflict areas, education might not a key factor influencing women’s 
participation. One of the most important factors affecting women’s participation was instead 
grievances from conflict and violence that turned into an emotional incentive. The conflict 
and violence meant many lives were at stake. Thus, the conflict and violence acted as a 
powerful force for political participation and provided more opportunities for women to build 
a better future for their families and communities through the collective action of civil 
society. 
 However, some Malay-Muslim women experienced difficulties in participating 
through civil society. Although women’s status is increasingly accepted in Thai society, the 
interviews from field research revealed that there still were problems of discrimination 
between men and women on some occasions. One Muslim female activist mentioned that she 
experienced, more than one time, some Malay-Muslim female activists participating in public 
conferences being insulted by some Muslim males, who believed a woman having leading 
role in society was wrong according to their religious beliefs
285
.  
Gender is a crucial factor in political participation, especially in Malay-Muslim 
society. When most channels of participation seemed to be limited for women’s participation, 
political participation through civil society is, other than voting, the only real means of 
participation for most women.  Although accepting Muslim female leadership roles would be 
uncomfortable for some Muslim males, encouraging the greater participation of women in 
conflict areas is very important and beneficial to all parties in the conflict agenda. This is 
because firstly, women are neither direct targets of the insurgents nor the main suspects of the 
military. According to interviews, there has not yet been a report of Malay-Muslim female 
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militants in the Deep South
286
. The risks of political participation were considered lower than 
for Malay-Muslim males, while women’s grievances from conflict and violence are high. 
Secondly, women have unusual capabilities. They can be seen as both strong and submissive, 
effective and harmless. Their non-violent involvement can easily get support and trust from 
both the state and local people. So, female political participation has the potential to draw 
more involvement from other actors in conflict areas.  
 
Business sector political participation  
 
 Although strictly speaking perhaps not part of civil society, generally, business 
organizations act as intermediaries between the state and business owners and have an 
important role in decision making processes, provincial and national. A representative of a 
business organization in Pattani further explained that  
We (a business organization) do not only work as a conciliator between private sectors but 
also as a representative of the business sector in solving economic problems with local 
government in our province. We also participate in many steering committees, including on 
economic, social, and even security issues
287
. 
For the southernmost provinces of Thailand, before the renewed violence, there were 
not many business organizations in the region
288
. Most of them, such as provincial chapters of 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industry, and the Tourism Business 
Association in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, were established and active in business policies 
many years before the unrest in 2004.  
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The renewed conflict and violence directly affected business in the conflict areas of 
the southern border provinces of Thailand. The economic zones in urban areas of the three 
provinces were often targets of the violent incidents. For example, Mueang district of Yala, a 
provincial capital and business center of Yala province had 1,229 violent incidents between 
January 2004 and January 2014, the highest rate among all districts of the three southern 
border provinces (Nurseeta et. al. 2014: 41). Many businesses, mostly owned by Chinese-
Buddhists and Thai-Buddhists, had to close or re-locate to other regions. Although there are 
meetings and discussions of members within a business organization regarding the conflict 
and violence, a business representative accepted that the security problem is beyond his 
organization’s capability to manage.  
We, as a business organization, have a major role in building confidence for businesses. There 
are two kinds of confidence needed in conflict areas, which are economic confidence and 
security confidence. We can more or less handle economic confidence but it is a state duty to 
build up security confidence for us. If the state fails to protect us, we cannot do anything. We 
cannot guarantee our members that their business will be safe. We cannot convince them 
(business owners) to stay on. It is beyond our control. So, we need to participate with the state 
and work together to build up both confidences for our members
289
. 
The move-out of many Buddhist business owners in turn opened more opportunities 
for local Malay-Muslims to run businesses in their hometowns. Due to an increase of Malay-
Muslim entrepreneurs, there were newly established Malay-Muslim business organizations, 
such as the Muslim Trading Association of Narathiwat (MTAN), Yala Muslim Business 
Association (YMBA), and the Federation of Malay-speaking Muslim Businessmen in 
Southern Border Provinces.  
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However, the ongoing conflict and violence caused suspicions even within business 
organizations. A representative of a business organization in Pattani told that even though his 
organization does not have many Malay-Muslim members, there were feelings of suspicions 
among committee members of his organization. To avoid more conflict in the organization, 
they tended not to talk about security issues
290
. The membership process of some business 
organizations was thus very strict and careful. For example, a new member had to be 
recommended and ratified by at least two existing members of the organization. Some 
business organizations were afraid that the greater number of members would cause a higher 
risk that separatists might infiltrate the organization for malicious intentions
291
.  
 The limitations of membership could more or less lead to a low number of business 
organization members in the Deep South. For example, despite the rubber industry was one 
of the most significant economic commodities of the region, only two (out of the total 
members of 55 nationwide) rubber producers and traders in conflict areas of southern border 
provinces were members of the Thai Rubber Association
292
. Similarly, the percentage of 
members of the provincial Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of Thai Industries 
(FTI) in the three provinces was quite low compared to the numbers of enterprises and 
factories in the provinces, as shown in Table 6-1. When compared to other provinces, the 
level of political participation of the business sector in the Deep South also showed a lower 
rate than, for example, Songkhla and Satun.  In Satun, a Muslim majority province, 13.53% 
of factories are members of the FTI, whereas less than 10% of factories in the three 
southernmost provinces of Thailand are members of the FTI. 
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 For the list of the Thai Rubber Association members, see 




Table 6-1: A comparison between numbers of businesses and factories and business 
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Source:   Data on numbers of enterprises is from an annual report on the SMEs situation in 2015, the 
Office of Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion, 
http://www.sme.go.th/th/index.php/data-alert/alert/report-smes-year/report-year/report-year-
2558, accessed 3 June 2016. 
   
Data on members of provincial Chambers of Commerce is from an interview, the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce officer, November 2016 
 
Data on numbers of factories is from an annual report on industrial statistics, by Department 
of Industrial Works, http://www.diw.go.th/hawk/content.php?mode=spss59, accessed 2 June 
2016. 
 
Data on members of FTI is from www.fti.or.th 
  
.   
Overall, violence might undermine political participation and create a suppressing 
effect on affiliation with business organizations. Interestingly, when comparing the 
percentage of business organizations’ members and violent incidents in Mueang districts, the 
major economic districts of the provinces and locations of most business organizations’ 
members, the data, as shown in Figure 4, demonstrated the relationship between the conflict 






Figure 6-4:  Comparison chart of casualties of violent incidents between 2004-2014 in 
Mueang districts of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat and percentage of members of 
business organizations in the three provinces in 2015 
 
 
Remark:  The percentage of business organizations’ members shown in this chart is the sum 
of the percentage of members of the provincial Chambers of Commerce and the 
FTI in Table 2. 
Sources: The number of violent incidents was adapted from Nurseeta Phoesalae et al., 2014 
“Betong: A Pathway to Stability”, King Prajadhipok’s Institute Journal, 13(2), pp. 
41. 
 
      
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6-4, the violent incidents, among the three provinces, occurred 
most often in Mueang Yala (1,229 violent incidents), where the province had the highest rate 
of business organization members (11.32%), whereas the lowest percentage of business 
organization members was in Narathiwat (3.77%), where the violent incidents in its major 
economic district, Mueang Narathiwat, occurred least frequently, 476 violent incidents from 
2004 to 2014. In general, violence might suppress political participation, however when 
compared within the violent conflict areas, participation was higher in the areas that had more 
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Even though motivations to participate in business organizations could be complex, 
ranging from the cost of a membership fee and benefits to business opportunities, the ongoing 
conflict and violence, which caused higher risks in doing businesses, unavoidably affected 
the decision to participate of some business owners. Interestingly, although the percentage of 
business sector participation in business organizations was not high, we still can see the 
relationship between violence and participation with business organizations.  
However, whereas some business owners might consider participating in a business 
organization could strengthen their businesses through the collective power of a business 
organization, many entrepreneurs in the Deep South might disagree or disregard the 
importance of participation in business organizations. There are many explanations for the 
low participation rates of the business sector in the conflict areas of the Deep South. Firstly, 
since most business owners had personal contact with state agencies, they could directly 
approach state officials without help from business organizations. As one Thai-Buddhist 
business owner in Pattani explained, “(Business) Problems could be solved more easily and 
faster if you knew some officials personally. I preferred to contact them directly and 
personally rather than go through a long bureaucratic process.”
293
 So, most of them did not 
need business organizations to connect them with the state. Secondly, since the government 
had major policies in developing economics and supporting businesses in the Deep South, as 
this was considered to be one of the effective ways to lessen the conflict and violence, many 
economic stimulus programs were issued to boost economic development in the conflict 
areas. Whether or not the business was a member of a business organization, it could receive 
the same privileges of, for example, tax incentives, a discounted rate for business registration, 
and low rate interest loans. Thirdly, the conflict and violence brought about a relocation of 
many businesses, mostly owned by Thai-Buddhists; these departures could possibly lead to a 
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small numbers of business organization members in the conflict areas. In addition, since the 
business sector was often targeted by militants, some entrepreneurs might consider that 
participation might bring danger to their businesses. So, many of them chose not to 
participate in politics to protect their businesses from any risk of violence.  
Therefore, political participation of the business sector in the Deep South might be 
lower than political participation of other sectors, such as youth or women who had higher 
incentives to participate. Since the business sector was already supported by government 
policies, most business owners had less incentive for participating through business 
organizations. At the same time, the business organizations in the conflict areas were 
selective and careful in promoting more members to join due to the high risk of conflict from 
strangers.  So, the lower incentives and higher risks of business insecurity led to the low 
participation of the business sector in the conflict areas of the Deep South.  Put differently, 
the economic motivations that set the business sector apart from civil society also affect its 
level of participation. 
 
Religions and political participation in civil society 
 
 Generally, a religion affects everyday life of people and has an important role in 
shaping moral decisions of its followers. Religion is ingrained in a society. Some laws and 
norms of a society are based on religious beliefs. For the conflict areas of southern Thailand, 
roles of religions, both Islam and Buddhism, got much more complicated after the upsurge of 
conflict and violence in 2004. Religions were not only a shelter for those who needed 
support, but religions were also part of the conflict.  
The religious sector is very important since it is the strongest element that emphasizes 
the Malay-Muslim identity. At the same time, religion is also a key element that isolated 




considered by some scholars as one of the major causes of the conflict (Liow 2007, Wattana 
2007, and Askew 2010). Yet, religion is also a direct victim of the violence. Religious 
leaders, both Islamic and Buddhist, became symbolic targets of the conflict between the Thai-
Buddhist state and the Malay-Muslim separatists. Since 2004, there have been at least 33 
Islamic religious leaders and 27 monks and novices killed and injured
294
. 
In most Malay-Muslim communities, belief and trust in religious leaders in the Deep 
South was very high. Malay-Muslims believed in their religious leaders in almost all aspects 
of their lives, including the political dimension. As a Malay-Muslim interviewee explained in 
his interview,  
Our religion supports political participation. Most Muslims believe that you should participate 
as a civilian. The Imam is important as he is a center of information. He receives news from 
the state and outside the community and distributes it to local people. Imam is ulama [Islamic 
scholar]. He is involved in every dimension of Muslims lives whenever you feel wrong or 
uncertain, you come to ask the imam. The Imam has high influence on Muslims and he can 




Malay-Muslims often decided to ask for help from their religious leaders when they had 
trouble with state authorities. A representative from a provincial Islamic Council in the Deep 
South stated that  
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When some Malay-Muslims were threatened and abused by Thai state security officers, they 
came to the provincial Islamic Council and asked for our help.  We (religious leaders at the 
provincial Islamic Council) did what we could but mostly we could only help in small cases. 
For example, we contacted a powerful person [Phuyai] and asked for his help. In some cases, 
we directly contact the military to guarantee a suspect’s innocence of crime. Mostly, the 
military and state authorities listen to us and follow our request
296
. 
A survey in 2015 by the Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD) 
also revealed that Islamic leaders were the group of persons that local Malay-Muslims trusted 
the most in developing peace and security in the Deep South
297
. Due to their influence, many 
people, including the Thai state, expected religious leaders to act as powerful actors in 
encouraging voluntary participation. 
However, the influence of the religious leaders acted like a double-edge sword. On the 
one hand, some extremist religious leaders could instigate more conflict and violence by 
injecting “misunderstandings through misleading presentations of religious concepts” (Rung 
2007: 154). Some religious teachers were allegedly key recruiters of separatist groups and the 
key site of recruitment was religious schools (Askew 2010: 127). One of the former advisors 
of the SBPAC also accepted that religious leaders had prominent roles in instigating the 
notion of Patani independence, as he explained: 
Some Islamic religious schools have input thoughts to their students since they were six years 
old. We (the Thai state) never observed what they taught. We thought a Tadika school was 
like a baby care center. We never looked at their curriculum. We only focused on the armed 
force militants in the jungle. Eventually, it turned out that it was the religious schools that 
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were most powerful in injecting thoughts against the Thai state. When we realized this, it was 
a bit too late
298
. 
However, based on conversations with former students in Pattani, not all religious 
schools and teachers were against the Thai state and opposed to political participation. Each 
religious school taught differently. Some Islamic teachers taught only religious beliefs and 
practices; some teachers inserted content about history of Patani and encouraged the 
nationalist sentiments of Patani. One Malay-Muslim interviewee said, “Studying in Tadika 
taught me to understand religion and discern the Patani identity but my teacher did not teach 
me to demonstrate against the Thai state. He just taught me the Patani language and way of 
life
299
”; some teachers taught students to hate the Thai state and Thai citizens. As one 
interviewee from Pattani revealed, “When I studied at Ponoh, I was told that Thais were bad 
and I should not be friends with them”
300
. Since the teachings of some religious teachers 
seemed to be a threat to national security, the government was suspicious that they were 
involved with separatism and branded them as terrorists (Tan-Mullins 2007: 149). Some 
religious leaders had their names on the state’s watch list and their students were sometimes 
closely watched by the Thai state
301
.  
On the other hand, religious leaders could also support non-violent participation. 
Some Malay-Muslims believed political participation should be structured in an Islamic way 
by implementing the concept of al-shura (mutual consultation) into participatory exercises
302
. 
The principle of al-shura encourages Muslims to have consultation on public affairs with the 
Muslim community in order to find a mutual resolution that does not violate religious 
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disciplines. The mutual resolution from al-shura is sacred and obligatory. The consultation 
under the principle of al-shura can encourage political participation in civil society, as 
mentioned by Ahmad Al-Raysuni, an international expert on Islamic Study: 
 When the matter of concern relates to something held in common by members of the society 
or which involves others’ rights, there is a great need still for consultation. Such consultation 
should include those whose rights are at stake (or those who are qualified to represent them), 
particularly when the matter at hand may have consequences that will affect them (Al-
Raysuni 2012: 16). 
 The principle of al-shura has already been implemented in some civil society groups 
in the Deep South. For example, the community health development projects in southern 
border provinces of Thailand applied the concept of al-shura by appointing shura councils, 
including religious leaders, women and youth representatives, and local authorities, and 
carried out several activities based on the shura process. So, the community members 
believed the policies of the project that were initiated by participation of the group members 
would be agreeable to the community and would not violate Islamic concepts
303
.  
  Since religious leaders were highly respected by most Malay-Muslims, the Thai state 
wanted religious leaders to act as intermediaries between the state and local Malay-Muslims, 
especially at the grassroots, who tended to avoid directly contacting with the state, in order to 
encourage further participation and collaboration with them. Some Imams felt that they were 
caught in between
304
. On the one hand, it was risky for them to participate closely with state 
authorities because they could become a target of militants. On the other hand, if they did not 
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participate with the state, they might be labeled as not collaborating with state officials and 
that could cause problems for them too
305
. 
 The roles of religious organizations, such as the Sheikhul Islam Office (known as 
the Office of the Chularajmontri) and the Office of Provincial Islamic Councils, are also very 
significant in promoting political participation and improving the civil society-state relations 
in the Deep South. However, for some local people, these Islamic organizations served as a 
tool of the Thai state
306
. An officer of the Sheikhul Islam Office explained that 
The Chularajmontri is elected by representatives of provincial Islamic Committees. We (the 
office of Sheikhul) cannot only serve the needs of the Thai state but sometimes we could not 
avoid it. There were many times that we were frustrated when we had to act according to the 




 Political participation through formal Islamic organizations might then be obstructed 
by some suspicions on the roles of the organizations. However, during the conflict and 
violence, the religious organizations still had an important role in participating with state 
actors and other religious organizations, such as the Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand, in 
reducing conflict and tension. A representative of the Islamic Council pointed out that “I do 
not deny that Islamic religious leaders are involved in politics but our involvement and 
participation is not for personal interest. We participate in politics for the benefits of our 
society and to bring peace through nonviolent means
308
.”  There are regular meetings 
between state representatives and religious leaders, including Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, 
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Before the conflict, the formal organizations of Buddhism, such as the Sangha 
Supreme Council of Thailand, did not have much political role in the Deep South. The 
Buddhist monks mainly emphasize healing people’s minds rather than involvement in 
political matters. However, when the violent conflict has increased, monks were killed and 
injured, and Wat (temple) were burnt, Buddhist monks and the organizations of Buddhism 
increasingly participated with state actors and other CSOs to protect Buddhists, monks, and 
temples from the violent incident. For example, Phra Paisal Visalo, a well-known abbot from 
Wat Pa Sukato, a forest monastery in the northeastern region of Thailand, was invited to join 
the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in 2005; the Sangha Council in the Deep 
South issued declarations regarding the attack on Wat Phromprasit in Pattani in 2005 and the 
attack in Kok Pho district, Pattani in 2011. Besides, the roles of Buddhism were changed to 
far from its principle. Some Buddhism is militarized and temples became armed bases. It 
created new link, a violent one, between the Thai security forces and the sangha (McCargo 
2009: 24).  
 The ongoing conflict and violence also affected the relationship between the Thai 
Buddhists and Malay-Muslims. In the past, Thai-Buddhists and Malay-Muslims were not 
divided. A Thai-Buddhist senior journalist in the Deep South recalled the days when both 
Thai-Buddhists and Malay-Muslims lived peacefully together.  
 We (villagers) helped each other in almost everything, even in funeral or ordination 
ceremonies, we cooked and shared food. Similarly, when Muslims had ceremonies at their 
mosques, we, the Buddhists, came to the mosque and helped them
310
.  








He further argued that the estrangement between the Thai-Buddhists and Malay-
Muslims gradually increased, particularly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. More strict 
Islamic practices were imported into southern Thailand through students who graduated from 
Islamic countries, especially Libya, Syria, and Pakistan. They believed that Muslims should 
not go to other religions’ places of worship and should not participate in their religious 
activities. So when Islamic practices and beliefs became more conservative, the relationship 
between Muslims and Buddhists in a community gradually weakened
311
. The unrest since 
2004 has increasingly eroded their relationship, resulting in a decrease of collaboration and 
participation of people with different religions in the Deep South.  
The ongoing conflict and violence that affected the life and death of people in the 
Deep South increased incentives for both violent and non-violent participation of both Malay-
Muslims and Thai-Buddhists. For the Thai-Buddhists in the conflict areas, although they are 
the majority in Thailand, they are a minority in the conflict areas of the Malay-speaking 
provinces. They sometimes felt they were ignored by the government (Albritton 2005: 168). 
The negative emotion then turned into an incentive for participation.  
 The conflict and violence turned some men of religion to violence even when against 
their religious beliefs. Monks were not only victims, but conflict changed them to become 
“agents of violence” (Jerryson 2011: 4). For example, a Thai monk from Bangkok called for 
burning one mosque for each Buddhist monk killed in the Lower South through his 
Facebook, YouTube, and public speech at a meeting of monks (Prachatai, 30 October 2015). 
However, the same incentives that lead people to conflict and violence can cause greater 
participation. Constructive participation among different religious leaders was established 
after the renewed violence. For example, the Inter-religious Council of Thailand (IRC-
Thailand), founded in 2009, is a Religion for Peace affiliate organization that brings together 






faith leaders from Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism to work for peace 
in southern border provinces of Thailand; the Thai-Muslim, Buddhist, and Chinese 
Association was launched in 2011 in Pattani with the objective of searching for peace in the 
South. 
Although the conflict is mainly between the Thai state and the Malay-Muslim 
separatists, the consequences of the conflict unavoidably affected innocent people of every 
ethnicity and religion in the conflict area. The religious leaders were called out to comfort 
their followers. However, since the conflict and violence directly affected the life and death 
of adherents on a large scale, including men of religion, it caused pressure on religious 
leaders to develop their roles from passive actors in politics to be active actors, who initiated 
and participated in civil society activities. Political participation of religious leaders after the 
renewed violence was not only for protecting their followers, but also for saving themselves 
from being attacked.  
 
The media and political participation in civil society 
 
At the beginning of the re-emergence of the violence in 2004, Thai people were 
surprised and had little knowledge of what was happening in the Deep South.  The media 
became an important source of information that many people looked to for answers and 
explanations regarding the violent incidents. Most news on the conflict and violence in the 
Deep South was dominated by the mainstream media, with its contents controlled by various 
means and degrees of government censorship
312
. Reports on the Deep South conflict and 
violence were then sometimes distorted. For example, Freedom House reported in 2005 that 
the Thai government pressured journalists and reporters to adjust news coverage regarding 
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criticisms of the government on the violence in the Deep South
313
.  Also, the Southeast 
Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) revealed that reporters were forced by the Thai police to 
identify a photographer who took a photo of a soldier firing into a crowd of protesters in one 
of Thailand's southern provinces in 2004, and some TV reporters were forced to cancel 
footage of demonstrations in the Deep South
314
.  
Moreover, as mentioned by McCargo (2000: 3), most of the news coverage in the 
mainstream media of Thailand is presented with a very high degree of “bureaucratization and 
routinization.” Most news on the Deep South represented state perceptions through 
interviews of senior politicians and bureaucrats. So, the other side of the story from local 
people in the areas of conflict and violence was mostly ignored
315
. In addition, most news on 
the front page of mainstream media, such as Thairath, Kom Chad Luek, and Dailynews, 




In addition, the mainstream media was mostly lacking in giving historical background 
to readers. Many media reports on conflict and violence in the Deep South were “mostly 
straightforward and presented without much context” (Phansasiri 2016: 51). They focused 
more on here and now events, what was happening in the fields, and the casualties. Many 
reporters tended to sell sensational news to their readers by making front-page news when 
there were murderers of Buddhists, especially when state officials or monks were killed (Tan-
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 For example, a headline by  Kom Chad Luek on 18 November 2011, ‘Chon tai hod! Wang 
buemb tahan chud khumkrong kru dub 1 jeb 1’ [Brutal southern Bandits! Bombed the armed teachers’ 
escort soldiers, one died one injured]’, and Dailynews’s headline on 15 February 2013, ‘Chon tai proi 
baiplew khu ao kheun! Len ngarn kru-Thaipud’ [Southern Bandit’ distributed fliers, threaten revenge! 




Mullins 2007: 149-150).  This kind of reports, according to Lee and Maslog (2005), was 
recognized as war journalism, rather than peace journalism. Johan Galtung (1998: 8) 
explained that peace journalism, instead of focusing only on the conflict of two opposing 
parties and its numerical results such as the deaths, injuries, and material damages, tends to 
seek the deeper roots of the conflict, search for all parties involved and their goals, and look 
for possible solutions to the conflict.  
When reading news on the Deep South of Thailand, one is struck by the sad, 
depressed, and angry feelings of victims. This kind of presentation would affect people’s 
interpretation of the conflict and violence, as well as expand the hatred and hostile sentiments 
towards the Malay-Muslims in the Deep South.  On the one hand, the repetitive news of 
violent incidents that many readers outside the conflict areas read from the mainstream media 
creates negative perspectives of Malay-Muslims in the Deep South.  On the other hand, the 
perhaps biased reports on the southern violence of mainstream media may have inspired and 
motivated some local Malay-Muslims to actively participate in reporting incidents of their 
hometown from their side of the story. For example, a university student from the conflict 
areas of Songkhla said that  
I am tired of watching news on TV about the violence in my hometown. I have had a bit of 
writing talent since I was a high-school student. I published an article about culture and old 
traditions of my hometown because I wanted to tell other people that my home is not that bad. 
When I had an opportunity to learn more about being a reporter, I did not hesitate to 
participate in a young media development program.
317
.   
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Moreover, the mainstream media was decreasingly active in reporting news on the 
prolonged conflict and violence because it could not get as much attention from readers as 
when it newly occurred in 2004.  Although the problem of the conflict and violence in the 
Deep South remains critical and unsolved, the interest of the Thai public on the southern 
unrest dissipated and there was not much new information to report. So, many Bangkok-
based media gradually decreased coverage on the Southern conflict (Nuannoi 2010: 281). 
Lessened attention on news of the violence in the southern border provinces negatively 
affected the Deep South problem. When the media were less interested in the news about the 
violence, there would be a high possibility that militants would create more seriously violent 
incidents to keep people in fear and call attention to the Thai government repression. 
Moreover, without media attention, there could be a greater risk of state violence, for 
example, the military may carry out abuses and get away then more easily. 
Although the Bangkok-based media decreased its attention on the news on the Far 
South, there were many local media groups that emerged as alternative media to present news 
on the South from local reporters. For example, the Wartani media agency became one of the 
leading local media agencies. It was established in January 2011 by a group of young 
independent journalists in the southern border provinces. The name of “Wartani” came from 
a combination of two words “Warta”, which means news in Malay, and Tani, which refers to 
Patani, the areas of the southern border provinces of Thailand
318
. The name of Wartani thus 
well represented its mission to report news for the Malay-Muslims of the Deep South.  
Moreover, due to the popularity of internet usage, the printed media was less 
important as the readers were likely to read news online. This provided an opportunity for 
smaller organizations or local media groups to report news with lower costs. Therefore, with 
the help of technology, native reporters and local media agencies were able to expand in the 
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Deep South. Due to their better understanding of local culture and the background of the 
conflict, the native reporters acted as “activists in order to represent from the inside the 
motives, experiences, feelings, needs and desires of the wider social movements they thus 
come to represent” (Atton 2002: 495). They also reported some sensitive issues that the 
mainstream media might ignore, such as the historical background of Patani, the issues of 
cultural and religious differences, the problem of human rights abuses, and a political 
campaign for self-determination.  
 
Figure 6-5: An example of a news report on sensitive political campaign in local media  
 
    
Source: Free Voice’s Facebook page, 
<https://www.facebook.com/media.FreeVoice/photos/a.934960726617900.1073741880.5399
97196114257/934961153284524/?type=3&theater>, accessed 2 May 2016. 
  
Figure 6-5 shows an example of news posted on the Facebook page of the Free Voice, 
a local media of youth and Patani students, that reported on students’ protest against the 






. While most newspapers in Bangkok did not report on this protest, except 
the Thai Post (15 February 2016), Prachatai (14 February 2016), and BBC Thai (14 February 
2016), this student protest was reported widely among online channels of local media, such as 
Wartani, Deep South Watch, and Free Voice.  
There were strong concerns and awareness among new media groups in the Deep 
South of the importance of reporting sensitive news on conflict and violence
320
. While 
individuals outside the conflict zone might not be concerned much with the negative effects 
of reckless news reports that spread to offline and online channels, some Malay-Muslim 
journalists got together to learn, discuss, and practice reporting news with more caution and 
neutrality, in order to avoid more conflict in the society. For example, the Deep South 
Journalism School (DSJ) was founded in December 2010, as a unit of Deep South Watch, to 
train and develop journalism skills for young reporters in the Deep South
321
.  
Since 2004, there have been many newly established local media in the Deep South 
ranging from online news reporters, who might be just one person created a Facebook page to 
report news on the Deep South, to radio media, such as We Voice, ran by a women’s 
organization, which produced a program on radio, the women’s voice for peace. There were 
attempts by small groups of media in the Deep South to demand constructive reporting that 
would not expand conflict in the communities. The group of local media expanded into 
networks, for example, the Community Radio Network of Pattani, and the Deep South 
Photojournalism Networks (DSP). The increasing roles of local media motivated people, 
especially the younger generation, to participate more in civil society not only as local 
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reporters and journalists, but also as activists and participants. However, the local media in 
the Deep South was independent and dispersed. There were differences in content between 
those independent media and the state-supported media, as well as between the Thai-
Buddhist media and the Malay-Muslim media. Most people tended to be selective and choose 
news that fit their views. The influence of local media is still limited to small group of 
people, especially those who can access online channels. Also, the mainstream media 
decreased its attention on the conflict and violence problems in the Deep South. These factors 
might impact negatively in encouraging political participation due to lack of knowledge and 
create greater risk of violence from both the state and the separatists. 
 
 
Civil society in the Deep South and the locals 
 
In the Deep South, where the majority of people are Malay-Muslims, many local 
people were afraid of contacting Thai state officials because of both language barriers and the 
negative perceptions they had of Thai state authorities, as discussed in previous chapters. The 
role of civil society was then very important as a third actor that could speak out on behalf of 
local people, especially the grassroots who mostly lacked political skills. In addition, during 
the conflict and violence, the Thai government gave importance mainly to national security 
and aimed at banishing separatists so much that they neglected other grievances of local 
people. Civil society thus played an important role in helping local people, a silent majority, 
who suffered the most from the conflict, but played the least significant role in the decision-
making process, to increasingly participate in Thai politics. 
However, one of the major problems, probably the biggest one that impeded political 
participation of people in the conflict areas, was the problem of untrustworthiness. Trust is 




cultivating trustworthiness in the midst of conflict areas is difficult. Although some local 
people felt more comfortable talking to civil society activists rather than to government 
officials, civil society activists, especially those from other regions, sometimes could not gain 
full trust from local people in the conflict areas. A Thai-Buddhist researcher based in Pattani 
explained that since there were many people from various agencies, both local and non-local 
activists, who came to talk to the locals, and mostly the same respondants did the interviews, 
they could not trust the opinions expressed. So, when people came to interview to them, the 
same story might be told in different ways, depending on whom they were talking to.   
They usually had a certain set of dialogues to answer a certain group of interviewers, such as 
press, scholars, civil society activists, the Thai military, and foreigners. I am not saying that 
their information was not true but they chose to cover or uncover some truths when talking to 
different groups of people in order to save themselves from any trouble
322
.  
The major problem of political participation through civil society in southern 
Thailand was that people were too afraid to talk to strangers about conflict issues. The public 
activities most people were likely to participate in were, instead, the activities that did not 
involve conflict issues. A local government officer in Pattani mentioned that  
My villagers tended to avoid participating with any activities involved in sharing opinions on 
conflict issues. Most villagers preferred to participate in activities relating to, for example, 
occupational and community development. So, when I was asked to tell my villagers to join a 
meeting with a CSO on a conflict issue, I sometimes had to assign someone to participate
323
. 
Not only did they distrust outsiders, but also they were afraid of becoming suspects 
and being threatened by both the Thai military and militants. Therefore, many of them chose 
to be quiet and not participate in civil society activities. One civil society activist in the Deep 
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South explained that almost every time he entered the conflict area and talked to villagers, he 
was told by the villagers that a few days after his interviews the military came to meet the 
villagers he talked to and asked for details of interviews between him and the villagers. Also, 
the villagers could be suspected by militants if the militants saw them talking to strangers 
from outside the village
324
. Therefore, local people preferred to keep a low profile.  However, 
there also were some villagers who wanted to participate with civil society but the channels 
provided for participation were generally limited to some specific group of local people. 
Political participation through civil society was criticized as it was always the same groups of 
local people who participated in the activities. One interviewee from Pattani complained that 
the majority of villagers had few chances to speak out. Most civil society activists came into 
her village and talked only to the Phuyaiban. Sometimes, the Phuyaiban’s opinions, she 
believed, could not reflect the majority of villagers
325
.  
In addition, working in the conflict area, which almost everywhere was dangerous and 
where almost everyone distrusted each other, was quite difficult for many civil society 
activists. While local people were suspicious and cautious in sharing their information and 
opinions with CSOs, the civil society activists had to keep a watchful eye on villagers they 
talked to.  They had to be very careful in talking to people with different cultures and 
backgrounds without knowing which side the person they were talking to was with. So some 
civil society activists tended to avoid asking sensitive questions in order to engender 
participation and build trust among villagers. 
Moreover, the doubtfulness on the amount and source of funding made local people 
question the civil society efforts. After the re-emergence of the conflict and violence in 2004, 
a great amount of funds from both state and non-state agencies, national and international, 
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were poured into the southern border provinces. On the one hand, these funds massively 
helped in increasing capacity of CSOs in the conflict areas. Many local-led CSOs were 
established to serve the needs of local people in many fields. On the other hand, there were 
arguments about funding and money flow. Not only was the military accused of retaining a 
big amount of the budget, civil society was also criticized as they were benefiting from 
massive amounts of funding given by the government, domestic and overseas non-state 
organizations, and underground interest groups. There was doubt that their goals in working 
may not be for the society but for the source of funding that they were committed to. In 
addition, some people were suspicious that some civil society activists, especially those who 
owned many projects at the same time, might be intoxicated by the negative influence of 
money and self-interested persuasion. Some CSOs were criticized for receiving money from 
donors without a true purpose of helping communities
326
. 
Does untrustworthiness always impede political participation in the Far South? The 
answer seems to be “no”. According to interviews, some civil society groups were 
established due to a feeling of distrustfulness. A Malay-Muslim student activist from the 
conflict area of the Deep South explained that he did not trust the Thai state so he did not 
trust any state-funded CSOs. He and his Malay-Muslim friends then established their own 
civil group. His group raised funds from selling local products and submitted project plans 
for international funds. He said,  
I saw some Malay-Muslim CSOs had to act according to state orders due to the government 
budget they received. I did not trust them so I and my friends decided to establish our own 
civil group. We did not receive money from the Thai state because we did not want to be 
controlled.  
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So, untrustworthiness could both negatively and positively affect political 
participation through civil society. Participants who distrust one group might get together and 
form their own group to take part in political activities in their own way. 
In general, even though the relationship between civil society and local people is 
considered better than the relationship between local people and the state
327
, fear from violent 
incidents and suspicion of local people towards the work of civil society might deter them 
from participating and cooperating in civil society activities
328
. Simultaneously, the same 
feeling of fear and distrustfulness were also able to encourage some people to participate 
more in civil society so that they gain more confidence. Finally, although the ongoing violent 
conflict in the Deep South brought about the emergence of numerous civil society 
organizations in the conflict area, ranging from village-level to international-level 
organizations, most CSOs were located in urban areas, such as Mueang districts of the three 
provinces
329
. Thus, despite the existence of a growing number of CSOs, many civil society 
activists being active in the conflict areas are middle class, such as university students and 
professional civil society activists. Their work was not able to draw participation from the 
wider grassroots levels, especially in the remote areas, where the role of civil society is 
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Civil society in the Deep South and the Thai state 
 
 In theory, civil society should function as an independent actor outside governmental 
control and influence but be able to make linkages between the two sides, society and the 
state (Gellner 1994, MacGaffey 1994, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe 1998). As discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between the state and the civil 
society is sometimes problematic. On the one hand, the state and the civil society could be a 
good partner, who supported each other. Civil society acted as an intermediary with the state 
in promoting policy to local people and forwarding demands of local people to the state. On 
the other hand, the state and civil society could be enemies of each other. The roles of civil 
society in counterbalancing the power of the state occasionally caused them to act against 
state policies.  
Civil society activities thus sometimes caused trouble rather than collaboration, at 
least, in the eyes of the state. The negative views of the state towards civil society activists 
led to attempts of government control of political participation through civil society.  In the 
conflict area, where the military and the state wanted to repress dissidents to protect national 
security, the roles of some civil society activists, such as those who promoted Patanian 
human rights and self-determination, might be perceived by the state as danger to state 
security. So, although, in theory, civil society is “an arena beyond state control and influence” 
(MacGaffy 1994: 169), the state, especially in the conflict areas, is unwilling to allow full 
freedom of the civil society. Implementing government control is considered by the state as a 
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 The relationship between the Thai state and civil society organizations in the Deep 
South demonstrated a similar pattern. The Thai government has played a two-pronged 
strategy towards the civil society in conflict areas. On the one hand, the Thai state 
encouraged political participation through civil society by funding and supporting many local 
CSOs and cooperating in many civil society activities. For example, the SBPAC initiated a 
project, volunteers for development of the South, to engender participation of local people in 
community development (Manager, 2 December 2015); ISOC provided funds to support 
some student organizations to promote non-violent participation in the Deep South; and the 
Thai government gave funds to each village in the Deep South to establish local civil society 
groups. However, some complained that villagers had little knowledge for managing CSOs. 
So, the groups mostly were short-lived and ineffective
331
. An interviewee from Pattani said, 
“my village has some local groups formed by the Phuyaiban. When the village received funds 
(from the government), they formed a group. These groups do not last long depending on 
how much funding they received
332
.” 
Although the Thai state increasingly illustrated a willingness to participate with civil 
society organizations by joining and supporting many civil society activities, the Thai state 
occasionally acted in a way that seemingly opposed political participation of CSOs. 
Government control can come in a variety of ways; for example, many civil society activists 
could not gain trust or draw people to participate with them because the military followed 
closely behind them. “Whenever I talked to villagers, after I left, the military came and asked 
the villagers what we talked about. They felt unsafe and did not want to participate with us 
anymore”, said a human rights activist in Pattani
333
.  
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In addition, some active civil society actors were arrested and accused of involvement 
with separatism. For example, Muhammad Anwar bin Isamel Hajiteh or Anwar, a civil 
society activist from Pattani and a co-founder of Bungaraya News, an alternative media outlet 
in the Deep South, was arrested and detained by the military as a suspected insurgent. He had 
participated in many civil society activities after he was newly graduated, to promote non-
violent participation as a way to develop peace in the area. However, when the Supreme 
Court verdict was delivered in May 2013, it created a shock wave to not only his family, but 
also to many civil society activists in the area. The Supreme Court issued a verdict of 12 
years imprisonment due to the charge against him of being a member of the BRN (Prachatai, 
14 May 2013). Although there was a campaign to free Anwar throughout the region, the 
impact was not strong enough to pressure the government to reconsider his case. Fortunately, 
after almost four years of imprisonment, he received a royal pardon and was released in 
January 2017 (Bangkok Post, 30 December 2016). 
The case of Anwar, who decided to participate in civil society as a local journalist, 
had a lot of impact on the work of civil society in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. On 
the one hand, this case destroyed the morale and good will of activists, who worked and 
participated in civil society activities, and undermined confidence in the Thai government 
attitude towards civil society activities. On the other hand, there still were many civil society 
activists who were inspired by the Anwar case. A local journalist and civil society activist 
said, “I were afraid after the decision of the Anwar case but at the same time I was motivated 
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The roles of civil society in counterbalancing state power sometimes caused more 
conflict between the state and the civil society. The state’s aggressive actions towards civil 
society activities would be seen more often if their activities related to issues of violation of 
human rights and self-determination, which were considered sensitive issues for Thai national 
security. For example, a complaint was filed by ISOC against three human rights activists, 
Somchai Homla-or, a Thai-Buddhist member of the Law Reform Commission of Thailand, 
Pornpen Khongkachonkiet, a Thai-Buddhist Director of the Cross Cultural Foundation, and 
Anchana Heemmina, a Malay-Muslim President of the Duay Jai Group, due to publishing a 
report on human rights violations and torture of Malay-Muslims in the Deep South. The 
ISOC Region 4 spokesperson, General Pramote Promin, claimed that the report was based on 
false information and questioned the aim of the alleged activists saying that they aimed to 
discredit the ISOC and destroy the country (Prachatai, 9 June 2016).  
The conflict and violence made it difficult for the Malay-Muslims in the Deep South 
to have an ideal civil society. Even though the degree of government control is different 
depending on the different degree of violence and level of trust in CSOs, government control 




Drawing Contrast: a direct comparison of conflict and non-conflict areas  
 
In this section, we will explore how people in different violent conflict areas with 
different degrees of government control participated in civil society. Generally, political 
participation in non violent conflict areas is considered less complicated than in conflict 




Ranot and Sathing Phra districts of Songkhla province, the expansion of CSOs and the level 
of political participation of local people in civil society activities was seemingly lower than in 
the conflict areas. Since political participation through civil society is voluntary, it is possible 
that people in non violent conflict area might have less incentive and motivation to 
participate. 
Although Ranot and Sathing Phra are distant from violent incidence of the Deep 
South, the districts had their own community conflict that needed the collective power of 
local people to make sure that mutual interest of the community can be met. Unlike the 
Malay-speaking districts, most conflict in Ranot and Sathing Phra was mostly a single issue 
based, such as conflict over natural resources, and mainly disputes between local people and 
the private sector, rather than disputes between the locals and the Thai state. Political 
participation through civil society in Ranot and Sathing Phra was formed mostly to increase 
negotiation power of local people against the private companies
335
. For example, the 
fishermen folk group in Sathing Phra district was formed by a group of village fisher folk, 
who lost benefits from fishing. The group became active after the arrival and operation of an 
oil exploration and production company in the Gulf of Thailand. However, after the group 
members successfully received compensation from the company, their efforts ended.
336
 
Most civil society groups in Ranot and Sathing Phra were loosely formed to achieve a 
single task. Most local civil society groups in the non violent conflict areas of Ranot and 
Sathing Phra were then short-lived and informal. As a civil society activist in Songkhla 
stated, “when group members were successful in negotiation and received satisfaction, they 
functioned no more and became inactive
337
”.  Although most villages had local civil society 
groups, such as farm women groups and fisher folk groups, they were small, comprising 
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dozens members in each village, and did not have much political influence. One civil society 
activist from Songkhla explained that most local civil society groups in Songkhla were 
ineffective because they lacked political and management skills in running their groups. He 
believed most successful civil society organizations needed to be managed or headed by 
experienced activists, such as academic and professional activists
338
. Although there was 
some collaboration between the local-led civil society and the expert-led organizations, such 
as Greenpeace, the collaboration was short term and was not able to transfer the know-how to 
the locals.  
Moreover, since the areas are distant from the Lower South, where frequent bombings 
and shootings have taken place, Ranot and Sathing Phra districts did not attract major 
resources of either the Thai state or civil society. The necessity for civil society in the area to 
act as intermediary for local people was less than in the Malay-speaking districts because 
local people do not have language barriers and feelings of fear and distrust of the Thai state 
officials. One interviewee from Ranot gave his opinion about participation in his village that 
“I think they (villagers) think it (the violence) does not involve them and they are not 
tormented by the current violent incidents
339
.” One student was asked to participate in a 
protest against oil palm plantations along Songkhla Lake by his lecturer.  He said, “I 
participated in the protest because my teacher told me to. I was afraid that if I did not join the 
protest, it might affect my mark. I think I might not have participated myself if no one asked 
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So, with the low incentives of participation through civil society, people in Ranot and 
Sathing Phra districts tended to solve their problems by themselves through direct contact 
with state authorities
341
.  Despite having the least government control among the three case 
studies, the impact from conflict was not strong enough to motivate people to participate.  
 For people of Chana and Thepha, who live in low conflict areas that had sporadic 
violent incidents, political participation was highly motivated by a desire to prevent more 
conflict in their community. Moreover, since the violent incidents did not occur as much as in 
the three conflict prone provinces, people felt they were at lower risk into participating than 
those in high conflict areas. The two conditions significantly contributed to a high rate of 
political participation through election and the state, as discussed in previous chapters.  
However, political participation through civil society in Chana and Thepha districts 
did not get as much attention as other channels of political participation. Although the areas 
were under the special security law, the 2008 Internal Security Act, the law did not prohibit 
political activities. So, people in Chana and Thepha had freedom to participate in politics. 
According to interviews, some villagers of Chana and Thepha, districts believed to be 
hideouts of some armed militants, showed great enthusiasm in community fora (Wethi 
prachakhom). In a community forum, villagers, including religious leaders, senior villagers, 
men and women, and even the youth, brainstormed and discussed problems or village 
development projects. One Malay-Muslim university student from Thepha district explained 
that his village had regular meetings after Friday prayers. Most villagers would get together 
and share their opinions on general politics and village problems. He gave a further example, 
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 When there were government funds distributed to my village, the village chief arranged a 
community forum. Dozens villagers took part in the meeting and they shared opinions on how 
our village should use the funds. Although I was only a teenager, I proposed my idea to the 
meeting. I suggested they built a village library.
342
. 
 Although he was the youngest in the meeting, his proposed idea was supported by 
many villagers and the community agreed to use the funds for building a library, “I was glad 
that I participated in the meeting and I was so proud that my voice was heard by the elderly in 
my village,” said a Malay-Muslim university student from Thepha
343
. Political participation 
through civil society could also be found among the Thai-Buddhists in the conflict areas of 
Chana and Thepha. A Thai-Buddhist university student revealed that he was a member of a 
youth group in his village. He said, “our group consists of 50-60 youths. We formed this 
group to represent opinions of the younger generation in the village. In the past, the elderly 
always neglected our voices so we wanted to make our voice louder as a group of youth.”
344
 
Another student in Thepha said, “The ongoing violence motivated me to participate in civil 
society activities. I wanted to solve the [violence] problem. I believed, since I was born and 
live here, I may know about the problem better than the government
345
.”  Similarly, one 
student from Chana said that he wanted to participate in resolving the conflict and violence. 
He wanted it to stop. However, in his village, he complained that “the adults always neglect 
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Since Chana and Thepha have a low rate of violent incidents, the area does not attract 
many civil society activists. While a university in Pattani, a high violent conflict area, has 
many civil society activities, a university in Songkhla has few civil society organizations 
come to arrange activities and even when they did, not many students participated in those 
activities, especially those relating to the violence issue
347
.  The low violent conflict areas 
were not at the center of attention of many expert-led organizations. The knowledge and 
resources from the professional activists was important to generate greater capability and 
awareness of community members for civil activities.  So, the areas lacked additional 
resources to encourage more public participation.  
In addition, most local people in Chana and Thepha did not have a language barrier in 
contacting the Thai state themselves. They did not need a CSO to act or speak out for them.  
However, for some specific problems that individuals could not solve, local people of Chana 
and Thepha were able to form civil society groups, with assistance from experts, to create 
greater impact on the specific issues. Although CSOs in Chana and Thepha were not many, 
compared to the high violent conflict areas, they were quite strong and active, such as the 
anti-pipeline groups in Chana, and the anti coal-fired power plant groups in Thepha. For 
example, hundreds of villagers and activists from the anti coal-fired power plant groups in 
Thepha joined with the anti coal-fired power plant groups in Krabi province to protest against 
the building of the coal-fired power plant in demonstrations at the parliament in Bangkok in 
February 2017 (Matichon, 17 February 2017).  
Generally, in the high violent conflict area, the ongoing conflict and violence brought 
large amounts of funds both from governmental and non-governmental organizations
348
.  The 
large budget contributed to the development of civil society capabilities and attracted more 
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attention of CSOs to work in the conflict areas. As discussed earlier, when the experts came, 
their knowledge was transferred and political participation was increasingly promoted. As a 
result, there was an increase in numbers of CSOs led by local activists who were trained and 
supported by the professionals and/or the government in high violent conflict areas of 
Mueang Pattani.  
In addition, Mueang Pattani is the site of the first university in southern Thailand, 
Prince of Songkhla University (PSU), Pattani campus. The university is a base of several 
CSOs, such as Deep South Watch (DSW), the Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep 
South, and Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), and many civil society 
activities were organized at the university, such as conferences and seminars on the conflict 
and violence, public hearings, and human rights campaigns. Participating with those CSOs 
gradually encouraged the development of public consciousness and political participation. 
When asked which CSOs she knew the best, a Malay-Muslim university student in Pattani 
said, “I would say Amnesty International (AI) Thailand because I participated in its activities 
many times at the university about human rights issue. I, later, became its member and 
regularly participated in the AI’s activities
349
.” There were about 20 Malay-Muslims at the 
PSU, who were members of the Amnesty PSU Pattani club and some of them still continued 
to participate in the AI’s activities even after they graduated
350
. Moreover, studying in 
university level developed attitudes, skills, and knowledge that enhance the civic and political 
skills of student. Some students were inspired and motivated by the conflict and violence at 
their hometown and their experiences of political participation during their times in the 
university. Some of them made resolution to work for the public benefit and some of them 
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formed a civil society group after graduation
351
.  One interviewee from Pattani expressed 
about his intention to work as a civil society activist that 
Local people do not know much about the current situation, even my family, they do not 
know that the violence is conflict between the two sides (the Thai state and the separatists). 
They just know that there are violent incidents from bandit. Most people do not know the 
history or sources of conflict. As a university student who has some knowledge, I set up a 
group with my friends and try to give local people more information. Though I can access to 
only small group of people, I keep trying
352
. 
However, there were concerns that political participation through civil society in 
Mueang Pattani could not reach the lower class in rural areas. As one interviewee from 
Pattani mentioned, “There are many CSOs in the Deep South but they are not strong enough. 
They cannot access to every village. They mostly promoted and operated their activities in 
universities, urban areas, or some big villages or districts, not in the rural
353
.” This was 
possibly true because the high risk of violent incidents impeded the access of civil society 
into the rural areas. Most participants and civil society activists were then concentrated in the 
urban areas that provided more opportunities for the middle class, who needed the least help 
from civil society, to participate. At the same time, some local people in rural areas 
disregarded political participation in civil society. A local authority in remote area of Mueang 
Pattani revealed that 
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Most villagers in the rural preferred to participate in the “fast food” activities that provided 
convenient and fast services. A CSO organizing a training program would receive less 
attention from villagers than a CSO giving out, for example, personal belongings or 
agricultural equipment. If we wanted them to participate in a training program or a meeting, 
we mostly had to force or push them to participate. Otherwise, there was a high chance that 
they would not come
354
.  
Despite the fact that people at the grassroots level are most in need of civil society assistance, 
the roles of civil society rather involved the middle class in city areas.  Most CSOs in 
Mueang Pattani had limited ability to reach local people in rural areas and failed to encourage 
more participation in civil society activities of people at the grassroots level, who needed it 
most. 
 When comparing political participation through civil society of the three study areas, 
the differences in possible risks and incentives from the conflict and violence, a degree of 
state control, and the capabilities of CSO itself shaped a pattern of political participation in 
civil society.  In non violent conflict areas of Chana and Thepha, which people had low risk, 
low incentives, and there was no state restriction on political participation, most civil society 
organizations popped up for single-issue based. After they fought and won the battle, most of 
them disappeared. Generally, a single issue based CSO would fade away after the project is 
done unless that CSO was able to generate a linkage and collaboration with other civil society 
groups (Darngnapasorn 2015: 242). However, in Ranot and Sathing Phra, the transformation 
rarely developed. So, the roles of CSOs were discontinued after the project was done and the 
CSO was not able to encourage more participation. In Chana and Thepha, the low violent 
conflict district, since the violence is ongoing, the work of CSOs had more continuity. 
However, the areas faced another problem that obstructed participation and the work of 
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CSOs.  Since Chana and Thepha had less frequent violent incidents, they did not attract 
enough resources from both domestic and international organizations to expand and continue 
the roles of CSOs in the area. So, their capabilities were limited without support. Most 
resources for civil society were dumped into the high violent conflict areas, such as Mueang 
Pattani. The high rate of violent incidents, in turn, attracted more attention and resources 
from state and non-state agencies. The increasing resources from various sources of funding 
generated more capabilities of local civil society activists and participants. In addition, their 
activities and collaborations were continuous as long as the conflict and violence were 
prolonged. Moreover, although most CSOs in Mueang Pattani originated as single-issue 
based, they expanded networks through collaborations with other civil society groups. For 
example, the gathering of 13 student groups and CSOs in Mueang Pattani in January 2016 to 
seek an end to violent acts toward children. Their activities included meetings, a walking 
campaign, and making a statement on child abuse.  There were about 500 participants who 
joined the activities (Deep South Watch 18 January 2016). When the networks of CSOs are 




While political participation through the state in conflict areas of the Deep South was 
relatively low and ineffective, political participation through civil society seemed to be 
increasing both in numbers and importance, particularly after the renewed violence in 2004.  
Civil society organizations in the southern border provinces of Thailand are gradually 
increasing and becoming increasingly important actors in the ongoing conflict and violence 
agenda. There are more than 400 CSOs in the Deep South (Deep South Watch, 11 May 2011) 




women, childhood problems and community development. Civil society helped many locals 
in conflict areas to non-violently raise their grievances to the state and guided them to raise 
their voices more efficiently.  
The roles of civil society in conflict areas of the Deep South were challenging and 
complicated. Working in the midst of conflict and violence, where everyone distrusted 
everyone else, could cause difficulties and limit the roles of civil society activists in 
encouraging participation in group activities, especially with the grassroots in rural areas. 
However, distrustfulness was also able to create more political participation of new groups of 
civil society activists, who were motivated from the feeling of untrustworthiness during 
conflict experiences, as explained earlier. 
The renewed conflict and violence brought many expert-led CSOs into the conflict 
areas of the Lower South. The achievement of expert-led CSOs gradually developed the 
political skills of local people, who participated in civil society activities. Moreover, the 
practices and accumulated experiences from forced participation with the Thai state trained 
and inspired both direct and indirect victims of the conflict and violence to participate 
actively in local civil society. In making stronger collaboration and power of local civil 
society, the regional civil society networks were gradually enlarged to connect local civil 
society, expand the reach of CSOs, and gain more power and influence in the state’s decision 
making process. However, attempts of CSOs in the Deep South to influence state policies 
were obstructed by the top-down policies of the Thai government. A civil society activist in 
Songkhla pointed out that 
We saw some weak points in the government policies but we did not have much chance to 
participate and propose our ideas. For example, the first round of talks with the BRN involved 
only the state and the BRN. We, in civil society, could only observe. We plan to discuss the 




Thai state. The Thai state does not have integrity and is not quite open for public opinions 
regarding this issue. So, we, a civil society, have to work a lot harder to increase our roles in 
the public policy making process
355
.  
Political participation in conflict areas was generally complicated. The fact that the 
ongoing conflict and violence involved complex elements contributed to a difference in the 
rate of political participation and the effectiveness of CSOs. Unlike political participation 
through the state, political participation through civil society was completely unforced. 
However, political participation through civil society is mostly reserved to the middle class. 
As an interviewee from Pattani said, “most lower class people do not participate, except 
political participation through elections, which does not need much political skills and 
knowledge.
356
” In this sense, civil society in the Deep South is oriented toward the middle 
class people, who need it least, rather than those at the grassroots, who need it most due to 
their inability in political skills and communication with the Thai state.   
One of the most crucial success factors in promoting political participation through 
civil society was state support. However, due to the violent situation, the Thai state decided to 
control and enforce some restrictions on the freedom of civil society activities in the conflict 
areas. Although the Thai state increasingly supported the roles of civil society through many 
grants and projects, it selectively impeded civil society activists in their activities. In this 
sense, civil society in the conflict areas of the Deep South has largely been controlled in its 
activities by the state, either through coercion or funding.  So, despite the rapid growth in 
numbers of CSOs in the Deep South, the tight government control in conflict areas prevented 
civil society from performing its proper role and undermined public participation.                                                                                            
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
 In this thesis, I study political participation during conflict based on 5 hypotheses. The 
results highlight an overlooked positive side effect of conflict and shed some light on the 
prolonged conflict and violence in Thailand’s Deep South. The validation of each hypothesis 
is discussed below. 
 
H 1: Conflict leads to a greater desire for peaceful political participation  
  
When most people think of ‘conflict’, they tend to imagine a confrontation that ends 
with violence. From this thesis, we learned that conflict can be seen to stimulate positive 
forms of participation. The conflict and violence act as trigger that pull stimulate people’s 
motivations to participate through non-violent means, largely due to experiencing violence 
and suffering. Therefore, the experiences of conflict and violence, instead of leading only to 
violent actions, also create a greater desire for people to be more active in politics through 
peaceful means as they seek to reduce suffering from the insurgent violence. The thesis also 
demonstrates a more complex picture. While people in the conflict areas seem to have a 
significant increase in electoral participation, which is a low-level of participation, political 
participation through the state and civil society, which are higher levels of participation, 
seems to have a more mixed outcome.  
This hypothesis is supported by the high rate of meaningful participation of people in 
the conflict areas through various means. Political participation through elections, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, not only showed increasing rates, but also a change in electoral 




significant impact in changing voters’ electoral behavior to a greater concern with policy than 
political party or personal qualifications of a candidate. As evidenced by the result of national 
elections after the re-emergence of violence, most voters tended to vote for the candidate they 
believed could potentially deliver effective policies to lessen the conflict and violence.  
For political participation through the state, due to the feeling of distrust and fear, 
many Malay-Muslims felt insecure in contacting state officers and chose to avoid political 
commitments, especially when they were affected by mistreatment by Thai state officials. 
Although some parts of the state are trusted a bit more than others, like the judiciary or the 
SBPAC, political participation through the state in high violence conflict areas largely 
became personalized rather than institutionalized. 
Civil society in the Deep South may be able to circumvent the broken linkage 
between the locals and the Thai state. Unlike political participation through the state, political 
participation through civil society is unforced and voluntary. A decision to take part in civil 
society is based on individuals’ freewill, that is, people make their own choice to participate 
without being forced or legally obliged. As discussed in Chapter 6, there are a number of 
Malay-Muslims who turned their experiences of conflict and violence into motivation for 
participation and became activists in the community.This is evidenced by an increase of 
local-led CSOs established by victims of the conflict and violence in the Deep South and by 
some specific cases of student and women activists. However, political participation through 
civil society is sometimes diminished by a feeling of distrust in civil society activists. Some 
people feel it is unsafe to talk to some activists as they are not sure if the information they 
give will hurt them later. Sources of funds also create doubt that goals in the work of CSOs 





Thus, while in general the level of political participation increased, especially through 
voting,  the distrust in the state and civil society created higher risk that impede people from 
participation and participation become more personalized. Political participation through the 
state and civil society then showed a more mixed outcome. 
 
H 2:  People in a conflict zone are more likely to participate in politics in other forms, 
including electoral and non-electoral ways.  
 
The thesis shows that people living in a violent conflict area do not always get 
involved with violent means. On the contrary, they are more likely to participate through 
some forms of non-violent participation when they perceive incentives are high enough to 
overcome risks. Based on the study, people in the conflict areas do not disregard 
participation. Experiencing many losses and deaths could be a prime motivation for some 
Malay-Muslims to seek a way to stop all the conflict non-violently. The high rates of voter 
turnout in the Deep South indicate that many Malay-Muslim voters desired to solve the 
conflict and violence in a non-violent form. Other sought to participate as political 
representatives. There were a number of Malay-Muslims, ranging from the former elites of 
Patani, to religious leaders, to new entrepreneurs, who entered in the Thai political system as 
politicians in order to take part in the state’s policy making process in the Thai parliament. 
The conflict and violence, although it is not the only reason, encouraged a desire for 
participation among people who live in the midst of conflict areas. 
Political participation through the state is seemingly the least used among the three 
channels since most local people only involuntarily participated, by force. This thesis 
indicates that political participation through the state in the conflict areas of the Deep South 




are not separated but impact each other. Involuntary participation could undermine voluntary 
participation. On the contrary, if people had positive experiences from involuntary 
participation, such as being treated fairly while they were in trials, it could reinforce positive 
participation. In addition, there are also a number of people who choose to collectively 
participate in civil society activities, instead of participate individually through the state, to 
increase their voice and power to fight against state power and make their grievances heard. 
This thesis found that political participation through civil society in the conflict areas 
of the Deep South has greatly expanded. As discussed in Chapter 6, there are groups of 
people, such as youths and women, who are very active. Compared to other regions with no 
violent conflict, Malay-Muslim and student activists are very active in public activities. The 
increasing roles of the local-led CSOs illustrated that experiences of conflict and violence did 
not prevent some people from the conflict areas from participation. Instead, the experiences 
of conflict and violence inspired them to participate non-violently to help their hometowns. 
 
H 3:  There is a relationship between level of violence and level of political participation 
as follows; 
 The same concerns that lead to violence also lead to participation  
 People’s experience of the violence has an additional impact on their desire for 
political participation. 




The thesis finds that the levels of violence and levels of some forms of political 
participation are correlated: the more frequent the violent incidents, the higher the level of 
some forms of participation.  The frequent violent incidents became an additional concern 




participation, people living in the midst of violence seem to be very careful and chose to 
participate politically only when they think it is important and can create an impact on 
society. Political participation is very important to them as it may be the only way possible 
they can have their voices heard by the Thai government. So we see some corrupted or 
ineffectual participation might not attract participation, such as the Senate election, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. As with other channelsof participation, they demonstrated a greater 
desire for political participation but they were willing to take the risk if they thought their 
participation could lessen the violence.  
The study finds that in some cases even involuntary participation could bring about 
positive participation in the conflict areas. As discussed in Chapter 5, people’s desires for 
participation through the state are different depending on the relationships with state 
authorities and experiences of involuntary participation. Frustrating experiences from 
contacting security or justice officers could indirectly increase more positive participation 
with local government officials, such as kamnan and phuyaiban, who local people trust more 
than the assigned officials from other regions. Even though personal negative experiences 
discouraged political participation through the state, the same experiences can lead to a 








H4: A weak civil society failing to promote popular interests and resist state domination 
will lead to more conflict. 
 
Overall, the roles of CSOs are increasing in the Deep South. Civil society in the 
conflict areas of the Deep South has immensely developed and expanded since the renewal of 
violence in 2004.  Their activities receive huge support financially and in other ways from 
both state and non state actors. In one sense, civil society can be perceived as strong, since its 
activities have more financial support, can develop better political skills, and can help 
strengthen expression for local people in conflict areas.  CSOs in the Deep South were also 
strengthened and able to engage in the policy-making process more effectively through the 
expansion of the CSO networks. For example the Women’s agenda for Peace itself comprises 
23 CSOs in the Deep South and they have joined together in many political campaigns. Since 
there is collaboration among CSOs, they can draw in a wider group of individuals to take part 
in civil society activities. However, despite the increasing number of civil society networks 
and CSOs in the Far South, many civil society activists were familiar faces who worked for 
several CSOs at the same time. There were concerns that if civil society in the Deep South 
was led by only a certain limited group of people, mostly middle class, it limited access to 
grassroots participation, and policies represented by civil society were likely to be opposed 
by local people. In this sense, civil society in the Deep South is oriented toward the middle 
class, who need it least, rather than those at the grassroots, who need it most due to their 
inability to communicate effectively with the Thai state.  So, their ability to formulate local 
programs still needs a lot of improvement. 
In addition, civil society organizations in the Deep South rarely expanded their 
network beyond the region. Without the participation and support of people from other 




Moreover, for the government, civil society is most of the time regarded as challengers for 
power, rather than a collaborator for solving problema and a partner to support state 
functions. The thesis finds that, despite its strengths, civil society is facing problems in that 
most CSO activities are controlled by the state, which distorts them into state directions. In 
general, the strength of civil society strongly depends on state policy. The state is considered 
to be the most critical actor in setting conditions and agendas for civil society (Chong and 
Elies 2011: 9). However, a number of civil society organizations in Thailand’s Deep South 
could not run their activities properly and freely. Despite the fact that the roles of civil society 
are very significant, especially for a divided society, the Thai state still limited their roles in 
some ways, as discussed in chapter 6.  
The degree of government control is different depending on the degree of violence 
and level of trust in CSOs. For some CSOs, government control came in the form of funding, 
for some CSOs, government control came in the form of threatening. Both ways of 
government control negatively affects political participation and, in turn, obstructs the state’s 
objective of national integration. Thus, despite the existence of a growing number of CSOs, 
when people realize that their participation is influenced by state control, they may turn to 
violence as they think it is the only means to resist and freely express their opposing political 
views. However, even though government control leads some people to violence, there are a 
number of people who participate through CSOs, as they see participation as the only way 








H5: A strong state preventing demands and closing channels for peaceful political 
participation will lead to more conflict. 
 
Based on the study and the literature, Thailand in the Lower South is considered as a 
strong and coercive state in which popular participation in politics, particularly for those 
living in the midst of conflict and violence, is more likely limited and controlled. In general, 
the openness of political participation is a function of the state. However, the Thai state 
perceives such high participation of the Malay-Muslims as both a pacifier and a danger, 
depending on forms of participation. On the one side, the Thai government wanted to reduce 
the strong feelings and normalize the situation by encouraging more participation. The Thai 
state knows that to win this war, they need to find more alliances with people and that can be 
done through promoting more participation. The government learned from its past mistakes 
that limiting participation can lead to more resistance. To lessen the risk of resistance from 
both militants and local people, the Thai state then selectively promoted participation as a 
tool to get people on its side. Then, political participation can serve to alleviate conflict and 
as a means of impeding Malay-Muslims from turning against the Thai state. 
On the other hand, since the three southernmost provinces are considered a 
major concern for Thai national security, having such high political participation of the 
Malay-Muslims, especially if that participation is in opposition to the state’s desired 
direction, can be considered as a threat to Thai security. So, we see many times that, for 
example, the military are sent to visit some activists at their home to let them know that the 
military is watching their every move, or some political movement, such as those that call for 
self-determination are warned off. Therefore, the Thai government considered some civic 
movements of the Malay-Muslims as a threat to national security, rather than a channel of 




This means that people in the Deep South could not participate the same way as 
people in other regions and are less likely to influence policies at the national level. This lead 
to local problems not being fully solved through the state’s channels. Although deterring the 
locals from participation (and joining the opposition against the state rather than bringing in 
more people to participate peacefully through state provided channels) is not in the state’s 
best interest, a strong state tends to limit channels of popular participation.  
We found that the Thai state controls the participation of people in the Deep South 
through either funding or coercion, decreaseing meaningful participation and making some 
participation seem illegitimate. After the rise in conflict in 2004, the Thai state used different 
tactics to direct political participation of the Malay-Muslims in the conflict areas. Most tactics 
aimed to increase the power of the state by interfering in political activities. Since the Thai 
state had experienced many violent acts from the Malay-Muslim rebels for a very long time, 
it is understandable why the state is always suspicious of the Malay-Muslim peaceful 
movements. While promoting participation is one of the state’s functions, the state also has 
authority to handle any political movement that would pose a threat to national security.  
However, Thai governments and the local security command always have problems in 
their  inability to differentiate between demands for political participation or decentralization 
and demands for separatism. So, their reactions toward some forms of political participation 
are sometimes not helpful. For example, the Southern Border Provinces Administration 
Center (SBPAC) offered more than 50 millions baht from the government budget to the civil 
society sector in 2016. There were more than 200 CSOs that submitted their projects for 
SBPAC consideration (Manager, 21 August 2017). On the one hand, this strategy motivated 
many local civil society activists to take part in local development. On the other hand, with 
the selective funding, only some particular CSO projects would be approved. For some 




government funding is almost zero. While screening is necessary to make sure that the 
separatists will not have more money for more violent incidents, the Thai state should show 
more concern for the groups that just have different views, but are not fond of violent means 
and should allow their voices to be heard. We found from the study and literature that, when 
people realized that their participation is not baed on free will, they may turn to violence as 
they think it is the only means they can resist and freely express their opposing political 
views. This led to even more conflict and deeper grievances by locals as noted in the 
hypothesis. 
 
Implications for the literature 
 
 In this thesis we draw attention to the relationship between conflict and political 
participation by examining the case of conflict and violence in the Deep South of Thailand. 
We started the study by examining the general concept and definition of political 
participation and found that it is relatively vague and varies widely in usage and meaning: 
there is no consensus on the meaning of political participation. A similar political activity can 
be considered differently in the various theoretical concepts. For example, according to the 
definition of Huntington and Nelson (1976: 4-7), political participation can include any 
activity, whether legal or not, that is “designed to influence governmental decision-making” 
(Huntington and Nelson 1976: 4). Thus, illegal acts, such as insurgent violence, can be 
considered as one type of participation, according to their definition.  Verba, Nie, and Kim 
(1978: 46) defined political participation in a more narrow way. They argued that political 
participation should only include “those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less 
directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or actions that they 
take.” So, according to Verba, Nie, and Kim, insurgent violence is not political participation 




If we limit a study on political participation to only legal participation, we would not 
be able to see whether illegal political participation could impact other types of participation, 
and vice versa. Based on this study, insurgent violence is partly caused by the limitation of 
legal political participation in the conflict areas. When legal channels of participation do not 
open for Malay-Muslims to make their demands, people look for other choices. Some might 
then choose to participate illegally to make demands on the Thai state. On the other hand, 
insurgent violence can generate more participation in conflict areas. It creates a greater desire 
for people to be more active in politics through peaceful means as they seek to reduce 
suffering from the insurgent violence. 
 Moreover, there are some types of political participation where people are forced to 
participate involuntarily without aiming at influencing government policies. Involuntary 
participation is not included in the definition of political participation of a number of 
academics (Huntington and Nelson 1976, Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, and Traut and Emmert 
1993), because this kind of participation is not a person’s choice and may not tell us anything 
about participation. However, the study found that involuntary participation is important as it 
greatly impacted on voluntary participation. If we do not consider forced participation, we 
may overlook how negative experiences from participation forced by state authorities 
threaten people and cause them to avoid participating voluntarily through other forms. And 
we may not realize how those subjected to involuntary participation transform negative 
experiences from being forced to participate into a motive for more positive voluntary 
participation. 
This thesis also investigated factors influencing political participation during conflict. 
Based on this study, we found that there are multiple factors influencing political 
participation. For non conflict areas, the “resource model” or “standard SES model” 




1995) that argued individuals with high socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in 
politics than individuals with low levels of socioeconomic status seemed to be accurate. 
When looking at political participation through elections in Ranot and Sathing Phra districts 
of Songkhla where the areas were among the poorest districts of the province, the data 
showed they had the lowest voter turnout in the province (see Figure 4-15). However, the 
standard SES model cannot explain the high level of political participation of people in the 
conflict areas that had low education. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, women’s 
political participation through civil society in conflict areas of the Deep South provided 
evidence against the SES model. In spite of an increasing level of female education in the 
Deep South, (See Figure 6-2), a number of women in the Deep South who took part in civil 
society activities were poor and could not afford to study, such as the two female civil society 
activists, Yaenah and Som, who were discussed in Chapter 6. 
The life cycle model (Milbrath 1965, Glenn and Grimes 1968, Nie, Verba, and Kim 
1974, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Jennings and Markus 1988), posits that political 
participation generally increases with age, but with the young and the old less likely to 
engage in the community. Based on the work in this thesis, we found that the explanation of 
the life cycle model and the case study in this thesis to some extent, do not match. Political 
participation in the Deep South showed political activeness of the younger generation 
beginning before the re-emergence of conflict and violence in 2004, as discussed in Chapter 
3, and participation of the youth has increased and expanded through many student groups’ 
activities from then to now, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
Trust in the political system also impacts the desire for political participation. As 
Nelson (1979: 1027) mentioned, individuals with high levels of trust in the political system 
tend to participate less than those individuals who have a lower level of trust. He explained 




is in good hands with trusted officials. In the Deep South, cultivating trustworthiness in the 
midst of conflict areas is difficult. Based on the study, we found that it is not trust that 
motivated Malay-Muslims to participate in the Thai political system; instead, it is the feeling 
of distrust that motivated them to participate in Thai politics, violently and non-violently.  
Distrust is one of the most vital factors that can either encourage or discourage participation 
in a community. However, in conflict areas, distrust means participation, when it occurs, 
becomes personalized. Based on this study, local people have trust in some state authorities, 
but not in state institutions. When trusted officials move to other areas, trust goes with them. 
Officials transferring in then need to build new relationships. When institutional trust is not 
created, we can expect lower and inconsistent participation. 
As discussed in previous chapters, due to the long history of the fight between the 
Malay-Muslims and Thai state, the Thai government always had suspicions of the Malay-
Muslims. Since the Thai state lacked trust in Malay-Muslims, they were deprived from 
working in administrative positions in the Far South and their political representatives were 
more or less ignored in the Thai parliament. Moreover, the close surveillance and aggressive 
actions by the Thai state and its officials towards the Malay-Muslims destroyed 
trustworthiness in the Thai political system. Based on this study, the distrust in the Thai 
political system can also lead to political participation in a community. The high voter 
turnout in conflict areas, as discussed in Chapter 4, is evidence of this. Political participation 
through election seems to be the simplest way to respond to distrust. As the past voter turnout 
demonstrated, people in conflict areas in southern Thailand went to vote at a higher level than 
people in other areas without conflict. Moreover, the study showed there are relationships 
between level of conflict and violence and political participation through elections (see 
Figure 4-3, Figure 4-5, and Figure 4-6). So, in the high violence conflict areas where distrust 




The prolonged conflict in southern Thailand has worn away social trust and unity and 
the coercive regime of the Thai state has suppressed participation. This condition can expand 
conflict and violence. The remoteness and distrust of the Thai state opened the opportunity 
for the militants to intervene and draw in more Malay-Muslims to join the insurgency.  
 Many scholars also pay attention to the relationship between culture, ethnicity and 
political participation (Wilson and Banfield 1971, Greeley 1974, Nelson 1979, Miller, Gurin, 
Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981, Lien 1994, Wrinkle et.al 1996, and Albritton and Denton 2008). 
They believed that cultural and ethnic identifications influence political participation to a 
significant degree. The feeling of shared identity creates a connection between members of an 
ethnic community and that connection shapes political participation. Based on the study, we 
found that evidence from the Deep South of Thailand significantly supported this conception. 
The Malay-Muslims have a long history of fighting to preserve their ethnic identity. When 
the Thai government promoted assimilation policies that exacerbated the conception of Thai-
self and other-selves, Malay-Muslims considered the assimilation policies as a direct attack 
on their religious, linguistic and cultural identity. While some minorities in the country 
decided to yield, the Malay-Muslims in the southern border provinces of Thailand chose not 
to act according to the government’s instructions on integration policy. They opposed these 
policies in different ways to protect their heritage and ethnicity. As discussed throughout the 
thesis, some joined separatist groups, some participated by voting to have their Malay-
Muslim representatives in the Thai parliament, some ran for election to take part in the state 
making decision process, and some participated in civil society activities to call for their 
rights. So, in this case, the two variables, ethnicity and political participation, are related to 
each other. The feeling of shared identity and shared grievances increased the desire to 




 Among the factors mentioned earlier, the thesis found that political participation of 
people in conflict areas is motivated significantly by their experiences of conflict and 
violence. The relationship between political participation and the experiences of conflict and 
violence in the Deep South of Thailand is in accord with the results of the study in Sierra 
Leone by John Bellows and Edward Miguel (2006) and in Uganda by Chris Blattman (2009).  
Both studies agreed that negative experiences from conflict increased political awareness and 
participation. Victims of conflict are more likely to participate in voting and community 
meetings. In the Deep South of Thailand, the thesis found that if we look within the high 
violence conflict areas, there is a relationship between level of political participation through 
elections and levels of conflict and violence: The more frequent the violent incidents, the 
higher the level of voter turnout. A desire to participate is not always the immediate result, it 
arises at later stages from unfavorable experiences (Mezey 1975: 508). Based on the study, 
there are a number of Malay-Muslims who did not have experience or interest in political 
activities, but experiences of conflict and violence motivated them to be more interested and 
to participate in politics. As discussed in Chapter 6, many Malay-Muslim youth and women, 
who had negative experiences from violent incidents and forced participation, decided to 
participate in CSO activities as both activists and participants to help those in their 
communities who experienced the same fate. One example is the case of Anchana Heemmina 
and Pattama Heemmina, who were local entrepreneurs from Saba Yoi district of Songkhla 
province and had no interest in political activities. The accumulated experiences from 
involuntary participation during the conflict changed and, at the same time, developed, their 






The conflict in the Deep South of Thailand has lasted longer than the oldest living 
Thai in the region and has not been inflamed by one single factor but by multiple causes such 
as historical grievances, religious differences, social and economic marginalization, the 
injustice of the political system, and limited political expression. In the midst of conflict, 
frightened people often avoid risky behaviors because fear “heightens the desire for security” 
(Peterson 2002: 68). As a result, some people are too fearful to participate in any political 
activities; some distrust the state and prefer to close their eyes to politics, especially on any 
issue related to the conflict.  
However, the same grievances can lead to the opposite reaction. As Oskars Thoms 
and Ron James (2007) mentioned, denial of political participation is linked to internal 
conflict. Abuses of rights such as inequality in accessing basic needs or to political 
participation can be recognized as “direct conflict triggers” that lead to conflict emergence 
and escalation (Thoms and James 2007: 704). This condition, on the one hand, can expand 
conflict and violence. On the other hand, it pushes people to be more active in politics 
through peaceful means as they seek to alleviate suffering from the violence.  The same 
factors that lead to conflict can also be a pathway leading more people to peaceful political 
participation. As Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson (2009: 94) noted, “the greater the 
level of participation by all political communities and domestic constituencies, the higher the 
likelihood that certain problems can be alleviated before they turn into serious and 







Implications for Thai politics 
  
 The thesis suggests several important implications for Thai politics in regard to the 
ongoing conflict and violence in the Deep South of Thailand. 
 A first implication is that the level of political participation greatly depends on the 
level of threats and incentives. Living in the midst of conflict and violence causes both risks 
and incentives that influence different levels of participation of people in conflict areas, as 
shown in figure 7-1. 
 










































The risk and incentive chart shown in Figure 7-1 is based on the comparative study 
among the non violence, low violence, and high violence conflict areas of the study in this 
thesis. The risks in this study can be divided into two types, which are risks from insurgents, 
such as violent incidents and being threatened by militant groups, and risks from the state, 
such as coming under suspicion as a suspected insurgent, or extrajudicial killings. Incentives 
refer to a number of positive things that encourage a person to participate. Incentives are, for 
example, a decrease of violent incidents, community development, financial compensation, 
and justice. 
Quadrant A, high risk and low incentive in figure 7-1, is the worst case scenario of the 
political participation matrix. High risks make people feel afraid and unsafe to participate in 
political activities. Under the condition of high risks, if people do not perceive strong 
incentives for participation or do not think participating is worth taking risks, political 
participation does not occur. We cannot expect political participation of people with high 
risks and low incentives to reach a higher level, unless either risks are lower or incentives are 
higher or both. Political participation is facilitated under other conditions in the following 
quadrants, which will be explained below in Quadrant B, C, and D.  
Quadrant B, low risks and low incentives in Figure 7-1, represents political 
participation in Ranot and Sathing Phra districts, non violence conflict areas of Songkhla 
province. Overall, people in Ranot and Sathing Phra have low threats from the conflict and 
violence in local disputes, and they are not directly affected by violent incidents in the Deep 
South. Since the threats of participation are lower than in the conflict areas, incentives to 
participate in public activities then may not be strong enough to create motivation to 





As discussed in Chapter 4, as a result of having low incentives, most voters, 
especially those working in other provinces, perceived it not worthwhile to go back home to 
vote, except in local level elections where incentives might be higher. Voter turnouts in Ranot 
and Sathing Phra districts showed lower rates than those in Chana and Thepha districts, the 
low violence conflict areas in the same province. People in non violence conflict areas not 
only had low participation rates in elections, but also, as discussed in Chapter 5, voluntary 
participation through the state was short-term and mostly done on a one-off basis. Similarly, 
political participation in civil society also showed lower levels than in conflict areas; as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 6, most civil society groups in Ranot and Sathing Phra were 
loosely formed to achieve a single objective. When a problem is solved, political 
participation regularly decreases or is discontinued. 
Quadrant C, high risk and high incentive in figure 1, fits the high violence conflict 
areas of Mueang Pattani and other high violence conflict areas in the Deep South. Living in 
the conflict areas unavoidably led to high risks for political participation. Based on the study, 
the conflict and violence that increased risks for local people to participate could also lead to 
high incentives, in which people had a strong desire to participate peacefully to stop the 
violence.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the study found that the ongoing conflict and violence did 
not weaken political participation of voters in national elections. On the contrary, the conflict 
and violence triggered more participation and enhanced the degree of political participation in 
the conflict areas of the Lower South. As shown in Chapter 4, voter turnouts in national 
elections in the Deep South since the emergence of violence in 2004 were higher than the 
national average in most elections. Political participation through elections is not only the 
simplest means of participation, but also the risks of voting are lower than other types of 




political standpoints though their choice of voting. However, since people in the conflict 
areas still had to face high risks from violent incidents, as sporadically occurred on election 
days, levels of participation through voting were not as high as in low violence conflict areas, 
where the risks are lower. 
In contrast, voter turnouts in senate elections in the high violence conflict areas were 
not as high as in national elections. As shown in Figure 4-7, although voter turnouts of Senate 
elections in the Deep South were higher than the national average, the data shows a 
decreasing trend of participation in senate elections. This means that incentives for voting can 
be decreased when voters in the conflict areas believed, under a less democratic election, that 
their votes could not bring much change to the community. Under this condition, we can 
expect lower participation if incentives are decreased. When the incentives are low, there is a 
possibility that levels of political participation can move from Quadrant C to Quadrant A, 
high risks and low incentives, the worst case in the matrix. This means that voters who have 
low incentives to vote, may neglect voting and have no desire to participate. As a result, the 
levels of political participation shift from medium to none.  
Political participation through the state in the high violence conflict areas also showed 
ineffectiveness, as discussed in Chapter 5. The high risks from forced participation and the 
illegitimate justice system decreased Malay-Muslims’ desire to contact the Thai state 
voluntarily. Forced participation resulted in negative experiences with state authorities, such 
as maltreatment during detention and mental suffering from imprisonment. Some people 
tended to avoid participation, if not forced, and some might even turn against the Thai state 
turning to violent actions.  However, high risks from participation through the state also 
increased incentives to participate in other channels. Political participation through civil 
society in the high violence conflict areas is quite high, as discussed in Chapter 6. However, 




Some activities related to security issues, such as promoting Patani self-determination and 
human rights violation campaigns, are prohibited by the military. Despite the high capability 
of CSOs in the Deep South in promoting more participation in the conflict areas, they were 
not able to increase participation for most people to a higher level.  
The D quadrant, low risk and high incentive in Figure 7-1, is the most desirable case 
for political participation. Quadrant D represents low violence conflict areas, Chana and 
Thepha districts of Songkhla. The degree of risks from conflict and violence in Chana and 
Thepha districts is not so much the result of people feeling afraid to participate. However, the 
lower degree of conflict and violence created stronger incentives for villagers to seek to 
protect their community from more violence. Incentives for participation of villagers in 
Chana and Thepha were high enough to motivate them to overcome the risks. With high 
incentives associated with low risks of danger from violent incidents and forced participation, 
people in low violence conflict areas see more opportunities to stop the conflict and violence 
through political participation. Therefore, they participated at a higher level than both the 
areas that did not have a record of violence and the high violence conflict areas of the Deep 
South.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, voters in Chana and Thepha were found to be very active 
in elections, as shown by the high rates of voter turnout in national elections between 2001 
and 2011 (see Figure 4-15 and 4-17). Political participation through the state in low violence 
conflict areas was also high, as stated in Chapter 5. Although the study found that there are 
some disappointments in the performances of state authorities in Chana and Thepha, their 
negative perceptions are not high enough to turn into risk factors. Based on the study, 
involuntary participation caused fewer problems than in high violence conflict areas where 
the degree of suspicion between people and state is higher. Local people feel less fear of 




hesitate to inform state officials when they noticed something unusual; the number of people 
in low violence conflict areas who contacted justice officers to file a civil action was 50% 
higher than the number of civil cases the Court of Justice received in the high violence 
conflict areas of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat (see Figure 5-2). A good relationship with 
state authorities created more incentives of participation as local people perceive a possibility 
of protecting their community through cooperating with state authorities. The lower barriers 
from participation and high incentives to prevent an escalation of violence in their 
community positively affected  an increase of political participation in low violence conflict 
areas. 
However, not every type of participation was at a high level in Chana and Thepha. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, while they participated at a high level in elections and by contacting 
the state, political participation through civil society showed the opposite results. People in 
Chana and Thepha did not have a language barrier in contacting the Thai state themselves. 
They did not need a CSO to act or speak out for them. So, the incentive of participation in 
civil society is lower. In addition, since Chana and Thepha have a low rate of violent 
incidents, the area does not attract many civil society activists. So, incentives of both 
villagers and activists are low. Thus despite the low of risks, people in the low violence 
conflict areas do not participate at the same high rate in some activities where they do not see 
high incentives. 
The thesis shows that the conflict and violence, though considered as threats, in some 
way can increase incentives for political participation of people who suffer from the ongoing 
crisis and would like to see their society change for the better. However, there is higher 
participation in low level violence conflict areas than in high violence conflict areas because 
people in the low violence conflict areas do not have to be afraid of deadly threats from 




they do not have to be too concerned when they go out to cast their ballots or participate in 
public activities. Secondly, due to lower risks and stronger incentives, people in the low 
violence conflict areas accepted the possibility of controlling the violence to protect their 
community from more threats. Lastly, state control of political participation in low violence 
conflict areas was more accepted than in the high violence conflict areas. Unlike the Martial 
Law Act and the Emergency Decree, the Internal Security Act, which was enforced in the 
least violent areas including Chana and Thepha districts of Songkhla, is considered to be the 
most moderate. When more channels of political participation are opened and supported by 
the state, people can participate more freely without fear. When the risks from participation 
are low, we can expect higher participation. 
The study allows us to see the relationships between the levels of risks and incentives 
and the levels of political participation in the conflict areas. The study found that people tend 
to participate at a high level when they have low risks and high incentives.  This means that 
in order to increase participation of people in the high violence conflict areas, which have 
high risks and high incentives, threats needed to be lower. The two types of possible risks in 
the conflict areas, which are risks from insurgents and risks from the state, needed to be taken 
into consideration.  
From past years the Thai state paid more attention to decrease risks from the 
insurgents through violent means without much realization, or intentionally ignore, on the 
fact that risks also came from the state side. Risks from the state in the conflict areas are 
obvious, yet overlook by the Thai state, as discussed in Chapter 5. Despite attempts to 
decrease threats from insurgents for years, the prolonged conflict and violence more or less 
proved a failure on state’s violent policies to eliminate risks from insurgency. Although it is 
undeniable that violent means are necessary for fighting with insurgents, it is not the only 




When people participate within the Thai political system, it means that they turn back on the 
violence. If the state could promote more supportive environment for local people to 
participate, we can expect higher participation.  
A second implication is that in conflict areas, personal trust is important but trust in 
state institutions is the key to national integration.  Although there were attempts by state 
authorities, including security forces, to increase trust and encourage more positive 
relationships, as discussed in Chapter 5, individual state officials, no matter how effective 
they are, cannot really change things. In conflict areas, trust and participation depends on 
personal relationships with state officials rather than on trust in the Thai state. This means 
that whenever a state official is transferred, trust and participation disappears because the 
institutional face of the state is not trusted, just some of its individual members. When local 
people do not trust state institutions, they do not voluntarily participate.  
Even though the security policy towards the Deep South gradually changed to accept 
more openness to public hearings and participation, the problem of trust still exists.  The state 
security agencies gradually realized the importance of political participation and wanted to 
promote political participation of all parties in order to gain more support from the local. 
Thus political participation is nowadays more often described as an indicator of state policy 
effectiveness. Even though the Thai government nowadays provides many channels of 
political participation to the Malay-Muslims, the political participation in a conflict area is 
still restricted by the state’s close watch and tight control under the application of Martial 
law. Therefore, although the state’s policy gradually changed to be more positive to 
participation, due to the feeling of suspicion and distrust and the concern for national 
security, the Thai state still centralizes its power and control of participation of Malay-




Ultimately, we found that trust, or a lack of trust, is the most important underlying 
issue of the conflict. Lack of trust in the conflict areas is one of the fundamental problems 
this makes it difficult for the Thai state to implement its policies successfully in the Deep 
South. So, unless the problem of trust is resolved, voluntary participation through the state 
and civil society, especially in the high violence conflict areas would be difficult to develop. 
To build trust in the state as an institution takes time, especially in the conflict areas, but it is 
not an impossible goal. The roles of the SBPAC in the Deep South can be a good example of 
a successful case.  
Unlike other military-run centers, the SBPAC applied peaceful strategies to deal with 
local grievances and promote political participation of local people. The SBPAC board and 
its staff comprise many locals, both Thai-Buddhists and Malay-Muslims, from different 
backgrounds, who have a better understanding of in culture and grievances of Malay-
Muslims in the Deep South. For non-Malay staff, the SBPAC provided training to increase 
knowledge and understanding of Malay-Muslim culture and language before posting them in 
conflict areas. Moreover, although the structure of the institution sometimes changed when 
the government changed, the major policy that focusing on promoting political participation 
continued. Regular seminars for Malay-Muslims to share their grievances and exchange their 
opinions with government agencies are arranged. Conferences with CSOs in the conflict 
areas are frequently organized. This participation throughout 30 years of its establishment 
creates a bond among the SBPAC, local people, and CSOs. The continuous performance of 
the SBPAC gradually built trust in the institution. When institutional trust is created, political 
participation in the Deep South can be expanded more effectively. If a culture like that in the 






 A third finding is that gender is a crucial factor in political participation, especially in 
Malay-Muslim society. When the roles of Malay-Muslim men are restricted during the 
conflict, many Malay-Muslim women stepped in for the sake of their family and community. 
However, based on the study, most channels of participation seemed to limit participation of 
women. As discussed in Chapter 4, since Thailand first elected MPs in 1933, there has been 
only one female Malay-Muslim politician, Pornpich Pattanakullert, from Narathiwat 
province. After 2004, the re-emergence of violence created high barriers that seemingly made 
it even more difficult for women to win elections. The number of female candidates in the 
general elections decreased (see Figure 4-13). Some Malay-Muslim voters were convinced by 
other candidates that voting for a female candidate was a sin. Since 2005, only one female 
candidate stood in each general election. None of them were elected. 
At the same time, many Malay-Muslims became indirect victims who suffer a lot 
from the loss of their loved ones, due to the prolonged conflict and violence. Even though the 
conflict and violence directly affect them, due to cultural limitations, Malay-Muslim women 
are seldom involved in the violent conflict. However, the situation forced them to participate 
through contacting the state.  They have no choice, but to participate involuntarily for the 
sake of their family. For example, some wives had to take part through the legal system to 
fight for justice for their husbandsm, and some mothers had to contact state authorities for 
financial remedies for the deaths of their sons. Since some Malay-Muslim women cannot 
understand Thai and lack education, they faced many difficulties in contacting the Thai state. 
Apart from voting, political participation through civil society seems to be the only 
real means of voluntary participation for most women. Women are not direct targets of either 
the state or the militants, so that the conflict, in other ways, opens an opportunity for women 
to participate more safely with less fear of state abuses. The risks of political participation for 




from conflict and violence are high. Their grievances turn into strong incentives to 
participate. Having low risks, but high incentives, as shown previously, leads to a high level 
of participation. However, as discussed earlier in Chapter 6, some Malay-Muslim female 
activists faced discriminated in political rights from some conservative Malay-Muslims. 
Some are treated as second class citizens who have lower status than males. This cultural 
barrier limited capabilities of Malay-Muslim women and discouraged women’s participation 
in the public arena. Promoting women’s participation, especially in Muslim communities, 
might be challenging but the increasing roles of female activists in the Deep South proved it 
was not impossible. An increase in women’s participation in the Deep South is reshaping the 
culture so that it is more acceptable for women to have leading roles in society. Women have 
a complex set of capabilities and challenges. They can be seen as strong and submissive, 
effective and harmless. Their non-violent involvement can easily get support and trust from 
both the state and local people. So, female political participation has the potential to draw 
more involvement from other actors in conflict areas. In addition, the vastly expanded role of 
women in participation will be important in the long run, even after the conflict.   
Lastly, the conflict and violence in the Deep South, as devastating as it has been for 
society and many individuals, also created new strengths and abilities in some people. The 
same concerns that lead to violence can also lead to participation; furthermore the violence 
itself acts as another motivation for participation. Based on the study, living in the midst of 
conflict, prolonged grievances and the aggressive policies of a coercive state creates complex 
feelings that cause different reactions through various means of participation. Some chose to 
react violently. When peaceful participation is seemingly ineffective for them, they decided 
to use violent methods to make demands of the Thai state. The conflict and violence, in this 
case, act as a driver for more violence by pushing people to violent actions to fight against the 




However, this study finds that people in the conflict areas of the Deep South do not 
disregard peaceful participation. In contrast, they show a greater desire for political 
participation through many channels. Political participation through voting in most elections 
shows an increasing rate, as discussed in Chapter 4. The study found that there is a 
relationship between level of political participation through elections and levels of conflict 
and violence: the more frequent the violent incidents, the higher the level of voter turnout. 
Political participation through the state may be problematic as local people distrust state 
authorities and vice versa. The negative experiences from forced participation, such as 
participating in security case trials, on the one hand, estranged local people from the state. On 
the other hand, it greatly impacted voluntary participation, and the other way around. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the relationship between local people and national civil servants 
might be poor but at the same time it indirectly strengthened political participation with the 
elected local officials, especially for the grassroots in rural conflict areas where voluntary 
participation gets stymied. 
In the Deep South, illegal and involuntary participation has been an important 
stimulus to meaningful changes because legal and voluntary forms of participation are not 
effective. When people feel that existing channel of participation are not effective, they have 
two choices: give up or find some other way. For the Deep South, their motivation to 
participate is so strong that they just cannot give up easily and violent or peaceful 
participation may be their last hope. 
Political participation through civil society is increasing and expanding to various 
fields, as discussed in Chapter 6. Participation in civil society allows local people who have 
difficulties in participating directly with the state to be able to make their demands to the Thai 
state through civil society organizations. Political participation through civil society works 




study, we found that the expanding roles of CSOs in the Deep South cannot reach the 
grassroots level in rural areas, where people really need assistance from civil society the 
most. Most CSOs are based in urban areas, such as Mueang districts and most participants 
and civil society activists are then concentrated in the urban areas and provided more 
opportunities for the middle class, who can access the activities more easily but needed the 
least help from civil society, to participate. 
The high rates of participation through various channels is a good sign that people 
suffering from the violence do not always resort to violence, or abandon commitment to Thai 
political institutions. Rather many people choose to participate and fight within the Thai 
political system. This study shows that conflict and participation can be linked in a positive 
way, in which conflict and violence leads to a greater desire for meaningful political 
participation and when people participate, it leads to less violence. But somehow, the military 
may perceive this linkage differently. This study finds that the military tried to control 
participation because they probably believe controlling participation can control violence. 
The Thai state controls participation through either bribes or coercion. When political 
participation is controlled by the state, it became illegitimate. Thus political participation that 
is supposed to lead to bottom up policies is still top down and ineffective. When people 
realized that their participation is actually tainted and controlled by the state, they may turn to 
violence as they think it is the only means they can resist and freely express their opposing 
political views. However, there are a number of people in the Deep South, who still 
participate peacefully, despite knowing that participation is undermined by state influence. 
Participation, though leading to national integration, can also be a tool for challenging the 
state control. Some people participate with the state, even when theydo not agree, because by 
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